Naval  War  College 
Student  Library 

No. 

22 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 


PRECEPTS   AND 
JUDGMENTS 


AUTHOR  OF  "THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  WAR" 


WITH    A   SKETCH    OF   THE    MILITARY    CAREER   OF 

MARSHAL    FOCH    BY         \ 
^C,-^^^      I 

MAJOR  AtfGRASSET 

OF   THE   FRENCH   SERVICE 


TRANSLATED   BY   HILAIRE   BELLOC  v  \  %  *t  0  - 

» i 


NEW  YORK 
HENRY   HOLT  AND   COMPANY 

1920 


Printed  in  Great  Britain 
by  Richard  Clay  &  Sons,  Ltd. 


Library 

u 


TRANSLATOR'S   NOTE 

THE  translator  would  like  to  point  out,  though 
the  direction  should  hardly  be  necessary,  that  he 
has  introduced  no  modification,  criticism,  or  even 
elucidation  of  his  original  even  in  a  footnote,  and 
that  the  historical  statements  appearing  especially 
in  the  introductory  sketch  or  study  are  their 
author's  alone.  He  would  further  point  out  that 
such  divergences  from  a  literal  rendering  of  the  text 
as  may  be  observed  are  due  to  nothing  more  than 
the  necessity  of  rendering  modern  French  into 
passably  readable  English.  To  translate  idiomatic 
French  into  idiomatic  English  is  impossible.  The 
most  that  can  be  done  is  a  rendering,  and  even  so 
the  mere  sense  of  the  original  can  only  be  procured 
at  the  expense  of  a  certain  foreign  flavour :  so 
widely  have  the  modes  of  thought  and  expression 

'in  France  and  England  diverged  since  the  eighteenth 

'century. 


I 

• 

I 


CONTENTS 


PACK 

TRANSLATOR'S  NOTE v 

A     SKETCH     OF     THE      MILITARY     CAREER     OF 

MARSHAL   FOCH      .         .        .         t        .        ,        .    .    I 

PRECEPTS 77 

JUDGMENTS     .         .         . 229 


Vll 


PRECEPTS   AND    JUDGMENTS 

A  SKETCH  OF  THE  MILITARY  CAREER  OF 
MARSHAL  FOCH 

BY  MAJOR  A.  GRASSET,  OF  THE  FRENCH 
SERVICE 


FERDINAND  FOCH  was  born  on  the  4th  of  August, 
1851,  at  Tarbes;  his  father  was  at  that  moment 
Secretary-General  to  the  Prefecture.  He  began 
his  schooling  in  a  college  of  that  town,  continued 
it  at  Rodez,  then  at  Polignan  with  the  Jesuits, 
and  ended  at  the  Jesuit  College  of  St.  Michel  at 
Saint-Etienne,  where  his  father  had  been  appointed 
Treasurer  and  Paymaster. 

He  was  studious  and  concentrated  in  his  work, 
and  rather  more  serious  than  his  years  might  allow 
for.  As  he  was  inclined  to  physics  and  history, 
the  Jesuit  fathers  had  determined  to  send  him  to 
the  Polytechnic.  In  1869  they  sent  him  to  Metz, 
to  their  celebrated  establishment  of  Saint  Clement 
in  that  town ;  and  there  he  passed  one  year  coaching 
for  the  examination. 

The  Franco-Prussian  war  broke  out  before  this 
year  was  over,  and  young  Foch,  who  had  every 
prospect  of  success  in  the  entrance  competition, 
enlisted  as  a  volunteer;  but  the  armistice  came 
before  he  had  completed  his  training  in  depot, 
and  before  he  could  do  anything  for  his  country, 
he  witnessed  the  disaster.  His  vocation  for  the 
B 


2  PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

Army  was  not  affected;  but  he  understood  now 
that  enthusiasm  and  faith  are  not  enough  to  secure 
victory ;  that  science  must  be  added.  And  without 
losing  a  moment  he  returned  to  his  work. 

The  College  of  Saint  Clement  at  Metz  was  occupied 
by  the  German  soldiery,  who  filled  its  courts  and 
corridors.  Nancy,  where  his  entrance  examination 
for  the  Polytechnic  was  held,  the  old  capital  of 
Lorraine,  was  the  headquarters  of  Manteuffel,  and 
the  Stanislas  Square  echoed  every  evening  with  the 
sound  of  the  German  marching  and  with  their  bugle 
calls.  Every  evening,  as  he  came  in  after  the 
day's  examination  work,  Ferdinand  Foch  looked 
out  upon  those  scenes ;  and  he  never  forgot  them. 

On  the  ist  of  November,  1871,  he  entered  the 
Polytechnic  School.  In  1873  he  was  at  Fontaine- 
bleau ;  in  1875,  Lieutenant  in  the  24th  of  Artillery 
at  Tarbes.  As  he  was  keen  upon  horsemanship, 
he  entered  Saumur  in  1877;  he  became  Captain 
in  the  loth  Regiment  of  Artillery  at  Rennes,  in 
1878,  and  entered  the  School  of  War  in  1885.  He 
was  attached  to  the  Staff  of  the  Montpellier  Division 
up  to  1891,  in  which  year  he  reached  the  rank  of 
Major,  and  was  summoned  to  the  3rd  Bureau  of 
the  General  Staff  of  the  Army.  After  commanding 
a  group  of  mounted  batteries  of  the  I3th  Regiment 
of  Artillery  at  Vincennes,  he  was  recalled,  in  1894, 
to  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army,  and  finally  ap- 
pointed, on  the  3ist  of  October,  1895.  Supplementary 
Professor  of  Military  History,  Strategy  and  Tactics. 
In  1896  he  received  his  promotion  as  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  and  the  full  title  of  Professor. 

Colonel  Foch's  lectures  produced  a  profound  im- 
pression on  all  the  officers  who  were  privileged  to 
hear  them.  The  man  had  personal  magnetism. 
He  was  clean-cut  in  figure  and  careful  in  manner. 
"  He  struck  every  one,"  says  a  witness  of  this 
phase  in  his  career,  "  by  the  mixture  of  energy  with 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS  3 

calm  and  directness  in  his  expression.  He  spoke 
without  gestures,  with  authority  and  conviction, 
in  a  grave,  somewhat  monotonous  voice,  invariably 
appealing  to  logical  process,  and  even  having 
recourse  to  mathematical  metaphors.  He  was 
sometimes  difficult  to  follow  through  the  exuberant 
wealth  of  idea  that  lay  behind  his  words,  but  he 
held  one's  attention  by  the  depth  of  his  views  as 
much  as  by  the  sincerity  of  his  accent." 

These  lectures,  which  trained  several  generations 
of  officers  of  the  Staff,  are  contained  in  two  books, 
The  Conduct  of  War  and  The  Principles  of  War. 
The  leading  ideas  which  appear  in  these  treatises 
are  simple  and  illuminating.  In  their  largest  lines 
they  are  somewhat  as  follows — 

War,  as  Napoleon  said,  is  a  simple  art  and  lies 
wholly  in  its  execution. 

Foch  reiterates  this.  The  art  of  war  is  simple, 
in  its  widest  sense,  for  the  most  marvellous  con- 
ceptions of  strategy  are  open  for  any  one  to  under- 
stand, and  are  discussed  every  day  in  general 
conversation.  Yes,  the  art  is  simple  enough  in  its 
conception,  but,  unfortunately,  complicated  in  its 
execution;  for  that  execution  necessitates  the 
accommodation  of  profound  knowledge  in  the 
material  and  moral  means  at  one's  disposal  with  an 
equally  profound  knowledge  of  the  highly  compli- 
cated organization  of  an  army.  The  execution  of 
any  strategical  conception  also  demands  in  the 
general  a  commanding  will,  a  tenacity,  an  energy 
and  a  strength  of  soul  which  no  disaster  can  reduce. 
And  all  these  qualities  must  be  made  in  some 
fashion  to  produce  their  irresistible  effect  upon  the 
mass  of  which  he  is  the  chief.  The  art  of  war,  there- 
fore, simple  though  it  be  in  theory,  is,  in  practice, 
accessible  to  but  a  very  small  number  of  men. 

What  are  the  steps  by  which  one  may  initiate 
oneself  in  this  art  ? 


4  PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

First  of  all,  the  soldier  must  appreciate  the  great- 
ness of  his  task  and  rise  to  it ;  he  must  train  himself 
to  think  in  terms  of  his  business,  and  to  reach  that 
state  of  mind  the  best  thing  is,  obviously,  to  have 
experience. 

Now  it  is  not  possible  to  obtain  experience  with- 
out actually  malting  war,  and,  moreover,  without 
making  war  continually. 

But  this  would  seem  impossible,  for  war  is  of 
its  nature  no  more  than  a  violent  crisis,  and, 
normally,  a  temporary  one. 

Yet  there  are  two  other  means  of  acquiring 
experience. 

First  the  study  of  history,  the  consideration  of 
events  that  have  taken  place  in  war,  and  of  the 
campaigns  of  the  great  captains.  It  was  upon 
these  lines  that  Napoleon  trained  himself. 

Secondly,  there  is  the  study  of  concrete  cases; 
that  is,  of  problems  based  upon  realities  as  opposed 
to  deduct  ve  abstractions.  Here  is  a  particular 
known  piece  of  ground,  a  general  situation  which 
can  be  denned;  a  body  of  troops  of  which  the 
material  and  moral  value  are  known;  here  is  a 
definite  order  given  to  these  troops.  Given  all 
these  data,  the  object  of  one's  study  consists  in 
discovering  how,  in  such  circumstances,  one  may 
reach  a  decision  through  action,  for  which  decision 
reasons  can  be  given.  And  the  role  of  the  pro- 
fessor is  this  :  to  appeal  continually  to  the  common 
sense  and  intelligence  of  his  pupils  until  he  has 
created  in  them  the  habit  of  treating  all  questions 
in  one  spirit ;  he  will  then  have  brought  into  being 
a  unity  of  doctrine  which,  in  the  moment  of  need, 
when  every  executant  has  to  act  on  his  own  full 
initiative,  will  assure  a  perfect  co-ordination  of 
effort  from  all  those  brains  towards  the  common 
objective  assigned  by  the  higher  command. 

Let  us  suppose  the  soldier,  trained  in  such  a 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS  5 

method  as  the  pupil  of  such  a  teacher,  to  have 
become  a  leader  in  his  turn.  He  finds  himself 
in  the  actual  presence  of  those  formidable  problems 
which  he  had  hitherto  envisaged  only  in  thought; 
how  will  he  solve  those  problems? 

In  the  first  place,  the  leader  must  have  a  plan  of 
operations,  and  this  plan  will  be  directly  dependent 
upon  the  geographical  situation  of  the  belligerents, 
their  separate  customs,  characters  and  power. 
That  plan  has  for  its  object,  of  course,  victory. 
And  because  victory  can  only  be  obtained  by  battle 
and  by  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  forces,  battle 
is  the  one  object  which  the  chief  bears  in  mind  : 
immediate  battle  founded  upon  sudden  attack  if 
the  general  situation  is  in  favour  of  it ;  prolonged 
battle,  awaiting  better  conditions,  if  the  state  of 
one's  forces  demands  such  delay. 

Knowing  what  his  objective  is,  the  chief  must 
eliminate,  in  the  presence  of  reality,  all  hypothesis 
and  even  every  memory  which  might  obscure  his 
vision  of  the  actual  situation  in  front  of  him. 
What  thing  am  I  handling?  What  is  the  thing  I 
have  to  deal  with?  That  is  the  first  question  he 
must  set  out  to  answer. 

Now  that  question  is  a  terribly  complicated  one. 
The  unknown  is  the  very  essence  of  war.  Where 
does  the  enemy  stand?  What  is  his  strength? 
What  are  his  intentions? 

There  is  only  one  way  in  which  to  answer  those 
questions,  and  they  will  always  be  answered  most 
imperfectly.  That  way  is  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy 
in  every  possible  fashion  :  to  complete  one's  informa- 
tion. 

This  done,  the  general  must  act  upon  the  precise 
information  he  has  obtained,  and  not  upon  pre- 
conceived ideas  or  upon  hypotheses,  which  very 
rarely  correspond  with  reality,  however  logically 
one  may  have  framed  them.  Put  thus,  this  way 


6  PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

of  acting  seems  so  natural  as  to  be  almost  childishly 
simple;  it  is  none  the  less  very  difficult  to  realize 
in  practice,  and  the  proof  is  that  Moltke  himself 
never  learned  to  carry  it  out. 

For  we  must  appreciate  that  it  is  not  enough 
for  the  various  organs  of  intelligence  to  gather 
precise  information,  difficult  as  that  task  is;  it  is 
further  necessary  that  such  information  should 
reach  the  chief  in  time  to  be  used — that  is,  not  too 
late  for  him  to  act  freely  :  not  too  late  for  him  to 
accept  or  to  provoke  a  combat  if  it  is  presented 
to  him  in  good  conditions,  or  to  refuse  it  if  the 
conditions  are  unfavourable. 

The  instrument  guaranteeing  such  liberty  of 
action,  the  instrument  which  Napoleon  used  and 
which  Moltke  never  managed  to  restore,  was  and 
is  the  General  Advance  Guard. 

Seeing  the  great  masses  which  are  brought  into 
action  to-day,  if  they  are  to  collaborate  in  time  for 
battle,  this  Advance  Guard  should  be  strong  enough 
to  fix  the  enemy,  once  he  is  in  contact  with  one's 
cavalry,  and  oblige  him  to  premature  deployment, 
which  will  betray,  if  he  is  not  very  careful,  the 
strength  of  his  forces;  which  will  disorganize  him 
and  leave  him  in  bad  condition  for  manoeuvring 
the  bulk  of  his  army. 

That  the  succeeding  events  of  the  action  should 
develop  according  to  the  will  of  the  chief,  he  must 
make  his  intentions  clear  to  his  subordinates. 
"  Command  "  never  yet  meant  "  obscurity."  When 
every  one  has  been  given  his  direction,  each  in  his 
own  sphere  collaborates  in  the  common  work. 
Each  feels  that  a  part  of  the  general  responsibility 
is  upon  him,  each  feels  that  the  success  of  the  man- 
oeuvre in  hand  in  part  depends  upon  his  own  effort, 
and  this  because  each  knows  what  the  general  task  is. 

The  commander  cannot  think  for  every  one;  he 
cannot  immix  himself  in  all  details ;  he  cannot  lead 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS  7 

every  executant  by  the  hand :  armies  are  not 
manoeuvred  like  pieces  upon  a  chess-board. 

We  begin,  then,  with  a  doctrine  ;  that  is,  a  common 
conception  of  war.  All  the  brains  at  work  are 
trained  and  have  a  common  way  of  approaching 
the  problems  they  have  to  solve.  The  data  of  a 
problem  being  known,  each  will  solve  it  after  his 
own  manner,  but  these  thousand  separate  manners 
will  harmoniously  diverge  towards  the  common 
end. 

Now  suppose  action  engaged.  A  leader  worthy 
of  the  name  will,  under  all  circumstances,  avoid  the 
parallel  battle.  In  this  two  armies  are  drawn  up  in 
two  ever-extending  lines  facing  each  other.  In  such 
a  battle  the  result,  of  necessity,  depends  upon  the 
mere  valour  or  ability  of  the  soldiers;  it  is  at  the 
mercy  of  any  incident,  as  of  a  local  panic,  and 
the  General  commanding  is  deprived  of  all  means  of 
action.  He  has  abdicated  his  function  through 
ignorance  or  sloth,  and  can  do  nothing  to  master 
his  fate. 

True  battle  is  the  battle  of  manoeuvre  in  which, 
thanks  to  the  forces  which  the  commander  has 
reserved  and  constituted  in  such  time  that  they 
can  be  usefully  employed,  thanks  also  to  the 
judicious  application  of  that  fruitful  principle 
"  the  economy  of  forces,"  it  is  he,  and  he  alone, 
who  will  preside  over  the  various  phases  of  the 
struggle,  and  will  at  last  be  definitely  the  master 
of  its  decision.  Where  he  chooses  and  when  he 
chooses  he  will  launch  the  decisive  attack  which  is 
the  expression  of  his  will,  and  which  alone  gives 
victory.  ' 

Battle  is  the  supreme  act  of  war.  It  should, 
therefore,  be  kept  in  hand  fully  and  thoroughly 
without  room  for  hesitation.  All  should  take  part 
in  it  with  all  their  strength  and  with  all  the  means 
at  their  disposal.  Therefore,  in  the  supreme  act, 


8  PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

there  should  be  no  strategic  reserve;  there  should 
be  no  important  bodies  left  in  the  rear  inactive 
and  wasted  while  the  fate  of  the  war  is  decided. 

Above  all,  this  tremendous  drama  demands  of 
each  one  of  us  not  only  the  complete  sacrifice 
of  himself  but  the  very  maximum  of  effort  and 
endurance;  he  must  clearly  appreciate  that  there 
will  come,  almost  fatally,  a  certain  moment  of 
crisis  when  the  nerves  of  a  force  will  be  strained 
to  their  utmost,  when  human  capacity  will  seem 
to  have  reached  its  limit,  and  when  the  dangers 
and  obstacles  present  will  appear  insurmountable. 
That  is  the  moment  when  we  must  fall  back  upon 
the  conception  that  spirit  always  dominates  matter ; 
that  in  spite  of  the  most  crushing  weight  of  apparent 
circumstance,  in  spite  of  the  most  formidable 
effects  of  the  most  modern  instruments  of  de- 
struction, it  is  always  (in  the  long  run)  the  moral 
effort  which  triumphs  over  the  material  one.  It 
is  always  the  spiritual  side  which  impresses  the 
whole. 

Victory  resides  in  the  will,  and  a  battle  won  is 
a  battle  in  which  one  has  not  admitted  oneself 
defeated. 

Victory  always  comes  to  those  who  merit  it  by 
their  greater  strength  of  will  and  of  intelligence. 

But  this  unshakable  determination  on  the  part 
of  the  Chief  to  achieve  victory,  all  the  enthusiasm 
and  all  the  faith  which  he  himself  may  possess, 
would  be  sterile  if  he  could  not  communicate  them 
in  their  entirety  to  the  souls  of  his  soldiers.  "  For 
an  army  is  to  its  commander  what  a  sword  is  to  a 
man;  it  has  no  value  save  through  the  impulsion 
which  its  bearer  gives  it.  It  is  the  influence  of 
the  Command,  through  the  enthusiasm  it  com- 
municates, that  explains  those  sub-conscious  move- 
ments in  a  human  mass  during  those  grave  moments 
when,  without  knowing  why,  the  army  opens  up 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS  9 

the  field  of  battle  and  feels  itself  carried  forward 
as  though  it  were  charging  down  a  slope." 

Let  there  be  no  error  on  this  point :  "  Generals, 
not  soldiers,  win  battles;  and  a  general  who  has 
been  defeated  is  one  who  has  not  understood  the 
task  of  leadership."  The  man  who  wrote  this  was 
not  Marshal  Foch,  the  victor  of  the  Marne,  of  the 
Yser  and  the  Battle  of  France  in  1918;  it  was 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Foch  who  signed  that  challenging 
definition  in  1898. 

There  is  no  conception  more  simple  nor  any  in 
execution  more  terribly  difficult  than  this,  which  is 
the  very  art  of  war  :  to  learn  the  enemy's  situation, 
to  think  matters  out,  and  to  will. 

To  understand  the  difficulty  of  this  business  of 
"  willing,"  of  "  knowing  how  to  will  " — to  get  a 
fairly  clear  idea  of  it — it  is  worth  remembering  that 
the  lives  of  many  thousand  men  and  the  future  of 
a  whole  country  are  often  bound  up  in  the  result 
of  one  battle.  Remembering  this,  one  can  guess 
what  strength  of  soul  is  required  in  a  man  of  warm 
emotion — a  strong  patriot — that  he  should  dare  to 
risk  a  decision.  That  is  why  the  great  Captains  of 
history  bear  the  names  of  Alexander,  Caesar,  Han- 
nibal and  Napoleon.  That  is  why,  in  twenty 
centuries,  we  have  only  produced  a  half-dozen  of 
them. 

Foch  was  a  man  of  such  emotion,  of  such  faith, 
and  of  such  sense  of  duty.  He  made  it  his  busi- 
ness to  impress  upon  his  pupils  by  what  means  the 
spiritual  forces  of  an  army  might  be  indefinitely 
increased  and  rendered  capable  of  passing  the 
supreme  test.  He  said :  "  In  our  time,  which 
thinks  it  can  do  without  ideals,  that  it  can  reject 
what  it  calls  abstractions,  and  nourish  itself  on 
realism,  rationalism  and  positivism;  which  thinks 
it  can  reduce  all  questions  to  matters  of  science 
or  to  the  employing  of  more  or  less  ingenious 


10          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

expedients ;  at  such  a  time,  I  say,  there  is  but  one 
resource  if  you  are  to  avoid  disaster,  and  only  one 
which  will  make  you  certain  of  what  course  to 
hold  upon  a  given  day.  It  is  the  worship — to  the 
exclusion  of  all  others — of  two  Ideas  in  the  field  of 
morals :  duty  and  discipline.  And  that  worship 
further  needs,  if  it  is  to  bear  fruit  and  produce 
results,  knowledge  and  reason." 

Foch  himself  had  yet  another  resource,  of  which 
he  only  spoke  once,  and  that  lately,  for  he  knew 
that  it  was  not  obtainable  at  will.  "  They  are 
blessed,"  he  said  one  day,  "  who  are  born  be- 
lievers; but  they  are  rare  ..."  and  he  suggested 
to  his  audience  that  faith  also  is  a  matter  of  will, 
as  is  strength,  and  as  is  instruction. 

In  1900,  General  Bonnal  succeeded  General 
Langlois  as  Commander  of  the  School  of  War.  We 
have  already  said  that  Colonel  Foch  was  a  believer  : 
he  stood  utterly  outside  the  political  game ;  he  was 
entirely  absorbed  by  his  great  duties  as  a  soldier. 
His  feelings  upon  this  matter  were  too  deep  and 
his  emotion  too  noble  to  permit  him,  for  any  motive 
whatsoever,  to  consider  even  for  a  moment  the 
admission  of  any  constraint,  however  small,  upon 
his  religious  practice. 

The  period  was  a  troubled  one.  A  brother  of 
the  Colonel  was  a  Jesuit.  There  were  some  who 
took  alarm  at  that.  There  were  some  who  thought 
it  impossible  to  allow  so  ardent  a  Catholic  to  have 
the  mission  of  training  the  officers  of  the  General 
Staff.  In  1901  Colonel  Foch  was  sent  back  to 
command  a  regiment.  He  left  the  school  in  good 
heart  and  took  up  garrison  life  again. 

This  eclipse  hurt  his  career  but  did  not  interrupt 
his  work ;  we  may  even  say  that  the  leisure  imposed 
by  it  was  favourable  to  the  growth  and  ripening 
of  those  ideas  which  have  proved  so  fruitful, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          11 

In  1903  he  was  promoted  full  Colonel  and  called 
to  command  of  the  35th  Regiment  of  Artillery  at 
Vannes. 

In  1905  he  was  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  5th 
Army  Corps  at  Orleans.  In  1907  he  was  promoted 
to  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General  and  summoned  to 
the  General  Staff  of  the  Army.  At  that  moment 
General  Bonnal  had  just  left  the  command  of  the . 
School  of  War,  and  the  question  of  his  successor 
was  raised. 

M.  Clemenceau  had  also  at  that  moment  just 
become  Prime  Minister.  He  sent  for  General 
Foch,  and  the  following  conversation  took  place 
between  the  two  men. 

"  I  wish  to  offer  you  the  command  of  the  School 
of  War." 

"  Thank  you;  but  doubtless  you  are  not  ignorant 
that  one  of  my  brothers  is  a  Jesuit  ?  " 

"  I  know  that,  and  I  care  nothing  for  it.  You 
can  make  good  officers,  and  the  rest  is  of  no  account." 

The  next  day,  therefore,  General  Foch  took  on 
the  direction  of  the  School  of  War. 

Convinced  as  he  was  that  "  the  art  of  war " 
(according  to  Napoleon's  expression)  "  is  a  science 
in  which  nothing  succeeds  which  has  not  been 
calculated  and  thoroughly  thought  out " ;  con- 
vinced as  he  also  was  that  to  acquire  that  com- 
plicated science  hard  work  was  even  more  useful 
than  genius,  Foch  had  the  good  fortune  to  make 
people  understand  that  the  two  years'  course  in 
the  School  of  War  in  Paris  could  not  yield  a  result 
comparable  to  the  three  years'  course  of  the  Ger- 
man Staff-training  in  the  War  Academy  of  Berlin. 
In  spite  of  opposition  to  his  scheme,  he  was  allowed, 
by  way  of  experiment,  to  keep  the  fifteen  best 
students  at  the  end  of  their  second  year  for  a  third 
year's  course,  this  third  year  to  be  given  to  the  study 
of  operations  in  an  army  and  a  group  of  armies. 


12          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

This  reform  would  have  been  well  received  if  it 
had  been  applied  to  all  students,  but  the  com- 
promise adopted  caused  the  system  to  be  con- 
demned. The  objection  was  made  that  the  very 
few  officers  chosen  (by  what  was,  after  all,  only 
the  chance  of  an  examination)  to  remain  a  third 
year  in  Paris,  would  find  themselves  at  the  opening 
of  their  career  specially  marked  out  and  designed, 
as  it  were,  to  be  Marshals  —  simply  because  they 
had  been  better  at  lectures  than  the  rest,  or 
because  they  were  more  precocious,  or  because 
they  happened  to  have  a  better  memory  than 
their  comrades,  whose  fundamental  character 
and  abilities  were  perhaps  superior.  Jealousies 
arose  and  a  certain  amount  of  bitterness.  There 
was  also  an  element  of  parliamentary  intrigue. 
In  a  word,  this  reform,  which,  had  it  been  fully 
applied,  would  certainly  have  given  excellent 
results,  broke  down. 

General  Foch,  promoted  to  be  General  of  Division 
in  1911,  was  given  the  command  of  the  i3th 
Division  at  Chaumont  ;  then,  in  1912,  of  the  8th 
Army  Corps,  which  he  left  on  the  23rd  of  August, 
1913,  to  take  up  the  command  of  the  2oth  Army 
Corps  at  Nancy. 

II 

THE  GENERAL  IN  COMMAND 


The  20th  Army  Corps.     Morhange 

WHEN  the  war  broke  out,  it  found  General  Foch 
at  the  head  of  the  advance  guard  covering  the 
frontier. 

The  2Oth  Army  Corps  formed  a  portion  of  the 
army  commanded  by  General  Castelnau.  From 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          13 

the  yth  of  August  the  whole  of  this  army  was  in 
line  ready  for  action,  covering  Nancy;  at  Lune- 
ville  and  Epinal;  facing  Metz  and  Chateau-Salins. 

On  the  I4th  of  August  this  army  took  the  offen- 
sive. The  2Oth  Corps,  which  was  flanked  on  the 
left  by  the  gth  Corps  and  on  the  right  by  the  I5th, 
had  for  its  first  objective  the  heights  that  mark 
the  frontier.  The  Germans  were  strongly  en- 
trenched there.  After  severe  losses  the  resistance 
of  the  enemy  was  overcome,  and  he  retired,  evacu- 
ating Vic,  Moyenvic  and  Chateau-Salins.  He  took 
up  a  new  position  15  kilometres  to  the  north, 
marked  by  the  points  of  Delme,  Morhange  and 
Sarrebourg.  This  position  had  been  organized 
very  strongly  and  very  secretly  for  some  time  past, 
and  was  abundantly  provided  with  machine-guns 
and  heavy  artillery. 

That  modern  heavy  artillery,  of  which  General  Foch 
had  already  foreseen  the  effect  in  battle,  proved  here, 
as  in  Belgium  and  in  Luxemburg  and  in  Alsace, 
the  hidden  and  powerful  ally  of  the  German  in- 
fantry. It  was  a  distant  adversary  whose  blows 
our  soldiers  received  without  being  able  to  reply 
to  them  or  knowing  whence  they  came ;  no  courage 
and  no  cunning  could  stand  against  those  new 
means  of  action. 

On  the  2oth  of  August  the  2oth  Corps,  with  its 
customary  gallantry,  struck  at  the  heights  of 
Marthil,  of  Baronville  and  of  Conthil.  It  had  for 
its  task  the  capture  of  Morhange  and  the  carrying 
of  Benestroff,  the  last  a  nodal  point  of  railways, 
and  therefore  of  capital  importance.  It  was  de- 
fended by  the  army  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria, 
picked  troops,  equal  in  number  to  the  French  and 
with  far  superior  weapons. 

The  losses  were  very  heavy,  all  the  more  so 
because  the  attack  was  so  desperately  pushed. 

On  the  left  the  gth  Corps,  threatened  upon  its 


14          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

flank  by  enemy  forces  which  had  come  out  of  Metz, 
was  checked.  To  the  right  of  it,  in  the  district 
known  as  that  of  "  the  ponds,"  the  i5th  Corps  fell 
back.  This  retirement  uncovered  the  right  flank 
of  the  2oth  Corps,  which  was  thus  exposed  to  the 
blows  of  the  7th  German  Army. 

It  would  have  been  folly  to  have  held  on;  the 
expected  victory  had  to  be  abandoned,  though  every- 
body thought  it  certain,  and  they  retired  upon  the 
Meuse,  which  was  reached  on  the  22nd  of  August. 

The  situation  was  critical.  The  right  of  the 
second  army  would  seem  to  be  out  of  action  for 
some  time;  the  enemy  could,  therefore,  either 
drive  straight  on  to  the  Gap  of  Charmes,  through 
the  unoccupied  gap  which  now  yawned  between 
the  armies  of  General  Dubail  and  General  de  Castel- 
nau,  or,  alternatively,  he  could  bring  all  his  forces 
to  bear  against  Nancy  and  achieve  the  complete 
annihilation  of  the  second  army.  Either  action 
would  have  had  the  very  gravest  consequences. 

The  2oth  Corps  was  tired  out,  and  it  had  suffered 
very  heavy  casualties;  but  it  proved  worthy  of  its 
chief,  and,  with  this  force  alone,  General  Foch 
retired  to  cover  both  Nancy  and  the  Gap  of  Charmes. 

With  this  object  in  view,  he  re-established  his 
troops  in  a  strong  and  central  position  to  the  south 
of  St.  Nicolas,  where  he  would  find  himself  upon 
the  flank  of  either  of  the  two  possible  directions 
by  which  the  German  columns  might  advance. 

On  the  east  he  depended  for  his  information 
upon  the  strong  advance  guard  of  the  nth  Division 
sent  forward  into  the  region  of  Falinval;  on  the 
north  he  similarly  depended  upon  light  infantry, 
which  held  Rambe'tant,  one  of  the  bastions  of  Nancy. 

Of  the  two  alternative  roads,  it  was  that  of  the 
Gap  of  Charmes  which  the  invasion  chose.  Wild 
with  enthusiasm,  the  Germans  drove  through 
Luneville,  exposing  their  right  flank  to  the  20th 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          15 

Corps.  On  the  24th  of  August,  while  the  enemy 
was  striking  against  the  unshakable  resistance 
of  Dubail's  army,  established  upon  the  Meurthe 
river,  General  Foch  received  the  order  to  take  the 
offensive  eastward.  On  that  same  day  the  heights 
of  Sanon  were  carried  :  to  the  north,  the  wood  of 
Crevic,  and  to  the  south,  Flainval.  On  the  morrow 
the  whole  of  de  Castelnau's  army  went  forward. 
Thus,  caught  in  flank  and  pressed  hard  in  front 
for  two  days  by  the  Dubail  army,  the  enemy,  in 
spite  of  his  crushing  numerical  superiority,  hesi- 
tated. He  was  checked  and  halted.  The  invasion 
at  this  point  was  mated.  Nancy  remained  free  and 
the  Germans  never  crossed  the  Meurthe. 


THE  NINTH  ARMY 


MEANWHILE,  very  serious  movements  had  de- 
veloped elsewhere,  and  the  higher  command  had 
need  of  General  Foch  in  another  theatre  of  war. 

Our  armies  had  proved  unable,  on  the  2ist  and 
22nd  of  August,  to  force  the  enemy's  entrench- 
ments in  the  face  of  their  heavy  artillery.  General 
Joffre,  abandoning  ground  wholesale  in  order  to 
gain  in  space  the  time  necessary  to  gather  sufficient 
means  of  resistance,  brought  all  his  armies  south- 
ward, with  the  left  swinging  back  on  to  Paris,  with 
Verdun  as  pivot. 

As  early  as  the  25th  of  August,  in  order  to  pro- 
vide for  the  coming  battle,  he  made  it  his  business 
to  gather,  in  the  region  of  Amiens,  a  new  mass  of 
manoeuvre,  the  6th  Army,  which  he  confided  to 
the  command  of  General  Maunoury,  and  which  the 
development  of  battle  was  destined  to  throw  back 


16          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

under  the  very  walls  of  Paris.  Then,  on  the  2Qth 
of  August,  when  he  saw  that  the  continuation  of 
the  retreat  would  open  a  gap  between  the  armies 
of  Franchet  d'Esperey  and  Langle  de  Gary,  and 
thus  form  a  weak  point  which  the  enemy  would 
try  to  force,  General  Joffre  decided  to  constitute 
in  this  region  a  new  army — the  gth  Army — of  which 
the  Commander  was  to  be  General  Foch. 

Summoned  urgently  to  Chalons,  Foch  arrived  at 
General  Headquarters  on  that  same  day.  He  had 
but  just  given  up  the  2oth  Corps  in  its  moment 
of  victory. 

His  new  army  did  not  yet  exist.  It  had  to  be 
formed.  It  was  to  consist  of  the  nth  Corps  (under 
General  Eydoux),  the  52nd  and  6oth  Divisions  of 
Reserve,  the  Qth  Cavalry  Division :  all  these  units 
had  been  taken  from  the  army  of  Langle  de  Cary, 
which  had  been  retreating  from  Belgium;  there 
was  also  the  42nd  Division  (under  General  Gros- 
setti),  taken  from  the  6th  Corps  of  Sarrail's  army, 
and  therefore  coming  from  Ardennes,  and  the 
9th  Corps  (General  Dubois),  taken  from  the  army 
of  de  Castelnau.  The  duty  falling  upon  General 
Foch  at  this  moment  was  to  gather  these  elements 
together,  though  they  were  in  full  retreat,  to  pro- 
vide them  with  munitions  and  subsistence,  and  to 
make  of  them  one  homogeneous  body  capable  of 
once  more  returning  to  advance  and  attack.  Mean- 
while, he  had  the  further  task  of  thoroughly  seizing 
the  general  situation.  The  time  was  short  and  the 
enemy  now  ardent,  pressing  our  columns  closely. 

There  is  an  order  of  General  Joffre's,  dated  the  1st 
of  September,  which  allows  for  the  holding  of  the 
retreating  armies  upon  the  line  Pont-sur-Yonne- 
Nogent-sur-Seine-Mery-Arcis-sur-Aube.  A  further 
note  on  the  2nd  of  September  goes  so  far  as  to 
envisage  the  abandonment  of  Bar-le-Duc  and 
the  falling  back  of  the  right  as  far  as  Joinville. 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          17 

There  was  left  to  guard  Paris  the  6th  Army,  and 
six  territorial  divisions. 

The  German  General  Staff  was  now  in  this 
quandary.  Should  it  try  to  force  an  entry  into 
Paris,  or,  on  the  contrary,  leave  on  one  side  the 
capital,  the  heart  of  France;  and  devote  all  its 
strength  to  the  destruction  of  the  French  army? 

Paris  is  a  great  entrenched  camp.  If  the  enemy 
had  attacked  it,  he  would  have  had  to  employ  for 
the  carrying  of  it  considerable  forces  which  would, 
therefore,  have  been  lacking  on  the  main  battle- 
field.  But  if  he  neglected  Paris  in  order  to  continue 
his  pursuit  of  the  French  Army,  he  would  neces- 
sarily at  a  given  moment,  as  he  advanced  southward, 
present  his  flank  to  the  army  of  General  Maunoury. 

It  was  the  second  of  these  two  alternatives  which 
took  place,  and  on  the  4th  of  September  the  German 
Army  fell  into  the  trap.  The  army  of  Von  Kluck, 
covering  itself  on  its  right,  towards  Paris,  with  no 
more  than  a  single  army  corps,  turned  to  the 
south-east  with  the  object  of  outflanking  the  army 
of  Franchet  d'Esperey.  At  the  same  time,  the 
armies  of  Bulow  and  Hausen,  a  mass  of  nearly 
300,000  men,  poured  upon  Epernay  and  Chalons 
and  made  for  Sezanne  in  order  to  break  the  French 
front  between  the  armies  of  Franchet  d'Esperey 
and  Langle  de  Gary.  The  German  Higher  Command 
believed  that  it  would  find  in  this  gap  no  elements 
of  sufficient  strength. 

On  the  5th  of  September,  at  midday,  Maunoury's 
army  of  the  6th,  launched  by  the  violent  ardour  of 
Gallieni,  fell  upon  the  flank  of  Von  Kluck,  and 
opened  the  battle  eighteen  hours  too  early,  eighteen 
hours  before  the  moment  chosen  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  which  moment  had  been  fixed  at  six 
o'clock  in  the  morning  of  Wednesday,  the  6th  of 
September.  Orders  were  sent  out  along  the  whole 
line  to  cease  the  retreat,  to  hold  and  to  take  the 
c 


18          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

offensive — Joffre's  final  order  of  the  day  upon  that 
occasion  could  not  be  .read,  in  most  units,  until 
after  the  victory.  General  Foch  transported  his 
headquarters  to  Fleurs,  a  point  from  which  he 
could  easily  overlook  action  towards  Sezanne  and 
La  Fere-Champenoise. 

It  was  his  business  to  stop  three  great  avenues 
of  advance  for  the  enemy  upon  a  front  of  thirty- 
five  thousand  yards ;  the  road  from  (i)  Epernay  to 
Sezanne,  and  (2)  to  La  Fere-Champenoise,  and 
(3)  that  from  Chalons  to  Arcis-sur-Aube.  Further, 
it  was  his  business  to  hold  on  to  the  plateaux  north 
of  Sezanne,  which  offered  a  point  of  resistance  for 
the  right  of  the  Franchet  d'Esperey  army,  and  to 
protect  that  army  against  an  outflanking  move- 
ment. Above  all,  he  had  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  debouching  to  the  south  of  the  marshes  of 
St.  Gond. 

The  42nd  Division  went  up  to  hold  the  heights  of 
Sezanne,  a  special  honour  granted  to  a  body  of 
troops  of  chosen  merit.  The  Moroccan  Division 
of  the  gth  'Corps  held  the  avenues  of  egress  from 
the  marshes  of  St.  Gond.  This  latter  was  a  hard 
task  because  the  marshes  were  then  nearly  dry, 
and  it  was  the  Prussian  Guard  which  had  the  task 
of  attacking.  The  nth  Corps  was  ordered  to  check 
in  the  plain  below  the  German  masses  driving 
forward  from  Chalons.  The  Qth  Cavalry  Division 
covered  the  right  flank  of  the  army  at  the  camp  of 
Mailly. 

All  these  units  combined  could  not  put  into  line 
more  than  70,000  combatants. 

Two  men  to  the  yard  is  little  indeed  to  check  in 
open  country  the  effort  of  300,000  men  who  thought 
themselves  already  victorious.  Napoleon  counted 
five  men  to  the  yard  for  the  delivery  of  an  attack. 
The  Germans  could  here  count  on  ten.  General 
Foch  could  only  hold  at  his  disposal  the  52nd  and 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS          19 

6oth  Divisions  of  Reserve  in  his  attempt  to  turn 
the  approaching  struggle  into  a  battle  of  manoeuvre 
such  as  he  had  himself  taught  and  conceived.  It 
was  a  very  feeble  instrument  for  so  great  a  task. 

On  the  6th  of  September  Foch  was  ordered  to 
support  upon  his  left  the  offensive  of  Franchet 
d'Esperey,  and  all  the  rest  of  his  front  to  hold  the 
enemy  in  order  to  afford  time  for  the  neighbouring 
armies  to  pass  to  the  attack.  Therefore,  on  his  left 
the  42nd  Division,  led  by  the  gallant  Grossetti, 
attacked,  and  the  loth  Army  Corps  clung  to 
Soizy  and  Villeneuve,  which  last  place  was  twice 
lost  and  twice  retaken ;  at  the  end  of  the  struggle 
this  corps  was  still  holding  an  enemy  far  superior 
in  numbers,  and  night  only  put  an  end  to  the 
butchery  upon  that  blood-stained  height,  lit  by 
the  flames  of  the  burning  farms. 

But  on  the  extreme  right  it  had  proved  necessary 
to  send  the  6oth  Reserve  Division  to  support  the 
nth  Corps,  which,  after  being  outflanked  by  two 
German  Corps,  was  retiring.  Thus  uncovered  on 
its  right,  the  gib.  Corps,  which  was  trying  to  hold 
on  the  north  of  the  marshes  of  St.  Gond,  had  to 
retire  in  its  turn,  and  to  be  supported  by  the  52nd 
Division  of  the  Reserve,  in  order  to  hold  the  points 
south  of  the  marshes,  whereby  the  enemy  might 
debouch.  By  this  time  all  the  forces  of  the  gth 
Army  were  engaged  in  a  very  heavy  struggle,  and 
General  Foch  had  no  further  troops  at  his  disposal. 

Nevertheless,  on  the  7th  of  September  his 
general  instructions  remained  the  same  as  they  did 
before.  On  the  left  an  offensive,  which  was  pur- 
sued in  touch  with  the  5th  Army :  everywhere 
else  a  desperate  defensive,  waiting  its  moment  to 
pass  to  the  offensive.  Under  the  bombardment 
of  the  German  heavy  artillery,  the  47th  Division, 
the  52nd  Reserve  Division  and  the  Moroccan 
Division,  far  from  being  able  to  go  forward,  could 


20          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

only  hold  their  positions  at  the  expense  of  heroic 
efforts,  and  the  German  masses  pushed  forward 
in  great  waves,  in  spite  of  very  heavy  losses,  with- 
out respite.  This  storm  did  not  disturb  the  attitude 
of  Foch.  His  common  sense,  which  the  enormity 
of  the  business  seemed  to  render  only  more  clear, 
judged  the  situation  thus : 

"  Since  they  are  trying  to  break  through  here  at 
such  a  price,  it  is  evident  that  their  fortunes  are  going 
ill  elsewhere." 

He  used  these  words  precisely  at  the  moment 
when  the  4th  German  Corps  was  being  withdrawn 
from  the  region  of  Rebais  and  sent  on  to  the  Ourcq 
to  check  the  outflanking  movement  of  Maunoury : 
precisely  at  the  moment  when  the  English  Army, 
disengaged  by  this  retreat,  passed  from  the  defen- 
sive to  the  offensive  in  the  region  of  Coulommiers  : 
at  the  precise  moment  when  the  tide  of  the  invasion 
had  turned. 

It  was  upon  the  8th  of  September,  then,  that 
the  German  Higher  Command  understood  victory 
by  envelopment  to  be  escaping  it.  It  held  on,  and 
still  tried  to  achieve  its  object  by  checking  Mau- 
noury on  the  right,  and  sending  powerful  reinforce- 
ments (so  as  to  burst  through  the  army  of  Foch) 
to  Bulow  and  Hausen.  It  was  an  effort  at  achieving 
a  strategic  rupture,  or  breach  of  the  line,  in  place 
of  the  envelopment  which  had  failed.  Such  a 
rupture  would  have  given  the  Germans  victory  as 
thoroughly  as  would  an  envelopment.  But  that 
attempt  at  a  breach  failed  in  its  turn. 

During  all  that  day,  the  8th  of  September,  the 
struggle  was  continued  with  extreme  violence.  On 
the  left,  Franchet  d'Esperey  disengaged  the  42nd 
Division  by  powerfully  thrusting  forward  the 
whole  of  his  loth  Corps.  But  on  the  right  the 
nth  Corps,  crushed  under  the  weight  of  forces 
double  its  own,  and  broken  by  the  fire  of  the  German 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          21 

heavy  artillery,  was  yielding.  It  had  very  heavy 
losses.  It  abandoned  La  Fere  Champenoise,  and 
the  6oth  Division  retired,  broken,  on  to  Maille. 

In  the  centre  the  Qth  Corps,  which  was  further 
taken  in  reverse,  also  gave  way.  The  Prussian 
Guard  was  very  near  Mondement,  and  if  Monde- 
ment  were  carried  the  gth  Army  would  be  cut  in 
two.  It  was  but  midday,  and  the  enemy  still  had 
many  hours  before  him  in  which  to  reap  the  fruits 
of  a  victory  which  appeared  certain. 

But  Foch,  while  he  was  still  a  Colonel  and  teach- 
ing in  the  School  of  War,  had  laid  it  down  in  his 
lectures  that  a  battle  was  not  lost  until  one  was 
persuaded  in  one's  own  mind  that  it  was  lost.  And 
though  the  General  carried  his  headquarters  back 
to  Plancy  (because  the  advancing  German  fire  had 
begun  to  interrupt  the  working  of  his  services), 
he  so  little  believed  in  the  enemy's  victory  that 
he  sent  to  the  General  Commander-in-Chief  the 
following  laconic  report — 

"  I  am  heavily  pressed  upon  my  right ;  my  centre 
is  giving  way;  I  cannot  re-distribute  my  forces. 
The  situation  is  excellent  and  I  shall  attack." 

This  has  been  called  an  epigram,  but  it  is  nothing 
of  the  kind.  While  he  was  listening  at  the  tele- 
phone, chewing  his  cigar  and  receiving  the  alarming 
dispatches  which  came  in  from  all  sides,  he  followed 
in  thought  the  progress  of  the  offensive  then  being 
conducted  by  Maunoury  on  the  Ourcq  and  those 
of  Marshal  French  and  Franchet  d'Esperey  on  the 
Petit  Morin.  It  was  his  business  to  hold  :  to  hold 
at  all  costs  :  for  "  victory  falls  to  those  who  deserve 
it  by  the  greater  mass  of  will."  And,  because 
"  the  feebler  one  is  the  more  one  should  attack," 
he  gave  orders  to  those  troops  of  his — now  dazed 
with  fatigue — to  turn  and  go  forward.  Sup- 
ported by  D'Esperey's  Army,  the  42nd  Division 
gained  ground.  On  every  other  point  of  his  front 


22          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

there  was  no  advance,  but  the  enemy,  bewildered 
by  this  new  movement,  halted,  and  the  essential 
positions  were  held  up  to  nightfall. 

In  the  evening  of  that  day,  the  8th  of  September, 
in  view  of  the  next  day's  task,  which  would  probably 
be  still  harder,  General  Foch  asked  for  aid  from  the 
Fifth  Army.  General  Franchet  d'Esperey  readily 
put  at  his  disposal  the  whole  of  the  loth  Corps  and 
the  5 ist  Reserve  Division. 

The  42nd  Division,  after  the  three  days  of  most 
unequal  struggle  which  it  had  maintained,  seemed 
physically  unable  to  support  another  day  of  equal 
trial,  excellent  though  its  moral  still  remained.  On 
the  8th  of  September,  at  dawn,  it  was  relieved  in 
the  first  line  by  the  5ist  Reserve  Division,  while 
the  loth  Corps  was  given  the  task  of  attacking  the 
loth  German  Corps  in  flank. 

On  their  side  Bulow  and  Hausen,  upon  the  early 
morning  of  this  gth  of  September,  reopened  their 
attacks  with  the  same  violence  as  upon  the  day 
before.  The  whole  line  was  heavily  engaged;  the 
Prussian  Guard,  7th,  loth  and  I2th  active  German 
Corps,  and  the  loth  and  I2th  Reserve  Corps,  all 
went  forward  together  for  the  final  attack. 

Our  men  put  up  a  determined  resistance.  On 
the  left  our  loth  Corps  went  forward;  but  in  the 
centre  even  the  heroic  sacrifices  of  the  Moroccan 
Division  did  not  prevent  the  Prussian  Guard  from 
carrying  Mondement  and  reaching  the  outskirts  of 
Allemant.  As  early  as  nine  o'clock  in  the  morn- 
ing, under  a  hail  of  heavy  shell,  the  nth  Corps 
began  to  fall  back  full  4000  yards  towards 
Corroy,  and  the  6oth  Reserve  Division  abandoned 
Mailly.  It  was  clear  that  the  limit  of  human 
endurance  upon  our  side  had  been  reached.  If 
the  enemy  still  had  an  effort  left  in  him  he  would 
pierce  our  centre,  and  his  general  situation,  which 
was  badly  compromised  upon  the  Ourcq,  would 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          23 

be  re-established  in  the  marshes  of  Saint  Gond. 
But  the  enemy  was  fairly  exhausted.  His  attack 
was  beginning  to  weaken;  his  foremost  waves  of 
men  were  hesitating.  His  supporting  columns 
were  less  dense.  They  no  longer  secured  an  ad- 
vance. They  were  beginning  to  take  cover  against 
the  storms  of  our  field  artillery,  and  our  men, 
calling  on  their  last  reserves  of  energy,  just  held, 
hiding  in  the  shell-craters  and  firing  the  last  of 
their  cartridges. 

The  critical  moment  was  appearing.  "  The 
battle  was  ripe,"  to  quote  Napoleon's  expression; 
or  again,  according  to  Foch's  own  formula,  vic- 
tory would  go  "to  that  one  of  the  two  adversaries 
who  had  kept  the  last  reserve  battalion  to  throw 
into  the  furnace  when  his  opponent  had  none." 

Now  the  Germans  had  no  more  troops  available ; 
but  on  our  side  one  reserve  remained  and  was  on 
the  march.  This  supreme  reserve  was  the  42nd 
Division,  which,  withdrawn  exhausted  from  the 
firing  line  that  same  morning,  was  now  coming  up 
to  a  place  assigned  to  it  between  Linthes  and 
Pleurs.  It  was  tired  out;  it  was  greatly  reduced 
in  numbers;  it  would  certainly  not  have  stood 
against  another  attack.  But  at  any  rate  it  was  at 
the  General's  disposal.  Its  march  down  behind 
the  lines  had  relieved  it  somewhat  from  the  violent 
tension  of  the  prolonged  struggle;  its  moral  was 
high,  and  it  had  all  the  vigour  required  for  attacking 
upon  its  own  account. 

It  received  the  order  to  go  forward,  with  the 
right  flank  of  the  I2th  German  Corps  as  its  objec- 
tive. That  right  flank  had  now  passed  Connantre, 
and  it  was  at  this  point  that  the  junction  between 
Bulow  and  Hausen  lay. 

The  execution  of  this  manoeuvre — striking  at  the 
enemy  point  of  junction,  in  flank,  with  the  French 
42nd  Corps — was  slow  on  account  of  the  extreme 


24          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

fatigue  of  the  troops.  They  had  barely  had  a  half- 
day's  interval  after  three  days  and  three  nights  of 
terrible  struggle;  they  had  not  had  the  time  to 
recover  themselves,  even  temporarily.  At  the 
moment  when  the  order  to  go  forward  was  given 
the  last  elements  of  the  42nd  Division  had  not  even 
yet  arrived  at  Linthes.  Only  the  greatest  generals 
are  able  to  obtain  from  large  bodies  of  men 
these  paroxysms  of  effort;  and  to  obtain  them  at 
all  the  commander  must  (in  Foch's  own  terms) 
"  know  how  to  communicate  the  supreme  energy 
which  animates  his  own  self  to  the  masses  of  men 
who  form  his  army."  You  will  find  hardly  any 
other  example  so  thoroughly  characteristic  of  this, 
outside  the  campaign  of  France  in  1814,  conducted 
under  the  very  eye  of  Napoleon. 

It  is  but  4000  yards  from  Linthes  to  Connantre. 
It  was  not  till  about  six  o'clock  in  the  evening, 
after  four  hours  of  mortal  anguish  in  which  men 
felt  that  the  fate  of  France  was  in  the  balance,  that 
the  42nd  Division  came  fully  into  line. 

During  this  interval  General  Foch,  who  had 
thrown  his  last  cards  upon  the  table  but  who  now 
counted  securely  upon  victory,  got  on  his  horse 
and  took  a  ride  with  Lieutenant  Ferrasson.  During 
this  ride  he  talked  with  his  companion  upon  certain 
points  of  philosophy  and  of  economics  wherein  he 
took  interest. 

Napoleon  slept  two  hours  on  the  battlefield  of 
Bautzen  while  awaiting  the  decision  of  his  fate. 
Foch  upon  this  occasion  did  not  sleep,  but  he  gave 
his  brain  a  rest  and  left  his  battle  on  one  side, 
though  the  cannonade  was  loud  during  all  that  ride. 

When  the  General  came  back  to  his  headquarters 
at  Plancy  he  heard  that  the  42nd  Division  was  now 
arrived  and  deployed  and  ready  to  attack.  He 
immediately  gave  orders  for  the  whole  line  to  go 
forward. 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          25 

The  order  was  obeyed.  The  whole  situation 
changed.  The  army  of  Hausen,  which  thought 
itself  on  the  threshold  of  victory  and  believed  the 
French  to  be  exhausted,  was  taken  aback  by  the 
apparition  of  new  opposing  forces — the  42nd.  Our 
shells  began  to  fall  upon  La '  Fere  Champenoise, 
where  the  Germans  were  unharnessing  their  supply 
teams  in  the  certitude  of  victory.  Those  teams 
were  hurriedly  re-harnessed  and  the  horses'  heads 
were  turned  northwards. 

All  along  that  line  the  enemy  began  to  take  to 
ground.  He  began  to  dig.  In  patches  here  and 
there  he  could  not  even  dig,  he  retired.  There  was 
a  wind  of  defeat  upon  him;  and  when  the  night 
checked  our  advance  our  soldiers  knew  well  that 
with  the  dawn  they  would  see  the  retreat  of  their 
opponents. 

During  the  night  that  retreat  began. 

On  the  loth  of  September,  at  five  in  the  morning, 
our  lines  went  forward,  and  no  more  resistance  was 
attempted.  They  gathered  their  trophies,  masses 
of  material,  and  here  and  there,  especially  at  I,a  Fere 
Champenoise  itself,  which  had  been  precipitately 
evacuated,  they  picked  up  officers  and  soldiers  of 
the  Prussian  Guard  as  drunk  as  helots. 

The  first  serious  attempt  at  resistance  was  made 
by  the  enemy .  upon  the  line  Morains-Normee-Len- 
harree-Sommesous.  To  get  the  better  of  that 
rearguard  it  was  necessary  to  wait  for  the  artillery. 
By  nightfall  General  Foch  had  brought  his  head- 
quarters forward  to  La  Fere  Champenoise  itself. 

On  the  nth  of  September  the  Qth  Army  reached 
the  Marne,  between  Epernay  and  Chalons. 

On  the  I5th  the  enemy  reached  the  Aisne,  taking 
up  a  strong  defensive  position  to  the  north  of  Rheims 
and  of  the  Chalons  training-camp.  He  had  received 
new  provision  of  munitions  and  strong  reinforce- 
ments. 


26          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

The  task  of  the  first  days  after  establishing  this 
contact  was  to  hold  him  and  to  throw  back  his 
vigorous  counter-attacks.  To  conquer  him  in  such 
positions  we  should  have  needed,  and  would  need 
for  a  long  time  to  come,  many  more  guns  and  their 
munitionment.  Victory  against  so  strong  an  organ- 
ization, held  by  very  numerous,  brave  and  power- 
fully-weaponed  troops,  could  only  be  obtained  at 
such  a  price.  It  would  have  been  madness  to  try 
and  force  the  lines  by  mere  weight  of  men.  Whether 
we  would  or  no,  therefore,  the  struggle  stabilised 
upon  this  point.  Already  the  interest  of  the  war 
had  been  transferred  to  another,  more  northern, 
field. 


The  Group  of  the  Armies  of  the  North.    The  Yser. 

The  French  and  German  General  Staffs  had  both 
discovered  that  a  breach  of  the  opposing  front  was 
for  the  moment  impossible  to  either  of  them,  and 
that  the  decision  of  the  battle  which  had  been 
engaged  could  only  be  sought  by  outflanking. 
Switzerland  was  forbidden  as  neutral  ground.  For 
each  of  the  opposing  forces  the  only  vulnerable  flank 
was  the  western  one.  Therefore  their  activity  must 
be  directed  to  sliding  their  forces  westward,  at  the 
risk  of  perilously  denuding  the  rest  of  their  fronts. 

On  the  2oth  of  September  the  whole  of  Castelnau's 
army  had  been  brought  from  Alsace  and  detrained 
in  the  region  of  Beauvais.  It  came  up  in  time  to 
hold,  near  Roye,  the  new  advance  of  the  German 
masses  upon  Paris. 

On  the  30th  the  army  of  Maud'huy  detrained  in 
the  region  of  Arras,  and  its  forces  also  arrived  in 
time  to  break,  even  as  it  detrained,  the  shock  of 
30O,ooo_Germans. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          27 

On  the  4th  of  October  a  call  on  the  telephone, 
without  any  preliminary,  gave  General  Foch  to 
know  that  he  had  been  nominated  to  a  command 
under  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  charged  with 
the  task  of  co-ordinating  the  operations  of  the  whole 
group  of  French  armies  in  the  north. 

There  were  then  in  that  region  the  armies  of 
Castelnau  and  Maud'huy  (the  6th  and  loth),  the 
group  of  Territorial  divisions  of  General  Brug£re 
(four  divisions),  and  the  two  cavalry  corps  of  Conneau 
and  De  Mitry. 

There  was  no  need  for  ampler  instructions.  Foch 
knew  the  general  situation  well,  it  was  a  simple  one, 
and  the  difficulties  of  execution  could  only  be  dis- 
covered upon  the  field  of  action  itself.  There  only 
can  the  problems  of  war  be  stated  and  solved. 

He  left  Chalons  at  ten  in  the  evening,  and  at 
four  o'clock  the  next  morning  he  was  at  Breteauil 
with  General  de  Castelnau.  A  heavy  cannonade 
was  in  progress,  dispatches  were  arriving  every  five 
minutes  that  the  5th  and  6th  Divisions  and  the  4th 
Army  Corps  were  supporting  a  very  severe  struggle 
against  the  iyth  Active  German  Corps,  the  iyth 
Reserve  German  Corps,  the  2ist  German  Corps,  and 
the  ist  Bavarian  Corps.  The  moral  of  the  troops 
was  excellent;  reinforcements  were  expected;  the 
Paris  road  was  well  defended.  Moreover,  the  enemy 
was  passing  his  reserves  northward.  His  real  object 
was  to  pin  down  our  disposable  forces  in  a  position 
covering  Paris  rather  than  to  break  our  line.  What 
he  really  had  in  mind  was  our  left  flank. 

The  two  Generals  held  their  discussion  on  the 
situation  as  they  took  their  coffee.  At  six  o'clock 
in  the  morning  General  Foch  took  a  warm  farewell 
of  the  man  who  had  been  his  commander  of  yesterday 
and  was  to-day  commanded  by  him.  Then,  as  he 
followed  the  road  to  Saint  Pol,  his  motor-car  ran 
along  and  behind  the  whole  length  of  the  battle, 


28          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

the  great  rumour  of  which  stretched  out  indefinitely 
northward.  By  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  he  had 
reached  Aubigny,  where  General  de  Maud'huy  had 
taken  up  his  post  of  command.  Here,  also,  the  battle 
was  in  full  blast.  The  extreme  left  of  our  line  barely 
reached  the  region  of  Lens.  The  loth  Corps,  the 
loth  Cavalry  Division,  and  the  70th  Reserve  Divi- 
sion, were  holding  the  violent  attack  of  German 
battalions  which  continued  to  detrain  behind  this 
field.  Towards  Lille,  Conneau's  Cavalry  Corps  was 
alone  upon  the  watch,  but  as  yet  there  was  no  enemy 
in  front  of  it. 

By  the  next  day,  the  6th  of  October,  General 
Foch,  having  now  fully  taken  his  bearings,  set  up 
his  headquarters  at  Doullens.  For  the  moment 
his  principal  business  was  to  hasten  by  every  means 
at  his  disposal  the  railway  and  motor  traffic  and 
vehicles  of  every  kind,  to  transport  towards  the 
north  the  troops  and  material  which  General  Head- 
quarters were  taking  from  all  the  rest  of  the  front 
and  pouring  ceaselessly  towards  this  end  of  the  line. 
It  was  also  his  task  to  see  to  the  strength  of  the  wall 
which  was  containing  the  invasion,  and  to  hold  him- 
self ready  to  close  immediately  any  breach  which 
might  appear  in  that  wall. 

Simple  as  such  a  general  conception  was,  its 
execution  became  very  difficult  from  the  fact  that 
Marshal  French  had  asked  that  the  British  Army 
should  be  brought  nearer  its  base  and  transported 
to  the  region  of  Lille.  Instead  of  French  troops, 
four  British  Army  Corps  were  thus  to  prolong  the 
left  of  our  line. 

General  Foch,  who  had  formerly  been  at  the  head 
of  a  Military  Mission  in  London,  knew  the  English 
well.  He  knew  that  their  forces,  heroic  in  courage 
and  highly  tenacious,  were  as  yet  ill  adapted  to 
the  necessities  of  action  under  heavy  strain,  where 
rapidity  of  movement  is  an  essential  condition  of 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS          29 

success.  Further,  how  would  the  British  Staff, 
which  had  hitherto  no  experience  in  such  things, 
solve  the  peculiar  problem  of  rapid  transport? 
Would  there  not  also  arise  in  the  exercise  of  a  com- 
mand, the  exact  limits  of  which  were  ill-defined,  no 
actual  friction,  perhaps,  but  misunderstandings,  and 
therefore  delays? 

In  spite  of  these  considerations  the  British  began 
to  detrain  on  the  gth  of  October,  and  our  cavalry 
which  was  covering  them  had  not  yet  given  evidence 
of  the  presence  of  any  Germans  before  it. 

But  it  was  precisely  upon  that  day  that  there  took 
place  an  event  of  considerable  importance,  the 
approach  of  which  had  been  envisaged  for  some  time. 

Antwerp,  the  enormous  fortress  which  was  the 
keep  of  the  Belgian  defence,  fell  under  the  ly-inch 
shells  of  the  enemy. 

The  German  Command  having  committed  the 
error  of  launching  the  attack  at  the  very  first 
moment  without  having  previously  made  certain 
the  complete  containment  of  the  place,  especially 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Scheldt,  the  Belgian  Army 
was  able  to  retire,  and  retreated  towards  the  Yser. 
To  cover  this  retreat  General  Foch  sent  forward  by 
rail,  at  top  speed,  from  Dunkerque  towards  Ghent, 
Admiral  Ronarch's  brigade  of  marine  fusiliers. 
When  its  task  was  accomplished  this  brigade  fell 
back  upon  Dixmude,  where  it  had  to  serve  as  a 
support  for  the  right  of  the  Belgian  Army,  which  was 
to  fall  back  behind  the  Yser. 

Two  of  our  Territorial  Divisions  were  at  this 
moment  rapidly  digging  trenches  round  Ypres. 
This  point  of  resistance  was  to  be  occupied  by  an 
English  division,  which  had  been  sent  too  late  to 
the  relief  of  Antwerp,  and  which  was  at  Ostend, 
where  it  had  just  disembarked.  When  the  English 
reached  Ypres  these  two  French  Territorial  Divisions, 
with  certain  other  Anglo-French  elements,  leaned 


30          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

to  the  north,  to  help  the  Belgian  Army  defend  the 
sector  Ypres-Dixmude.  But  from  the  south  of 
Ypres,  all  the  way  to  La  Bassee,  there  opened  a 
breach  of  -some  30,000  yards,  utterly  unprovided 
with  troops,  and  only  watched  by  our  cavalry 
patrols.  Should  the  German  army  released  by  the 
fall  of  Antwerp  present  itself  on  that  side  the 
situation  might  become  difficult. 

Happily  for  us,  the  German  Higher  Command, 
doubtless  uninformed  about  the  exact  situation  in 
front  of  Lille,  full  of  contempt  for  the  Belgian  Army 
and  making  certain  of  its  complete  destruction, 
took  for  its  objective  the  front  of  the  Yser,  now 
solidly  occupied  between  Dixmude  and  the  sea. 

The  charge  was  delivered  on  the  I3th  of  October. 
The  I2th,  I3th  and  I5th  German  Corps  and  their 
I7th  Corps  of  Reserve  drove  on  in  deep  columns, 
singing  the  "  Deutschland  iiber  Alles,"  confident  of 
a  victory  without  combat.  These  units  were  of 
recent  formation,  recruited  from  the  younger  men — 
the  choice,  indeed,  of  the  Prussian  youth,  but  know- 
ing nothing  of  war  and  barely  efficient  as  yet  in 
mere  drill.  They  were,  none  the  less,  filled  with  all 
the  illusions  of  the  pan-German. 

The  result  was  a  fearful  massacre,  which  was 
renewed  day  after  day  without  respite  on  the  i6th, 
lyth,  i8th  and  igth  of  October.  At  every  point 
the  Belgian  Army,  supported  by  certain  French 
elements,  held  good  under  the  bombardment  of  the 
heavy  artillery,  and  the  bloody  sacrifice  of  the 
German  Army  achieved  not  the  slightest  advantage. 
At  the  same  moment,  and  with  equally  ill  success, 
the  i gth  Corps  assaulted  the  sector  of  Ypres  after  a 
violent  bombardment,  and  broke  in  its  turn  against 
the  unshakable  resistance  of  the  British  troops. 

Now  while  this  battle  was  in  full  activity  towards 
the  north,  the  weak  part  of  the  front  was  being 
rapidly  garnished.  By  the  I7th  of  October  four 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          31 

British  corps  had  already  detrained  entirely,  and 
the  gap  between  Ypres  and  Cambrai  was  closed  to 
the  enemy. 

At  this  moment  the  weakest  part  of  the  northern 
front  was  the  sector  between  Ypres  and  Dixmude, 
because  the  bringing  up  of  the  English  had  caused 
a  delay  in  our  own  detraining  in  this  region.  But  a 
powerful  reinforcement  was  to  arrive  here  also, 
under  the  command  of  General  D'Urbal,  who  had 
been  appointed  upon  the  2oth  of  October.  Upon 
the  22nd  of  October  the  gth  Corps,  upon  the  ist  of 
November  the  i6th  and  the  32nd,  arrived.  Day 
and  night  trains  and  motor  lorries  were  passing  up 
north  behind  the  line  of  fire  and  were  discharging 
upon  the  points  chosen  by  General  Foch  their 
precious  loads  of  energy,  while  in  front  of  the  move- 
ment the  cannon  thundered  and  shook  the  soil, 
and  whole  villages  disappeared  under  the  heavy 
shelling. 

The  officers  of  the  staff  who  served  under  the 
orders  of  General  Foch  during  this  period  are 
unanimous  in  declaring  that  it  was  his  talent  and 
his  will  which  achieved  all,  and  his  activity  which 
animated  all.  Incredible  difficulties  kept  on  present- 
ing themselves  and  were  overcome,  one  hardly  knew 
how.  Was  heavy  artillery  needed  at  a  certain 
point  ?  It  was  found  and  brought  thither.  Was  a 
battalion  needed  here,  a  brigade  there?  That 
battalion  and  that  brigade  came  to  the  desired  point 
at  the  desired  moment.  Units  detrained  in  the  night 
were  sent  forward  on  lorries,  re-entrained  without 
one's  knowing  how  they  would  arrive,  or  whether 
they  had  been  fed.  They  came  and  were  there  at 
the  designated  point  to  check  the  enemy.  Parallel 
with  this  crushing  task,  the  General  had  another 
task  to  fulfil,  which  was  perhaps  more  difficult.  He 
had  to  keep  up  the  moral  of  our  allies,  upon  whom 
the  weakness  of  our  means  of  defence  was  making 


32          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

as  strong  an  impression  as  the  strength  and  deter- 
mination of  the  enemy. 

On  the  2oth  of  October,  in  the  night  between  the 
2oth  and  the  2ist,  and  during  the  2ist,  we  passed 
those  long  hours  of  anguish  when  Dixmude  was 
crushed  with  shell  and  when  the  Germans,  whose 
effectives  were  perpetually  reinforced,  pressed  with 
greater  fury  than  ever  upon  the  Belgian  lines  and 
ended  by  bending  them.  Keyem  and  Beerst  were 
carried  by  the  enemy;  the  Belgian  Army  had  put 
in  its  last  reserves;  it  was  exhausted  and  short  of 
munitions.  The  line  of  the  Yser  was  on  the  point 
of  being  forced,  and  the  General  Staff  had  begun  to 
envisage  the  execution  of  a  retreat  on  Dunkerque. 
That  would  have  spelt  disaster. 

Foch  learnt  of  this  by  telephone  and  came  up 
at  once.  He  happened  to  arrive  in  the  midst  of  a 
council  of  war  in  which  our  brave  allies,  upon  the 
point  of  despair,  were  discussing  the  last  dispositions 
to  be  taken. 

He  did  no  more  than  indicate  a  line  to  which 
the  forces  might  fall  back — and  then  suggested  the 
idea  of  flooding  the  country. 

Inundation  had  saved  Holland  at  another  period 
of  history ;  it  might  well  save  Belgium.  No  one  had 
thought  of  it.  Now  it  was  determined  to  hold  on  as 
best  could  be  done  until  the  country  should  be 
flooded.  Moreover,  at  this  moment  the  42nd  Divi- 
sion, that  which  we  have  already  seen  upon  the 
marshes  of  Saint  Gond,  appeared.  It  counter- 
attacked, and  again  fixed  the  German  line.  The 
General,  to  show  his  fixed  determination  to  force  a 
victory  here,  took  up  his  headquarters  on  the  24th 
of  October  as  far  forward  northward  as  Cassel. 

On  the  28th  the  plain  to  the  east  of  the  Yser,  the 
German  trenches  and  batteries,  and  the  whole  land- 
scape began  to  disappear  under  a  sheet  of  water. 
The  enemy  would  be  bound  to  retire,  but  before 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          33 

doing  so  he  was  to  make  one  supreme  effort  against 
this  army,  which  he  felt  to  be  at  the  end  of  its 
strength,  and  whose  ruin  would  give  him  the  coast 
which  he  so  ardently  desired.  On  the  3oth  he 
attacked  in  deep  columns  against  the  Belgian  centre, 
after  a  heavy  artillery  bombardment. 

Ramscappelle  was  carried,  the  centre  was  pierced, 
the  German  victory  seemed  assured.  But  the  42nd 
Division  was  still  there,  and  by  a  brilliant  bayonet 
charge  it  mastered  the  scattered  and  reduced  columns 
of  the  enemy,  which  fell  back,  this  time  never  to 
return.  The  German  retreat  was  conducted  through 
water.  Its  heavy  guns  were  caught  in  the  mud  and 
lost.  It  even  found  difficulty  in  dragging  its  field- 
pieces  with  it  through  the  slime.  The  Belgian  Army 
was  saved. 

On  this  same  soth  of  October  the  British  ist  Corps 
was  violently  attacked  in  front  of  Dixmude  by 
considerable  enemy  effectives.  Under  the  crushing 
preparation  of  the  German  heavy  artillery  and 
flooded  by  the  mass  of  the  attack,  it  weakened. 
But  were  it  to  retreat  the  flank  of  our  own  gth  Corps 
would  be  exposed. 

General  Dubois  sent  in  aid  of  our  allies  the  feeble 
resources  at  his  disposal,  and  himself  asked  for 
reinforcements.  Foch  went  immediately  to  Saint 
Omer,  where  Marshal  French  had  his  headquarters. 
It  was  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  the  Marshal 
had  just  gone  to  bed.  He  was  awakened,  and 
General  Foch  said  to  him — 

'  Monsieur  le  Marechal,  your  line  is  pierced." 

'  Yes,"  was  the  answer. 

'  Have  you  any  forces  disponible  at  the  moment  ?" 

'  I  have  not." 

'  I  bring  you  mine.     General  Joffre  has  sent  me 
eight  battalions.     Take  them  and  go  forward." 

The  Field  Marshal  took  the  hand  of  General  Foch 
with  some  emotion  and  thanked  him,  and  with  dawn 
D 


34          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

the  struggle  began  again,  supported  by  this  new 
blood. 

On  that  same  day,  the  3ist  of  October,  the  enemy, 
thanks  to  his  crushing  numerical  superiority,  carried 
Gheluvelt  and  threatened  Hooge.  At  two  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  the  last  English  reserves,  decimated 
and  exhausted,  began  to  yield,  and  it  looked  like 
the  end. 

General  Dubois,  whose  army  corps  would  have 
been  involved  in  the  disaster,  came  up  to  Vlamer- 
tinghe,  the  post  of  command  of  General  D'Urbal. 
General  Foch  was  there.  The  situation  was  terrible, 
but  clear.  It  was  essential  to  hold  out  twenty-four 
hours,  the  time  necessary  for  the  i6th  and  32nd 
Corps  to  arrive  and  detrain. 

By  a  providential  piece  of  luck  the  motor-car  of 
Marshal  French  passed  at  the  moment  of  this  meet- 
ing, and  an  officer  of  the  General  Staff,  Major  Jamet, 
ran  forward  towards  him.  The  Marshal,  hearing 
that  General  Foch  was  present,  agreed  to  stop. 

But  now  he  was  without  hope.  His  last  reserves 
had  melted  away  in  the  furnace  of  the  battle,  his 
divisions  were  quite  worn  out,  decimated  and 
shaken.  They  were  no  longer  capable  of  any  pro- 
longed resistance,  there  was  nothing  left  but  to  die. 

Foch  replied,  "  No,  Monsieur  le  Marechal.  The 
first  thing  of  all  to  do  is  to  hold  out  at  all  costs. 
Dying  can  come  afterwards.  Hold  out  till  this 
evening.  I  will  come  to  your  aid." 

Even  as  he  spoke,  since  the  Marshal  was  not 
fully  familiar  with  French,  the  General  wrote  on 
the  back  of  the  order  of  retreat  which  the  British 
Staff  had  drawn  up  what  should  be  done  in  order 
to  prolong  the  resistance.  He  presented  these  notes 
to  the  Marshal,  but  the  latter  was  not  yet  convinced. 
Foch  continued,  "  If  Wellington's  infantry  will  no 
longer  hold,  to-day,  entrenched,  my  lads  will  have 
to  go."  Marshal  French  replied  that  it  would  hold, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          35 

and  taking  his  order  to  retreat,  he  crossed  it  out, 
turned  it,  and  wrote  at  the  foot  of  Foch's  notes 
these  few  words,  which  he  signed  :  "  Execute  the 
order  of  General  Foch."  For  the  rest,  the  day  was 
not  over  before  a  French  brigade  came  up  in  line 
and  helped  to  check  the  progress  of  the  enemy. 

It  was  thus  at  every  point  in  the  line.  The  un- 
shakable will,  the  faith  of  the  General,  communi- 
cated to  all,  roused  courage  and  multiplied  energy, 
while  his  clear  and  sure  grasp  of  a  situation  and  his 
gift  of  discovery  warded  off  danger  at  the  moment 
when  all  seemed  lost.  Every  one  felt,  as  it  were,  that 
his  reserves  sprang  from  the  earth  at  the  very  moment 
and  place  where  their  intervention  was  indispensable. 

On  the  ist  of  November  the  ist  Bavarian  Corps 
captured  Messines.  Immediately  a  detachment  of 
cavalry  and  artillery  was  formed,  under  General 
Mazel,  and  was  brought  up.  On  the  2nd  of  Novem- 
ber a  battle  was  engaged  between  Dixmude  and  the 
River  Lys,  for  the  Germans  were  ending  their  task 
at  the  point  where  they  should  have  begun  it.  From 
that  date  up  to  the  I5th  of  November  they  struck 
against  a  wall  now  strong  enough  not  to  be  shaken 
by  their  battering-ram.  They  launched  in  dense 
columns  their  2nd,  the  I3th,  the  I5th  and  the  iyth 
Corps,  a  Bavarian  Corps,  and  a  division  of  the  Guard. 

On  the  3rd  came  the  furious  attack  on  Ypres. 
The  French  20th  Army  Corps  was  brought  up  in 
lorries,  and  the  assault  was  checked. 

The  following  week  was  a  week  of  butchery.  The 
savage  struggle  ceased  neither  day  nor  night.  The 
Marines,  the  8th  and  gth  Territorial  Divisions,  cer- 
tain units  of  cavalry  and  of  cyclists,  the  32nd  Corps, 
recently  detrained,  contested  violently  and  under 
the  most  difficult  conditions,  with  the  I2th  and  I3th 
German  Reserve  Corps,  for  the  possession  of  Dixmude, 
the  Chateau  of  Woumen,  Merckem  and  Bixchoote. 

Dixmude  had  been  captured  from  our  Marines 


36          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

by  the  enemy  as  early  as  the  ist  of  November  at  a 
very  heavy  loss.  At  the  same  time  Bixchoote  was 
carried ;  and  the  salient  of  Ypres,  in  front  of  which 
our  i6th  Corps  was  holding  the  26th  German  Corps, 
was  on  the  point  of  being  taken  in  reverse.  But 
Foch  was  on  his  guard.  Napoleon  made  war  with 
the  legs  of  his  soldiers ;  here  the  genius  for  manoeuvre 
used  with  equal  ease  the  rapid  means  of  transport 
at  his  disposal,  and  the  22nd  Brigade,  one  of  the 
Brigades  of  the  famous  "  Division  of  Iron,"  was  on 
the  spot  with  two  cavalry  corps;  and  the  enemy, 
having  missed  his  victory  once  more,  fell  back. 

That  was  the  end.  Their  wild  efforts  had  cost 
the  Germans  300,000  men.  Those  efforts  could  not 
'be  renewed. 

General  Foch  knew  well  that  his  victory  was  a 
purely  negative  one.  Victory  in  the  full  sense  of 
the  word  demands  the  destruction  of  the  enemy  by 
a  violent  pursuit.  But  the  effectives  at  his  disposal 
were  far  too  inferior  to  those  of  his  adversary,  and, 
above  all,  he  had  too  little  heavy  artillery  with  which 
to  reply  to  the  big  pieces  of  the  enemy. 

It  was  a  negative  victory,  but  a  victory  none  the 
less,  and  a  great  one.  In  spite  of  a  formidable 
deployment  of  eleven  army  corps  and  the  admission 
of  incalculable  losses,  the  enemy  had  proved  unable 
either  to  outflank  us  on  the  left,  or  to  attain  Calais, 
or  to  pierce  our  line,  though  that  line  had  but 
barely  crystallized.  General  Foch,  by  his  activity, 
his  astonishing  grip  of  a  position,  his  indomitable 
energy,  and  his  effect  upon  our  allies,  had  brilliantly 
and  definitely  confirmed  the  results  of  the  first 
victory  which  had  checked  the  enemy  at  the  Marne. 

(d)  The  Artois  and  the  Somme 

Hardly  had  the  last  cannon  shots  on  the  Yser 
died  down  when  the  situation  on  the  whole  of  our 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          37 

front  was  profoundly  modified.  The  enemy,  who 
had  by  this  time  made  up  his  mind  to  turn  his  main 
effort  against  Russia,  went  to  earth  in  Flanders 
and  in  the  Artois,  as  he  had  already  gone  to  earth 
in  the  Somme,  Champagne,  the  Argonne  and 
Lorraine. 

His  numerical  superiority  being  still  beyond  ques- 
tion and  his  material  incomparably  more  powerful 
than  our  own,  we  also  had  to  entrench  to  guard 
against  a  new  push  and  to  be  able  to  recreate  our 
forces  with  some  sort  of  security  in  view  of  a  renewal 
of  the  offensive.  The  winter  of  1914-15  was,  there- 
fore, a  period  of  intense  but  ungrateful  labour  for 
General  Foch  and  his  staffs,  which  labour  had  for 
its  object  the  transport  and  accumulation  of  material 
upon  the  scale  of  which  no  one  in  the  past  had  had 
any  conception.  An  incredible  number  of  trains  cease- 
lessly followed  each  other  upon  the  tracks,  carrying 
mountains  of  building  material  (corrugated  iron, 
armoured  plates,  rolls  of  wire,  both  smooth  and 
barbed,  and  piquets  of  wood) ;  of  military  material 
(guns  of  all  calibres  by  the  thousand,  pyramids  of 
shell  and  munitions  of  every  kind,  of  which  the  last 
operations  had  shown  how  necessary  it  was  to  con- 
sume very  great  quantities,  and  navvying  and 
entrenching  tools  by  the  million).  Finally,  there 
was  the  necessity  for  special  provisionment  in  food 
and  clothing  and  coal,  due  to  the  winter  season 
which  had  already  begun. 

It  was  also  a  period  of  extreme  strain  for  the 
troops,  who  had  to  dig  night  and  day  at  their 
trenches  in  the  frozen  mud,  often  with  water  up  to 
their  knees,  and  in  despite  of  the  weather  and  of  the 
enemy's  heavy  artillery,  which  often  destroyed  in  a 
few  minutes  the  intensive  labour  of  several  days. 

There  were  also  not  a  few  sharp  engagements, 
of  which  the  object  was  to  hold  the  enemy  upon  our 
front  in  order  to  prevent  him  sending  as  manyjmen 


38          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

as  he  would  against  our  Russian  allies,  and  to  keep 
up  among  our  own  troops  the  "  bite  "  and  offensive 
spirit  which  are  indispensable  to  active  operations. 
The  names  of  these  episodes  are  St.  George,  the  Ferry- 
man's House,  the  Kortekar  Inn,  Dixmude  and  Ypres 
again,  Vermelles,  Carency,  Andechy.  These  were 
our  feats  of  arms  in  November  and  December  1914. 

Our  British  allies  took  for  their  part  their  full 
share  of  these  struggles,  under  the  personal  in- 
fluence of  General  Foch  and  in  spite  of  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  means  as  yet  at  their  disposal.  On  the 
26th  of  January,  1915,  they  engaged  in  a  glorious 
struggle  at  Givenchy,  and  on  the  loth  of  March 
they  carried  Neuve  Chapelle. 

None  the  less,  the  inferiority  of  our  material 
means  was  such  that  these  winter  operations  were 
unable  to  prevent  the  enemy,  confidently  relying 
upon  the  inviolability  of  his  defensive  organization, 
from  taking  150,000  men  from  the  Western  front 
and  inflicting  a  grave  defeat  upon  the  Russian  Army 
in  the  region  of  the  Masurian  Lakes. 

But  by  the  spring  the  results  of  our  labour  became 
appreciable,  and  when  the  Russian  Higher  Command 
let  us  know  that  it  was  about  to  undertake  an  offen- 
sive in  Galicia  we  were  nearly  ready  to  support  it 
efficiently,  and  General  Foch  was  able  to  consider 
the  organization  of  an  attack  in  the  Artois.  He 
transported  his  headquarters  from  Cassel  to  Prevent, 
on  the  road  between  Saint  Pol  and  Doullens,  in  order 
to  be  in  the  centre  of  his  theatre  of  operations ;  for 
he  had  decided  to  take  as  his  objective  the  last 
bastions  of  the  Artois  hills  which  separate  Arras 
from  the  plains  of  the  north.  Beyond  this  barrier 
lay  Lens,  with  its  mines  and  its  junction  of  rail- 
ways, and  beyond  also  lay  Lille  and  Douai.  It  was 
a  vital  point  for  the  enemy. 

The  means  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  General  were 
still  very  inferior.  He  refused  to  calculate  the 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          39 

breadth  of  his  attacking  front  on  the  basis  of  the 
number  of  soldiers  he  could  put  into  line.  He  would 
only  accept  as  the  foundation  of  his  estimate  the 
number  of  heavy  pieces  which  he  was  given.  Now 
of  these  very  large  guns,  in  spite  of  all  the  efforts 
that  had  been  made,  we  still  had  few,  while  the 
enemy  had  many,  and  in  order  to  obtain  that 
superiority  of  artillery  fire  which  the  General  thought 
necessary  for  victory  the  zone  of  attack  had  to  be 
very  restricted.  He  therefore  prepared  to  attack 
upon  a  front  of  only  10,000  yards,  between  Neuville- 
Saint-Vaast  and  Notre-Dame-de-Lorette. 

On  the  Qth  of  May  a  formidable  artillery  prepara- 
tion destroyed  the  powerful  defensive  organizations 
of  the  enemy  and  opened  the  way  to  our  waves  of 
attack.  The  Germans  concentrated  their  defensive 
on  a  number  of  strongly  organized  supporting  points  : 
Ablain-Saint-Nazaire,  Carency,  La  Targette,  Neu- 
ville-Saint-Vaast,  and  the  celebrated  "  Labyrinth," 
which  was  a  complicated  network  of  trenches, 
cemented  dug-outs  and  lines  of  barbed  wire.  In 
spite  of  the  constant  aid  of  the  artillery  which 
delivered  several  hundred  thousand  shells  a  day, 
and  of  which  the  fire  was  minutely  controlled  by 
our  airmen,  the  progress  across  these  underground 
works  and  open  fields,  where  every  obstacle  hid 
some  trap,  was  very  slow.  On  the  iQth  of  June  the 
objectives  first  assigned  by  General  Foch  were 
reached.  We  were  the  masters  of  Neuville-Saint- 
Vaast,  of  the  "  Labyrinth,"  of  Carency,  of  Souchez, 
and  of  the  spur  of  Notre-Dame-de-Lorette.  On  the 
10,000  yards  front  of  the  attack  we  had  advanced 
3000  yards,  we  had  captured  8000  prisoners  and  a 
score  of  cannon,  and  had  held  sixteen  German 
divisions  for  a  space  of  two  months. 

It  was  a  victory.  But  in  spite  of  all  the  science, 
all  the  efforts  and  all  the  heroism  laid  out  upon  it, 
it  had  no  decisive  character.  It  had  flattened  out 


40          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

a  salient  in  the  German  line,  but  the  door  thus 
opened  was  too  narrow  to  take  effectives  through 
in  sufficient  number  :  the  forces  advancing  through 
it  would  very  soon  have  been  caught  in  reverse  if 
they  had  ventured  into  the  plain  beyond.  But  this 
fine  military  episode  had  yielded  lessons  of  high 
value.  In  the  first  place,  it  was  now  clear  that  local 
offensives  on  a  narrow  scale  were  powerless  to  pro- 
cure victory.  In  order  to  obtain  an  appreciable 
result  it  would  be  necessary  to  give  a  greater  develop- 
ment to  the  front  of  attack;  and  since  the  breadth 
of  the  sector  of  attack  is  a  function  in  terms  of  the 
heavy  guns  one  can  put  into  line,  it  was  obviously 
necessary  to  intensify  yet  further  the  manufacture 
of  material  and  munitions. 

Further,  it  was  essential  not  to  leave  the  enemy 
free  to  use  his  reserves  as  he  would.  Thanks  to  his 
central  position,  he  could  always  be  superior  to  his 
assailant  in  any  given  place,  whence  the  necessity 
of  bringing  about  important  offensives  simultane- 
ously upon  all  fronts,  through  obtaining  from  our 
allies  an  intensification  of  their  effort,  at  any  rate, 
even  if  we  had  to  wait  for  the  power  of  attaining 
unity  of  command  over  the  war. 

On  the  7th  of  July  the  first  reunion  at  Chantilly 
brought  together  at  French  headquarters  representa- 
tives of  all  the  armies  of  the  Entente,  under  the 
presidency  of  General  Joffre.  A  decision  was  taken 
to  attempt  offensives  in  which  the  English  and 
Belgian  Armies  should  join  upon  the  Western  front 
in  order  to  relieve  the  Russian  front.  These  offen- 
sives were  delivered  upon  the  25th  of  September  in 
Champagne  and  in  the  Artois.  The  Champagne 
front  had  been  weakened  by  the  enemy,  to  the 
advantage  of  his  Russian  front.  The  Germans 
suffered  a  defeat  there  which  cost  them  20,000 
prisoners,  and  might  have  been  decisive  had  we  had 
more  material. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          41 

In  the  Artois  the  attack  was  delivered  on  much  the 
same  ground  as  that  of  May,  and  with  the  same 
objectives  :  the  last  bastions  of  the  hills  of  the 
Artois,  which  we  already  held,  Notre-Dame-de- 
Lorette,  which  dominates  the  plain  of  Lens.  The 
enemy's  Higher  Command  was  perhaps  preparing 
an  offensive  in  this  region,  for  enemy  reserves  had 
already  accumulated  there,  with  superior  material 
to  ours,  and  after  the  first  success  gained  by  our 
troops  at  Souchez,  and  by  the  British  at  Loos  and 
Hulluch,  we  were  compelled  to  halt  by  the  powerful 
counter-attacks  and  the  formidable  array  of  heavy 
artillery  on  the  enemy's  side.  Thanks,  however, 
to  the  exact  co-ordination  of  our  efforts,  the  object 
aimed  at  was  attained  on  this  occasion ;  the  German 
offensive  launched  against  Russia  was  checked, 
and  the  situation  of  our  allies  in  Galicia  was 
re-established. 

These  operations,  small  as  were  their  results,  had 
proved  that  it  was  possible  to  co-ordinate  the  efforts 
of  ah1  the  allies  effectively.  To  mould  opinion  in  this 
direction  the  French  Government  took  an  initia- 
tive :  on  the  2nd  of  December  General  Joffre  was 
made  Generalissimo  of  the  French  Armies  in  all  the 
theatres  of  war,  and  General  de  Castelnau  the  Chief 
of  his  General  Staff.  This  measure  strengthened  the 
character  of  the  French  Command,  but  did  not 
produce  upon  our  allies  the  effect  it  was  expected 
to  do.  The  conclusions  of  the  further  meetings 
which  took  place  at  Chantilly  on  the  6th,  7th  and 
8th  of  December,  the  object  of  which  was  to  lay 
down  a  plan  for  the  operations  of  1916,  remained 
rather  vague.  There  was  some  question  of  a  general 
offensive  to  be  launched  on  all  fronts  as  soon  as  that 
was  possible,  and  meanwhile  a  local  offensive  under- 
taken mainly  by  the  British,  Italian  and  Russian 
Armies,  which  had  hitherto  suffered  less  than  the 
French. 


42          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

The  work  of  examining,  studying  and  preparing 
the  front  in  view  of  the  projected  offensive  which 
General  Foch  furnished  during  this  disappointing 
period  cannot  be  analyzed  here.  Later  we  shall 
see  the  result  of  these  studies,  and  we  shall  see  how 
the  General  found  means,  when  his  hour  had  come, 
to  apply  the  Napoleonic  art,  compact  of  energy  and 
grasp,  in  spite  of  the  momentary  triumph  of  mere 
material  strength. 

In  execution  of  the  conclusions  come  to  at  Chan- 
tilly,  the  preparations  of  the  Entente  made  active 
progress.  The  British  effort  was  intensified,  some 
Russian  units,  even,  appeared  upon  the  Western 
front.  By  reducing  its  effectives  in  line  the  Higher 
French  Command  built  up  a  "  mass  of  manoeuvre  " 
of  thirty-seven  Divisions. 

At  the  end  of  the  inter-allied  discussions  the 
Somme  was  chosen  as  the  theatre  for  the  great 
offensive  envisaged.  General  Foch,  who  had  moved 
his  headquarters  to  Dury  in  September,  had  long 
been  preparing  that  offensive  in  all  its  details. 
Forty  French  and  twenty  British  divisions  were  to 
be  put  at  his  disposal.  His  plan  of  attack  was 
approved  on  the  I4th  of  February,  1916.  The 
offensive  was  to  be  delivered  to  the  north  and  to 
the  south  of  the  Somme  river  on  a  front  of  25,000 
yards,  between  Chaulnes  and  Gomecourt.  Nothing 
remained  to  be  settled  by  the  Higher  Command 
but  the  date  of  the  attack.  That  date  was  to 
coincide  with  Russian  and  Italian  offensives,  and 
with  the  recall  from  Egypt  of  certain  British 
troops. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  2ist  of  February,  the  Germans 
struck  against  Verdun  with  very  formidable  appa- 
ratus, and  in  five  days  ruined  all  the  northern 
defences  of  that  entrenched  camp.  In  the  following 
days  they  developed  and  intensified  to  the  last 
degree  of  energy  their  offensive  upon  this  sector, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS  43 

and  with  every  passing  day  it  appeared  more  and 
more  clearly  as  a  decisive  operation. 

A  new  conference  between  the  Allies,  which  met 
on  the  1 2th  of  March,  decided  that  it  was  necessary 
to  hasten  the  execution  of  the  offensives  already 
settled  in  order  to  relieve  Verdun.  Hence,  the 
Russian  Army  was  to  be  ready  to  attack  by  the 
I5th  of  May,  the  Anglo-French  and  the  Italians 
by  the  ist  of  June. 

But  Verdun  gradually  absorbed  all  our  reserves. 
On  the  I5th  of  April  General  Foch  was  warned  that 
instead  of  the  forty  French  divisions  promised 
him  for  his  battle  he  could  no  longer  count  on  more 
than  thirty.  On  the  I5th  of  May  we  could  only 
allow  him  twenty-six.  Happily,  British  reinforce- 
ments had  already  arrived,  and  when  the  time  came 
the  General  was  able  to  dispose  of  twenty-six 
English  divisions  instead  of  twenty. 

On  the  ist  of  June  our  allies  were  not  ready,  and 
the  operation  was  postponed  until  the  2Qth.  For 
Verdun  could  still  hold  in  spite  of  all  the  efforts  of 
the  German  Army. 

Meanwhile,  the  Higher  Italian  Command,  finding 
itself  menaced  by  an  Austrian  offensive  which  it 
doubted  its  power  to  check,  asked  Russia  to  under- 
take an  offensive  on  her  side  for  its  relief.  The 
battle  which  was  still  raging  at  Verdun  now  awoke 
at  once  on  the  Russian  and  the  Italian  fronts.  It 
was  a  unique  occasion  for  realizing  by  a  great 
offensive  on  the  Somme  the  maximum  co-ordination 
of  effort  which  had  yet  been  obtained  in  the  course 
of  this  war. 

On  the  ist  of  July,  after  a  terrible  bombardment 
which  flattened  out  the  German  trenches,  a  vigorous 
attack  was  launched  between  Frise  and  Estrees, 
facing  Peronne,  on  a  front  of  6000  yards.  At  the 
first  bound  the  enemy's  first  positions  were  carried 
and  our  soldiers  brought  back  5000  prisoners.  The 


44          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

effort  continued  throughout  the  succeeding  days, 
each  stage  carefully  prepared  and  the  whole  pro- 
ceeding h'ke  clockwork.  On  the  2nd  of  July  the 
second  German  position  was  breached  by  the  capture 
of  Frise  and  Herbecourt.  On  the  3rd  Biscourt, 
Flaucourt  and  Assevillers  fell,  and  on  the  4th 
Barleux,  Belloy-en-Santerre,  and  Estr£es.  By  the 
loth  the  number  of  prisoners  had  reached  10,000, 
seventy-five  guns  had  been  taken,  and  the  plain  of 
Peronne  was  dominated  from  Briaches,  while  the 
important  railway  junction  of  Roisel  was  under 
our  fire  at  a  range  of  10,000  yards. 

On  the  I4th  of  July,  according  to  the  common 
programme  and  after  a  bombardment  which  had 
lasted  since  the  nth,  the  British  Army  went  forward 
in  its  turn  on  a  front  of  6000  yards.  It  carried 
with  fine  dash  Bazentin,  Longueval,  and  the  woods 
Trone  and  Delville,  breaking  the  resistance  of  the 
first  and  second  German  lines  and  capturng  2000 
prisoners.  By  the  zyth  our  allies,  who  were  now 
righting  on  the  third  German  line,  counted  as  many 
as  n,ooo  prisoners.  But  by  this  date  the  Germans 
had  been  able  to  bring  up  powerful  reinforcements, 
among  which  were  the  Prussian  Guard.  The 
English  lost  Delville  Wood,  and  as  the  Thiepval 
pivot  still  held  strongly  the  British  offensive  could 
not  make  progress.  Happily,  as  on  the  Yser, 
General  Foch  was  overlooking  the  execution  of  his 
own  manoeuvre,  and  from  the  20th  of  July  our  troops 
again  took  up  their  attacks,  first  on  a  front  of 
3500  yards,  to  the  north  of  the  Somme  between 
Hardaumont  and  Feuilleres,  then  to  the  south  of 
the  river,  between  Barleux  and  Soyecourt,  on  a 
front  of  4000  yards.  These  operations  gave  us 
3000  prisoners  and  pinned  down  the  German 
reserves.  Thus  relieved,  the  British  carried  Pozieres 
and  drove  the  enemy  out  of  Delville  Wood. 

The  results  obtained  in  this  month  of  July  had 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          45 

been  brilliant,  but  the  consumption  of  munitions 
had  been  so  considerable  and  the  field  of  battle 
so  ploughed  up  with  shell  that  the  operations  had 
to  be  toned  down  in  the  first  days  of  August  to 
permit  the  re-munitionment  of  the  guns.  Moreover, 
the  British  Army,  whose  organization  and  means 
were  not  yet  at  the  full  height  the  war  demanded, 
was  fatigued  by  the  efforts  already  undertaken. 
Hence  the  month  of  August  witnessed  no  important 
operation  save  the  capture  of  Maurepas  by  our 
troops. 

At  the  opening  of  September,  the  head  of  munition- 
ments  of  all  kinds  was  fairly  well  re-established, 
and  immediately  General  Foch  undertook  a  new 
series  of  combined  offensives,  in  the  directions 
of  Bapaume,  Peronne  and  Nesles.  On  the  3rd  of 
September,  to  the  south  of  the  Somme,  the  armies 
of  Fayolle  and  Micheler  carried  Berny,  Vermande- 
villers,  and  Chilly,  and  took  3000  prisoners.  On 
the  6th  they  passed  Belloy  and  Chaulnes,  and  on 
the  1 2th  they  conquered  Bouchavesnes. 

The  English  moved  in  their  turn  on  the  I5th. 
They  introduced  great  armoured  cars  for  attack 
called  "  tanks."  These  machines  were  invulnerable 
to  rifle  fire  and  made  a  way  for  the  advance  of 
infantry  by  crushing  the  belts  of  barbed  wire,  over- 
throwing low  walls,  crushing  flat  the  parapets  of 
even  the  best -made  works,  and  ruining  the  cemented 
dug-outs.  The  enemy's  moral  was  heavily  shaken 
by  the  apparition  of  these  new  engines  of  war. 
The  Germans  lost  Ginchy,  with  4000  prisoners, 
and  then  we  pushed  back  along  their  whole  line 
between  Bouchavesnes  and  Thiepval,  where  they 
left  5000  of  their  men  in  the  hands  of  our  allies. 

But  the  bad  weather  was  approaching  and  making 
the  operations  very  difficult.  Further,  these  opera- 
tions were  costing  in  men  and  in  their  prodigious 
quantity  of  munitions  something  of  which  one 


46          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

can  gather  some  idea  when  one  considers  that  in 
a  single  day  as  many  rounds  were  fired  by  the 
artillery  as  in  the  whole  seven  months  of  the  war 
of  1870-71. 

Under  these  conditions  the  Higher  Command, 
fearing  to  exhaust  the  country  and  to  outstrip  the 
rate  of  production  possible  to  our  munition  factories, 
ordered  the  cessation  of  these  operations  on  a  large 
scale.  We  contented  ourselves,  therefore,  during 
the  months  of  October  and  November,  with  com- 
pleting the  results  already  obtained  and  rendering 
them  secure  by  the  occupation  of  important  points 
such  as  Ablaincourt,  Saillisel  and  Pressoire,  and 
with  taking  posts  of  observation  for  the  artillery 
such  as  Sailly,  from  which  the  enemy  had  been 
able  to  overlook  our  lines  and  could  have  rendered 
our  rest-billets  untenable  in  the  course  of  the  winter. 

From  this  moment,  the  opening  of  October, 
though  the  tactical  results  of  the  battle  of  the  Somme 
were  yet  to  be  completed,  the  strategical  results 
were  definitely  acquired  and  were  very  brilliant. 
Forty  German  divisions  had  melted  away  on  those 
fields  of  carnage  which  have  been  called  the  shambles 
of  Europe,  and  as  a  consequence  the  Germans  had 
been  compelled  to  give  up  their  attacks  on  Verdun. 
The  German  Crown  Prince  had  hoped  to  found  his 
reputation  as  a  General  upon  the  capture  of  the 
great  French  fortress.  General  Falkenhayn,  the 
Chief  of  the  German  General  Staff,  was  rendered 
responsible  for  the  defeat,  dismissed  on  the  5th 
of  September,  and  replaced  by  Marshal  Hindenburg. 
On  the  other  fronts,  the  Russian  offensive,  in  the 
absence  of  German  reserves,  went  forward  again 
in  the  Carpathians;  the  Italian  offensive  was 
victorious  in  the  region  of  Gorizia.  Finally, 
Rumania,  judging  definitive  victory  to  be  approach- 
ing, decided  on  the  i8th  of  August  to  enter  the 
coalition.  These  European  events,  which  were 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          47 

due  in  great  part  to  the  vigorous  operation  upon 
the  Somme  and  hence  to  the  intensity  in  attack, 
the  offensive  spirit  and  the  activity  of  General  Foch, 
it  would  have  been  impolitic  to  emphasize  at  the 
time,  though  they  were  far  more  important  than 
the  capture  of  twenty-five  ruined  villages,  35,000 
prisoners,  and  150  German  guns,  the  booty  which 
an  order  of  the  day  on  the  25th  of  September  laid 
down  to  the  credit  side  of  the  group  of  armies  of 
the  north. 

The  Council  of  the  Entente. — The  age  limit  of 
service  had  been  reached  by  General  Foch  on  the 
3oth  of  September,  1916;  but  under  the  present 
circumstances  it  was  thought  that  his  services 
were  still  too  necessary  to  France  for  the  active 
and  vigorous  victor  of  Saint  Gond,  of  the  Yser,  the 
Artois,  and  the  Somme,  to  be  lost  in  a  final  retire- 
ment. This  law,  which  had  sacrificed  so  many 
eminent  chiefs,  was  modified  in  his  favour.  He 
was  accorded  the  Military  Medal,  and  was  maintained 
upon  the  active  list. 

Yet  this  was  the  period  when  the  Government, 
with  the  idea  of  giving  more  vigour  to  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  began  rejuvenating  the  Higher  Command. 
General  Joffre's  position  had  become  doubtful; 
Generals  Foch  arid  Castelnau  were  thought  too  old 
to  conduct  operations,  and  General  Foch  in  par- 
ticular, who  was  believed  to  be  in  ill-health,  was 
especially  aimed  at. 

The  Generalissimo  strongly  refused  to  be  separated 
from  a  colleague  who  was  so  indispensable  to  him, 
and  discovered  a  happy  means  of  using  to  the 
highest  advantage  of  the  country  (now  that  the 
war  was  at  low  pressure  in  the  north)  that  colleague's 
power  of  work  and  lucidity  of  intelligence  and  wide 
sweep  of  erudition.  On  the  I3th  of  December,  1916, 
he  persuaded  the  Government  to  create  at  Senlis 
a  bureau  for  the  study  of  the  principal  Inter- Allied 


48  PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

questions,  and  gave  the  direction  of  this  new  organ 
to  General  Foch. 

This  institution  corresponded  to  what  had  become 
an  urgent  necessity  of  this  moment. 

The  Generalissimo,  heavily  burdened  by  the 
duty  of  directing  operations  on  the  Western  front, 
could  not  possibly  follow,  with  all  the  attention 
they  required,  the  grave  events  of  which  the  whole 
world  was  the  theatre.  There  was  the  crushing 
of  Rumania,  which  had  allowed  the  central  empires 
to  break  through  the  blockade  which  was  stifling 
them  and  to  re-victual  themselves.  It  also  per- 
mitted them  to  reduce  their  eastern  front  con- 
siderably, and  put  all  the  Bulgarian  Army  at  their 
disposal  for  an  attack  on  Salonika.  There  was 
the  revolution  which  was  now  rising  in  Russia  and 
was  every  day  weakening  the  armies  of  our  allies 
and  giving  Germany  a  greater  liberty  of  action. 

On  what  point  would  the  mass  of  enemy  effectives 
thus  rendered  disponible  be  directed?  Would  it 
be  upon  Salonika,  or  upon  the  Italian  front  or 
upon  the  French?  Here  was  a  question  which  it 
was  of  vital  importance  to  grasp,  without  mention- 
ing the  domestic  affairs  of  the  Near  East,  of  Italy, 
or  even  of  Germany  itself,  where  on  the  I2th  of 
December  the  Chancellor  had  read  from  the  Tribune 
of  the  Reichstag  proposals  for  a  "  German  Peace  " 
which  he  thought  he  could  find  means  to  get  accepted 
by  the  Entente. 

General  Foch  only  stayed  a  few  days  at  Senlis. 
In  the  immense  complexity  of  the  problems  he 
had  to  solve  his  lucid  mind  had  rapidly  fixed  the 
precise  point  on  which  it  was  necessary  to  concentrate 
at  the  outset. 

In  his  view  there  was  the  one  principal  theatre 
of  operations  on  which  the  most  vital  and  immediate 
interests  were  at  stake,  and  victory  upon  which 
would  solve  all  other  problems.  The  other  theatres, 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS          49 

whatever  their  more  or  less  distant  interest  might 
be,  were  secondary.  The  principal  theatre  was 
the  Western  front,  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Adriatic.  It  was  there  that  we  must  prepare  to 
receive  the  shock  of  the  new  German  masses  and 
there  that  we  must  conquer. 

If  the  shock  should  take  place  in  France,  there  had 
already  been  done  what  was  necessary,  so  far  as  the 
means  at  our  disposal  allowed,  for  parrying  it.  If 
it  took  place  on  the  Italian  front,  the  possibility  of 
sending  aid  to  our  allies  had  long  been  envisaged; 
it  was  a  question  of  transport,  the  study  of  which 
had  already  been  carried  far. 

There  remained  (what  had  not  yet  been  envisaged) 
the  possibility  of  an  outflanking  movement  by  way 
of  Switzerland.  Germany  had  already  violated  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  in  the  hopes  of  thus  obtaining 
victory.  She.  would  do  the  same  by  Switzerland 
if  she  could  see  a  military  advantage  in  that  act. 
Consequently,  it  was  the  problem  of  the  defence  of 
Switzerland  which  imposed  itself  with  the  greatest 
urgency  at  this  moment. 

General  Foch  went  to  Mirecourt  with  the  nominal 
title  of  "  General  in  Command  of  the  Foch  Group," 
and  set  to  work,  actively  supported  by  General 
Weygand.  By  the  month  of  March  1917  his  task 
was  completely  achieved.  A  plan  of  operations  had 
been  elaborated  in  full  accord  with  the  Swiss  General 
Staff,  the  battle  had  been  prepared  down  to  its  last 
details ;  it  would  have  been  delivered  by  our  three 
Eastern  armies,  reposing  on  their  right  upon  the  whole 
army  of  the  Confederation. 

Having  fulfilled  this  important  mission,  General 
Foch  was  called  on  the  i5th  of  May  to  the  post  of 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  Army,  replacing 
General  Petain,  who  had  received  the  command  of 
the  armies  of  the  north  and  the  north-east.  The 
General  took  up  his  quarters  in  the  Invalides,  and 


50          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

became  at  the  same  time  the  technical  counsellor 
of  the  Government,  which  desired  to  take  a  greater 
part  in  the  direction  of  the  war. 

In  the  month  of  July  1917  came  the  complete 
breakdown  of  Russian  military  power.  Happily,  the 
United  States,  in  their  indignation  against  the  crimes 
of  the  Germans,  had  come  in  upon  our  side  since  the 
3rd  of  February ;  but  though  the  intervention  of  the 
great  Republic  might  guarantee  victory  for  us,  we 
had  none  the  less  to  accept  a  very  severe  winter  in 
the  course  of  which  France,  England  and  Italy 
would  have  to  hold  in  check,  with  their  unaided 
resources,  the  whole  military  power  of  the  central 
empires. 

It  was  not  upon  Switzerland,  it  was  upon  Italy 
that  the  thunderbolt  fell  without  so  much  as  the 
warning  of  a  lightning-flash.  On  the  22nd  of  October 
a  formidable  battering  stroke  of  the  Austrians  and 
Germans  on  the  Izonzo,  accompanied  by  an  out- 
flanking manoeuvre  in  the  Carnic  Alps,  seemed  to  be 
imminent.  On  the  25th  the  German  communiques 
made  it  clear  that  the  Italian  Army  had  been  thrust 
back  on  the  Izonzo  with  a  loss  of  30,000  prisoners 
and  300  guns.  On  the  26th  the  figures  rose  to 
60,000  prisoners  and  500  guns.  And  serious 
rumours  spoke  of  over  100,000  prisoners  and  700 
guns.  It  was  a  disaster. 

As  early  as  the  26th  General  Foch  had  sent  a 
laconic  telegram  to  General  Cadorna,  saying,  "  If 
you  need  our  troops  we  are  ready  to  march." 

The  transport  of  four  French  Divisions,  which 
were  later  followed  by  two  English  ones,  began  on 
the  28th.  It  was.  effected  at  the  rate  of  forty  trains 
in  the  twenty-four  hours,  so  that  the  first  of  our 
elements  detrained  in  the  Lombard  plain  on  the 
ist  of  November.  The  command  of  this  French 
Army  of  Italy  was  given  to  General  Duchene,  the 
Commander  of  the  loth  Army.  He  left  on  the  2gth, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          51 

after    having    received    precise    instructions    from 
General  Foch. 

The  Higher  Italian  Command,  fearing  to  find  its 
eastern  armies  taken  in  reverse  by  the  German 
offensive  coming  from  the  Alps,  was  inclined  to 
abandon  ground  and  to  fall  back  if  necessary  as  far 
as  the  Mincio.  Already  the  Tagliamento  had  been 
forced  in  spite  of  an  abortive  resistance.  The 
evacuation  of  the  Livenza  line  was  in  process  of 
execution ;  while  the  enemy's  propaganda  had  pro- 
duced disastrous  effects  in  certain  centres  of  Italian 
opinion,  and  the  moral  of  the  army  was  badly  shaken. 

Foch  hurried  to  Italy.  He  persuaded  Cadorna 
that  he  had  not  suffered  definitive  defeat,  that  the 
2nd  Army  alone  was  attacked,  and  that  the  enemy 
could  be  checked  on  the  Piave  and  the  Trentino. 
To  achieve  that  object  it  would  be  necessary  to  have 
a  plan  of  operations  to  which  everybody  should 
conform,  an  energetic  command  on  the  points  to  be 
held,  and,  behind  the  lines,  a  reorganization  of  the 
troops  and  the  formation  of  a  mass  of  manoeuvre. 

The  Italian  Army,  which  had  rapidly  recovered 
itself,  resisted  vigorously  on  the  Piave  and  on  the 
Plateau  of  Asiago.  It  was  still  on  the  same  line  in 
1918  when  the  hour  of  its  offensive  struck. 

Upon  these  events  there  was  created  at  Versailles 
an  Inter-Allied  Superior  Council  of  War.  It  was  a 
hesitating  but  none  the  less  decisive  step  towards 
unity  of  command.  The  business  of  this  Council 
was  to  bring  forward  and  concord  the  points  of  view 
of  the  various  Governments  of  the  Entente  and 
then  to  give  the  Generals  commanding  the  various 
armies  the  directing  ideas  necessary  to  the  attain- 
ment of  the  common  end.  It  was  clearly  a  place  for 
General  Foch,  and  he  was  called  to  represent  France 
and  to  preside  over  the  decisions  of  the  Council. 

Now  the  Higher  German  Command,  confident 
that  it  had  rendered  Italy  incapable  of  undertaking 


52          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

any  offensive  operation  for  a  long  time  to  come,  had 
decided  to  turn  all  the  efforts  of  the  coalition  against 
France.  It  wanted  to  make  an  end  once  and  for  all. 
Germany  was  beginning  to  get  hungry,  and  she 
was  exhausted.  It  was  common  sense  that  France 
ought  to  be  crushed  before  the  American  Army, 
the  instruction  of  which  in  the  camps  of  the  United 
States  was  being  hastened,  should  be  in  a  condition 
to  make  themselves  felt  upon  the  battlefields  of 
Europe. 

On  this  account  the  transport  of  troops  and 
material  from  the  Russian  front  to  the  Western, 
the  importance  of  which  had  already  been  noted 
in  November  and  December  1917,  was  intensified 
in  February  and  March  1918.  The  whole  of  the 
neutral  Press  was  filled  with  the  rumour  of  a  powerful 
German  offensive  which  was  being  prepared  with  the 
greatest  secrecy,  with  consummate  art,  and  would 
immediately  be  launched  upon  the  whole  Western 
front  with  an  effect  that  would  be  necessarily 
irresistible. 

On  our  side,  the  Air  Service  and  the  Intelligence 
were  able  to  make  certain  that  by  the  I5th  of  March 
the  offensive  preparation  of  nearly  the  whole  enemy 
front  was  fully  completed  :  188  of  the  enemy  divi- 
sions were  identified  with  absolute  certainty,  of 
which  109  alone  were  in  the  first  line,  so  that  one 
might  presume  the  existence  behind  the  front  and 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Higher  Command  of  a  mass  of 
manoeuvre  of  more  than  eighty  divisions.  It  was 
further  discovered  that  between  the  Oise  and  the 
sea,  facing  the  Anglo-Belgian  armies,  the  German 
front  had  been  reinforced  by  thirty  divisions.  In 
front  of  the  French  Army  it  had  been  reinforced  by 
ten  divisions.  Lastly,  two  new  armies  had  been 
created  :  one  the  lyth,  in  the  region  of  Valen- 
ciennes, under  Otto  von  Below,  facing  Montreuil; 
and  the  other  the  i8th,  in  the  region  of  Le  Cateau, 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          53 

facing  Montdidier,  under  the  command  of  Von 
Hutier,  the  victor  of  Riga  and  the  specialist  in 
sudden  attack. 

That  part  of  the  front,  therefore,  which  was 
menaced  by  an  imminent  attack  on  a  formidable 
scale  ran  from  Ypres  to  La  Fere,  about  150  kilo- 
metres. 

There  was  some  temptation  to  parry  this  mortal 
blow  by  forestalling  it  with  an  immediate  offensive. 
But  to  those  who  knew  what  defensive  organizations 
the  Germans  had  erected  in  French  ground  such  an 
enterprise  could  only  seem — in  view  of  the  numerical 
superiority  of  the  enemy — an  act  of  madness.  The 
defensive  organization  here  mentioned  consisted  of 
four  principal  lines. 

FIRST  : — First  there  was  drawn,  following  the 
front  more  or  less  exactly,  an  immense  line  from 
the  sea  to  Switzerland,  some  10,000  yards  broad, 
formed  of  trenches  which  interlaced  everywhere  and 
were  covered  by  forests  of  barbed  wire,  with  ar- 
moured emplacements  for  guns  and  machine-guns, 
fortified  woods  and  villages,  and  every  perfection 
of  modern  science.  It  was  called  the  Hindenburg 
Line,  and  the  different  sectors  of  this  formidable 
"  Chinese  wall  "  bore  names  taken  from  the  heroes 
of  the  Nibelungen — Wotan,  Siegfried,  Alberik,  etc. 

SECOND  : — A  system  of  two  lines,  more  or  less 
continuous,  formed  in  a  crescent  shape,  the  convex 
side  of  which  was  turned  towards  Paris,  and  reposing 
at  one  end  upon  the  entrenched  camp  of  Lille,  which 
had  been  powerfully  organized,  and  at  the  other  on 
the  fortified  region  of  Metz  and  Thionville. 

The  first  of  these  lines  was  marked  by  Douai, 
Cambrai,  La  Fere,  Vouziers,  Dun-sur-Meuse,  Pagny- 
sur-Moselle — from  west  to  east  it  was  called  Hunding, 
Brunhilde,  Kriemhilde,  and  Michel  Stellung  line. 

The  second  of  these  lines  branched  off  from  the 
first  towards  Douai,  was  prolonged  by  Lequesnoy, 


54          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

where  it  became  double  as  far  as  Hirson.  It  covered 
Rocroi,  Mezieres,  and  Sedan,  and  ended  in  the 
entrenched  camp  of  Metz. 

THIRD  : — The  fourth  line,  also  continuous  and 
very  solid,  was  marked  by  Valenciennes,  Maubeuge, 
Philippe  ville  and  Givet.  It  covered  the  valleys  of 
the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse,  the  vital  arteries  of  the 
German  Army,  and  was  destined  to  afford  time,  in 
case  of  disaster,  for  the  evacuation  of  Flanders. 

FOURTH  : — There  were  intermediary  lines,  not 
yet  furnished,  but  capable  of  rendering  good  service, 
which  reinforced  in  certain  sectors  the  principal 
lines. 

Further,  there  were  complicated  organizations 
called  "  switches,"  which  united  the  lines  perpen- 
dicularly one  to  the  other.  The  role  they  had  to 
play  was  that  of  great  decoys  which  should  canalize 
a  victorious  enemy  offensive  and  take  that  offensive 
in  reverse. 

Only  Alsace  Lorraine  seemed  neglected.  They 
were  protected  by  nothing  more  than  the  Hindenburg 
Line,  a  fortified  system  going  from  Strasburg  to  the 
Donon  Mountain,  which  seemed  to  have  been  made 
in  preparation  for  a  shortening  of  the  front  and  for 
confining  to  Upper  Alsace  the  progress  of  the  Allies. 

The  total  of  this  defensive  system  which  anchored 
the  invasion  into  the  body  of  France  will  thus  be 
seen  to  be  formidable,  and  in  the  existing  state  of 
our  organization  and  our  material  means  it  was 
impossible  to  forestall  by  an  offensive  the  battering 
blow  which  threatened  us  as  imminent. 

The  terrible  chance  of  this  offensive  General  Foch 
had  foreseen  since  the  month  of  November,  while 
he  was  assuring  the  re-establishment  of  the  situation 
in  Italy  by  his  presence  there.  From  that  moment 
he  had  emphasized  the  urgent  necessity  for  develop- 
ing the  strength  of  our  armies  and  of  giving  more 
play  to  the  articulation  of  our  reserves,  of  creating 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          55 

an  Inter-Allied  Reserve,  and  of  multiplying  the 
lateral  communications  in  order  to  render  manoeuvre 
possible. 

All  this  had  been  but  imperfectly  carried  out. 
The  Council  of  Versailles  had  indeed  decided  to 
create  an  Inter-Allied  Reserve,  of  which  General 
Foch,  with  the  title  of  "  President  of  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Superior  Council  of  War,"  was 
eventually  to  take  command;  but  this  decision 
had  not  been  carried  into  effect.  Nay,  the  British 
Government,  having  to  feed  its  operations  in  Asia, 
reduced  the  effectives  of  its  armies  in  France  by 
200,000  combatants.  Italy  could  send  workmen 
to  our  aid,  but  no  soldiers.  The  little  Belgian 
Army  alone  was  being  reinforced  and  reorganized 
in  twelve  divisions  on  the  French  model. 

Finally,  in  their  session  of  the  3rd  of  March, 
and  in  spite  of  the  energetic  protests  of  General 
Foch,  the  Council  went  so  far  as  to  decide  on  an 
important  reduction  of  the  Inter-Allied  Reserve 
and  to  envisage  nothing  more  than  resisting,  as 
well  as  might  be,  the  German  effort,  though  this 
threatened  to  be  of  the  most  formidable  type  ! 

It  was  indeed  of  such  a  type.  On  the  2ist  of 
March,  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning,  after  a  very 
short  but  fearful  artillery  preparation,  the  forty-two 
enemy  divisions  of  the  lyth,  2nd  and  i8th  German 
Armies  were  hurled  between  La  Fere  and  Fontaine- 
les-Croisilles  against  the  seventeen  British  divisions 
of  the  3rd  and  5th  Armies.  At  the  outset  the  front 
began  to  crack  in  the  region  of  St.  Quentin.  On 
the  22nd  of  March  it  gave  way  on  the  eighty  kilo- 
metres of  the  zone  attacked.  The  retirement 
of  the  3rd  and  5th  British  Armies  was  carried  out 
rapidly  up  to  the  30th  of  March,  on  which  date  it 
had  gone  back  thirty  kilometres  to  the  general 
line  Arras-Moreuil-Albert-Montdidier.  Already  a 
wide  breach  had  opened  between  the  right  of  the 


56          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

5th  English  Army  as  it  retired  westward  and  the 
left  of  the  6th  French  Army,  which,  in  spite  of  all 
the  activity  it  put  forth,  could  not  stretch  its  front 
quickly  enough  towards  Chauny  and  Noyons  to 
keep  contact  with  our  allies. 

The  road  to  Paris  lay  open;  Hutier  poured  his 
reserves  in  there  and  they  advanced  as  far  as  the 
line  Montdidier-Noyons,  only  sixty  kilometres  from 
the  capital.  There  was  needed  this  extreme  peril 
and  the  crushing  force  of  this  blow  to  open  men's 
eyes  and  to  put  an  end  to  international  jealousies. 
It  was  understood  at  last  that  the  Entente  would 
be  definitely  defeated  if  the  efforts  of  all  the  Allies 
were .  not  co-ordinated  towards  a  common  end. 
On  the  26th  of  March,  at  Doullens,  on  the  pro- 
position of  the  British  Government,  General  Foch, 
though  not  yet  given  the  supreme  command  of 
the  Allied  Armies,  was  charged  with  "  co-ordinating 
the  operations  of  those  Armies."  It  was  under 
this  title  that  he  had  won  the  victory  of  the  Yser. 
Men's  ideas  developed  with  surprising  rapidity 
under  the  growing  menace  of  imminent  disaster; 
every  objection  dissolved  like  smoke,  and  before 
the  montn  of  March  was  ended  General  Foch  had 
been  named  "Generalissimo  of  the  French,  English, 
American  and  Belgian  Forces  fighting  upon  the 
Western  Front." 

The  Entente  had  now  at  last  a  Chief,  and  the 
very  first  cpndition  of  victory  was  at  last  brought 
into  being.  L 


THE  GENERALISSIMO 
A. — The  Defensive. 

The  situation  was  so  difficult  that  a  leader  of 
other  stuff  would  probably  have  despaired  of  it. 
All  the  decisions  that  had  to  be  taken  were  handi- 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          57 

capped  by  a  double  threat  from  the  enemy,  the 
success  of  either  of  which  would  have  been  decisive. 
There  was  the  threat  to  seize  the  ports  of  the  Channel, 
the  realization  of  which  would  have  thrown  the 
English  Army  back  on  the  sea.  There  was  the 
threat  of  reaching  Paris,  the  success  of  which  enter- 
prise might  well  ruin  the  moral  of  the  French  people 
and  force  its  Government  to  make  peace. 

There  was  therefore  no  free  play  for  the  reserves — 
which,  moreover,  were  already  insufficient  in  number. 
These  reserves  had  to  be  disposed  in  such  a  manner 
that  they  could  check  any  serious  advance  of  the 
Germans  towards  the  coast  and  any  advance  at 
all  towards  Paris,  or  at  least,  any  advance  on  such 
a  scale  as  to  raise  anxiety. 

The  army  of  Below  was  only  twelve  kilometres 
from  Amiens  and  held  under  the  fire  of  its  heavy 
artillery  the  sole  railway  line  communicating  directly 
with  the  northern  part  of  the  front.  It  was  under 
these  conditions  that  the  army  of  Hutier  made 
yet  another  violent  thrust  on  the  3oth  of  March 
towards  Paris,  in  a  powerful  effort  at  breaking  the 
line. 

The  victor  of  Saint  Gond  and  the  Yser — he  and 
his  much-reduced  staff  installed  at  Sarcus,  a  village 
lost  in  the  depths  of  Picardy — judged  indeed  that 
the  situation  was  very  serious,  but  not  to  be  despaired 
of,  and  that  strength  of  will,  activity,  energy  and 
intelligence  would  overcome  every  difficulty. 

To  build  up  reserves,  levies  were  made  from  all 
parts  of  the  front  not  directly  menaced.  General 
Pershing  nobly  put  at  the  disposition  of  General 
Foch  the  as  yet  small  American  Army,  which  by 
the  terms  of  our  treaties  was  not  to  have  been 
engaged  in  the  field  of  battle  till  much  later.  The 
divisions  of  this  Army  at  once  relieved  in  the  quiet 
sectors  war-trained  French  divisions,  which  passed 
to  the  line  of  fire.  A  new  group  of  Franco-British 


58          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

armies,  constituted  under  the  command  of  General 
Fayolle,  succeeded  in  "  welding  over  "  the  breach 
in  the  line  which  yawned  so  wide  towards  Paris, 
and  thanks  to  prodigies  of  heroism  and  very 
painful  sacrifices  as  well,  the  liaison  between  the 
French  and  the  British  was  maintained,  and  stopped 
Hutier's  powerful  offensive  dead. 

It  seemed  that  the  check  was  definite  enough  so 
far  as  this  field  was  concerned.  Of  the  ninety 
German  divisions  fronting  us  in  this  region  at 
least  eighty-three  had  been  put  through  the  mill 
and  very  severely  mauled.  There  was  nothing 
behind  to  support  the  assaulting  columns.  The 
German  offensive  was  out  of  breath.  It  had  failed. 

The  German  Higher  Command,  therefore,  adopted 
a  new  and  more  modest  conception  suited  to  its 
present  resources.  Paris  seemed  hardly  accessible, 
and  eighty  kilometres  was  too  extended  a  front 
for  its  weakened  reserves.  Amiens  was  to  be  the 
new  objective,  and  the  front  of  attack  was  to  be 
only  forty  kilometres.  This  new  effort  was  made 
between  the  4th  and  the  8th  of  April.  It  was 
checked,  as  its  predecessor  had  been,  but  only 
after  furious  fights.  The  road  to  Amiens  was  barred, 
as  had  been  that  to  Paris.  The  German  reserves 
were  getting  exhausted;  more  than  100  divisions 
had  already  more  or  less  melted  in  the  furnace. 

Hindenburg  would  not  give  up.  Amiens  cannot 
be  reached;  his  forces  no  longer  have  the  strength 
to  attack  on  a  front  of  forty  kilometres.  Well,  then, 
he  determined  to  strike  with  twenty  divisions  on 
a  front  of  only  twenty-five  kilometres,  between 
Ypres  and  La  Bass£e,  with  the  objectives  of  Calais 
and  Dunkerque;  that  is,  with  the  intention  of 
throwing  back  the  British  line  and  separating  it 
from  the  Belgian. 

On  the  Qth  of  April  a  Portuguese  division  was 
badly  shaken  and  dragged  into  its  retreat  five 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          59 

divisions  of  the  British  Army.  The  enemy  crossed 
the  river  Lys  and  pushed  forward  as  far  as  Mount 
Kemmel. 

But  this  methodical  displacement  of  the  German 
objectives  more  and  more  to  the  north  had  by 
now  for  a  long  time  past  given  General  Foch  the 
key  of  the  situation.  His  alert  mind  developed 
its  plan  with  greater  swiftness  than  theirs.  Pain- 
fully and  drop  by  drop,  as  it  were  (for  the  main 
railway  line  by  Amiens  was  under  the  enemy's 
fire),  the  French  reserves  had  for  a  long  time  past 
been  passed  northward,  and  already  a  detachment 
of  General  de  Mitry's  army  was  supporting  the 
British  Army. 

The  fighting  was  exceedingly  severe.  By  the 
end  of  April  the  German  armies  of  the  north,  which 
had  now  thrown  into  the  battle  at  least  150  divisions 
(of  which  fifty  had  been  engaged  two  or  three  times), 
which  had  also  suffered  very  heavy  losses,  and  which 
were  also  showing  unequivocal  signs  of  moral 
fatigue,  gave  up  the  attack.  Unfortunately,  the 
British  Army  on  its  side  was  too  exhausted  and 
too  reduced  in  effectives  to  be  able  to  pass  to  the 
offensive.  Moreover,  the  French  reserves  were 
weakened,  and  the  weakening  of  the  British  Army, 
also,  compelled  General  Foch  to  keep  portions  of 
his  own  reserve  in  the  north.  Further,  the  com- 
munications were  still  so  precarious  as  to  render 
manoeuvre  difficult.  The  American  Army  was 
growing  rapidly,  it  is  true,  and  every  day  6000  to 
8000  men  disembarked  in  our  ports.  But  this 
number  of  men  were  not  trained  soldiers.  Italy 
on  her  side  declared  that  she  still  needed  the  two 
French  divisions  which  we  had  in  her  territory, 
and  could  only  send  two  divisions  of  her  own  to 
our  aid. 

To  sum  up :  after  this  first  passage  of  arms,  the 
Allies  only  had  at  the  end  of  the  month  of  May  172 


60          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

divisions  to  oppose  to  the  212  German  divisions 
by  then  reconstituted.  The  Generalissimo  did  not 
dispose  of  the  strategic  reserve  which  would  have 
been  necessary  for  victory,  and  the  double  threat 
of  the  enemy  against  Paris  and  against  the  coast 
was  still  in  existence. 

Indeed,  the  threat  against  Paris  was  not  slow 
in  denning  itself.  One  of  the  consequences  of  the 
"  pocket  "  seized  towards  Amiens  by  Hutier's  army 
had  been  to  create,  between  La  Fere  and  Mont- 
didier,  an  offensive  base  of  about  forty  kilometres, 
fronting  towards  Paris,  with  the  river  Oise  as  the 
axis  for  an  advance.  But  this  foundation  for  an 
advance  could  not  be  utilized  so  long  as  the  wooded 
hills  of  the  region  of  Compiegne  and  Villers-Cot- 
terets  remained  in  the  hands  of  such  a  master  of 
manoeuvre  as  General  Foch ;  for  so  long  as  he  held 
them  every  operation  against  Paris  was  menaced 
on  its  flank. 

It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  get  round  this 
region,  which  was  too  difficult  a  one  to  be  cleared 
by  a  frontal  attack,  and  in  order  to  get  round  it 
the  ridge  of  the  Chemin  des  Dames  must  be  carried. 
The  French  Command,  which  had  been  obliged 
to  reinforce  points  where  the  danger  was  vital, 
relied  here  upon  the  natural  strength  of  the  ground 
and  had  put  only  five  divisions  in  the  first  line  for 
the  whole  forty  kilometres  between  Anizy-le-Chateau 
and  Berry-au-Bac,  with  four  divisions  in  reserve. 

On  the  27th  of  May  twenty-two  German  divisions 
sprang  to  the  assault  of  these  positions,  swept  away 
the  forces  defending  them,  and  on  the  second  day, 
advancing  twelve  kilometres,  reached  the  banks  of 
the  Vesle.  On  the  2gth  of  May  the  enemy  had 
carried  Soissons;  on  the  3ist  he  forced  the  passage 
of  the  Ailette  river;  and  on  the  ist  of  June  he 
entered  Chateau-Thierry  and  stood  upon  the  banks 
of  the  Marne  from  that  town  up  as  far  as  Dormans. 


PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS          61 

Henceforward  the  enemy  was  in  possession  of  a 
second  base  of  operations,  between  Soissons  and 
Chateau -Thierry,  which  aimed  at  Paris  with  the 
river  Marne  as  the  axis  for  an  advance.  The 
capital  stands  at  the  centre  of  a  circumference 
with  a  radius  of  sixty  kilometres,  from  which 
circumference  the  German  waves  of  attack,  cease- 
lessly renewed,  now  broke  against  the  hill-forests 
of  Laigle,  Compiegne  and  Villers-Cottere'ts,  which 
our  troops  heroically  defended.  Guns  of  a  power 
hitherto  unknown  were  further  delivering  upon 
Paris  their  daily  tons  of  explosives,  which  blew 
in  the  walls  of  churches,  destroyed  manufactories 
and  private  houses,  opened  great  craters  in  the 
streets,  and  killed  numerous  victims,  including 
women  and  children.  It  was  a  knell  that  the 
German  Higher  Command  was  ringing  for  France, 
and  an  advertisement  to  the  world  of  what  a  German 
victory  would  mean. 

But  France,  under  the  energetic  direction  of  M. 
Clemenceau,  remained  firm,  and  kept  full  confidence 
in  those  iron  men  to  whom  she  had  entrusted  her 
destinies.  As  for  General  Foch,  never  was  his  faith 
more  ardent,  nor  his  mind  calmer  or  more  clear,  nor 
his  vision  less  troubled. 

The  fall  of  Chateau-Thierry,  since  it  cut  the 
railway  between  Paris  and  Nancy,  imposed  fresh 
delays  upon  the  communications  between  eastern 
and  western  parts  of  the  front.  Our  reserves  could 
now  only  move  much  more  slowly.  Our  troops 
had  therefore  for  some  time  longer  to  hold  out  where 
they  stood,  at  the  price  of  sacrifices  in  men  and 
ground  which  were  occasionally  bitter  indeed.  But 
things  were  destined  to  come  right.  A  sufficient 
display  of  activity  and  of  thought  brought  up 
reserves  before  the  enemy  could  finally  triumph 
over  the  resistance  of  the  poilus,  and  it  was  clear 
at  last  that  we  should  emerge  from  the  struggle 


62          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

victorious.  Every  one  by  this  time  saw  and  felt 
this. 

But  what  General  Foch  told  no  one  was  that  he 
had  divined  an  error  the  enemy  would  make,  and 
was  at  that  moment  massing  reserves  in  the  woods 
of  Villers-Cotterets,  from  which  point  he  foresaw 
that  there  would  be  a  possibility,  in  no  long  delay, 
of  attempting  a  manoeuvre  upon  interior  lines  against 
one  of  the  two  branches  of  the  German  pincers, 
or  against  their  centre.  Troops  were  brought  up 
from  the  east,  the  centre,  and  even  from  the  north. 
American  divisions  which  had  barely  achieved  their 
training  assured  the  defence  of  considerable  sectors, 
while,  from  the  2nd  to  the  I5th  of  June,  our  troops 
resisted  formidable  attacks  directed  first  against 
Rheims,  then  against  Compiegne,  and  finally  against 
the  forest  of  Villers-Cottere'ts  itself. 

At  the  end  of  this  violent  fighting  Hindenburg 
had  at  his  disposal  to  act  as  a  mass  of  manoeuvre 
no  more  than  three  fresh  divisions  and  thirty  more 
or  less  tired  ones. 

B. — The  Decisive  Counter-Offensive 

A  calm  succeeded  to  this  tempest.  The  energy 
of  the  enemy  was  for  the  moment  exhausted,  and 
General  Foch  used  the  interval  to  build  up  his  mass 
of  manoeuvre  in  the  region  of  Compiegne. 

The  "  pocket  "  of  Chateau -Thierry  was  clearly 
the  weak  point  of  the  German  decision,  for  Rheims, 
having  held  out  against  every  attack,  the  enemy  had 
no  convenient  railway  at  his  command  by  which 
to  feed  the  battle  with  men  and  munitions.  It 
was  therefore  here  that  Foch  designed  to  strike  on 
the  i8th  of  July,  and  he  prepared  against  that  date 
an  offensive  on  a  large  scale,  facing  eastward,  on 
the  forty-kilometre  front  between  the  river  Aisne 
and  Belloy. 

Our  Air  Service  had  given  us  warning  during  the 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          63 

first  fortnight  of  July  of  a  novel  enemy  activity  in 
the  woods  north  of  Dormans.  The  Germans  were 
gathering  in  this  region  men  and  heavy  guns  and 
munitions,  and  the  pontoons  necessary  for  the 
crossing  of  the  Marne.  They  were  evidently  pre- 
paring a  new  and  formidable  push  towards  Paris, 
across  and  southward  of  that  river.  They  knew 
that  this  region  was  deprived  of  natural  defences 
and  was  very  lightly  held.  The  Generalissimo,  when 
he  received  information  of  these  enemy  dispositions, 
refused  to  change  his  own  in  any  point.  Above  all 
did  he  refuse  to  reinforce  beyond  a  certain  measure 
the  defence  of  the  Marne.  If  the  enemy  were  to 
commit  the  error  of  launching  his  reserves  to  the 
south  of  that  river,  so  much  the  better.  Those 
troops  would  then  not  be  facing  the  forest  of  Villers- 
Cottere'ts,  and  the  German  "  pocket  "  would  be  in 
great  peril.  Once  more  there  appeared  the  formula 
that  "  a  battle  is  a  struggle  between  two  wills," 
and  we  are  about  to  see  what  the  resultant  was  to 
be  when  the  force  of  Foch's  should  clash  with  that 
of  Hindenburg. 

When  the  Instructor  in  General  Tactics  at  the 
School  of  War  refused  to  support  the  defence  of  the 
Marne — a  decision  which  could  not  but  incite  the 
enemy  to  press  towards  this  side  with  the  mass  of 
his  reserves — had  he  not  perhaps  in  mind,  through 
a  flash  of  genius,  the  memory  of  Napoleon  refusing 
to  support  the  right  of  his  army  on  the  day  of 
Austerh'tz? — when  Davout  was  retiring  that  right 
toward  the  lakes  and  luring  to  his  pursuit  the 
Russian  reserves  so  that  they  evacuated  the  plateau 
of  Pratzen  ?  No  doubt  it  will  remain  the  General's 
secret.  At  any  rate,  the  fine  manoeuvre  which  was 
now  about  to  open  and  which  was  to  be  crowned  by 
decisive  victory  was  a  development  on  a  large  scale 
of  that  same  operation  of  which  the  day  of  Austerlitz 
had  given,  as  it  were,  a  cinema  model. 


64          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

On  the  1 5th  of  July  the  Germans  crossed  the 
Marne  and  hastened  with  heavy  reinforcements  of 
men  and  material  to  gather  the  fruits  of  their  victory 
and  push  forward  in  great  strength  towards  the 
south. 

And,  on  the  i8th  of  July,  at  dawn,  on  the  day 
and  at  the  hour  which  had  been  settled  on  long 
before,  Mangin  and  Degoutte,  whose  skirmishing 
line  was  preceded  by  a  barrage  fire  and  accompanied 
by  tanks,  debouched  from  the  forest  of  Villers- 
Cottere'ts,  and  pierced,  north  of  Soissons,  upon  a 
front  of  twenty  kilometres,  far  into  the  reduced 
German  centre.  By  the  evening  of  the  igth  of 
July  the  two  French  armies  had  captured  20,000 
prisoners  and  400  guns  ! 

Under  this  terrible  blow  Hindenburg  fell  back. 
The  Germans  evacuated  the  south  bank  of  the 
Marne  at  top  speed.  On  the  2ist  they  let  go 
their  hold  of  Chateau-Thierry.  On  the  night  of 
the  27th  they  retreated  from  the  fatal  river  which 
once  more  had  proved  disastrous  to  them.  On 
the  29th,  pressed  in  front  and  flank,  they  held 
their  line  on  the  Aisne  and  the  Vesle  from  Soissons, 
which  Mangin  had  recovered,  to  a  point  below 
Rheims.  That  glorious  city,  terribly  mutilated, 
was  now  victorious. 

A  wave  of  enthusiasm  rose  throughout  the  world. 
As  for  France,  she  felt  that  victory  was  beginning  to 
spread  its  wings.  The  whole  country7  applauded 
the  proposal  of  M.  Clemenceau  on  the  6th  of  August 
that  the  President  of  the  Republic  should  name 
General  Foch  a  Marshal  of  France. 

"  The  dignity  of  Marshal  of  France,"  ran  the 
report  of  the  Prime  Minister,  "  is  not  to  be  regarded 
only  as  a  reward  for  past  services.  It  will  rather 
confirm  for  the  future  the  authority  of  that  great 
man-at-arms  who  has  been  called  to  lead  tHe  Armies 
of  the  Entente  to  a  decisive  victory." 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS          65 

Marshal  Foch  was  about  to  transform  that  act 
of  faith  into  a  reality.  The  operations  which  were 
to  follow  are  characterized  by  a  special  mark  of 
nervous  energy,  vigour  and  marvellous  precision. 

The  Marshal  was  about  to  prove  at  last  by  his 
[action  that  the  principles  of  the  art  of  war  never 
[change,  and  that  the  core  of  his  instruction  in  the 
School  of  war  still  had  its  full  value;  that  the 
Napoleonic  idea,  at  once  elastic  and  clear,  had 
kept  all  its  strength  in  spite  of  the  formidable 
apparatus  and  heavy  creations  of  German  industrial 
war.  The  battle  was  let  loose  over  nearly  800  kilo- 
metres, from  the  North  Sea  to  Switzerland.  The 
whole  line  was  alight,  and  half  France  sounded  night 
and  day  with  the  uninterrupted  rumbling  of  the 
cannon.  As  the  attacks  followed  each  other  in  a 
dozen  different  fields  and  often  overlapped,  as  the 
whole  scheme  of  this  gigantic  drama  seems  hap- 
hazard, one  might  be  tempted  to  imagine  that  each 
leader  was  pushing  straight  forward,  each  according 
to  his  own  temperament,  and  that  hence  the  advance, 
obviously  general  upon  the  whole  front,  might  seem 
probably  due  to  the  initiative  of  the  various  com- 
manders of  sectors,  or  at  the  most  to  that  of  the 
various  Generals  commanding  the  armies.  A  more 
attentive  examination  of  the  affair  proves  the 
contrary.  A  single  will  animated  the  whole,  and  a 
single  brain  directed  the  whole,  following  throughout 
rigorously  a  logical  method. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  enemy  was 
anchored  into  French  soil  on  four  principal  lines  of 
defence.  We  shall  now  see  the  Marshal  pushing 
the  German  armies  back  everywhere  to  their  defences 
behind  the  Hindenburg  Line,  then  breaching  that 
strong  wall  and  vigorously  attacking  points  of  less 
resistance,  piercing  or  turning  the  further  lines 
behind,  always  advancing,  ceaselessly  striking,  so 
that  the  enemy  should  never  have  time  to  rally,  to 


66          PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS 

reconstitute  his  reserves,  or  to  manoeuvre  them.  And 
this  was  to  proceed  until  the  enemy,  finally  thrown  out 
of  all  his  trenches  and  deprived  of  half  his  artillery, 
was  reduced  to  the  mercy  of  his  conqueror. 

As  to  the  methods  employed  to  obtain  these  more 
than  human  efforts  from  tired  troops  and  decimated 
reserves,  to  achieve  rapid  transport  of  units,  material 
and  munitions  necessary  for  each  stroke,  in  spite 
of  the  bad  condition  and  congestion  of  railways 
which  had  in  part  to  be  actually  captured  from  the 
enemy;  in  a  word,  to  accomplish  with  nineteen 
armies,  representing  a  total  effective  of  six  million 
men,  the  marvellous  feat  which  had  been  accom- 
plished in  1914  on  the  Yser  with  five;  it  will  cer- 
tainly remain  for  a  century  an  inexhaustible  subject 
for  study  and  reflection  for  soldiers.  The  pushing 
back  of  the  enemy  on  to  the  Hindenburg  Line  and 
the  reduction  of  the  dangerous  Albert-Montdidier- 
Noyons  "  pocket  "  were  tasks  finally  achieved  by 
the  24th  of  December.  This  result  was  the  work  of 
six  Franco-British  offensives. 

FIRST  : — The  Marshal  opened  what  he  himself 
called  the  "  adventure  of  Amiens  "  by  launching 
Rawlinson  and  Debeney  between  Albert  and  Mont- 
didier.  Aircraft,  artillery  and  tanks  all  came  into 
play  with  the  greatest  energy  and  drive.  There 
was  an  immediate  advance  of  twelve  kilometres  to 
Lihous  and  Le  Quesnoy-en-Santerre.  When  that 
attack  was  exhausted  the  Marshal  launched  the 
3rd  Army  between  the  Aisne  and  the  Oise.  Hum- 
bert, its  commander,  was  somewhat  anxious.  He 
had  no  reserve  at  all.  "  Go  forward  all  the  same," 
said  the  Marshal.  He  went  forward,  he  took 
Ribecourt,  then  Canny-sur-Matz,  reaching  the  Oise 
to  the  south-east  of  Noyons. 

SECOND  : — On  the  22nd  of  August  a  new  English 
offensive  appeared  between  Albert  and  Fray-sur- 
Somme.  Albert  was  captured  and  our  allies 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS          67 

reached  the  outskirts  of  Bapaume.  At  the  same 
time  the  vigorous  French  attack  got  as  far  as  the 
river  Ailette,  carrying  Roye  and  Lassigny.  Out- 
flanked, bewildered  and  at  a  loss,  Hutier  fell  back 
on  the  29th  of  August  to  the  line  Peronne-Noyons. 
Indeed,  rather  than  spoil  the  symmetry  of  a  fine 
retreat,  he  would  not  defend  Noyons,  and  De 
Marwitz  on  his  side  abandoned  Bapaume  and 
Combles  on  the  3oth. 

THIRD  : — This  was  the  moment  in  which  to 
launch  a  great  attack  in  the  north.  The  General- 
issimo asked  it  of  Marshal  Haig.  The  latter, 
though  eager,  pointed  out  that  he  had  no  great 
force  for  such  an  action.  "  Attempt  it  all  the 
same,"  said  Foch;  and  Haig  sent  forward  Home 
and  Byng  upon  the  Scarpe,  upon  the  26th  of 
August,  thereby  bringing  about  immediately  the 
retreat  of  Von  Quast  between  Bailleul  and  Bethune. 

FOURTH  : — On  the  6th  of  September  Rawlinson 
and  Debeney  took  up  their  movement  again  between 
Peronne  and  Ham.  The  enemy  abandoned  Ham 
and  Tergnier. 

FIFTH  : — Haig  on  the  i8th  of  September  again 
took  up  the  attack,  which  he  launched  towards 
Gonzeaucourt  upon  a  front  of  20,000  yards,  and 
thus  brought  the  British  infantry  against  the 
Hindenburg  Line  itself. 

SIXTH  : — Finally,  on  the  24th  of  September  a 
vigorous  offensive  on  the  part  of  Rawlinson  and 
Debeney,  between  the  Somme  and  the  Omignon, 
threw  Von  Hutier  behind  the  great  line  of  defence 
where  it  faced  St.  Quentin. 

Upon  this  date  of  the  24th  of  September  the 
preliminary  operations  came  to  an  end.  Upon  a 
front  of  1 60  kilometres  from  the  sea  to  the  Aisne 
our  armies,  tired  and  reduced  though  they  were, 
but  with  a  heightened  moral,  were  taking  in  hand 
the  reduction  of  the  Hindenburg  Line. 


68          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

It  was  from  this  date  that  Germany,  which  had 
always  thought  itself  on  the  eve  of  victory  until 
then,  felt  that  it  was  defeated.  It  could  no  longer 
even  threaten.  The  great  pieces  which  had  fired 
on  Paris  were  now  silent. 

Here,  indeed,  one  may  see  the  full  application 
of  that  great  principle,  "  the  weaker  one  is  the  more 
one  should  attack  " ;  and  of  that  other,  drawn  from 
the  lessons  by  the  battle  of  Gravelotte  :  "In  that 
constant  race  towards  superiority  of  moralfc  the 
business  in  hand  was  to  repeat  the  necessary 
aggressive  acts  during  a  whole  day,  and  that  in 
the  absence  of  strong  •  reserves.  The  goal  was 
reached  by  isolated  actions  rather  than  by  a  common 
plan.  In  the  lack  of  a  great  common  plan,  which 
had  had  to  be  given  up,  partial  plans  were  brought 
into  being,  and  what  resulted  was  a  victory  of 
moral? all  compact  of  energy  and  of  action." 

It  is  here  necessary  to  remark  that  the  Hinden- 
burg  Line  had  already  been  breached  in  two  places. 
On  the  2nd  of  September  in  the  Artois  the  bat- 
talions of  Home,  preceded  by  tanks,  had  crushed 
and  pushed  far  into  the  Drocourt-Queant  organiza- 
tion, just  at  the  point  where  the  three  first  lines 
joined.  Marshal  Foch  had  the  ability  to  use  that 
success  later  on  before  its  value  was  lost. 

On  the  1 2th  of  September,  in  the  Argonne,  a 
brilliant  Franco-American  offensive,  supported  by 
our  armoured  cars,  had  taken  Von  Gallwitz  un- 
awares and  had  pinched  off  the  bulge  of  St.  Mihiel, 
and  brought  the  Americans  right  up  to  the  Michel 
Stellung.  This  victory  put  at  our  disposal  the 
railway  from  Verdun  to.  Nancy,  and  sensibly 
bettered  the  communications  of  this  eastern  part 
of  our  front. 

After  the  reaching  of  the  Hindenburg  Line 
assaults  were  redoubled  against  the  Wotan,  Siegfried 
and  Alberik  sectors  from  the  sea  down  to  the  Aisne. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          69 

We  have  already  remarked  that  on  the  2nd  of 
September  Home  had  breached  the  Wotan  sector. 
Marshal  Foch  gave  the  signal  on  the  22nd  of  Sep- 
tember for  another  effort  in  the  same  region,  and 
this  time  the  tanks  got  right  up  to  the  second  line 
of  defence,  in  front  of  Cambrai. 

All  that  part  of  the  Wotan  which  stretched  up 
as  far  as  Lille  was  taken  in  reverse  and  was  no 
longer  capable  of  defence.  Von  Quast  evacuated  it 
between  Armentieres  and  the  river  Scarpe. 

Immediately  afterwards,  on  the  28th  of  Sep- 
tember, the  Marshal  launched  a  Franco-Belgian 
offensive  reaching  right  up  to  the  sea-coast.  Sixt 
von  Arnim  could  hardly  hold  his  positions.  His 
army,  menaced  on  its  left  flank,  was  growing 
anxious  though  hardly  yet  demoralized.  The 
army-group  of  King  Albert  of  Belgium  went  for- 
ward easily  enough  through  the  complicated  system 
of  the  Franken,  Prussische,  and  Bayerische  Stellun- 
gen,  thus  fully  disengaging  Ypres,  Amentieres  and 
Lens.  Then,  on  the  2nd  of  October,  Rawlinson 
carried  St.  Quentin,  while  on  the  3ist  of  September 
Home  had  attacked  on  a  13,000  yards  front  towards 
Le  Catelet  and  Sequehart  and  gone  forward  deeply 
into  the  Siegfried  sector,  which  was  fully  pierced 
by  the  gth  of  October. 

On  the  3ist  of  September  Mangin  had  pressed 
back  the  right  wing  of  the  Crown  Prince  in  the 
difficult  regions  of  the  Ailette,  and  the  battalions 
of  Guillaumat  had  pushed  into  the  German  wire 
on  a  front  of  15,000  yards  between  the  Vesle  and 
the  Aisne.  On  the  4th  of  October  they  outflanked 
the  right  of  the  German  armies  in  Champagne,  and  the 
Crown  Prince  evacuated  the  belt  45  kilometres  long 
by  15  deep,  abandoning  Laon  on  the  west  and  retiring 
on  the  east  from  before  the  glorious  ruins  of  Rheims. 

Ludendorff  now  felt  that  nothing  could  ward  off 
the  approaching  catastrophe. 


70          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

The  new  Chancellor,  Prince  Max  of  Baden, 
wished  to  formulate  an  academic  Peace  pro- 
gramme and  discuss  its  terms  with  America.  Luden- 
dorff  opposed  that  plan.  The  military  situation 
permitted  of  no  delays.  If  the  necessary  time  to 
relieve  the  army  of  the  pressure  upon  it  was  to  be 
gained  and  to  confine  the  approaching  disaster 
within  certain  limits,  an  armistice  must  be  asked 
for.  Max  of  Baden  yielded  his  point  on  the  5th 
of  October. 

This  diplomatic  manoeuvre  did  not  constitute 
a  sufficient  reason  in  the  eyes  of  Marshal  Foch  for 
checking  the  military  operations. 

On  the  i2th  of  October  only  one  sector  of  the 
Hindenburg  Line  still  held  out,  the  Alberik  Stellung. 
This  was  in  the  region  of  La  Fere,  where  the  power 
of  the  first  line  was  reinforced  by  the  immediate 
neighbourhood  of  a  second;  but  this  second  line 
was  turned  on  the  north  by  English  columns 
debouching  from  St.  Quentin  and  on  the  south  by 
French  columns  debouching  from  Laon.  It  was, 
therefore,  not  even  defended,  no  more  than  was  La 
F^re,  whereas  that  place,  which  had  been  attacked 
in  more  detail,  might  have  held  our  armies  in  check 
for  some  days. 

On  the  i3th  of  October  Dixmude,  where  several 
German  battalions  were  still  holding  out,  was  carried 
by  a  Franco-Belgian  offensive.  The  army  of  Von 
Arnim  had  therefore  to  fall  back  upon  Lille,  evacuat- 
ing the  last  trenches  which  it  still  held  towards  the 
sea,  and  leaving  in  the  hands  of  our  allies  12,000 
prisoners  and  considerable  material.  The  right 
flank  of  the  German  armies  was  now  uncovered, 
and  a  turning  movement  had  become  possible  which 
would  take  in  reverse  all  the  carefully  disposed 
lines  of  defence  which  were  facing  the  south-west — 
the  direction  of  the  original  German  ambition. 
This  manoeuvre  was  emphasized  by  a  disembarka- 


PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS          71 

tion  from  the  British  Fleet  under  Admiral .  Keyes, 
executed  on  the  i6th  of  October,  in  the  port  of 
Ostend,  whence  the  enemy  had  just  fled  in  haste, 
leaving  behind  him  his  cannon  and  his  magazines, 
and  where  the  population,  in  a  fever  of  excitement 
at  their  release,  had  themselves  disarmed  the 
enemy's  stragglers.  The  outflanking  movement 
was  also  reinforced  by  an  offensive  movement  of 
the  Franco-Belgian  army,  which  caused  Thourout, 
Thielt  and  Courtrai  to  fall,  and  brought  the  allies 
to  the  south  of  the  river  Lys,  while  Von  Arnim  fell 
back  behind  the  river  Deule,  abandoning  the  coast 
and  its  batteries  up  to  the  Bruges  Canal. 

The  Higher  German  Command  could  no  longer 
count  on  anything  but  certain  water-lines  to  prolong 
its  resistance  upon  this  side.  Its  strong  defensive 
organizations  had  been  passed  and  the  open  plain 
unrolled  before  the  Allied  cavalry,  which  was 
scouting  as  early  as  the  igth  of  October  on  a 
front  of  sixty  kilometres  for  the  general  offensive 
of  the  armies  of  Flanders  which  Marshal  Foch  was 
launching  in  the  direction  of  Ghent. 

On  the  20th  of  October  the  general  situation 
might  be  summed  up  as  follows.  The  Hindenburg 
Line  no  longer  existed  from  the  sea  right  down  to 
the  Argonne.  All  the  northern  part  of  the  Second 
Line  was  in  our  power  right  to  Rethel — that  is, 
over  an  extent  of  160  kilometres ;  and  on  that  same 
day  a  powerful  attack  delivered  by  Guillaumat  was 
to  carry  the  Hunding  Stellung  over  a  front  of  fifty 
kilometres  down  to  the  region  of  Sissone.  The 
Third  Line  was  still  nearly  intact,  save  near  Le 
Cateau;  but  it  was  taken  in  reverse  by  the  great 
outflanking  attack  which  was  in  progress  upon  the 
north  and  which,  as  it  had  reached  Toucoing  and 
Roubaix,  also  menaced  the  Fourth  Line. 

The  defeat  of  Germany  thus  clearly  inscribed 
upon  the  ground  and  map  appears  equally  clearly 


72          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

from  an  examination   of   the  German   forces   dis- 
ponible. 

The  German  Higher  Command  had  now  in  line 
only  160  reduced  divisions,  which  is  very  little 
for  the  holding  of  750  kilometres.  Of  this  number 
it  had  but  thirty-one  in  sector-reserves  to  assure 
the  relief  of  troops  and  to  give  the  men  the  absolutely 
indispensable  minimum  of  repose.  It  only  had, 
to  use  as  a  mass  of  manoeuvre,  ten  exhausted 
divisions  left  in  the  place  of  the  twenty-four  which 
it  could  still  boast  on  the  2nd  of  October,  and  of 
the  forty-five  which  it  had  in  hand  on  the  I5th 
of  August.  Upon  our  side,  on  the  contrary,  to 
the  105  French  divisions,  the  sixty  British,  the 
twelve  Belgian  and  the  two  Italian,  there  had 
already  been  added  twenty-six  American  divisions, 
each  in  strength  of  effectives  double  our  own ;  while 
ten  more  American  divisions  were  on  the  point  of 
coming  in.  There  were  therefore  now  present 
215  divisions  upon  our  side,  about  equivalent  in 
strength  to  251  German  divisions.  It  was  no 
longer  possible  for  the  enemy  to  preserve  any 
illusion  or  keep  his  eyes  closed.  Ludendorff  took 
fright  at  the  complete  breakdown  of  his  system  of 
defence  and  at  the  menace  of  a  turning  manoeuvre 
to  which  he  could  make  no  reply.  He  declared 
the  situation  to  be  desperate,  and  the  Reichstag 
was  warned  in  two  tumultuous  sessions  on  the 
24th  and  25th  of  October  that  a  catastrophe  was 
imminent. 

The  armistice  conditions  imposed  by  the  Allies 
and  communicated  by  Marshal  Foch  to  the  German 
plenipotentiaries  underlined  the  defeat.  There  was 
no  longer  any  question  of  peace  proposals;  there 
was  question  only  of  a  capitulation,  in  every  way 
similar  to  that  which  Bulgaria  had  accepted  and 
which  Austria  was  on  the  point  of  accepting.  The 
Fleet,  the  pride  of  pan-Germanism,  must  be  sur- 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          73 

rendered ;  Belgium  and  all  French  territory,  includ- 
ing Alsace-Lorraine,  must  be  evacuated ;  the  French 
Army  must  occupy  Metz  and  Strassburg,  and  the 
enemy  must  allow  the  Allied  Armies  to  hold  the 
bridge-heads  of  the  Rhine.  Marshal  Foch  still 
struck  with  great  rapidity  and  greater  and  greater 
vigour,  depriving  Ludendorff  of  all  liberty  of  action 
and  of  all  possibility  of  rallying.  The  German 
General  Staff  had  but  one  chance  for  avoiding  the 
fatal  blow,  and  that  was  to  give  ground  on  a  very 
great  scale  and  at  the  expense  of  extremely  rapid 
marching,  to  put  its  armies  together  again  far  to 
the  rear,  as  for  instance  behind  the  Meuse.  It  had 
successfully  carried  out  such  manoeuvres  from  the 
Marne  to  the  Aisne  in  1914  and  after  the  Battle  of 
the  Somme  in  1917.  But  now,  dogged  without 
respite  by  our  troops,  who,  exhausted  and  deci- 
mated but  kept  up  to  the  mark  by  the  idea  of 
victory  and  ceaselessly  urged  forward  by  an  iron 
will,  the  enemy  could  not  renew  the  experiment. 
The  German  units  disengaged  themselves  and  retired 
each  as  best  it  could,  sometimes  in  mere  flight, 
always  leaving  behind  them  many  men  and  an 
enormous  mass  of  material. 

On  the  28th  of  October,  between  the  Sambre 
and  the  Serre,  Hutier  gave  up  a  belt  twenty-five 
kilometres  long  by  eight  kilometres  broad,  to 
Debeney,  to  avoid  a  breach  of  his  line,  but  without 
succeeding  in  making  Debeney  lose  contact.  On 
the  2nd  of  November  the  British  Army  got  round 
Valenciennes,  the  right-hand  pivot  of  the  fourth 
and  last  line  of  defence.  On  the  5th  of  November, 
Home,  Byng,  Rawlinson  and  Debeney  let  loose 
a  strong  attack  sixty  kilometres  long,  between 
Valenciennes  and  Guise,  and  this  brilliant  operation 
secured  13,000  prisoners.  Landrecies,  the  Forest 
of  Mormal,  and  the  last  defences  of  the  Third  Line 
were  carried.  On  that  same  day,  to  the  north  of  the 


74          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

Argonne,  the  Americans  went  forward  five  kilometres 
on  a  front  of  thirty,  and  King  Albert's  group  of 
armies  already  threatened  Ghent. 

Ludendorff,  against  whom  the  anger  of  all 
Germany  had  now  turned,  was  replaced  as  First 
Quartermaster-General  by  General  Greener,  but 
the  latter  had  no  more  luck  than  his  predecessor. 
In  vain  did  Hindenburg  on  the  2nd  of  November 
solemnly  adjure  Germany  to  make  one  last  effort 
to  save  its  honour.  Germany  had  decided  to 
capitulate.  In  vain  did  the  old  Marshal  call  into 
being  a  Council  of  National  Defence  on  the  5th  of 
November,  at  the  moment  when  the  Third  Line 
of  defence  was  breaking  down,  with  the  object 
of  organizing  a  fight  to  the  very  end.  Greener, 
in  order  to  avoid  the  final  blow,  called  in  his  turn 
for  the  immediate  signature  of  the  armistice  at 
no  matter  what  price,  and  to  gain  even  a  single 
day  he  fell  back  from  Valenciennes  to  the  Meuse 
over  eight  or  ten  kilometres,  followed  step  for  step 
by  the  eager  columns  of  Debeney,  Mangin,  Degoutte,. 
Guillaumat  and  Gouraud. 

On  the  yth  of  November,  before  the  armistice 
was  signed,  he  fell  back  with  Valenciennes  as  his 
pivot.  The  retreat  in  the  centre  was  of  no  less 
than  eighteen  kilometres,  and  on  our  right  the 
Americans  entered  Sedan.  Foch  maintained  his 
hold.  "  Victory,"  he  had  himself  once  said,  "  is 
an  inclined  plain.  On  condition  that  you  do  not 
check  your  movement  the  moving  mass  perpetually 
increases  its  speed." 

On  the  gth  of  November  the  retreat  grew  rapid 
between  Ghent  and  the  Meuse.  Our  cavalry,  sent 
forward  to  forage,  captured  whole  trains  of  material 
and  provisions.  Our  armies  advanced  along  the 
whole  of  the  immense  line.  A  last  offensive  was 
ready  to  be  delivered  in  the  east,  where  Castelnau's 
group  was  to  strike  in  touch  with  the  American 


PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS          75 

Army,  which  had  suffered  the  least.  Probably  this 
shock,  delivered  by  young  and  eager  troops,  against 
tired,  demoralized  and  reduced  units,  short  of 
munitionment,  would  have  brought  about  the 
rupture  of  the  centre,  the  pouring  of  the  allied 
masses  through  an  open  breach,  and  the  capture  of 
the  five  armies  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria 
still  remaining  in  Belgium.  If  a  rout,  which  had 
become  by  this  time  inevitable,  was  to  be  avoided, 
there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  capitulate  within 
twenty-four  hours. 

On  the  nth  of  November  the  armistice  was 
signed  and  the  German  Empire  capitulated  uncon- 
ditionally. 

We  see,  then,  that  the  victory  of  Marshal  Foch, 
the  greatest  and  most  complete  in  history,  had 
not  the  external  character  which  victories  have 
borne  through  centuries;  a  decisive  attack,  the 
breach  of  the  enemy's  formation,  his  flight,  and 
a  pursuit.  It  did  not  bear  this  external  appearance 
because  Germany,  a  nation  in  arms,  had  capitulated 
as  a  whole,  in  order  to  avoid  the  destruction  of 
its  troops. 

France  in  1871  thought  it  her  duty  to  continue 
the  struggle  for  honour  after  the  complete  destruc- 
tion of  her  army.  To  this  resolution  she  owes  in 
great  part  the  glory,  she  at  present  enjoys.  That  is 
well  enough;  but  what,  in  the  light  of  historical 
fact,  we  must  never  allow  to  be  said  or  thought, 
is  that  the  German  Army  was  not  conquered.  We 
must  clearly  understand  that  if  the  German  regi- 
ments in  their  return  to  German  towns  passed  under 
triumphal  arches  it  was  because  the  capitulation 
of  Germany  as  a  whole  had  saved  them  from 
disaster.  The  army  of  Bazaine  was  not  conquered 
in  1870.  It  had  even  proved  victorious  at  Borny, 
at  Rosenville,  at  Ladonchamps,  and  elsewhere. 
Then  its  chief  capitulated.  It  never  came  into 


76          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

our  heads  to  say  that  the  army  of  Metz  had  not 
been  defeated. 

The  representatives  of  the  nation  were  certainly 
of  the  opinion  here  put  forward.  On  the  nth  of 
November,  when  the  Prime  Minister,  M.  Georges 
Clemenceau,  a  last  and  glorious  survivor  of  those 
who  had  drawn  up  the  national  Protest  in  1871, 
entered  the  Tribune  of  the  Chamber  to  read  the 
text  of  the  armistice,  the  Deputies  replied  that  the 
following  order  of  the  day,  enthusiastically  adopted 
upon  the  vote  of  495  members:  "The  Armies  of 
the  Republic  and  their  Chiefs,  Citizen  Georges 
Clemenceau,  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of  War, 
Marshal  Foch,  Generalissimo  of  the  Allied  Armies, 
have  deserved  well  of  their  country." 

The  brilliant  career  of  Marshal  Foch  is  not  over. 
His  armies  are  at  this  moment  on  guard  along  the 
Rhine,  seeing  to  it  that  a  defeated  Germany  shall 
exactly  carry  out  that  to  which  she  is  pledged. 
Meanwhile,  at  the  conference  table,  the  laws  of  a 
new  world  are  under  discussion ;  and  the  Marshal 
is  there  also,  the  counsellor  of  the  diplomatists, 
standing,  to  the  end,  where  danger  threatens. 

The  presence  of  this  great  soldier  in  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  congress,  where  so  many  different  and 
conflicting  interests  are  at  work,  is  a  sure  guarantee 
that  France  will  not  be  deprived  of  the  benefits  of 
a  victory  which  she  has  bought  so  dearly  with  the 
best  of  her  blood. 


PRECEPTS 


ACTION. — In  tactics,  action  is  the  governing 
rule  of  war. 

ACTION  OF  DEMONSTRATION.— Though  pre- 
liminary action  is  often  termed  a  combat  of 
mere  demonstration,  it  implies  an  extreme 
energy  on  the  part  of  the  performers.  For 
troops  in  action,  for  secondary  first-line  units, 
there  is  only  one  manner  of  fighting,  and  that 
is  to  fight  with  the  utmost  vigour,  with  all 
available  means,  utilizing  fire,  marching  power, 
everything.  These  are  the  only  principles 
the  rank  and  file  and  units  used  in  prepara- 
tion need  consider.  To  speak  to  them  of  a 
demonstration,  a  dragging  fight,  a  slow  action, 
still  more  of  keeping  still,  would  amount  to 
inducing  them  not  to  act,  to  preparing  them 
for  flight,  to  breaking  their  spirit  at  the  very 
moment  when  that  spirit  must  be  most 
exalted. 

Such  an  action,  both  slow  and  of  long  dura- 
tion, which  preparation  demands,  is  a  result 
of  the  commander's  applying  the  principle 
of  economy  of  forces  in  a  fashion  he  alone 
can  appreciate  and  determine. 

79 


80          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

The  higher  command  devotes  to  prepara- 
tion a  minimum  of  force,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
reinforce  the  decisive  act  as  strongly  as 
possible;  the  subordinate  commanders,  who 
are  in  charge  of  preparation,  establish  and 
reinforce  their  three  lines  according  to  the 
front  ascribed  to  them  and  to  the  efforts  to 
be  made.  The  rank  and  file,  however,  when 
in  action,  must  only  know  full  action,  the 
object  of  which  is  to  conquer  or  to  hold. 

In  consequence,  every  attack,  once  undertaken, 
must  be  fought  to  a  finish ;  every  defence, 
once  begun,  must  be  carried  on  with  the  utmost 
energy. 

ACTIVITY  OF  GENERALS.— The  Commander 
of  the  2nd  Army  having  been  informed 
at  last  at  two  o'clock,  by  a  message  from  the 
General  commanding  the  2oth  Division  and 
dated  Thiaucourt,  11.30,  galloped  to  the 
plateau.  He  covered  in  fifty-five  minutes 
the  space  of  more  than  twenty  kilometres 
between  it  and  Pont-a-Mousson. 

Having  come  before  four  o'clock  to  the 
heights  which  overlook  Gorze,  on  which  the 
5th  Division  was  fighting,  he  could  gather 
what  the  general  situation  was,  and  his 
decision  was  rapidly  formed. 

Towards  ten  o'clock,  after  the  last  shots  had 
tbeen  fired  in  the  wood  of  Ognons  and  silence 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS          81 

came   upon    the   plateau,    Prince   Frederick 
Charles  returned  to  his  headquarters  at  Gorze. 

ADVANCE  GUARD. —  The  organ  which 
guarantees  the  tactical  security  of  a  large 
unit  (of  an  army  corps  in  the  case  under 
consideration)  is  the  advance  guard,  meaning 
by  this  general  term  a  detachment  placed 
on  the  flank,  in  front  or  in  the  rear  of  the 
main  body;  such  a  detachment  to  utilize 
in  any  case  its  own  resisting  power  for  the 
benefit  of  the  main  body,  in  order  to  enable 
that  body  to  carry  out  the  operation  pre- 
scribed and  to  comply  with  the  orders  received. 
Further,  as  that  operation,  those  orders, 
are  constantly  changing,  it  may  be  at  once 
concluded  that  the  manner  of  acting  of  the 
advance  guard,  the  tactics  it  will  have  to 
resort  to,  will  have  to  be  determined  in  each 
particular  case  by  the  nature  of  the  operation 
to  be  protected  as  well  as  by  the  circumstances 
(time,  space,  ground)  surrounding  the  advance 
guard  as  it  moves  forward. 

When  one  moves  at  night,  without  a  light, 
in  one's  own  house,  what  does  one  do  ?  Does 
.  one  not  (though  it  is  a  ground  one  knows  well) 
extend  one's  arm  in  front  of  one  so  as  to 
avoid  knocking  one's  head  against  the  wall  ? 
The  extended  arm  is  nothing  but  an  advance 
guard. 


82          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

The  arm  keeps  its  suppleness  while  it 
advances  and  only  stiffens  more  or  less  when 
it  meets  an  obstacle,  in  order  to  perform  its 
duty  without  risk,  to  open  a  door,  for  instance ; 
in  the  same  way,  the  advance  guard  can 
advance  and  go  into  action  without  risking 
destruction,  provided  it  uses  suppleness  and 
strength,  manoeuvring  power,  resisting  power. 

In  the  past,  the  unknown  disappeared  the 
moment  the  battle-field  was  entered. 

In  Napoleon's  time,  fighting  dispositions 
were  taken  at  a  very  short  distance  in  presence 
of  an  enemy  one  could  easily  see,  the  power 
and  situation  of  whom  could  be  easily 
measured.  Later,  in  proportion  as  the  range 
and  power  of  arms  increased,  distances 
increased  too ;  troops  had  to  look  for  shelter, 
to  adopt  a  more  and  more  dispersed  order. 
Still,  the  smoke  produced  by  powder  enabled 
the  general  to  reconnoitre,  at  least  partly, 
the  first  dispositions  of  the  enemy.  The 
latter  disclosed  by  his  fire  the  positions 
he  was  occupying.  Smokeless  powder  has 
changed  the  picture  and  made  the  unknown 
both  complete  and  lasting.  Going  into  action 
to-day  reminds  one  of  a  struggle  between 
two  blind  men,  between  two  adversaries  who 
perpetually  seek  each  other  but  cannot  see. 
Shall  our  new  method,  then,  consist  in  rushing 
straight  on,  or  to  the  right,  or  to  the  left, 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS          83 

at  random?  Shall  we  allow  the  enemy  to 
throw  his  arms  round  our  body,  to  grasp  us 
completely,  without  our  retaining  the  possi- 
bility of  first  grasping  him  ourselves,  and  of 
striking  hard?  Obviously  not.  In  order  to 
conquer  that  unknown  v/hich  follows  us 
until  the  very  point  of  going  into  action,  there 
is  only  one  means,  which  consists  in  looking 
out  until  the  last  moment,  even  on  the  battle- 
field, for  information  ;  there  is  only  one  way  : 
extending  the  arm  before  one,  utilizing  the 
advance  guard,  which  keeps  searching  for,  and 
supplying,  information  even  on  the  battle-field. 

To  inform,  and,  therefore,  to  reconnoitre, 
this  is  the  first  and  constant  duty  of  the 
advance  guard. 

On  what  should  it  give  information?  On 
the  main  body  of  the  enemy  forces. 

At  Pouilly,  the  Kettler  brigade  found  itself 
before  parties  of  francs-tireurs  who  obscured 
the  field  of  view;  it  was  necessary  to  try 
and  see  beyond  them.  An  advance  guard  was 
sent  out.  It  scattered  those  parties,  started 
reconnoitring,  then  attacked  the  village  of 
Pouilly. 

It  found  the  main  line  of  resistance  of  the 
enemy  behind  that  place;  its  mission  had 
then  come  to  an  end. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  enemy,  with  his 
reconnaissances,  with  his  detachments  of 


84  PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

all  kinds,  is  everywhere.  Still,  his  main 
body  is  only  to  be  found  on  one  point,  in  a 
certain  region.  It  is  the  main  body  we  must 
strike;  it  is  against  the  main  body  we  must 
guard  ourselves  ;  it  is  the  main  body,  therefore, 
on  which  we  must  have  information.  We 
must  know  where  that  main  body  actually 
is;  therefore,  we  must  break  through  the 
security  service  which  obviously  covers  it. 
Our  organ  of  information  has  therefore  to  be 
endowed  with  force,  to  possess  a  breaking 
power.  But  even  this  does  not  suffice;  we 
must  know  what  the  main  body  is,  what  it  is 
worth.  The  advance  guard  must,  then,  in 
order  to  compel  the  main  body  of  the  adver- 
sary to  make  itself  known,  oblige  it  to  deploy ; 
but  that  task  presupposes  attack — that  is, 
full  forces  in  artillery  and  infantry. 

The  reconnoitring  mission  of  the  advance 
guard  must  be  pushed  up  to  that  point — 
full  information  on  the  main  enemy  body  : 
that  mission  comes  to  an  end  when  this  first 
point,  information  about  the  enemy's  main 
body,  has  been  secured. 

There  is,  however,  another  circumstance 
which  impedes  our  manoeuvre,  namely, 
dispersion. 

Troops  arrive  in  a  marching  column,  or 
even  in  several  marching  columns  :  it  takes 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          85 

an  army  corps,  thirteen  or  fourteen  miles 
long,  five  or  six  hours  to  march  past  a  given 
point  or  to  make  the  rear  come  up  with  the 
head  of  the  column;  for  these  five  or  six 
hours,  the  army  corps  only  disposes  of  part 
of  its  forces.  Still  the  officer  commanding 
the  army  corps  cannot  think  of  pouring  his 
forces  drop  by  drop  into  action,  even  if  he 
is  aware  of  the  direction  to  be  taken;  he 
must  therefore  first  manage  to  assemble, 
then  to  deploy  and  array  his  troops  facing 
their  objective. 

Under  different  circumstances,  another 
mode  of  assembling  has  to  be  resorted  to. 

The  army  of  Alsace  in  1870  had  to  con- 
centrate its  ist,  5th,  and  7th  Corps  before 
risking  a  battle;  its  advance  guard,  the 
Douai  division,  might  enable  it  to  do  so. 

It  was  the  same  case  at  Jena,  at  Montenotte. 

In  either  case,  the  preparatory  operation, 
which  may  last  a  long  time,  must  be  covered ; 
otherwise  it  will  be  endangered.  This  implies 
security,  which  it  is  the  business  of  the  advance 
guard  to  supply.  The  latter  must  enable 
all  the  fighting  troops  to  fall  into  line  in  spite 
of  the  enemy's  presence. 

To  cover  the  forces,  first  while  assembling, 
then  while  being  put  into  action,  such  is  the 
second  mission  devolving  on  the  advance 
guard. 


86          PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

The  main  body  must  in  any  case  be  pro- 
vided with  a  zone  of  manoeuvre,  but  it  is  also 
necessary  to  hold  safely  all  the  issues  which 
the  main  body  must  utilize  in  order  to  deploy. 

To  hold  these  issues  safely  means  enabling 
troops  to  perform  under  good  cover  the  double 
operation  of  arrival  and  deployment.  The 
advance  guard  must  hold  the  keys  of  the 
avenues  of  approach  whereby  arrival  is 
effected  or  debouching  from  which  deploy- 
ment is  made. 

But  there  remains  a  further  point.  So  long 
as  we  have  not  beaten  or  at  least  attacked 
the  enemy,  he  keeps  his  freedom  of  action  ;  he 
remains  free  to  alter  his  situation  or  to  shun 
the  manoeuvre  we  are  preparing  against  him. 

The  two  first  results  attained  by  the  advance 
guard— 

The  reconnoitring  of  the  enemy  : 

The  covering  of  our  own  forces — these 
would  not  be  of  the  slightest  use  to  us  if  the 
advance  guard  did  no  more. 

The  reconnoitred  enemy  might  at  the 
last  moment  alter  his  dispositions,  or,  if  need 
be,  steal  away.  The  manoeuvre  we  had 
carefully  prepared  and  covered  would  be 
void  from  the  very  moment  we  began  to 
carry  it  out. 

The  reconnaissance  must  therefore  be 
followed  by  an  attack,  made  by  the  advance 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          87 

guard  with  the  object  of  fixing  the  adversary, 
more  especially  if,  in  the  course  of  the  recon- 
naissance, the  enemy  has  been  found  to  be 
manoeuvring. 

You  cannot  strike  an  enemy  who  is  running 
away  in  order  to  shun  the  blow.  You  must 
first  take  him  by  the  collar  to  compel  him  to 
receive  the  blow. 

Taking  the  enemy  by  the  collar  is  the 
function  of  the  advance  guard. 

Those  three  unavoidable  conditions  of  war  : 
the  unknown,  dispersion,  freedom  of  the  enemy, 
gave  rise  to  the  advance  guard  and  determine 
its  threefold  task,  which  is : 

1.  To  inform,  and  therefore  to  reconnoitre  up 
to  the  moment  the  main  body  goes  into  action. 

2.  To   cover    the    gathering   of    the   main 
body  and  to  prepare  its  entrance  on  the  field. 

3.  To     fix     the     adversary    one     intends 
attacking. 

The  proper  way  of  handling  an  advance 
guard  naturally  results  from  this  threefold 
task  : 

I.  There  must  be  an  offensive — 
i.  In  order  to  reconnoitre;  that  is,  in 
order  to  peer  through  the  service  of  security 
established  on  his  side  by  the  adversary,  and 
to  reach  his  main  body  and  compel  it  to  show 
itself. 


88          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

2.  In  order  to  conquer  the  ground  necessary 
to  the  protective  mission  of  the  advance  guard. 

3.  In  order  to  conquer  the  ground  necessary 
to  its  own  preparatory  mission,  as  well  as  the 
space  needed  by  the  main  body  for  going 
into  action;    room  for  approach,  and  room 
of  deployment. 

That  offensive  must,  however,  be  methodi- 
cally conducted. 

II.  Then  there  must  be  a  defensive,  after 
one  has  finished  scouting ;    after  one  holds 
the  ground  necessary  to  the  protection  and 
preparation  of  the  main  body's  action,  and 
after  one  has  nothing  left  to  do  but  to  keep  it. 

So  regarded,  the  tactics  of  the  advance 
guard  make  an  appeal  to  the  resisting  power 
of  a  force,  and  to  its  ability  to  last  out.  They 
utilize  to  this  end  everything  which  may 
further  these  two  distinct  properties,  positions, 
"points  d'appui,"  long-range  fire,  manoeu- 
vring to  the  rear,  in  retreat. 

III.  Lastly   comes   an   offensive   again,   in 
order  to  immobilize  an  adversary  who  might 
otherwise  get  away  or  manoeuvre. 

The  composition  of  the  advance  guard : 
This    composition    is    determined    by    the 

threefold  mission  an  advance  guard  has  to 

fulfil : 

In  order  to  reconnoitre,  you  obviously  need 

cavalry ;  but  infantry  and  artillery  are  equally 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          89 

needed  in  order  to  overcome  the  first  resistance 
of  the  enemy,  to  reach  his  main  body,  and  to 
compel  the  latter  to  deploy. 

In  order  to  cover  and  to  last  out,  firing  troops, 
moreover  troops  firing  at  a  long  range,  are, 
as  we  have  seen,  indispensable;  they  must 
be  capable  of  resistance,  of  holding  their 
ground  strongly  :  hence  the  need  of  infantry 
and  artillery. 

In  order  to  fix  the  enemy,  the  offensive 
must  obviously  be,  resorted  to  and  must  be 
carried  far  enough  to  threaten  the  adversary 
at  close  quarters,  otherwise  he  may  escape  : 
the  more  need  for  infantry. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  advance 
guard  must  be  composed  of  all  three  arms, 
if  it  is  to  become  that  organ  of  information, 
of  protection,  and  of  preparation,  which  we 
desire. 

The  advance  guard,  then,  needs  all  three 
arms.  And  as  it  acts  independently,  it  must 
also  be  under  a  single  commander. 

***** 

Of  the  advance  guard  with  its  threefold 
mission  : 

To  inform ; 
To  protect; 

To  come  up  to,  and  keep  in  touch  with,  the 
enemy ; 


90          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

we  might  also  say  that  it  is  necessary  up  to 
the  very  moment  when  the  main  body  goes 
into  action,  that  is,  until  the  main  body  has 
actually  deployed  and  begun  to  act  upon  the 
enemy. 

We  insist  on  this  point  because  people 
willingly  acknowledge,  in  practice,  an  advance 
guard  to  be  necessary  in  front  of  a  marching 
column ;  they  are  less  prepared  to  acknow- 
ledge that  necessity  where  an  assembled  force 
is  concerned;  they  deny  it  altogether  con- 
cerning a  deployed  force. 

***** 

In  countries  with  numerous  communica- 
tions, one  ought  not  to  manoeuvre  a  priori 
against  an  enemy  in  possession  of  his  freedom 
of  movement.  One  ought  to  begin  by  getting 
hold  of  him ;  once  that  preliminary  condition 
has  been  fulfilled,  the  opportunity  will  arise 
to  carry  out  a  manoeuvre  the  effect  of  which 
shall  be  safe  and  certain. 

The  advance  guard,  which  has  fulfilled  the 
first  part  of  the  task,  getting  information, 
must  then  fulfil  the  second,  keeping  a  hold 
on  the  adversary,  keeping  actually  in  touch 
with  him,  so  as  to  make  it  possible  to  organize 
a  well-founded  and  right  manoeuvre,  that  is, 
a  manoeuvre  corresponding  to  the  circumstances. 
The  advance  guard  attacks  the  enemy  if  he 
tries  to  escape.  It  resists  by  means  of  a 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          91 

defensive  and  of  a  retreating  manoeuvre  if 
he  attacks. 

ADVANCE  GUARD,  IN  RETREAT.— His  l  tactics 
are  an  excellent  example  of  the  tactics  which 
should  be  employed  by  retreating  outposts. 
The  line  of  retreat  should  be  safeguarded ;  the 
main  points  of  it  occupied  in  time;  such 
movements  of  the  enemy  as  might  endanger 
'it,  watched;  fighting  troops  which  one  intend 
to  withdraw  should  not  be  reinforced.  Such 
troops  should  successively  retire  under  pro- 
tection of  supporting  troops.  Finally,  the 
main  body  must  fall  back  without  the  enemy 
perceiving  the  movement  (so  far  as  this  is 
possible),  and  covered  by  a  rear  guard  which 
later  on  falls  back  upon  and  is  received  by  the 
main  force. 

Retreating  advance  guards  must  fight,  while 
keeping  in  mind  their  twofold  task  :  observing 
the  enemy  and  delaying  him  in  his  approaches. 

Advance  guards  delay  the  enemy,  by  com- 
pelling him  to  take  up  fighting  dispositions, 
to  assemble,  to  deploy,  to  use  his  superiority 
in  order  to  outflank. 

The  nature  of  the  ground,  as  well  as  the 
distance  of  the  force  to  be  covered,  determine, 
of  course,  how  long  the  resistance  must  last ; 

1  General  Cervoni's  in  the  Voltri  affair  (Italian 
Campaign  of  1796). 


92          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

however,  under  any  circumstances,  the  losses 
will  depend  upon  the  resistance  one  has  de- 
cided to  make.  And  it  is  also  for  this  reason 
that  resistance  must  not  be  resorted  to 
whenever  the  necessary  time  can  be  secured 
in  another  way. 


The  difficulties  of  a  running  fight  are : 
(i)  the  danger  of  being  turned  :  once  turned, 
the  advance  guard  no  longer  covers  the  main 
body;  it  may,  besides,  be  cut  off;  (2)  the 
danger  of  being  assaulted  from  too  short  a 
distance,  which  makes  it  very  difficult  to 
extricate  the  fighting  troops;  and  (3)  the 
necessity  of  fighting  by  fire  and  from  a  great 
distance,  in  order  to  act  on  the  enemy  at 
long  range. 

The  arrangement  of  forces  corresponding 
to  these  various  conditions  generally  consists 
in  having  each  of  the  successive  positions 
occupied  by  a  relatively  strong  body  of 
artillery,  in  principle  by  all  the  guns  available  ; 
and  by  infantry  numbers  proportionately 
sufficient  to  guard  and  support  that  artillery ; 
while  the  remainder  of  the  infantry  prepare, 
and  carry  out  the  occupation  of,  the  second 
position. 

Numerous  cavalry  are  also  required  to 
discover  and  parry  outflanking  movements. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          93 

They  usually  form  the  reserve  on  each  position 
taken. 

Thus  an  advance  guard  consisting  of  six 
battalions,  six  batteries,  six  squadrons,  will, 
as  a  rule,  bring  up  to  the  first  position  its 
six  batteries,  two  or  three  battalions,  and  its 
six  squadrons,  while  the  other  battalions 
occupy  the  second  position,  where  the  artillery 
will  join  them  at  a  trot  after  leaving  the  first 
position;  finally,  the  cavalry  covers  the 
retreat  of  the  last  infantry  elements  from  the 
first  position  and  afterwards  resumes  its  r6le 
of  a  general  reserve. 

In  an  advance  guard  manoeuvring  in  retreat 
so  as  to  cover  a  manoeuvre  of  the  main  body, 
as  well  as  in  an  advance  guard  going  ahead 
in  order  to  find  and  seize  the  enemy,  a  strong 
body  of  cavalry,  supported  by  artillery  and 
infantry,  is  a  necessary  part. 

THE   ADVANCE   GUARD.     GENERAL   REMARKS. 

— In  the  Napoleonic  system,  thanks  to  an 
organism  designed  to  give  security  and  kept 
at  high  tension  and  called  "  covering  troops  " 
or  "  general  advance  guard,"  a  defensive 
concentration  does  not  only  mean  a  defensive 
battle,  still  less  the  successful  occupation  of 
a  given  position,  but  rather  the  power  to 
parry  the  enemy's  attack  by  some  final 
manoeuvre  which  will  be  defensive  or  offensive 


94          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

according  to  circumstances,  and  will  always 
be  secure  of  its  power  of  action.  For  instance, 
supposing  it  is  one's  business  to  execute  a 
defensive  manoeuvre;  the  operation  evidently 
involves  the  occupation  of  some  position 
which  has  been  chosen  definitely  beforehand. 
But  there  is  no  necessity  that  the  troops 
should  have  been  previously  kept  in  the 
proximity  of  this  position,  for  the  organism 
designed  to  give  security  guarantees  them, 
just  at  the  moment  when  the  need  arises,  the 
time  and  space  to  reach  the  position  and  to 
establish  themselves  there.  If  this  arrange- 
ment of  a  general  advance  guard  had  been 
applied  by  Moltke  in  1870  it  would  have  per- 
mitted him  further  to  extend  the  region  over 
which  the  2nd  Army  gathered  upon  the 
line ;  to  bring  up  part  of  his  forces  further  to 
the  south,  and,  when  the  moment  had  come, 
to  march  towards  the  Neunkirchen-Homburg 
district  to  make  use  of  a  third  road,  that  from 
Landau  to  Pirmasens,  which  road  was,  more- 
over, covered  by  the  3rd  Army.  He  could 
have  turned  two  army  corps  on  to  that  road, 
and  have  thus  lightened  and  improved  his 
movements  across  a  belt  of  country  densely 
wooded  and  still  difficult. 

ARMIES,  GROUPS  OF. — An  army,  like  an  army 
corps,  is  nowadays  a  subordinate  unit.     It 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          95 

does  not  involve  creation,  the  exercise  of  an 
art,  but  simply  execution.  One  has  to  rise 
higher  and  study  the  functioning  of  a  group 
of  armies.  Then  only  do  the  accomplished 
facts  reappear  as  a  suitable  field  to  explora- 
tion, to  nourish  our  study  and  to  provide  our 
theories  with  some  foundation. 

ARMIES  ORGANIZED.— After  Metz  and  Sedan 
there  remained  no  army  in  France  worthy 
of  that  name,  and  yet,  in  spite  of  all,  the 
enemy  was  compelled  to  a  hard  campaign  of 
four  months  before  he  could  get  peace. 
Armies  fully  organized  do  not,  therefore, 
represent  the  whole  of  a  country's  military 
resources. 

ART  OF  COMMAND. — The  art  of  command  is 
not  that  of  thinking  and  deciding  for  one's 
subordinates  as  though  one  stood  in  their 
shoes. 

ART  OF  WAR. — The  art  of  war,  like  every 
other  art,  has  its  theory  and  its  principles, 
or  it  would  not  be  an  art. 

The  art  of  war  does  not  consist  for  the 
highest  officers  and  for  the  commanders  of  an 
advance  guard  in  falling  upon  the  enemy  like 
a  wild  boar.  In  order  to  have  a  general 
common  action  there  must  be  mutual  under- 


96          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

standing  and  there  must  be  consultation  and 
submission  of  the  subordinate  to  a  direction 
above  himself,  which  direction  is  not  limited 
to  the  drawing  up  of  plans,  but  has  the  task 
also  of  effective  command.  What  would  one 
say  of  the  conductor  of  some  orchestra  who, 
after  having  indicated  what  piece  of  music 
was  to  be  played,  should  withdraw  to  a 
distance  from  the  instruments,  leaving  to  the 
executants  the  duty  of  starting  the  affair  and 
arranging  it  among  themselves  as  best  they 
could  manage  it  ? 

ARTILLERY.  —  The  Austrian  artillery  had 
also  proved  very  superior  to  the  Prussian 
artillery  in  armament,  in  tactics  and  in 
training ;  they  were,  in  consequence,  superior 
in  their  fire.  They  inflicted  on  the  succes- 
sively arriving  Prussian  batteries  losses  which 
prevented  the  latter  from  keeping  up  the 
struggle.  In  spite  of  that,  the  Prussians 
conquered  at  the  end  of  the  day.  Artillery 
action  is  not,  then,  any  more  than  cavalry 
action,  of  such  a  decisive  value  as  to  settle 
finally  the  result  of  a  battle. 

In  the  future  we  shall  frequently  see  artillery 
action  remain  indecisive,  on  account  of  the 
range  and  of  the  difficulty  of  observation  with 
smokeless  powder.  Should  we  check  our 
attack,  for  that  reason,  until  our  artillery 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          97 

has    secured    an   undisputable   superiority  ? 
Obviously  not. 

.  ARTILLERY,  HEAVY. — Side  by  side  with  the 
quick-firing  light  field-piece  are  to  be  found 
in  all  the  German  army  corps  a  group  of 
howitzers  of  loj  centimetres  calibre,  and  in 
certain  army  corps  batteries  normally  with 
out-teams,  but  furnished  with  harness,  and 
consisting  some  of  mortars  of  21  centi- 
metres, which  are  destined  to  attack  those  of 
our  forts  designed  to  check  invasion  and  our 
small  places;  others  (in  greater  number)  are 
howitzers  of  15  centimetres,  with  a  projectile 
of  40  kilogrammes  or  so  and  a  strong  charge. 
What  is  expected  of  this  artillery  ? 

1.  To  master  the  field  fortification  of  the 
adversary. 

2.  To  reinforce  their  own  field  organization. 

3.  To   master    the    field   artillery   of    the 
adversary. 

4.  To  crush   under  a  fire  which  is   incon- 
testably   superior   the   objective   chosen    for 
the  decisive  attack.     The  Saint  Privat  of  the 
future  will  not  only  be  bombarded  by  the 
artillery   of  the   guard  of  the   I2th   and  of 
the    loth  Corps,   but    also    by    the    mobile 
heavy  artillery  attached  to  the  army  as  a 
whole. 

In  this  fashion  there  is  added  a  new  element 
H 


98          PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

to  the  breaching  power  of  field  artillery  in 
order  that  it  may  master  that  power  of  the 
defensive  which  is  certainly  growing  every 
day.  It  is  for  the  same  reason  that  the 
38,000  men  who  constitute  the  personnel  of 
the  heavy  batteries  are  called  to  take  their 
place  in  action  in  the  field  instead  of  waiting 
until  they  are  attacked  in  their  fortified 
places  of  Strasburg  or  Metz  or  they  them- 
selves are  called  to  attack  Toul  or  Epinal. 
There  you  have  another  development  of 
that  constant  principle  of  economy  of  force, 
which  counsels  not  the  specialization  of  forces 
nor  their  affectation  in  some  invariable  fashion 
to  one  only  particular  task,  but  throws  them 
all  in,  whatever  be  their  type,  to  the  decisive 
act  of  war  which  is  battle. 

ASCENDANCY  IN  MORAL. — Thus  do  we  sum 
up  the  conduct  of  General  Alvensleben  in 
the  first  place,  and  the  next  that  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles,  a  conduct  which,  as  we 
see,  was  made  up  of  a  superb  use  of  reason 
accompanied  by  virile  decisions  and  that  gift 
of  command  which  can  still  animate  the 
troops  at  the  last  stage  of  exhaustion.  We 
have  seen  what  use  of  forces  was  made  corre- 
sponding to  such  a  tactic.  In  the  unin- 
terrupted race  for  moral  ascendancy,  even 
though  they  could  not  hope  for  a  decisive 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS          99 

success,1  it  was  their  business  to  repeat  the 
necessary  acts  of  aggression  all  day  long,  and 
that  in  the  absence  of  any  strong  reserves. 
The  thing  was  done  by  a  series  of  isolated 
actions  in  the  lack  of  a  general  combination. 
The  using  up  of  units  piecemeal,  which  is 
always  an  evil,  became  on  this  occasion  a 
necessary  evil.  The  commanders  suffered 
that  evil  while  reducing  it  to  its  least  possible 
limits.  It  was  necessary  to  present  certain 
units  before  others  could  arrive.  They  did 
so,  but  not  without  making  sure  that  each 
effort  should  have  a  strength  which  might 
allow  it  to  hope  at  least  for  a  result.  Thus 
a  brigade  was  not  launched  squadron  by 
squadron  or  battalion  by  battalion,  but  in 
its  entirety.  In  the  absence  of  a  great 
general  movement,  which  had  had  to  be 
given  up,  they  brought  to  bear  what  we  may 
call  partial  general  movements. 

We  have  seen  by  what  fortunate  decisions 
upon  the  field  of  battle  itself  Alvensleben  and 
Frederick  Charles  corrected  the  imperfect 
dispositions  taken  at  Pont-a-Mousson  or  at 
Herny;  and  by  what  constantly  offensive 
posture  they  had  not  only  conjured  the  defeat 
which  threatened  them,  but  saved  a  strategic 
manoeuvre  which  had  been  designed  without 
a  base  and  without  security  for  its  action. 

1  At  Gravelotte. 

•  4 


100        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

By  their  continuous  aim  at  a  moral  ascendancy 
which  was  to  be  maintained  at  all  costs,  they 
had  imposed  their  decision,  which  was  to 
check  their  adversary.  It  was  a  victory  of 
moral,  compact  of  energy  and  of  action, 
upon  their  side,  singularly  facilitated,  one 
must  admit,  by  the  absence  of  will  on  the  part 
of  their  adversary. 

ATTACK. — The  actions  round  Wysokow  show 
what  conditions  of  ground  are  required  for 
attack.  The  Austrian  attack  penetrated  into 
the  village  because  it  was  strongly  supported 
by  artillery,  that  is  undeniable;  but  also, 
and  above  all,  because  it  had  at  its  disposal 
covered  avenues  of  approach,  defiladed  ways 
of  access,  which  brought  the  attacking  forces 
under  shelter  from  enemy  fire  up  to  300  or 
400  yards  from  their  objective.  A  sound 
attacking  direction  is  one  which  provides 
covered  approaches  for  infantry,  and  which 
makes  it  possible  to  use  both  arms  (artillery 
and  infantry)  against  a  common  objective, 
with  that  full  development  of  the  means  of 
action  which  is  derived  from  numerical 
superiority. 

With  modern  arms,  of  which  we  have  seen 
the  full  power  on  the  ground  of  Nachod,  the 
Austrians  suffered  their  heaviest  losses  when 
they  retreated  after  an  unsuccessful  attack, 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        101 

or  when  they  abandoned  a  position  they  had 
lost.  It  was  less  costly  to  them  either  to 
advance  in  attack  or  to  keep  on  the  defensive. 
Hence  the  two  principles  which  command 
modern  tactics  :  any  attack  once  undertaken 
must  be  carried  home  ;  defence  must  be  sup- 
ported with  the  utmost  energy  ;  those  are  the 
most  economical  policies.  These  principles 
must  prevail  in  practice;  they  make  it, 
moreover,  absolutely  imperative  for  the  direct- 
ing mind,  the  commander,  to  know,  to  foresee 
and  to  solve  the  difficulties  which  the  attack 
is  bound  to  meet;  not  to  undertake  any 
attack  that  cannot  be  carried  home,  that 
cannot  be  organized  and  brought  up  under 
cover,  prepared,  supported,  guarded  up  to  the 
last  moment. 

ATTACK,  DECISIVE.— Theoretically  a  well- 
conducted  battle  is  a  decisive  attack  successfully 
carried  out. 

Nevertheless  we  must  acknowledge  that, 
besides  the  ultimate  execution  of  decisive 
attack,  such  an  attack  must  be  : 

1.  Well  directed  by  means  of  scouting; 

2.  Secondly,  prepared;    and, 

3.  Thirdly,  protected  and  utilized ;  in  view 
of  the  enemy  being  otherwise  able  first  to 
conceal   his   disposition;    secondly,    to   alter 
them;    thirdly,  to  impede  our  preparations; 


102        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

and,  fourthly,  to  make  similar  prepara- 
tions. 

Hence  the  necessity  of  a  series  of  disposi- 
tions (of  security-dispositions,  if  you  will), 
the  object  of  which  will  be,  first,  to  reconnoitre 
the  enemy ;  secondly,  to  immobilize  him ;  and, 
thirdly,  to  paralyze  him  and  absorb  his  activity. 

Such  dispositions  are  included  in  what  is 
termed  the  first  frontal  attack,  which  is  rather 
the  preparation  of  battle  than  battle  itself. 

But  reconnoitring  that  enemy,  wherever  he 
shows  himself,  requires  large  forces;  im- 
mobilizing him  requires  large  forces :  you 
cannot  stop  him  with  nothing ;  and  paralyzing 
him,  holding  him,  requires,  again,  both  large 
forces  and  time. 

Finally,  the  frontal  attack,  to  which  one 
may  have  intended  devoting  but  small  num- 
bers (so  as  to  keep  faithful  to  theory),  in 
practice  will  absorb  the  largest  part  of  our 
forces,  as  well  as  take  up  the  largest  part  of 
the  time,  at  our  disposal;  while  our  decisive 
attack  only  uses  the  smaller  part  of  our  troops 
and  lasts  but  for  a  short  space  of  time ;  hence 
a  second  optical  delusion,  which  has  confirmed 
(in  superficial  minds)  the  belief  that  the  frontal 
attack  was  the  true  battle ;  for  their  judgment 
was  based  on  quantities  (forces  and  time), 
not  on  results — an  error  which  thus  brought 
them  back  to  the  doctrine  of  parallel  battle. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         103 

Let  us  beware  of  such  superficial  views. 
Even  should  theory  fail  when  applied  by 
unskilful  hands,  should  the  essentials  of 
theory  be  lost  in  accessories  or  its  foundation 
be  obscured  by  detail,  history  and  reason 
have  shown  us  that  there  is  in  battle  only 
one  valid  argument :  the  decisive  attack. 
This  alone  is  capable  of  ensuring  the  result 
desired,  for  it  overthrows  the  enemy. 

Decisive  attack  is  the  supreme  argument 
used  by  modern  battle,  which  itself  is  a 
struggle  between  nations  fighting  for  their 
existence,  for  independence,  or  for  some  less 
noble  interest;  fighting,  anyhow,  with  all 
their  resources  and  passions.  These  masses 
of  men  and  of  passions  have  to  be  shaken  and 
overthrown. 

If  we  study  in  detail  the  attack  of  Mac- 
donald's  l  column,  for  instance  (which  includes 
all  the  phases  of  the  tragic  act  of  battle),  we 
should  find  its  attack  : 

1.  Prepared  (a)  by  a  charge  of  40  squadrons 
(the  object  of  which  was  to  make  it  possible 
for  the  attacking  column  to  assemble) ;   (b)  by 
fire  from  102  guns  (in  order  to  halt  and  shake 
the  enemy). 

2.  Carried   out    by  50   battalions    (22,500 
men). 

1  At  Wagram. 


104          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

We  should  find  that  mass  of  infantry  un- 
able to  act  by  fire,  in  view  of  the  formation 
it  has  taken ;  unable  to  use  the  bayonet.  The 
enemy  nowhere  awaits  the  shock.  Finally, 
it  does  no  harm  whatever  to  the  adversary; 
on  the  contrary,  it  suffers  a  great  deal 
itself ;  it  was  reduced  to  1500  victorious  men 
when  it  reached  its  objective,  Siissenbrunn. 

In  summing  up,  we  should  find  that  this 
decimated  force  was  able  to  beat  the  decimating 
one;  moreover,  this  decimated  force  deter- 
mined the  forward  movement  of  the  whole 
army,  the  victory  on  the  wide  Marchfeld. 

This  result  was  secured  not  by  physical 
means — these  were  all  to  the  advantage  of 
the  vanquished — it  was  achieved  by  a  purely 
moral  action,  which  alone  brought  about 
decision  and  a  complete  decision. 

***** 

Owing  to  its  continually  offensive  attitude, 
the  preparation  has  finally  succeeded  in 
throwing  back  the  enemy's  first  lines,  in 
carrying  the  enemy's  advanced  posts  and  in 
immobilizing  him  by  the  series  of  its  efforts 
and  by  threatening  him  with  close  attack. 
It  holds  him  exposed  to  a  more  violent  attack. 

But  it  is  by  this  time  in  a  state  of  exhaus- 
tion ;  the  greatest  part  of  its  reserves  are  in 
action,  units  are  mixed,  the  number  of  officers 
is  reduced,  ammunition  begins  to  grow  scarce. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         105 

The  preparation  is  now  confronted  by  the 
main  enemy  forces,  by  important  obstacles; 
a  ground  swept  by  fire  or  strong  "  points 
d'appui  "  (strongly  occupied  and  only  to  be 
approached  with  difficulty). 

In  front,  there  is  a  (so  to  speak)  "  im- 
passable "  zone;  no  defiladed  ways  of  access 
.  are  left ;  a  hail  of  bullets  sweeps  the  ground 
in  front  of  the  first  line.  But  success  has  not 
yet  been  secured ;  "  nothing  is  done  so  long 
as  something  remains  to  be  done  "  (Frederick). 
The  laurels  of  victory  are  at  the  point  of 
enemy  bayonets.  They  must  be  plucked 
there  ;  they  must  be  carried  by  a  fight  hand 
to  hand,  if  one  really  means  to  conquer. 

To  reinforce  the  troops  of  preparation  in 
order  to  attain  the  result  would  be  without 
effect :  a  battle  of  parallel  lines  would  begin 
and  would  remain  powerless. 

To  run  away  or  to  fall  on,  such  is  the  un- 
avoidable dilemma.  To  fall  on,  but  to  fall 
on  in  numbers  and  masses  :  therein  lies  salva- 
tion. For  numbers,  provided  we  know  how 
to  use  them,  will  allow  us,  by  means  of  the 
physical  superiority  placed  at  our  disposal, 
to  get  the  better  of  that  violent  enemy  fire. 
Having  more  guns  we  can  silence  his  own ;  it 
is  the  same  with  rifles,  the  same  with  bayonets, 
if  we  know  how  to  use  them  all. 

Ground    must    next    be    considered.     It 


106        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

determines  the  objective  of  the  decisive  attack. 
Up  to  800  or  600  yards  the  attack  suffers 
heavily,  and  has  little  effect  of  its  own. 

Our  art  consists,  then,  in  reducing  this  belt 
to  the  smallest  limits,  and  in  launching  the 
attack  from  as  close  to  the  enemy  as  possible, 
and  ground  is  the  element  which  furnishes 
us  with  our  means. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  attack  once  launched 
must  proceed  rapidly,  and  yet  for  that  purpose 
it  needs  ground  devoid  of  obstacles,  which 
does  not  mean  devoid  of  cover.  The  ideal 
conditions  are  a  ground  open  but  rolling,  and 
the  important  point  is  the  rapidity  of  the 
advance.  Ground,  we  see  by  this,  deter- 
mines, as  I  have  said,  the  point  of  attack,  for 
if  we  have  combined  these  two  conditions, 
the  power  of  attacking  from  close  by  and  of 
rapid  advance,  the  admitted  difficulties  of  a 
central  attack  disappear. 

The  Rdle  of  Artillery. — To  make  a  breach  on 
the  front  of  attack,  to  open  the  way  for 
infantry,  to  keep  it  clear  once  it  is  open,  to 
sacrifice  itself  if  need  be  in  order  to  enable 
infantry  to  perform  its  task,  to  watch  the 
batteries  and  counter-attacks  of  the  enemy ; 
such  is  at  this  moment  the  mission  of  our 
artillery. 

To  this  end,  the  largest  possible  number  of 
guns  enters  into  action  towards  the  point  of 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         107 

attack.     There  can  never  be  too  many  guns, 
there  are  never  enough  of  them. 

All  the  artillery  groups  placed  near  that 
point,  those  which  would  still  be  available 
and  could  enter  in  line  :  corps  artillery,  the 
artillery  of  the  infantry  divisions,  of  the 
cavalry  divisions,  of  second-line  army  corps, 
those  which  have  taken  part  in  the  prepara- 
tion and  which  are  now  without  an  object; 
all  of  them  work  in  the  same  direction,  by 
means  of  a  fire  both  violent  and  suddenly 
unmasked,  the  intensity  of  which  continually 
increases. 

In  order  to  fulfil  this  task,  it  is  enough  that 
artillery  should  see  ;  all  the  batteries  which 
can  act  from  their  position  must  be  left  where 
they  are.  They  must,  on  the  contrary,  be 
moved  if  they  cannot  see.  Such  are  the  tactics 
to  be  adopted. 

A  quarter  of  an  hour's  quick  fire  by  a  mass 
of  artillery  on  a  clearly  determined  objective 
will  generally  suffice  to  break  its  resistance, 
or  at  any  rate  to  make  it  uninhabitable  and 
therefore  uninhabited. 

The  mass  of  artillery  must  then  open  a 
quick  fire  a  quarter  of  an  hour  before  the 
infantry  mass  enters  in  line.  Such  will  be 
the  rule ;  artillery  fire  must  begin  later  if  the 
infantry  attack,  starting  from  a  great  distance, 


108          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

needs   a  longer  time  before  coming   within 
efficient  range  for  infantry  fire. 

Against  what  should  fire  be  opened  ? 
Against  the  obstacles  which  may  delay  the 
march  of  infantry. 

The  first  obstacle  is  the  enemy  gun.  It 
will  be  the  first  objective  assigned  to  artillery 
masses. 

Once  superiority  shall  have  been  secured 
in  that  struggle,  obstacles  and  shelters  cover- 
ing the  road  to  that  objective  will  have  to  be 
smashed,  or  at  any  rate  made  untenable. 
The  second  part  of  the  same  task  of  prepara- 
tion will  consist  in  destroying  and  riddling 
with  projectiles  the  infantry  occupying  or 
surrounding  them. 

Once  the  road  is  open,  it  must  be  kept  clear  ; 
once  the  breach  is  made,  the  enemy  must  be 
prevented  from  filling  it ;  therefore  one  must 
be  able  to  go  on  firing  against  the  part  of  the 
enemy  front  which  is  our  target  until  it  shall 
be  assaulted  by  the  attacking  infantry. 

The  success  of  the  attack  must  also  be 
ensured  by  striking  at  any  kind  of  troops  the 
enemy  may  oppose  :  fresh  batteries,  counter- 
attacks. 

In  order  to  fulfil  this  third  rdle,  the  artillery 
masses  prepare  groups  of  batteries  (called 
groups  of  attack  and  of  counter-attack), 
designed  to  follow  and  support  the  infantry 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         109 

columns,  as  well  as  to  manoeuvre  in  the 
directions  which  threaten  danger. 

The  Role  of  Infantry  — Artillery  has  shaken 
the  enemy's  resistance;  infantry  must  now 
overthrow  him.  In  order  to  decide  the  enemy 
to  retreat,  we  must  advance  upon  him;  in 
order  to  conquer  the  position,  to  take  the 
enemy's  place,  one  must  go  to  where  he  is. 
The  most  powerful  fire  does  not  secure  that 
result.  Here  begins  more  particularly  the 
action  of  infantry  masses.  They  march 
straight  on  to  the  goal,  each  aiming  at  its  own 
objective,  speeding  up  their  pace  in  propor- 
tion as  they  come  nearer,  preceded  by  violent 
fire,  using  also  the  bayonet,  so  as  to  close  on 
the  enemy,  to  be  the  first  to  assault  the 
position,  to  throw  themselves  in  the  midst  of 
the  enemy  ranks  and  finish  the  contest  by 
means  of  cold  steel  and  superior  courage  and 
will.  Artillery  contributes  to  that  result 
with  all  its  power  while  following,  supporting, 
covering  the  attack. 

In  the  presence  of  an  enemy  master  of  his 
own  fire  and  free  to  use  it  against  the  on- 
coming mass,  a  formation,  however  skilful 
it  may  be,  will  not  generally  make  it  possible, 
of  itself,  to  advance  under  fire  over  an  open 
ground,  not  even  to  cross,  under  those  con- 
ditions, spaces  of  any  length ;  losses  would  be 
incurred  which  would  break  the  organization 


110        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

and  above  all   the  spirit  of  the   troops,  of 
the  infantry  mass. 

To-day,  even  more  than  in  the  past,  the 
art  will  consist,  during  this  period  of  the 
march,  in  utilizing  all  the  defiladed  ways  of 
access  and  all  the  cover  provided  by  the 
ground.  The  formation  to  be  given  to  the 
mass,  far  from  aiming  at  symmetry,  at  har- 
mony, at  regularity,  must  only  tend  to 
enabling  the  greatest  possible  numbers  to 
secure  those  advantages  of  cover  which 
nothing  can  replace. 

On  the  contrary,  in  the  second  phase  of 
combat,  from  a  distance  of  600,  700,  800  yards 
from  the  previously  reconnoitred  enemy  posi- 
tion, the  mass  is  able  to  develop  its  whole 
power :  firing-power  and  striking-power. 
The  formations  to  be  adopted  must  tend  to 
make  the  most  efficient  use  possible  of  these 
two  means  of  action  :  to  make  one  succeed 
the  other  without  a  hitch,  so  that  the  com- 
bined effects  of  fire  and  assault  should  be 
superimposed  and  added  one  to  the  other. 

The  consideration  of  what  fire  one  may 
oneself  receive  now  becomes  a  secondary 
matter;  the  troops  are  on  the  move  and 
must  arrive ;  moreover,  there  is  but  one  means 
to  extenuate  the  effects  of  enemy  fire  :  it 
is  to  develop  a  more  violent  fire  oneself, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         111 

capable  at  least  of  getting  to  ground  and 
paralyzing  the  enemy;  another  means  con- 
sists in  rapid  advance. 

To  march,  and  to  march  quickly,  preceded 
by  the  hail  of  bullets;  in  proportion  as  the 
enemy  is  hard  pressed,  to  bring  forward  more 
and  more  numerous  troops,  and,  moreover, 
troops  well  in  hand,  such  is  the  fundamental 
formula  for  the  formations  to  be  taken  and 
tactics  to  be  adopted. 

A  body  of  infantry  formed  in  double  line 
obviously  fulfils  the  twofold  condition  of 
providing  powerful  fire  and  rapid  advance. 
Therefore  such  a  body  will,  for  a  certain  time, 
be  equal  to  the  task.  But  the  mass  melts 
away  while  performing  that  task;  it  soon 
stops  and  becomes  exhausted  before  reaching 
the  position.  Hence  the  necessity  of  having 
a  second  line  which  should  be  particularly 
strong,  coming  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  first, 
designed  to  prevent  the  attack  from  receiving 
a  check,  to  push  the  first  line  on  ahead,  to 
draw  it  along  on  to  its  destined  position.  We 
thus  have  the  second-line  battalion  (or  bat- 
talions) of  the  regiment  in  fighting  order, 
launching  (in  order  to  make  an  end)  into  the 
more  and  more  billowy,  confused,  mixed  line, 
whole  companies  in  close  order  (line  or  column) 
and  fully  commanded. 


112        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

To-day,  as  in  the  past,  the  attacking  mass 
cannot  succeed  unless  it  possesses  the  firm 
will  to  reach  its  objective.  Any  force  charged 
with  carrying  out  a  decisive  attack  must 
be  full  of  Bugeaud's  maxim  :  "  When  the 
moment  has  come  to  act,  you  must  march  on 
and  meet  your  enemy  with  that  energy  and 
self-possession  which  alone  enables  a  man  to 
perform  anything  whatsoever." 

Therefore  we  must  have  vigour,  speed, 
violence,  no  long  halts,  and  therefore  a  quick 
pressure  from  troops  behind  so  as  to  urge 
forward  the  first-line  troops.  These  must  be 
the  characteristics  of  action  at  that  moment. 

The  Role  of  Cavalry. — At  the  very  time 
when  the  crisis  of  the  tragedy,  the  infantry 
attack,  is  developing,  the  squadrons  of  the 
attack  suddenly  appear  out  of  a  cloud  of 
dust  on  the  flank  or  in  the  rear  of  the  position. 
They,  too,  have  had  to  reach  the  ground 
where  the  fate  of  the  day  is  to  be  settled,  and, 
since  distance  is  no  obstacle  to  them,  they 
have  found  sheltered  ways  of  access  which 
have  enabled  them  to  reach  at  any  rate  the 
external  wing  of  the  attack.  They  charge 
thence  on  anything  that  is  still  resisting 
among  the  enemy,  or  on  enemy  cavalry  as 
it  attempts  to  charge  the  attacking  infantry, 
or  on  arriving  enemy  reserves  as  they  come 
up. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         118 

For  cavalry  as  well  as  for  other  arms,  then, 
there  is  both  a  necessity  and  a  possibility 
of  acting,  and  this  by  means  which  must  be 
entirely  left  to  the  commander's  initiative, 
the  object  being  to  facilitate  the  decisive 
attack.  That  attack  is  a  victory  for  all.  It 
sometimes  arises  even  from  the  apparently 
fruitless  efforts  of  some,  but  in  every  case 
from  the  concord  between  different  arms,  from 
the  resultant  of  their  converging  efforts,  from 
an  assault  delivered  arm  in  arm. 


ATTACK,  OBJECTIVE  OP.— The  objective  of 
the  attack  must  be  determined  beforehand. 
Taking  the  same  things  into  consideration, 
namely,  the  space  to  be  covered  under  enemy) 
fire  and  the  superior  efficiency  which  has  to  be/ 
produced  and  maintained  on  the  selected  point 
of  attack,  we  are  led  to  the  following  con- 
clusion :  the  first  objective  selected  must  be 
that  point  occupied  by  the  enemy  which  is 
nearest  to  us  and  on  which  we  may  apply  a 
numerical  superiority,  which  should  guarantee 
superior  efficiency. 

BATTLE. — As  there  is  direction,  convergence 
and  a  result,  it  may  well  be  assumed  that  logic 
governs  here,  as  everywhere  :  that  it  asserts 
its  full  rights;  that  it  imposes  itself  in  its 


114         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

most  ruthless  vigour.     There  is  such  a  thing 
as  a  theory  of  battle. 

*  *  *  *  * 

A  purely  defensive  battle  is  a  duel  in  which 
one  of  the  fighters  does  nothing  but  parry. 
Nobody  would  admit  that,  by  so  doing,  he 
could  succeed  in  defeating  his  enemy.  On  the 
contrary,  he  would  sooner  or  later  expose 
himself,  in  spite  of  the  greatest  possible  skill, 
to  being  touched,  to  being  overcome  by  one 
of  his  enemy's  thrusts,  even  if  that  enemy 
were  the  weaker  party. 

Hence  the  conclusion  that  the  offensive 
form  alone,  be  it  resorted  to  at  once  or  only 
after  the  defensive,  can  lead  to  results,  and 
must  therefore  always  be  adopted — at  least 
in  the  end. 

Any  defensive  battle  must,  then,  end  in  an 
offensive  action,  in  a  thrust,  in  a  successful 
counter-attack,  otherwise  there  is  no  result. 
Such  a  notion  will  seem  to  some  elementary; 
still  it  cannot  be  omitted  without  all  the  ideas 
one  ought  to  hold  on  war  becoming  confused. 
This  idea  was  ignored  by  the  French  army  of 
1870,  otherwise  they  would  not  have  given 
the  name  of  a  victory  to  the  battles  of  the 
I4th  and  i6th  of  August,  1870,  and  others 
which  might  have  become  victories,  but  cer- 
tainly did  not  deserve  that  name  at  the  stage 
in  which  they  were  left.  To  use  a  term  current 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         115 

at  the  time,  "  positions  had  been  maintained," 
and  no  more.  Nothing  could  be  expected 
to  come  of  such  battles.  Maintaining  a 
position  is  not  synonymous  with  being  vic- 
torious; it  even  (implicitly)  prepares  defeat 
if  one  stops  there,  if  an  offensive  action  is  not 
resorted  to. 


Joseph  de  Maistre  wrote  :  "A  battle  lost 
is  a  battle  one  thinks  one  has  lost;  for,"  he 
added,  "  a  battle  cannot  be  lost  physically." 
Therefore,  it  can  only  be  lost  morally.  But 
then,  it  is  also  morally  that  a  battle  is  won, 
and  we  may  extend  the  aphorism  by  saying  : 
A  battle  won,  is  a  battle  in  which  one  will  not 
confess  oneself  beaten. 

BATTLE,    PARALLEL    AND    OF    MAN(EUVRE. — 

Parallel  battle  or  battle  of  lines,  in  which  one 
goes  into  action  at  all  points,  and  in  which 
the  commander-in-chief  expects  a  favourable 
circumstance,  or  a  happy  inspiration  (which 
are  not  usually  forthcoming)  to  let  him  know 
the  place  and  time  when  he  must  act ; — unless 
he  leaves  all  this  to  be  decided  by  his  lieu- 
tenants, while  the  latter,  again,  leave  this 
to  their  own  subordinates.  So  that  in  the 
end  the  battle  is  won  by  the  privates  :  an 
anonymous  battle. 


116        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

Let  us  analyze  this  theory  of  "  the  parallel 
battle."  What  do  we  discover  ? 

Troops  go  into  action  everywhere;  once 
in  action,  they  are  supported  everywhere. 
In  proportion  as  forces  are  used  up,  they  are 
renewed  and  replaced.  Such  a  battle  con- 
sists in  putting  up  with  a  constant,  a  suc- 
cessive, wear  and  tear,  until  the  result  ensues 
from  one  or  more  successful  actions  of  par- 
ticular combatants — subordinate  commanders 
or  troops.  Such  actions  all  remain  second- 
rate,  because  their  decision  never  involves 
more  than  a  portion  of  the  forces  engaged. 
As  for  the  whole,  it  is  but  a  chain  of  more  or 
less  similar  combats,  in  which  command  is 
broken  up,  has  to  specialize  the  means  of 
action  in  detail,  and  in  which  the  issue  must 
proceed  from  a  sum  (or  excess)  of  successful 
local  results  which  escape  the  direction  of 
the  commander. 

This  is  therefore  a  battle  of  an  inferior  kind 
when  compared  to  the  battle  of  manoeuvre 
which  makes  an  appeal  to  the  commander-in- 
chief's  action,  to  his  manoeuvring  ability,  to 
a  sound  and  combined  use  of  all  the  forces 
present;  which  achieves  a  true  economy  of 
those  forces,  by  attempting  to  concentrate 
effort  and  mass  on  one  selected  point  and 
neglecting  all  else ;  which  remains  to  the  very 
last  a  combination — due  to  one  command — 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        117 

of  combats  varying  in  intensity,  but  all 
aiming  in  the  same  direction  to  produce  a 
final  resultant :  an  intentional,  resolute  and 
sudden  action  of  masses  acting  by  surprise. 

The  parallel  battle  uses  inferior  methods, 
and  is  bound  to  lead  to  inferior  results. 

Its  weakness  lies  in  the  fact  that  attack, 
in  such  a  battle,  develops  everywhere  with 
equal  force,  and  ends  by  exerting  a  uniform 
pressure  against  a  defender  who  in  his  turn 
offers  a  uniform  resistance ;  a  resistance 
which,  however,  is  more  efficient  than  the 
pressure,  because  the  defender  disposes  of 
special  advantages  such  as  shelter,  fire-power, 
etc.,  which  the  assailant  does  not  possess  to 
the  same  degree. 

Such  a  battle  means  bringing  up  forces 
piecemeal;  it  soon  amounts  to  throwing 
drops  of  water  into  a  sea. 

We  have  a  wave  breaking  against  a  strong 
dam.  The  dam  will  not  be  broken. 

Suppose,  however,  we  should,  as  a  result 
of  some  mental  vision,  discover  a  crack  in 
the  wall  of  the  dam;  a  point  of  inadequate 
resistance.  Or,  again,  should  we  manage, 
by  means  of  a  particular  combination  of 
forces,  to  add  to  the  rhythmical  and  method- 
ical action  of  the  wave  some  kind  of  water- 
hammering  capable  of  breaking  the  wall  of 
the  dam  on  some  one  point,  then  the  balance 


118        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

would  be  upset;  the  mass  would  rush  in 
through  the  breach  made,  and  carry  the 
whole  obstacle.  Let  us  look  for  the  crack, 
for  the  point  of  inadequate  resistance,  or  let 
us  organize  to  this  end  our  water-hammering 
on  one  point  of  the  enemy  line ;  we  shall  thus 
attain  the  one  result. 
That  is  the  "  battle  of  manoeuvre." 
Defence,  once  it  has  been  overthrown  on 
one  point,  collapses  on  all.  Once  the  resist- 
ance has  been  pierced,  the  whole  line  falls. 

In  the  parallel  battle,  tactics  attempt, 
consciously  or  unconsciously,  to  break  the 
other  party's  resistance  by  slowly  and  pro- 
gressively using  up  enemy  forces.  To  this 
end,  fighting  is  kept  up  everywhere.  It  is 
fed  everywhere.  Reserves  are  devoted  to 
this  supporting  task.  Reserves  become  a  kind 
of  reservoir  of  forces  from  which  one  draws 
what  is  necessary  to  making  up  the  wear  and 
tear  which  continues  and  must  be  repaired. 
Art  consists  in  still  keeping  a  reserve  up  to 
the  point  where  the  enemy  has  none  left,  so 
as  to  be  able  to  have  the  last  word  in  a  struggle 
where  wear  and  tear  is  the  only  valid  argu- 
ment. In  such  a  battle,  however,  reserves 
have  no  place  allotted  to  them  beforehand; 
they  have  to  be  everywhere,  so  that  it  should 
be  possible  to  use  them  according  to  our 
needs — that  is,  to  continue  the  action  on  the 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         119 

whole  front.  They  afterwards  scatter  and 
melt  away  in  a  combat  where  a  favourable 
circumstance  is  always  hoped  for,  without  it 
being  known  where  and  when  such  a  circum- 
stance may  be  found,  and  where  their  only 
effect  is  to  prevent  the  struggle  from  coming 
to  an  end. 

In  the  battle  of  manoeuvre,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  reserve  is  a  club,  prepared,  organ- 
ized, reserved,  carefully  maintained  in  view 
of  carrying  out  the  one  act  of  battle  from 
which  a  result  is  expected — the  decisive  attack. 
The  reserve  Ts  spared  with  the  utmost  parsi- 
mony, so  that  the  instrument  may  be  as 
strong,  the  blow  as  violent  as  possible. 

Such  a  reserve  must  be  hurled  in  the  last 
instance,  without  any  thought  of  sparing  it; 
with  a  view  to  carrying  by  force  a  selected 
and  well-determined  point.  It  must  there- 
fore be  hurled  as  one  block,  in  the  course  of 
an  action  exceeding  in  violence  and  energy  all 
the  combats  of  the  battle,  under  the  con- 
ditions demanded  by  surprise,  mass,  and 
speed.  We  envisage  a  single  goal;  a  deter- 
mining act  in  which  all  our  forces  take  part, 
either  in  order  to  prepare  it,  or  in  order  to 
carry  it  out. 

The  notion  of  a  parallel  battle  was  the 
ruling  one  in  the  French  army  of  1870;  or 
rather  it  was  an  absence  of  notion  regarding  the 


120        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

conduct  of  battle  as  a  whole.  Adequate  proof 
of  this  may  be  derived  from  official  and 
private  narratives  recording  the  struggles  of 
that  tune.  The  Germans  are  always  sup- 
posed to  have  achieved  victory,  because 
numerous  reinforcements  came  up,  as  though 
these  numerous  reinforcements  had  not  been 
troops  reserved  and  brought  up  in  the  num- 
bers and  in  the  time  required  to  produce  that 
demoralizing  effect  which  overthrows  an 
army ! 

This  way  of  putting  things  shows  clearly 
enough  that,  if  such  fresh  troops  had  arrived 
on  our  side,  they  would  have  been  used  as 
reinforcements — not  as  a  means  of  under- 
taking a  special  and  decisive  action  which  no 
one  contemplated. 

BATTLE,  MODERN. — What  has  been  said 
about  the  philosophy  of  battle  and  about  the 
arguments  advanced  regarding  it  remain  true 
in  the  main,  even  in  these  modern  days  of 
long  range,  rapid  fire,  and  vast  numbers, 
because  it  is  the  same  moral  being,  man,  who 
is  fighting ;  the  forces  in  action  are  ruled  by 
the  same  mechanics. 

The  various  acts  of  battle  will,  therefore, 
remain  the  same  :  to  prepare,  to  carry  out, 

and  to  utilize  the  decisive  attack. 

***** 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         121 

The  first  object  of  preparation  is  to  supply 
the  commander  with  the  intelligence  he  needs 
in  order  to  direct  and  execute,  with  full  know- 
ledge of  the  case,  the  decisive  act  of  battle. 
Considered  from  that  standpoint,  it  involves 
seeking  the  objective  to  be  struck,  for  the 
means  and  ways  leading  to  that  objective,  as 
well  as  determining  the  enemy's  situation. 
The  part  it  plays  in  thus  looking  for  direction 
and  information  has  to  be  carried  on  until  the 
moment  when  the  decisive  act  is  performed — 
that  is  obvious — but  it  also  begins  sometimes 
several  days  before  the  battle.  If  one  has  to 
deal  with  large  units,  for  instance,  with  whole 
armies,  the  information  collected  during  these 
days  concerning  the  situation  and  distribution 
of  enemy  forces,  already  indicate  how  one's 
own  forces  must  be  distributed,  and  largely 
determine  the  direction  and  importance  of 
the  decisive  attack,  although  it  is  impossible 
to  think  of  altering  one's  plan  at  the  last 
moment. 

Thus  the  strategical  advance  guards  of 
Napoleon  (more  particularly  those  of  1806 
and  1809)  supply  by  their  intelligence  service 
a  basis  for  the  Napoleonic  manoeuvres,  as 
well  as  providing  later  on,  by  their  resistance 
and  their  hold  over  the  enemy,  the  pivot 
around  which  that  manoeuvre  develops. 
But,  besides  what  has  just  been  said, 


122        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

preparation  must  also  conceal  the  direction 
and  moment  of  the  decisive  attack;  it  must 
cover  the  organizing  process  :  hence  a  new 
mission,  that  of  protecting  and  covering  the 
attack. 

Preparation  must  at  the  same  time  maintain 
the  previously  reconnoitred  situation  of  the 
enemy,  deprive  him  of  the  means  and  possi- 
bility of  preparing  a  manoeuvre  on  his  part; 
therefore,  immobilize  him  by  depriving  him 
of  the  physical  possibility  of  assembling  an 
adequate  force  which  he  might  victoriously 
oppose  to  the  effort  of  the  decisive  attack; 
to  this  end,  undertake  a  number  of  actions 
against  the  enemy. 

In  order  to  fulfil  this  twofold  task,  prepara- 
tion must  attack  the  enemy  wherever  he 
shows  himself,  so  as  to  inflict  serious  losses 
on  him,  to  deprive  him  of  his  means  of  action, 
to  paralyze  him,  to  threaten  him,  which 
prevents  him  from  removing  his  forces  to 
some  other  place.  Its  attitude  must  there- 
fore be  a  resolutely  offensive  one. 

But  it  must  at  the  same  time  keep  him  off 
if  he  becomes  threatening,  it  must  be  able  to 
resist  and  know  how  to  do  it.  While  acting, 
preparation  must  prepare  the  means  of  suc- 
cessfully defending  itself.  N 

To  conquer  and  to  maintain  with  ever- 
increasing  vigour  is  its  formula, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         123 

Preparation  troops  will  in  practice  soon  be 
found,  not  to  start  one  single  action,  but  to  be 
fighting  several  partial  actions,  conducted 
independently  of  each  other  with  the  object 
of  conquering  the  resisting  centres  of  the 
enemy. 

As  the  latter  is  also  attempting  to  do  the 
same  thing  (until  he  has  been  completely 
immobilized),  or  as  he  is  trying  to  recapture 
the  points  he  has  lost,  there  results  a  series 
of  offensive  and  defensive  actions,  with  a 
view  to  disputing  the  points  of  the  ground, 
and  all  this  generally  imparts  to  the  combat  of 
preparation  a  special  kind  of  tenacity,  of 
desperation,  of  length,  producing  among  the 
enemy  a  wear  and  tear  of  strength  and  means 
of  action,  losses,  physical  and  moral  exhaus- 
tion, all  of  which  are  equally  desirable  results. 

Hence  also  the  duration  of  the  combat  of 
preparation  which  has  been  improperly  termed 
a  dragging  fight;  while  it  actually  results  in 
a  constant  offensive,  carried  on  everywhere, 
moreover,  under  difficult  conditions;  in  case 
of  failure,  it  changes  into  a  defensive  prepared 
beforehand  and  kept  up  with  desperation,  so 
that  it  remains  in  either  case  the  very  reverse 
of  a  slack  action. 

To  attack  the  important  points  of  the 
ground,  to  carry  them,  to  occupy  them;  to 


124        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

defend  them,  if  they  are  attacked;  to  retake 
them  if  they  are  lost;  to  make  them  a  new 
base  for  new  progress  if  the  enemy  does  not 
attack  them  :  such  are  the  processes  prepara- 
tion-troops must  continuously  maintain,  until 
the  enemy  gives  up  every  hope  of  conquering 
and  leaves  the  place,  or  until  they  stop  of 
themselves  as  a  result  of  complete  exhaustion. 
But  even  in  this  latter  case  they  have  to 
establish  themselves  in  front  of  the  enemy, 
so  as  to  threaten  him  or  to  drive  him  back  if 
he  attempts  to  advance. 

As  has,  then,  been  seen,  preparation  con- 
sists in  a  multitude  of  partial  combats,  each 
of  which,  in  order  to  secure  success,  to  lead 
to  decision,  that  is,  to  the  conquest  of  the 
objective  selected,  involves  a  decisive  act, 
a  convergence  towards  the  same  point,  at 
the  same  moment,  of  all  available  co-ordinated 
efforts.  Such  a  decisive  act  will  contain, 
in  a  lesser,  but  still  certain  proportion,  the 
three  phases  involved  by  battle  :  preparation, 
execution,  utilization.  In  the  case  of  each  of 
these  phases,  the  use  and  formation  of  troops 
are  directed  by  the  principles  which  should 
command  the  corresponding  acts  in  battle. 

It  is  also  certain  that  such  a  great  number 
of  actions  cannot  be  directed  by  a  single  man. 
The  commander-in-chief  plays  his  part  by 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         125 

dividing  the  task  of  preparation  between  a 
certain  number  of  subordinate  officers,  to  the 
initiative  of  each  of  whom,  according  to  his 
own  means,  he  leaves  the  reduction  of  the 
enemy. 

General  Victor  commands  at  Garnsdorf, 
General  Claparede  commands  at  Beulwitz. 

The  commander  reserves  to  himself  the 
main  task,  that  of  directing  and  carrying 
out  the  decisive  attack,  and  he  also  reserves, 
in  any  case,  the  possibility  of  intervening  up 
to  the  last  moment  with  the  help  of  general 
reserves. 

Preparation  finally  ends  in  a  general  action 
along  the  whole  front,  in  sometimes  a  very 
hard  and  often  very  long  struggle.  There- 
fore, although  this  operation  should  theoretic- 
ally only  absorb  a  minimum  of  forces,  it 
requires  in  reality  serious  sacrifices,  which 
the  commander  must  make  ungrudgingly,  so 
long  as  the  waste  thus  incurred  does  not 
endanger  the  subsequent  phases  and  more 
particularly  the  success  of  the  decisive  act; 
sacrifices  which  he  must  make  early,  as  the 
deployment  of  forces,  that  is,  the  process  of 
establishing  units  facing  their  objectives, 
must  take  place  out  of  the  reach  of  guns,  and 
therefore  at  a  very  great  distance. 

Preparation  is,  then,  a  multitude  of  partial 


126         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

combats,  the  object  of  which  generally  is  to 
conquer  successively,  on  the  field,  "  points 
d'appui  "  or  commanding  points,  organized 
and  transformed  into  resisting  centres  and 
starting-points  for  new  offensive  actions ; 
each  of  these  combats  involving  three  acts — 
preparing,  carrying  out  and  utilizing  a  decisive 
action. 

In  such  a  preparation,  what  should  be  the 
part  played  by  each  different  arm  ? 

PART  PLAYED  JBY  THE  THREE  ARMS 

Artillery. — Artillery  must  obviously  be  the 
first  to  act,  owing  to  its  range,  its  mobility, 
and  the  fact  that  it  can  easily  come  into 
action  and  go  out  of  it  in  order  to  proceed, 
when  necessary,  to  some  other  place;  more- 
over, it  can  act  so  as  to  get  hold  of  the 
enemy. 

Therefore  the  artillery  of  the  main  body, 
the  largest  part  of  which  is  marching  close 
behind  the  head  of  the  column,  will  speed  up 
its  movement.  Protected  by  infantry,  it 
reinforces  the  artillery  of  the  advance  guard. 

What,  then,  are  these  bodies  of  artillery 
about  to  do? 

The  guns  will  help  the  advance  guard  in  its 
mission,  which  consists  in  reconnoitring, 
immobilizing,  and  wearing  down  the  enemy; 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         127 

this  implies  taking  the  offensive;  therefore 
guns  will  break  the  obstacles  opposing  infantry 
— "  points  d'appui,"  and  enemy  artillery. 

As  soon  as  progress  becomes  possible,  the 
guns  will  avail  themselves  of  that  opportunity 
and  advance  in  their  turn  in  order  to  settle 
in  a  final  way  the  fate  of  the  enemy  artillery. 
They  will  undertake  to  this  end  a  struggle 
at  a  short  range.  This  is  the  artillery  duel. 
It  is  obviously  a  matter  of  the  highest  import- 
ance to  secure  as  soon  as  possible  a  superiority 
in  that  duel  between  guns  holding  under  their 
powerful  fire  the  whole  of  the  ground  they  can 
observe. 

To  this  end,  superiority  of  numbers  must 
be  secured  immediately;  a  long  line  of  fire 
must  be  immediately  organized;  all  guns 
must  be  brought  up,  nothing  must  be  kept 
in  reserve.  Such  is  first  of  all  the  tactical 
formulae  for  gunners  engaged  in  an  artillery 
duel. 

Once  the  enemy  artillery  has  been  over- 
thrown or  silenced,  the  guns  must  return  to 
the  task  of  helping  infantry,  by  preparing 
the  attack  on  the  points  which  are  the  latter's 
objectives. 

That  preparation  involves  (as  we  shall  see 
by  and  by,  more  particularly  when  studying 
the  decisive  attack)  clearing  the  ways  of  access, 
the  approaches  leading  to  the  objective,  as 


128        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

well  as  breaching  the  objective  ;    following  up 
the  attack. 

Opening  a  way  for  infantry  on  the  whole 
front  so  as  to  enable  it  to  reach  decisive  acts ; 
helping  it  in  these  attacks,  in  these  decisive 
acts;  these  are  the  tactics  of  artillery  in  the 
course  of  the  preparation. 

These  two  successive  and  different  functions 
of  artillery,  first  in  the  artillery  duel  and  next 
the  infantry  actions,  leads  to  a  corresponding 
difference  in  the  grouping  of  batteries.  In 
the  first  case  (artillery  duel),  divisional 
artilleries  must  attempt  to  join  the  corps 
artillery,  under  the  effective  or  nominal 
command  of  the  officer  commanding  the 
artillery  of  the  army  corps.  All  the  batteries 
must  then  try  to  form  a  whole,  the  artillery  of 
the  army  corps  working  in  a  common  direction 
(which  does  not  mean  in  a  single  place). 

In  the  second  case  (infantry  action,  artillery 
in  support  of  infantry),  divisional  artilleries, 
of  course,  remain  under  the  orders  of  the 
generals  commanding  the  divisions ;  they  are 
reinforced  by  all  or  part  of  the  corps  artillery, 
which  thus  becomes  an  artillery  attached  to 
infantry  under  the  orders  of  generals  com- 
manding the  divisions.  The  whole  artillery 
of  the  army  corps  tends  to  become  divisional, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         129 

and  therefore  to  dividing  itself  and  acting 
in  two  or  three  directions,  those  of  the 
divisions. 

Moreover,  in  proportion  as  arms  are  im- 
proved (quick-firing  rifles  and  guns),  infantry 
is  compelled,  when  advancing,  to  move  under 
cover,  at  least  from  gunfire;  to  this  end, 
infantry  has  to  utilize  all  practicable  defilades 
and  to  follow  them  for  the  longest  time 
possible.  The  necessity  of  cover  increases 
every  day. 

But  these  ways  of  access  are  easily  para- 
lyzed nowadays  by  weak  troops  occupying 
''  points  d'appui "  and  armed  with  quick- 
firing  rifles,  or  enfilading  with  a  few  quick- 
firing  guns  (two  or  three).  Formerly  many 
guns  were  needed  to  produce  an  effect.  To- 
day, a  few  suffice.  Hence  this  consequence, 
that  the  numerous  ways  of  access,  more  and 
more  necessary  to  infantry,  would  be  im- 
practicable if  infantry  were  not  helped  from 
close  at  hand  by  an  artillery  capable  of  putting 
out  of  action  the  resisting  means  of  the 
enemy.  The  union  of  both  arms  has  become 
more  necessary  than  ever.  It  is  only  when 
preceded  by  shells  which  break  obstacles  and 
silence  the  fire  of  enemy  guns,  that  infantry 
will  manage  to  move  even  in  small  numbers 
along  its  avenues  of  approach.  And  as  the 

divisional  artillery,  be  it  reinforced  or  not, 
K 


130        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

could  not  fire  from  one  single  central  position 
along  all  these  means  of  access  in  order  to 
clear  them,  that  artillery  will  often  be  brought 
to  subdivide  itself  in  order  to  follow  and  help 
infantry  troops.  Thus  we  shall  have  guns 
attached  to  a  brigade  or  to  a  regiment,  this 
being  a  temporary  device  which  must  not 
alter  our  organic  constitution,  but  on  the 
contrary  must  be  made  to  show  what  elas- 
ticity and  suppleness  have  to  be  displayed 
nowadays  in  managing  an  army.  It  is  further 
obvious  that  the  inconvenience  resulting  from 
the  parcelling  and  apportionment  of  batteries 
becomes  much  smaller  when  we  pass  from  a 
gun  firing  two  shots  a  minute  to  a  gun  firing 
twenty. 

One  must  nevertheless  not  lose  sight  of  the 
fact  that  the  moral  effect,  the  characteristic 
of  artillery,  increases  rapidly  with  the  con- 
centration of  fire.  It  is  only  by  means  of 
an  action  en  masse  that  one  can  even  attempt 
to  secure  important  and  decisive  results. 

Moreover,  artillery  possesses  in  the  highest 
degree  the  means  of  effecting  surprise :  it  is 
able,  as  soon  as  it  appears,  to  make  effect 
follow  upon  menace  without  delay.  The 
reality  of  the  blow  follows  the  first  apparition 
of  danger.  It  must  see  to  it  that  its  action 
keeps  this  characteristic,  and  even  possesses 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         131 

it,  if  possible,  to  an  ever-increasing  degree; 
to  this  end,  destruction  must  be  made  to 
coincide  with  the  entrance  of  guns  in  line, 
and,  as  few  direct  hits  are  wanted  to  put  the 
enemy  out  of  action,  artillery  must  attempt 
from  the  moment  of  opening  fire  to  bracket 
the  objective  widely. 

Infantry. — Though  it  is  artillery  which 
begins  the  battle,  it  cannot  do  so  unless  it  is 
safely  protected.  The  alternative  is  too  great 
a  risk. 

Infantry  must  therefore  open  the  battle- 
field for  artillery  and  constantly  cover  the 
batteries  by  occupying  points  wherefrom  it 
can  protect  them. 

The  preparation-force  must  further  im- 
mobilize the  enemy.  This  makes  it  necessary 
for  infantry  to  strike  at  the  enemy,  to  threaten 
him  with  a  close  attack,  with  assault,  and  first 
of  all  to  approach  as  near  as  the  distance 
required  for  such  an  operation. 

These  efforts  mainly  devolve  upon  the 
first-line  troops,  as  a  result  of  the  necessity  of 
keeping  the  others  covered  at  a  distance, 
of  reserving  them  in  order  to  maintain  and 
supply  the  preparation. 

They  cannot  be  directed  by  a  high  com- 
mand, nor  by  a  commander  acting  from  the 
rear  and  sending  up  troops.  Yet  these  first- 


132        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

line  operations  cannot  succeed  without  having 
forces  at  their  disposal.  It  therefore  behoves 
officers  commanding  first-line  units  (com- 
panies, battalions)  to  display  initiative  and 
understanding  in  order  to  combine  the  action 
of  their  forces,  however  disorganized  they 
may  be,  against  the  objectives  to  be  suc- 
cessively carried;  in  order  to  reduce  to  a 
minimum  such  forces  as  are  holding  the  con- 
quered points  of  the  ground,  and  to  use  the 
rest  of  their  forces  against  the  points  which 
have  still  to  be  conquered. 

Once  progress  has  become  impossible,  they 
must  try  and  attain  by  their  fire  the  enemy 
artillery  and  organize  their  forces  in  order  to 
drive  back  the  enemy's  attempts;  this  will 
be  the  last  phase  of  preparation,  until  the 
moment  when  decisive  attack  is  to  be  carried 
out. 

BATTLE,  PLAN  OF.— All  acts  of  battle  should 
tend  to  : 

1.  Preparing    that    conclusion;     be    they 
called  the  action  of  an  advance  guard,  frontal 
attack,  artillery  duel,  encounter  of  cavalry, 
they  cannot  be  studied  and  conducted  alone,  but 
only  in  so  far  as  they  prepare  the  conclusion ; 

2.  Carrying  out  that  conclusion ;  and 

3.  Utilizing  it  by  pursuit,  so  as  to  destroy 
the  fallen  enemy. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         183 

Therefore,  and  from  the  outset,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  make  a  plan  involving  such  a  succession 
of  efforts  and  a  corresponding  distribution  of 
forces. 

CAVALRY. — The  Prussian  cavalry  1  remained 
in  action  right  up  to  the  end.  After  breaking 
the  attempts  made  by  the  enemy  in  order  to 
debouch  from  the  wood,  they  attacked  the 
enemy  artillery,  captured  three  guns,  and 
afterwards  carried  out  the  pursuit.  Although 
their  professional  value  was  inferior  to  that 
of  the  Austrian  cavalry,  they  knew  how  to 
fulfil  their  mission  in  the  battle,  how  to 
act  in  compliance  with  the  advance  guard's 
tactics;  above  all,  they  were  handled  by  a 
commander  who  utilized  them  to  the  utmost 
even  to  the  very  close  of  the  action. 

CAVALRY,  IN  ACTION. — As  far  as  the  cavalry 
action  south  of  Wysokow  2  is  concerned,  both 
parties  have  claimed  victory.  Both  may  be 
right,  if  that  action  be  only  considered  in 
itself.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Austrian 
cavalry  was  proved  to  possess  dash,  ma- 
noeuvring efficiency,  undeniable  professional 
value.  But  they  were  not  properly  com- 

1  At  Nachod,  in  1866. 

2  In  the  same  action,  Nachod,  1866. 


134          PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

manded.  The  Prussian  cavalry  were  more 
cautious,  less  well  trained  :  they  had  the 
same  pluck,  the  same  quickness,  the  same 
versatility  in  manoeuvring.  And  they  were 
commanded.  They  showed  tactical  ability. 
If  we  only  consider  the  result,  it  was  they 
who  obtained  the  victory.  Two  cavalry 
forces  do  not  fight  in  order  to  find  out  which 
is  the  better  force  of  the  two.  There  is 
always  a  general  situation  to  be  considered,  a 
tactical  goal  to  be  reached.  For  the  Austrian 
cavalry,  as  well  as  for  the  Austrian  infantry, 
the  object  here  was  to  reach  the  approaches 
of  the  Nachod  pass.  They  failed  to  do  so. 
For  the  Prussian  cavalry,  as  well  as  for  the 
Prussian  infantry,  the  object  was  to  protect 
that  issue.  They  secured  that  result. 

Among  other  mistakes,  the  Austrian  cavalry 
were  faulty  in  omitting  to  scout,  to  protect 
themselves  in  the  direction  of  Wysokow; 
hence  a  decisive  surprise.  The  general  use 
made  of  cavalry  by  either  party  leads  to  a 
similar  remark.  General  Steinmetz  had  his 
whole  cavalry  (about  twelve  squadrons)  on 
the  battle-field.  The  Austrian  commander, 
who  had  more  than  thirty  squadrons  at  his 
disposal,  only  managed  to  send  five  into 
action.  He  had  numbers  on  his  side;  yet 
it  was  by  numbers  that  his  cavalry  were 
beaten. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         135 

CAVALRY  CORPS.— The  authorities  did  well, 
after  the  experiences  of  1812  and  of  1866, 
to  give  up  the  permanent  organization  of 
cavalry  corps,  which  are  difficult  to  feed, 
clumsy  to  manoeuvre,  and  generally  come  up 
too  late.  Nor  should  we  to-day  be  led  to 
reconstitute  the  same  at  the  opening  of  a 
war.  We  have  not  to  envisage  scouting  over 
great  distances  such  as  those  of  the  Palatinate 
in  1870,  considering  the  effectives  actually 
assigned  to  the  function  of  covering  and  the 
distances  which  separate  the  opposed  cover- 
ing screens.  There  are  but  twenty-seven 
kilometres  from  Chateau-Salins  to  Nancy. 
To  employ  such  corps  in  order  to  turn  one 
or  other  of  the  wings  of  the  enemy's  cover- 
ing screen  would  only  lead  one  on  to  a 
lengthy  enterprise  which  doubtless  will  be 
without  result.  On  the  other  hand,  cavalry 
used  in  masses  will  fulfil  to-day  as  in  the 
past  (1806),  as  a  covering  or  as  a  manoeuvring 
advance  guard,  the  role  of  a  highly  mobile 
large  reserve  capable  of  reinforcing  a  point 
which  is  about  to  yield  or  of  parrying  a 
turning  movement.  Even  after  the  first 
encounters,  when  the  opposing  armies  shall 
have  taken  the  field,  one  must  use  cavalry 
masses  to  obtain  the  first  information,  and 
this  only  an  unquestionable  numerical  superi- 
ority can  procure. 


136        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

CHARACTERS  OF  WAR.— Were  I  to  speak 
about  strategy  and  general  tactics  in  Brussels 
instead  of  in  Paris,  my  study  would  bear  on 
a  particular  form  of  war.  The  situation  of 
Belgium  is  known  to  you :  a  neutrality 
guaranteed  by  Europe,  which  is  perhaps 
nothing  more  than  a  word,  but  has,  in  any 
case,  hitherto  saved  the  existence  of  that 
little  State;  further,  the  immediate  neigh- 
bourhood of  two  great  Powers,  Germany  and 
France,  from  neither  of  which  does  any  serious 
military  obstacle  separate  that  State,  by  either 
of  which  it  might  be  easily  conquered  if  the 
other  neighbour,  or  Europe  as  a  whole,  did 
not  intervene  in  the  struggle.  The  special 
theory  of  war  that  would  have  to  be  pre- 
sented to  the  Belgian  Army  would  have  a 
well-determined  object,  namely  that  of  de- 
laying as  much  as  possible  the  advance  of 
the  invading  neighbour.  The  study  would 
then  consist  in  finding  out  how  the  Belgian 
Army  can  perform  such  a  part,  by  avoiding 
the  decision  by  arms  and  adjourning  the 
judgment  of  battle. 

Such  a  conclusion  would  necessarily  in- 
fluence the  whole  military  state  of  the  nation  : 
organization,  mobilization,  armament,  fortifica- 
tion, as  well  as  the  instruction  of  the  troops, 
not  excluding  the  training  of  the  company 
and  even  of  the  individual  private. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         137 

If  from  Brussels  we  proceed  to  London,  we 
again  find  a  different  situation,  different 
ambitions.  Those  are  equally  familiar  to 
you.  There  you  would  find  an  insular  situa- 
tion which  ought  to  be  maintained  intangible 
by  a  protecting  organization;  also  the  ambi- 
tion of  maintaining  and  developing  an  Empire 
beyond  the  seas  and  in  both  hemispheres. 
This  would  require  another  way  of  handling 
the  problem,  another  theory  of  war. 

So,  again,  in  Madrid.  Every  idea  of  terri- 
torial extension  on  the  Continent  is  tem- 
porarily discarded  by  Spain  in  view  of  its 
geographical  situation,  of  the  nature  of  its 
frontiers,  of  its  political,  financial  state,  etc. 
.  .  .  What  does,  then,  such  a  country  request 
from  its  army?  The  maintenance  of  the 
integrity  of  national  territory.  Would  not  in 
that  case  the  best  lesson  on  the  art  of  war 
be  derived  from  reading  certain  pages  of  the 
history  of  Spain  from  1808  to  1814? 

The  same  is  true  of  Rome,  or  Berne.  Each 
country  finds  itself  in  a  different  situation, 
requiring  a  distinct  handling  of  the  problem. 

COMMANDMENT. — An  army  which  desires  to 
conquer  must  be  provided  with  a  factor  of 
the  first  order,  command :  and  the  man  who 
would  undertake  the  conduct  of  battle  must 
possess  a  certain  gift  :  that  of  commanding. 


188         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

To  think  and  to  will,  to  possess  intelligence 
and  energy,  will  not  suffice  for  him ;  he  must 
possess  also  the  "  imperative  fluid "  (De 
Brack),  the  gift  of  communicating  his  own 
supreme  energy  to  the  masses  of  men  who 
are,  so  to  speak,  his  weapon;  for  an  army 
is  to  a  chief  what  a  sword  is  to  a  soldier. 
It  is  only  worth  anything  in  so  far  as  it  receives 
from  him  a  certain  impulsion  (direction  and 
vigour). 

"  The  Gauls  were  not  conquered  by  the 
Roman  legions,  but  by  Caesar.  It  was  not 
before  the  Carthaginian  soldiers  that  Rome 
was  made  to  tremble,  but  before  Hannibal. 
It  was  not  the  Macedonian  phalanx  which 
penetrated  to  India,  but  Alexander.  It  was 
not  the  French  army  which  reached  the 
Weser  and  the  Inn,  it  was  Turenne.  Prussia 
was  not  defended  for  seven  years  against  the 
three  most  formidable  European  Powers  by 
the  Prussian  soldiers,  but  by  Frederick  the 
Great." 

These  are  Napoleon's  words.  What  would 
he  not  have  written,  and  still  more  rightly, 
had  he  included  in  his  enumerations  that 
dazzling  period  of  history,  the  fascinating 
memory  of  which  will  live  through  future 
centuries  under  the  name  of  "  the  Napoleonic 
epic,"  and  to  which  he  gave  all  its  life  by  his 
own  gigantic  personality  ! 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        139 

Great  results  in  war  are  due  to  the  com- 
mander. History  is  therefore  right  in  making 
generals  responsible  for  victories — in  which 
case  they  are  glorified;  and  for  defeats — in 
which  case  they  are  disgraced.  Without  a 
commander,  no  battle,  no  victory  is  possible. 

Is  it  not  again  this  influence  of  the  com- 
mander, the  very  enthusiasm  derived  from 
him,  which  alone  can  explain  the  unconscious 
movements  of  human  masses,  at  those  solemn 
moments  when,  without  knowing  why  it  is 
doing  so,  an  army  on  the  battle-field  feels  it  is 
being  carried  forward  as  if  it  were  gliding 
down  a  slope. 

It  is,  moreover,  easy  to  perceive  why  such 
an  influence  is  necessary.  Let  us  come  to 
that  point.  When  the  moment  arrives  for 
taking  decisions,  facing  responsibilities,  enter- 
ing upon  sacrifices — decisions  which  ought  to 
be  taken  before  they  are  imposed,  responsi- 
bilities which  ought  to  be  welcomed,  for  the 
initiative  must  be  secured  and  the  offensive 
launched — where  should  we  find  a  man  equal 
to  these  uncertain  and  dangerous  tasks  were 
it  not  among  men  of  a  superior  stamp,  men 
eager  for  responsibilities?  He  must  indeed 
be  a  man  who,  being  deeply  imbued  with  a 
will  to  conquer,  shall  derive  from  that  will 
(as  well  as  from  a  clear  perception  of  the  only 
means  that  lead  to  victory)  the  strength  to 


140        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

make  an  unwavering  use  of  the  most  formid- 
able rights,  to  approach  with  courage  all 
difficulties  and  all  sacrifices,  to  risk  every- 
thing; even  honour — for  a  beaten  general  is 
disgraced  for  ever. 

"  It  is  difficult  to  appreciate  correctly  what 
moral  strength  is  required  to  deliver — after 
having  completely  thought  out  the  conse- 
quences— one  of  those  great  battles  upon 
which  the  history  of  an  army  and  of  a  country, 
the  possession  of  a  crown  depend."  So  wrote 
Napoleon.  He  added  that,  "  generals  who 
give  battle  willingly  are  seldom  found " ; 
and  "  a  morally  strong  personality  must  be 
understood  to  mean  not  one  who  is  only 
possessed  of  strong  emotions,  but  one  whose 
balance  is  not  upset  by  the  strongest  possible 
emotions  "  (Clausewitz). 

Let  us  salute,  too,  that  sovereign  power  of 
the  commander,  just  as  he  will  be  saluted  by 
drums  and  bugles  when  appearing  on  the 
battle-field ;  a  power  necessary  to  the  organ- 
ization of  the  whole,  of  the  final  thrust,  and 
alone  capable  of  fixing  fortune. 

Let  us  at  the  very  beginning  of  our  study 
make  note  of  that  capital  factor :  the  com- 
mander's personal  action.  No  victory  is 
possible  unless  the  commander  be  energetic, 
eager  for  responsibilities  and  bold  under- 
takings; unless  he  possess  and  can  impart 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         141 

to  all  the  resolute  will  of  seeing  the  thing 
through;  unless  he  be  capable  of  exerting  a 
personal  action  composed  of  will,  judgment, 
and  freedom  of  mind  in  the  midst  of  danger. 
These  are  natural  gifts  in  a  man  of  genius, 
in  a  born  general;  in  an  average  man  such 
advantages  may  be  secured  by  means  of  work 
and  reflection. 

In  order  to  manifest  itself,  such  a  personal 
action  requires  the  temperament  of  a  chief  (a 
gift  of  nature),  ability  to  command,  inciting 
power,  which  teaching  cannot  provide. 

The  effects  of  that  personal  action  are 
numerous,  for  by  using  such  gifts  (natural  or 
acquired),  it  finds  in  the  most  unlimited  use 
of  forces  a  means  of  increasing  the  efficiency 
of  such  forces;  it  also  transforms  its  instru- 
ment, giving  birth,  as  it  were,  to  officers  and 
troops,  creating  an  ability  and  devotion  which, 
failing  such  spark  or  impulsion  from  above, 
would  have  remained  sunk  in  mediocrity. 

This  task  of  the  commander  becomes  an 
immense  one  where  modern  numbers  are 
concerned.  It  is,  indeed,  seldom  possible  for 
a  single  man  to  fulfil  it;  several  men  are 
needed.  This  is  the  new  conception  which 
the  French  Revolution  brought  into  war,  by 
making  the  personal  initiative  of  subordinate 
chiefs  (all  working  in  the  same  direction  and 
complying  with  the  same  doctrine)  concur 


142         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

in  setting  up  a  complete  direction  of  armies. 
It  became,  at  any  rate,  a  fully  developed 
reality  with  the  German  armies  of  1870. 

One  should  remark  in  their  headquarters 
the  presence  of  the  King;  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Allied  Forces  with  his  great 
General  Staff;  of  the  German  Princes;  and 
also  of  the  Minister  of  War,  of  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  and  of  the  Federal 
Chancellor.  There,  indeed,  you  have  an 
example  of  command  in  nations  going  to 
war.  The  whole  power  of  the  Government 
accompanies  the  Commander-in-Chief ,  in  order 
to  put  at  his  disposal  all  the  resources  of 
diplomacy,  of  finance,  and  of  the  national 
soil;  in  order  that  the  military  enterprise 
to  which  the  nation  has  given  all  its  energies, 
and  one  to  which  it  proposes  to  devote  all 
the  power  of  its  authorities,  may  succeed. 
***** 

The  formula,  "  strike  hard  and  strike  at 
the  main  mass,"  does  not  sum  up  the  whole 
of  war,  at  least  so  far  as  the  Higher  Command 
is  concerned.  There  is  one  essential  condition 
from  which  the  latter  cannot  escape,  and 
that  is,  to  strike  all  together,  to  co-ordinate. 
Lacking  that,  you  get  disaster. 

COMRADESHIP. —  The  Germans  fought  at 
Spicheren  with  a  mass  of  60,000  men,  splen- 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        143 

didly  bound  together  by  the  sole  emotion  of 
comradeship. 

CONCENTRATION. — A  concentration  ought  to 
be  carried  out  in  a  region  where  the  armies 
can  be  supplied,  whether  an  offensive  or  a 
defensive  follows  upon  the  conclusion  of  that 
operation.  It  should  take  into  account  both 
the  direction  of  attack  and  the  line  of  retreat 
to  be  kept  open.  The  same  railway  lines 
which  carry  the  concentration  into  effect 
generally  allow  of  an  easy  supply  for  the 
army,  provided  always  that  the  retreat  in 
case  of  check  can  be  made  over  the  most 
important  part  of  the  ground,  and  therefore 
that  the  zone  of  concentration  should  lie 
just  in  front  of  that  region. 

Our  concentration  ought  to  cover  the 
frontier  provinces  menaced  by  invasion. 
Public  opinion  has  too  much  influence  to-day 
to  allow  the  Government  to  leave  those 
frontiers  without  defence.  Further,  were  they 
to  act  thus,  they  would  be  depriving  them- 
selves of  resources  and  territory,  and  they 
would  lose  ground  which  would  have  to  be 
recovered.  But  the  protection  of  these  pro- 
vinces is  not  identical  with  their  occupation. 
One  must  reconcile  this  idea  of  protection 
with  the  necessity  of  all  the  troops  being 
absolutely  required  to  combine  for  decisive 


144         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

actions.  Therefore  we  must  keep  intact  the 
principle  of  assembling  all  one's  forces,  and 
one  must  provide  the  guarantee  desired  for 
the  threatened  provinces  either  indirectly, 
as  Moltke  provided  protection  for  southern 
Germany  in  1870,  or  by  the  aid  of  covering 
troops. 

To  satisfy  in  one  and  the  same  system  these 
political  necessities  and  the  military  necessities 
as  well,  such  are  the  fixed  limits  of  the  task 
imposed  at  the  outset  upon  our  staffs. 
***** 

The  German  concentration  of  the  future 
will  not  be  a  reunion  of  forces  directed  to 
various  ends.  It  is  directed  towards  a  ma- 
noeuvre which  has  been  planned  a  priori.  It 
is  an  attack  all  planned  out;  its  execution, 
in  direction  and  in  means  already  fixed.  It 
will  be  preceded  by  the  highest  degree  of 
preparation,  in  order  to  permit  the  advance 
against  the  enemy,  and  this  preparation 
will  be  based,  to  conclude,  upon  resolution 
and  will;  that  is,  upon  spiritual  conditions 
which  secure  the  initiative,  and  the  sub- 
ordination of  the  adversary,  from  the  first. 
The  whole  thing  is  a  constant  effort  to  seize 
the  direction  of  the  struggle  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment.  However  highly  these 
characteristics  may  be  developed,  we  must 
remark  that  in  order  that  the  manoeuvre 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         145 

should  lead  to  its  military  result — the  over- 
throw of  the  adversary — it  will  have  to  strike 
hard  and  strike  exactly  in  the  right  place. 
To  that  end  there  must  be  nothing  about  it 
haphazard.  It  must  be  fully  informed,  and 
the  action  must  be  planned  with  a  deter- 
mined direction  strictly  denned  before  it  is 
undertaken.  Further,  it  must  be  planned 
with  common  sense,  and  the  direction  chosen 
must  be  that  which  will  produce  the  chief 
effect  and  where  the  army  can  wage  battle 
with  large  results.  Lacking  such  an  end, 
rapidity  of  movement  and  initiative  itself  are 
worthless.  Therefore  let  the  direction  be 
chosen  beforehand  upon  considered  reasons. 
The  great  European  States  have  drawn  up 
projects  of  concentration  to  be  realized  at 
the  moment  war  breaks  out.  These  plans 
are  partly  indicated  by  the  lines  of  railway 
and  the  opportunities  for  detraining.  They 
are  also  partly  evident  from  the  measures 
undertaken  in  time  of  peace.  Further,  there 
are  documents,  known  either  partially  or  as 
a  whole,  which  allow  one  to  reconstitute, 
partially  or  entirely,  the  projects  which  have 
been  decided  upon.  Commerce  and  industry 
have  increased  the  number  and  the  efficiency 
of  railway  lines  purely  commercial  in  their 
object.  Therefore : 

i.  It  is  no  longer  necessary  for  us  to  fully 


146        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

employ  all  the  railways  which  lead  to  the 
frontier.  There  are  more  than  we  need, 
both  in  their  number  and  in  the  work  they 
can  do.  On  account  of  this  it  is  possible  to 
make  a  combination,  or  indeed  several  com- 
binations, of  the  use  one  proposes  to  make 
of  those  lines. 

2.  The  fact  that  the  personnel  is  now  fully 
instructed  with  a  view  to  that  object  allows 
us  to  wait  till  the  very  last  hour  before  draw- 
ing up  our  combination  for  the  distribution 
of  our  forces.  Here  is  a  contrast  to  the 
position  which  existed  in  1870.  There  has 
reappeared  the  power  to  create  a  concen- 
tration at  the  last  moment,  and  by  that  very 
fact  to  create  surprise,  in  the  Napoleonic 
manner,  if  to  the  elastic  use  of  railways  one 
adds  a  combination  of  march  by  the  roads. 

COVERING  TROOPS. — The  organisation  of  a 
strong  covering  screen,  once  accomplished, 
will  necessarily  have  its  effect  upon  the 
events  of  the  first  days  after  the  declaration 
of  war. 

DEFENCE  OF  A  VILLAGE.— The  distribution 
of  troops  devoted  to  the  defence  of  a  place 
includes  a  garrison,  an  occupying  force, 
numerically  as  weak  as  possible;  a  reserve 
as  strong  as  possible,  designed  for  counter- 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         147 

attacking  and  for  providing  itself,  at  the 
moment  it  goes  into  action,  with  a  security- 
service  which  will  guard  it  from  any  possible 
surprise. 

The  occupying  numbers  may  be  calculated 
on  the  following  basis  :  at  the  moment  when 
the  enemy  reaches  the  outskirts  of  the  village, 
we  oppose  him  with  one  rifle  per  yard  to 
make  resistance  serious  and  adequate.  The 
enemy  can  generally  assault  only  one  side  of 
the  outskirts  of  the  village.  It  is  only  after 
measuring  that  part  of  the  outskirts  and 
organizing  a  central  redoubt,  that  the  numbers 
of  the  force  attached  to  the  direct  defence  of 
the  village  can  be  fixed.  At  Wysokow,1  the 
force  devoted  to  this  task  was  the  equivalent 
of  three  battalions. 

This  calculation  must  never  lead  to  our 
devoting  to  the  occupation  of  the  "  point 
d'appui  "  the  whole  force  available,  however 
weak  that  force  may  be ;  part  of  it  must  always 
be  kept  in  reserve  for  the  counter-attack. 

DIRECTION. — The  power  to  command  has 
never  meant  the  power  to  remain  mysterious, 
but  rather  to  communicate,  at  least  to  those 
who  immediately  execute  our  orders,  the 
idea  which  animates  our  plan. 

1  In  the  action  of  Nachod,  in  the  Austro-Prussian 
war  of  1866. 


148        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

If  any  one  ever  had  the  chance  of  playing 
the  mysterious  r6le  in  war  it  was  Napoleon. 
For  his  authority  was  beyond  question,  and 
he  had  taken  upon  himself  to  think  out 
everything  and  decide  everything  for  his 
army.  Yet  in  his  correspondence  he  always 
put  his  views  and  his  programme  for  several 
days  to  come  before  the  Commanders  of  his 
army  corps.  And  if  we  call  to  mind  a  number 
of  his  proclamations  we  shall  see  that  his  very 
troops  were  made  aware  of  the  manoeuvre 
he  intended.  Souvarov  said  exactly  the  same 
thing.  Every  soldier  should  understand  the 
manoeuvre  in  which  he  is  engaged.  He  was 
convinced  that  one  can  get  anything  out  of  a 
force  to  which  one  speaks  frankly,  because 
such  a  force  will  understand  what  is  asked 
of  it  and  will  then  itself  ask  no  better  than 
to  do  what  is  required  of  it. 

***** 

General  von  Kirchbach,1  commanding  the 
loth  Division,  had  forestalled  the  column  on 
the  field  of  action;  he  had  found  his  way, 
and  had  witnessed  the  loss  of  the  Waldchen 
and  the  cavalry  action. 

As  soon  as  his  troops  arrived  he  ordered 
the  general  commanding  the  igth  Brigade 
to  retake  and  occupy  the  Waldchen,  while 
he  himself  proceeded  to  Wysokow,  which  the 

1  At  Nachod,  as  above. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         149 

Commander  of  the  army  corps  had  ordered 
him  to  occupy. 

DISCIPLINE. — To  be  disciplined  does  not 
mean  that  one  does  not  commit  any  breach 
of  discipline ;  that  one  does  not  commit  some 
disorderly  action;  such  a  definition  works 
well  enough  for  the  rank  and  file,  but  not 
at  all  for  a  commander  placed  in  any  degree 
of  the  military  hierarchy,  least  of  all,  therefore, 
for  those  who  find  themselves  in  the  highest 
places.  •  9 

To  be  disciplined  does  not  mean,  either, 
that  one  only  carries  out  an  order  received 
to  such  a  point  as  appears  to  be  convenient, 
fair,  rational  or  possible.  It  means  that  one 
frankly  adopts  the  thoughts  and  views  of 
the  superior  in  command,  and  that  one  uses 
all  humanly  practicable  means  in  order  to 
give  him  satisfaction. 

Again,  to  be  disciplined  does  not  -mean 
being  silent,  abstaining,  or  doing  only  what  one 
thinks  one  may  undertake  without  risk  ;  it 
is  not  the  art  of  eluding  responsibility ;  it 
means  acting  in  compliance  with  orders 
received,  and  therefore  finding  in  one's  own 
mind,  by  effort  and  reflection,  the  possibility 
to  carry  out  such  orders.  It  also  means 
finding  in  one's  own  will  the  energy  to  face 
the  risks  involved  in  execution.  In  a  high 


150        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

place,  discipline  implies  mental  activity  and 
a  display  of  will.  Laziness  of  mind  leads  to 
indiscipline,  just  as  does  insubordination. 
In  either  case  it  is  an  error;  a  guilty  act. 
Incapacity  and  ignorance  cannot  be  called 
extenuating  circumstances,  for  knowledge  is 
within  the  reach  of  all  who  seek  it. 

***** 

In  a  time  such  as  ours  when  people  believe 
they  can  do  without  an  ideal,  cast  away  what 
they  call  abstract  ideas,  live  on  realism, 
rationalism,  positivism,  reduce  everything  to 
knowledge  or  to  the  use  of  more  or  less 
ingenious  and  casual  devices — let  us  acknow- 
ledge it  here — in  such  a  time  there  is  only 
one  means  of  avoiding  error,  crime,  disaster, 
of  determining  the  conduct  to  be  followed 
on  a  given  occasion — but  a  safe  means  it  is, 
and  a  fruitful  one  ;  this  is  the  exclusive 
devotion  to  two  abstract  notions  in  the  field 
of  ethics  :  duty  and  discipline  ;  such  a  devo- 
tion, if  it  is  to  lead  to  happy  results,  further 
implies  besides,  as  the  example  of  General  von 

Kettler  shows  us,  knowledge  and  reasoning. 
***** 

Those  words :  common  action,  union  of 
forces,  mean  the  reverse  of  independent, 
isolated,  or  successive,  action  which  would 
fatally  lead  to  dispersion.  It  is  obvious, 
therefore,  that  any  one  of  the  units  which 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         151 

is  a  component  part  of  the  whole  force  is 
not  free  to  go  where  it  wishes  (union  in  space) , 
nor  to  arrive  when  it  likes  (union  in  time) ; 
to  allow  itself  to  be  directed  by  its  chief's 
private  views,  however  sound  they  may 
appear  to  be;  to  act  on  its  own  account; 
to  seek  the  enemy  and  fight  him  where  and 
when  it  likes — even  should  the  undertaking 
be  a  successful  one. 

***** 

The  crime  lay  in  the  fact  that  Garibaldi,1 
after  being  ordered  to  join  the  Eastern  Army, 
had  not  done  so.  He  never  thought  of  carry- 
ing out  his  orders.  His  conduct  was  dictated 
by  his  own  personal  views,  by  his  craving  for 
personal  success. 

No  material  impossibility  prevented  him 
from  obeying,  had  he  attempted  to  do  so  : 
the  Pelissier  Division  remaining  at  Dijon 
would  have  sufficed  to  absorb  General  von 
Kettler's  activity;  the  army  of  the  Vosges 
might  freely  have  joined  the  Eastern 
Army. 

Garibaldi  and  General  de  Failly,2  although 
their  military  origins  were  very  different, 
reached  the  same  result,  disaster,  by  following 
the  same  ways  :  mental  indiscipline,  neglect  of 

1  Near  Dijon,  in  1870. 

2  Also  in  1870.     He  failed  to  execute  an  order  to 
concentrate  on  Bitche  early  in  the  war. 


152         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

military  duty,  in  the.  strictest  sense  of  the 
term. 

DIVERSITY  IN  WAR. — In  war  there  are  none 
but  particular  cases;  everything  has  there 
an  individual  nature;  nothing  ever  repeats 
itself. 

In  the  first  place,  the  data  of  a  military 
problem  are  but  seldom  certain ;  they  are 
never  final.  Everything  is  in  a  constant 
state  of  change  and  reshaping.  These  data, 
therefore,  only  possess  a  relative  value  as 
compared  to  the  absolute  value  of  mathe- 
matical terms. 

Where  you  have  only  observed  one  com- 
pany, you  find  a  battalion  when  you  come  to 
attack. 

One  regiment  of  3000  rifles,  if  well  cared 
for,  represents,  after  a  few  days  campaigning, 
2800  rifles;  less  well  managed,  it  will  no 
longer  include  more  than  2000.  The  varia- 
tions in  the  moral  of  a  force  are  at  least  as 
ample.  How,  then,  compare  two  regiments 
with  each  other?  Under  the  same  name 
they  represent  two  utterly  different  quantities. 
Illness,  hardships,  bivouacking  at  night,  react 
on  the  troops  in  various  ways.  Certain  troops 
after  such  an  ordeal  are  soon  only  a  force  in 
name.  They  are  nothing  but  columns  of 
hungry,  exhausted,  sick  men.  Or  you  may 


153 

have  a  division  still  called  "  a  division " 
though  it  shall  have  lost  part  of  its  batteries, 
etc.  .  .  .  The  same  is  true  of  the  tactical 
situation,  which  varies  as  seen  by  the  one 
side  or  the  other.  The  interest  of  one  of  the 
adversaries  is  not  the  mere  reverse  of  the 
interest  of  the  other  :  so  with  their  tactics. 
Suppose  one  force  has  to  escort  a  convoy, 
while  the  other  has  to  attack  it :  could  the 
manner  of  fighting  be  the  same  on  both 
sides  ?  Evidently  not.  On  the  same  ground, 
under  the  same  circumstances  of  time  and 
place,  one  would  have  to  proceed  differently 
in  each  of  these 'cases. 

The  same  regiment,  the  same  brigade,  will 
not  fight  in  the  same  manner  when  they  have 
to  carry  out  the  pursuit  of  a  beaten  enemy 
and  when  they  will  have  to  meet  a  fresh 
adversary,  although  they  will  use  in  both 
cases  the  same  men,  the  same  rifles,  the  same 
numbers. 

Again  as  regards  two  advance  guard  en- 
gagements :  one  can  never  be  a  mere  repeti- 
tion of  another  because,  independently  of 
the  fact  that  the  ground  varies  from  one  to 
the  other,  they  are  both  governed  by  differ- 
ences other  than  those  of  time  and  space. 

The  consequence  of  all  this  is  that  each 
case  considered  is  a  particular  one,  that  it 
presents  itself  under  a  system  of  special 


154        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

circumstances  :  ground,  state  of  the  troops, 
tactical  situation,  etc.  .  .  .  which  are  bound 
to  impress  upon  it  an  absolutely  original 
stamp.  Certain  factors  will  assume  an  addi- 
tional importance,  others  a  lesser  one. 

This  absence  of  similarity  among  military 
questions  naturally  brings  out  the  inability 
of  memory  to  solve  them ;  also  the  sterility 
of  invariable  forms,  such  as  figures,  geo- 
metrical drawings  (e'pures),  plans  (schemas), 
etc.  One  only  right  solution  imposes  itself  : 
namely,  the  application,  varying  according 
to  circumstances,  of  fixed  principles. 

DOCTRINE  OF  WAR.— What  is  the  form  of 
this  teaching  sprung  from  history  and  destined 
to  grow  by  means  of  further  historical  studies  ? 

It  appears  in  the  shape  of  a  theory  of  war 
which  can  be  taught — which  shall  be  taught 
to  you — and  in  the  shape  of  a  doctrine,  which 
you  will  be  taught  to  practise. 

What  is  meant  by  these  words  is  the  con- 
ception and  the  practical  application  not  of  a 
science  of  war  nor  of  some  limited  dogma, 
composed  of  abstract  truths  outside  which 
all  would  be  heresy,  but  of  a  certain  number 
of  principles,  the  application  of  which,  though 
they  will  not  be  open  to  discussion  once  they 
shall  have  been  established,  must  logically 
vary  according  to  circumstances  while  always 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         155 

tending  towards  the  same  goal,  and  that  an 
objective  goal. 

The  doctrine  will  extend  itself  to  the  higher 
side  of  war,  owing  to  the  free  development 
given  to  your  minds  by  a  common  manner 
of  seeing,  thinking,  acting,  by  which  every 
one  will  profit  according  to  the  measure  of 
his  own  gifts;  it  will  further  constitute  a 
discipline  of  the  mind  common  to  you  all. 
***** 

There  are  fixed  principles  to  be  applied  in 
a  variable  way,  according  to  circumstances, 
to  each  case ;  for  each  is  always  a  particular 
case  and  has  to  be  considered  in  itself :  such 
is  our  conclusive  formula  for  the  time  being. 
Now  does  not  such  a  conclusion  bring  us 
back,  on  the  field  of  practical  application, 
to  the  very  intellectual  anarchy  we  had  hoped 
to  remedy  by  creating  unity  of  doctrine  and 
establishing  a  theory  of  war  ? 

Not  in  the  least.  Whatever  may  be  your 
present  impression,  you  will  soon  find  that, 
in  applying  fixed  principles  to  various  cases, 
concordance  reappears  as  a  consequence  of  a 
common  way  of  facing  the  subject — a  purely 
objective  way. 

From  the  same  attitude  towards  things  will 
first  result  a  same  way  of  seeing  them,  and 
from  this  common  way  of  seeing,  arises  a 
common  way  of  acting. 


156         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

The  latter  will  soon  become  itself  instinc- 
tive :  another  of  the  results  aimed  at. 
*  *  *  *  * 

A  wild  fowl  flies  up  in  front  of  a  sports- 
man; if  it  goes  from  right  to  left,  he  fires 
in  front  and  to  the  left ;  if  from  left  to  right, 
he  fires  in  front  and  to  the  right ;  if  it  comes 
towards  him,  he  fires  high ;  if  away  from  him, 
he  fires  low. 

In  each  of  these  cases,  he  applies  in  a  vari- 
able way  the  fixed  principle  :  to  get  three 
points  upon  one  straight  line,  his  eye,  the 
sight  and  the  quarry,  at  the  moment  the 
shot  takes  effect. 

Whence  does  he  derive  his  method  of 
application  ?  Does  he  resort  to  discussion 
of  the  problem?  He  has  not  got  the  time. 
He  unconsciously  derives  his  method  of 
application  from  the  sight  of  his  object  under 
the  particular  surrounding  circumstances : 
he  swings  from  left  to  right,  or  the  reverse, 
at  a  given  speed;  a  purely  objective  process. 
And  from  seeing  as  quickly  as  possible,  there 
naturally  results  a  tension  of  all  the  means 
in  one  single  direction;  he  has  practised  the 
art  of  acting  rationally  without  reflecting. 

What  we  need,  then,  in  order  to  apply  a 
principle,  is  to  look  at  the  object  in  itself 
under  the  conditions  of  the  moment,  and, 
so  to  speak,  through  the  atmosphere  of  the 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         157 

particular  case  characterizing  the  situation. 
Our  own  object  is  the  enemy,  on  whom  we 
desire  to  act  in  a  given  way  according  to  the 
day,  to  the  mission  we  have  been  given;  we 
have  to  make  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy, 
or  to  pin  him,  or  to  delay  him,  or  to  strike, 
etc. 

Thence — from  the  sole  consideration  of  the 
object — must  be  derived,  first  by  means  of 
reasoning  (when,  as  here,  in  this  school  we 
have  to  study),  later  when  in  the  field, 
automatically  our  whole  conduct,  our  whole 

manner  of  acting. 

*  *  *  >          *  * 

A  doctrine  of  war  consists  first  in  a  common 
way  of  objectively  approaching  the  subject; 
second,  in  a  common  way  of  handling  it,  by 
adapting  without  reserve  the  means  to  the 
goal  aimed  at,  to  the  object. 

ECONOMY  OF  FORCES.— The  principle  of 
economy  of  forces  gives  us  the  means  of 
reconciling  these  two  apparently  contradictory 
conditions ;  to  strike  with  an  assembled  whole, 
after  having  supplied  numerous  detachments. 

The  principle  of  economy  of  forces  is  the 
art  of  pouring  out  all  one's  resources  at  a 
given  moment  on  one  spot;  of  making  use 
there  of  all  troops,  and,  to  make  such  a 
thing  possible,  of  making  those  troops  perma- 


158        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

nently  communicate  with  each  other,  instead 
of  dividing  them  and  attaching  to  each 
fraction  some  fixed  and  invariable  function; 
its  second  part,  a  result  having  been  attained, 
is  the  art  of  again  so  disposing  the  troops 
as  to  converge  on,  and  act  against,  a  new 
single  object. 

In  practice  the  new  1  theory  of  war,  based 
on  the  principle  of  economy  of  forces  and 
characterized  in  the  highest  degree  by  initia- 
tive, attack,  and  well-conceived  action  has 
for  its  outcome  the  following  : 

1.  Action  in  one  direction   (namely,   that 
which  is  implied  in  the  strategical  plan)  by 
means  of  tactics;    that  is,  by  using  military 
means  as  skilfully  as  possible.     For  instance, 
once  the  direction  of  Voltri 2  had  been  aban- 
doned, the  army  marched  first  on  Montenotte, 
then  on  Dego ;  once  Dego  had  been  given  up, 
on  Millesimo ;   Millesimo  having  been  settled, 
the  army  came  back  on  Dego,  etc. 

2.  In    each    of    the    successively    adopted 
directions,  victory  is  secured  by  using  all  the 
forces,   or   at   least  the  main   body;    in   the 
other  directions,  safety  is  ensured  by  as  few 
troops  as  possible,  their  mission  being  not 
to  beat  the  enemy,   but  to   delay  him,   to 
paralyze  him,  to  reconnoitre  :    so  Cervoni  in 

1  Revolutionary  or  Napoleonic. 

2  During  Napoleon's  Italian  campaign  of  1796. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         159 

face  of  Beaulieu,  Massena  at  Dego,  Serurier 
in  face  of  Colli. 

3.  In  strategy  as  in  tactics,  a  decision  is 
constantly  enforced  by  mechanics,  by  apply- 
ing to  part  of  the  enemy  forces  a  main  body 
made  as  strong  as  possible,  by  devoting  to 
that  task  with  the  greatest  possible  care  all 
the  forces  which  have  been  freed  elsewhere. 
Once  this  part  of  the  enemy  forces  has  been 
destroyed,  another  has  to  be  dealt  with 
promptly  by  again  applying  the  main  body, 
in  order  to  be  successively  the  stronger  on  a 
given  point  at  a  given  time. 

In  order  to  do  things  in  that  way,  forces 
must  be  constantly  arranged  according  to  a 
system  : 

(1)  attacking  in  order 

to    reconnoitre ; 

(2)  to  fix  the  enemy, 


On     the    peri- 


vance  guards 


to  the  benefit  of 


phery,anum-       /  x   ,,  .    ,     , 

her    of     ad-        3    the  mam  body; 

(4)  or  parrying  an  at- 


tack   in    order 


to     cover     the 
main  body; 
2.  In  the  rear,  the  main  body  manoeuvring 
in  the  direction  of  the  objective  aimed  at. 

We  cannot  be  victorious  everywhere  :  it 
will  suffice  for  us  if  we  are  victorious  on  one 
point.  We  must  fight  everywhere  else  with 


160         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

a  minimum  of  forces  in  order  to  be  over- 
whelming on  that  point.  We  must  economize 
everywhere  else,  in  order  to  be  able  to  spend, 
regardless  of  loss,  on  the  point  where  we 
desire  to  secure  a  decision ;  the  mass  must 
be  applied  there,  and  therefore  be  made  and 
reserved  beforehand. 

EDUCATION  OF  THE  COMMAND. — The  char- 
acteristic feature  to  be  noted  in  all  the 
French  Commanders  who  were  sent  to  the 
relief  of  Frossard *  was  their  completely  passive 
attitude ;  they  consistently  awaited  direction 
from  without.  If  we  find  our  French  Com- 
manders in  that  state  of  mind  we  must  be 
concerned  to  discover  the  system  which 
produced  it  in  them. 

The  foundations  of  this  system  were  essen- 
tially a  false  conception  of  the  rights  and 
duties  of  a  Commander. 

This  conception  merged  the  thoughts  of  the 
will  of  subordinates  throughout  a  whole  army 
in  the  thoughts  of  the  will  of  its  Commander- 
in-Chief.  It  took  no  account  of  distance,  of 
time,  of  accident,  nor  even  of  the  independent 
initiative  of  the  adversary;  yet  these  are  all 
things  which  imperil  it  or  demand  in  one 
fashion  or  another  spontaneous  decisions 
upon  the  part  of  subordinates. 

1  During  the  Battle  of  Spicheren. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         161 

From  this  there  results  an  absolute  central- 
ization, wholly  theoretic,  opposed  to  practical 
needs,   denying  every  inferior  the  right  to 
think  or  to  act  without  an  order.     Hence  also 
there  results  in  those  inferiors  an  inveterate 
habit  of  blind  obedience,  inert,  complete,  and 
set  up  as  a  sovereign  law.     It  involves  in- 
activity, inaction,  and  at  last  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  offensive  idea,  for  the  subordinate, 
left  without  action  during  the  greater  part 
of  his  career,  cannot  suddenly  become  a  chief 
endowed  with  the  faculty  of  decision.     This 
method   further   suppresses   personality  and 
initiative    even    in    the    leaders    below    the 
Supreme  Command.     They  also  have  only  to 
wait  for  orders.     Then  they  come  themselves 
to  neglecting  the  numerous  daily  necessities 
of  life  in  the  field  which  cannot  be  regulated 
•by    the    Higher    Command.     They    do    not 
throw  out  sufficient  guards ;  they  do  not  scout 
and  obtain  information;    they  dare  not  use 
their    cavalry.     And    this    last    catches    the 
general  evil  and  becomes  imitative  and  timid 
when  by  chance  it  is  sent  on  a  reconnaissance. 
Soon  there  follows  a  complete  blindness  upon 
what  the  enemy  may  be  at.     Inaction  leads 
to  surprise,  and  surprise  to  defeat,  which  is 
after  all  only  a  form  of  surprise. 

EVOLUTION  OF  WAR.— From  1813    onwards 

M 


162         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

the  Germans  organized  upon  a  large  scale 
that  national  war  which  had  sprung  from  the 
French  Revolution.  At  Waterloo  it  was  their 
conscript  recruitment,  universally  applied, 
which  brought  success  to  the  British  Army, 
based  upon  volunteer  and  paid  recruitment, 
itself  defeated  by  the  French  Army  based 
upon  restricted  conscription.  After  Napoleon 
had  laid  down  the  direction  of  the  strategy  of 
national  war,  Clausewitz  and  Moltke  made 
clear  its  foundations  to  their  general  staff. 
In  the  hands  of  this  body  the  conduct  of  great 
masses  could  then  be  undertaken  without 
difficulty.  It  was  thus  that  the  Prussian 
genius,  though  it  created  nothing,  by  giving 
the  French  ideas  their  most  methodical  and 
the  widest  possible  development,  by  manu- 
facturing, as  it  were,  the  war  of  masses  upon 
a  gigantic  scale,  reached  the  unprecedented 
success  of  Metz  and  Sedan  and  of  Paris.  In 
our  own  day  this  evolutionary  process  still 
continues  in  the  Prussian  State  which  has 
become  the  German  Empire.  The  same  idea 
of  preparing  for  a  gigantic  struggle  is  care- 
fully maintained.  The  organization  for  it  is 
continually  grow'ing.  New  corps  are  created. 
Professional  and  intellectual  development  are 
assured  upon  the  largest  scale ;  the  command  is 
chosen  with  the  most  minute  care.  It  is  a  clear 
warning  to  us  of  what  the  future  will  bring  forth. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         163 

FIRE. — What  do  the  present1  German  dis- 
positions show? 

They  disclose  first  of  all  a  theory  :  up  to 
800  yards,  fire  produces  but  a  weak  effect, 
and  must  therefore  be  resorted  to  as  little  as 
possible;  at  800  yards  it  becomes  decisive; 
an  undisputable  superiority  must  then  be 
secured.  Their  practice  follows  from  this 
theory :  the  dispersion  and  dropping  out  on 
the  way  of  men  and  cartridges  must  be  care- 
fully avoided  up  to  800  yards.  From  that 
moment  on,  expenditure  must  be  lavish,  a 
large  number  of  rifles  being  thrown  together 
into  line;  on  the  other  hand,  riflemen  must 
be  commanded,  brought  up  in  companies,  or 
at  least  in  whole  platoons,  with  a  complete 
set  of  cartridges. 

Such  tactics  are  capable  of  ensuring  the 
efficiency,  duration  and  violence  of  fire  re- 
quired, owing  to  a  constant  direction  given 
by  a  commander  previously  taught  in  training- 
camps  to  practise  the  technique  of  fire  and 
owing  to  a  direction  received  by  men  pre- 
viously exercised  in  these  same  training- 
camps  to  practising  the  mechanism  of  fire 
in  war. 

Thus  do  exercises  carried  out  in  peace  time 
(training-camps,  grand  manoeuvres,  etc.) 
prepare  troops  in  the  highest  degree  for 

1  In  1901. 


164        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

performing   on   the   battle-field    the   act    of 
fighting  by  fire. 

One  can  no  longer  engage  with  an  unshaken 
adversary,  as  one  could  in  former  times,  by 
merely  appealing  to  energy.  The  most  solid 
moral  qualities  melt  away  under  the  effect  of 
modern  arms,  if  one  allows  the  enemy  to  use 
all  his  power.  Attack  is  necessarily  checked 
if  the  question  of  superiority  of  fire  is  not 
decided  at  a  given  distance.  That  superiority 
alone  permits  the  attack  to  make  new  pro- 
gress because  it  deprives  the  enemy  of  part  of 
his  means,  strikes  at  his  moral,  reduces  his 
effectives,  consumes  his  munitions,  destroys 
cover,  and  renders  him  incapable  of  making  a 
full  and  complete  use  of  his  arms. 

But  since  the  struggle  between  the  fire- 
power of  either  adversary  has  now  become 
inevitable,  we  must  prepare  for  it  and  organize 
it  in  time  of  peace,  or  it  will  not  be  capable  of 
execution  in  time  of  war.  We  must  be  clear 
upon  the  results  which  we  seek  to  obtain  and 
the  means  by  which  we  seek  to  obtain  them  : 
upon  our  method  of  command  and  upon  what 
a  given  force  can  deliver. 

***** 

The  2nd  battalion  of  Prussian  37th  which  had 
stood  its  ground  alone  against  a  large  part  of 
the  Austrian  efforts x  had  particularly  checked 
1  At  Nachod,  as  above. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         165 

these  efforts  by  its  fire  during  the  whole 
morning.  Yet  it  had  fired  only  32,000  car- 
tridges. This  meant  an  average  of  thirty- 
two  cartridges  per  man.  We  see,  then,  that 
considerable  results  may  be  secured  by  con- 
suming a  relatively  small  and  easily  provided 
quantity  of  ammunition,  provided  the  fire  is 

well  directed. 

*  *  *  *  * 

Fire  has  become  the  decisive  argument. 
The  most  ardent  of  troops,  those  the  spirit 
of  which  has  been  enhanced  to  the  highest 
degree,  will  always  want  to  conquer  ground  by 
performing  successive  bounds,  but  they  will 
meet  with  heavy  difficulties  and  incur  consider- 
able losses  whenever  their  partial  offensive 
has  not  been  prepared  by  effective  fire.  They 
will  be  thrown  back  on  their  starting-point, 
with  still  more  severe  losses.  A  superiority 
of  fire,  and,  therefore,  a  superiority  in  direct- 
ing and  performing  fire  and  in  making  use  of 
fire,  will  become  the  main  factors  upon  which 
the  efficiency  of  a  force  will  depend. 

Officers  must  keep  the  direction  in  hand  as 
far  as  the  assaulting  distance.  Therefore, 
fire  by  command,  or  at  least  fire  directed  and 
mastered  (volley  fire  or  fire  at  will  of  a  short 
duration  and  in  squalls)  is  the  only  kind 
that  good  infantry  will  deliver  when  engaged 
in  a  lively  action.  On  the  contrary,  slow, 


166        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

continuous  fire,  undirected  fire  (wasteful  fire), 
as  well  as  disorderly  fire  at  will,  in  which  the 
objective  has  not  been  sufficiently  determined 
or  in  which  the  number  of  cartridges  fired  or 
the  effect  produced  is  not  checked,  must  be 
absolutely  prohibited  as  leading  to  a  useless 
waste. 

FORTIFICATION  ON  THE  FIELD. —  The  troops 
of  the  initial  attack  have  to  make  use  of 
improvised  fortification  in  order  to  protect 
the  points  conquered  against  enemy  counter- 
attacks. 

Not  only  will  first-line  companies  try  and 
reinforce  with  the  help  of  all  the  means  within 
their  reach  and  to  their  best  ability  the 
extreme  "  points  d'appui  "  they  may  occupy 
at  certain  moments,  but  second-line  com- 
panies and  battalions  must  also  consolidate 
those  points  in  proportion  as  the  progress  of 
the  action  brings  them  up. 

Finally,  partial  reserves,  with  or  without 
the  help  of  engineers,  may  organize  supporting 
positions  in  prevision  of  a  failure. 

FREEDOM  OF  MARCH. —  While  organizing 
one's  intelligence  service  by  cavalry,  one  has 
to  foresee  at  the  same  time  the  case  when 
the  enemy  is  reconnoitred  within  less  than  a 
day's  march  from  the  column.  In  order  to 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        167 

ensure  the  freedom  of  marching  then,  it  is 
necessary  to  locate  between  the  road  followed 
by  the  column  and  the  enemy  some  resisting 
force  capable  of  holding  that  enemy  during 
the  time  the  column  is  marching  past. 

GAPS. —  A  gap,  a  valley  is  not  specially 
dangerous ;  there  are  roads  outside  the  valleys 
on  the  highest  plateaus;  indeed,  there  are 
roads  wherever  commerce  or  any  kind  of 
necessary  connection  requires  them.  But  a 
road  in  a  valley  or  on  a  plateau  is  only 
dangerous  to  us  in  so  far  as  it  is  or  can  be 
used  by  the  enemy.  If  the  enemy  does  not 
utilize  it,  it  does  not  exist  tactically ;  that  is, 
everything  goes  on  as  if  it  did  not  exist  at  all. 

GENIUS  AND  WORK.— Are  we  to  say  that 
the  power  of  Genius  is  supreme  and  mere 
Work  suffers  from  radical  impotence?  This 
might  be  a  well-founded  conclusion  if  Genius 
were,  as  Work  is,  within  reach  of  everybody. 
But  it  is  not. 

We  will,  on  the  contrary,  lay  stress  on  the 
efficiency  of  work,  of  method,  of  science,  in 
the  absence  of  Genius,  which  is  as  rare  as  all  the 
great  gifts  of  Nature.  We  shall  see  Theory 
start  by  getting  her  lessons  from  Genius,  and 
then  commenting  on  and  discussing  those 
lessons  :  "Is  not  what  Genius  has  done  the 


168        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

best  of  rules  to  be  followed,  and  can  theory 
do  anything  better  than  show  why  and  how 
this  is  true?  "  (Clausewitz).  Also  we  shall 
find  later  on  "  Science  giving  a  great  number 
of  its  adepts  the  benefit  of  its  fruits,  put- 
ting within  'reach  of  an  average  intellect 
the  understanding  and  the  conduct  of  great 
military  affairs,  infusing  into  the  very  veins 
of  an  army  the  principles  of  experience, 
warranting  in  other  words  a  community  of 
thought,  wherefrom  individual  initiatives  and 
rational  decisions  spring  up  as  an  ultima 
ratio  "  (General  Bonnal).  We  shall  see  the 
results  of  work,  method,  science.  We  shall 
see  in  1870,  the  Prussian  General  Staff,  a  set 
of  average  minds,  successfully  conducting  a 
great  war  with  three  or  four  armies,  though 
the  difficulties  which  the  matchless  genius  of 
Napoleon  had  met  in  1812  and  1813  are 
notorious.  In  spite  of  his  scale,  Napoleon 
failed  in  his  task.  The  body  had  but  one 
head ;  it  lacked  muscles,  articulations,  limbs, 
without  which  such  a  vast  whole  could  not 
live. 

Yet  what  were  the  numbers  of  1812  and 
1813  as  compared  with  those  of  1870  ?  What 
are  these  latter  as  compared  with  those  of 
to-morrow?  The  technical  side  of  war- 
railways,  balloons,  telegraphy,  etc. — has  in- 
creased in  a  similar  way.  "  To-day,  the 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         169 

Commander-ii>Chief  cannot  sum  up  every- 
thing in  his  own  person.  Genius  itself  will 
want  auxiliaries  full  of  initiative  and  well 
taught.  How  much  more  will  any  general 
who  does  not  belong  to  the  stars  of  first 
magnitude  need  to  be  helped  and  completed  ! 
Managing  an  army  is  too  complex  for  a  single 
man.  Certain  technical  branches  require, 
besides,  special  knowledge  "  (von  der  Goltz). 

How,  then,  in  the  enforced  absence  of  a 
sufficient  genius,  can  the  means  be  found 
rationally  to  conduct  the  enterprise,  the  war, 
with  such  masses  of  men,  if  not  among  a 
corps  of  officers  who  shall  have -been  trained 
by  method,  work,  science,  whom  the  same 
spirit  shall  pervade,  who  shall  submit  to  a 
common  mental  discipline,  who  shall  be 
numerous  enough  to  be  able  to  move  and 
manage  the  heavy  machine  of  modern  armies  ? 

Those  are  happy,  who  have  been  born 
believers,  but  they  are  rare  men.  One  is  not 
born  with  learning  either.  Every  one  of  us 
must  make  for  himself  his  faith,  his  convic- 
tions, his  knowledge  of  things.  Here,  again, 
the  result  will  not  be  produced  by  a  sudden 
revelation  of  light  coming  in  a  flash  or  by  an 
instantaneous  development  of  our  faculties. 
We  shall  only  reach  it  by  a  continuous  effort 
of  penetration,  absorption,  assimilation,  by  a 
repeated  and  detailed  labour.  Do  not  the 


170         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

most  elementary  of  arts  require  the  same  from 
us?  Who  would  boast  of  teaching  within  a 
few  moments  or  even  within  a  few  lessons 
fencing,  riding,  etc.  ? 

HISTORY. — To  keep  the  brain  of  an  army 
going  in  time  of  peace,  to  direct  it  continually 
towards  its  task  of  war,  there  is  no  book  more 
fruitful  to  the  student  than  that  of  history. 
If  war,  in  its  just  aspect,  is  but  a  struggle 
between  two  wills  more  or  less  powerful  and 
more  or  less  informed,  then  the  accuracy  of 
decisions  arrived  at  in  war  will  always  depend 
upon  the  same  considerations  as  those  of  the 
past.  The  same  errors  reappear,  leading  to 
the  same  checks.  The  art  of  war  is  always 
to  be  drawn  from  the  same  sources. 

INFANTRY  IN  ACTION.— We  find  that  in- 
fantry action,  having  been  more  or  less  trans- 
formed under  the  influence  of  modern  arms, 
subdivides  itself  into  : 

i.  A  period  of  marching,  as  far  as  to 
about  800  yards  range  in  order  to  reach  the 
fire  position  (that  is,  the  distance  which  allows 
of  a  fire  of  a  sure  efficiency,  or  the  nearest 
position  which  may  be  reached  under  cover), 
during  which  the  force  does  little  harm  to 
the  enemy,  but  suffers  a  serious  harm  unless 
it  evades  it  by  resorting  to  : 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         171 

(a)  Formation;    a  weak  protection  in  the 
presence    of    modern    armament.     The    less 
vulnerable  formations  are  still  much  too  risky 
to  make  marching  possible. 

(b)  Firing  very  little;   such  fire,  in  spite  of 
its  slight  efficacity,  to  be  capable  of  maintain- 
ing a  certain  confusion  among  the  enemy,  of 
partly  paralyzing  his  means  of  action. 

(c)  Ground,  and  such  sheltered  approaches 
as  the  ground  may  contain.     In  this  last  lies 
the  only  really  efficient  means  of  advancing 
in  spite  of  the  enemy's  fire,  for  the  enemy 
then  ceases  to  see.     From  that  method  may 
be  deduced  the  formation  or  formations  to  be 
adopted.     Such  a  formation  must  enable  the 
men  to  utilize  well-reconnoitred  approaches; 
moreover,  in  view  of  their  having  to  undertake 
fire  action  at  an  early  stage,  such  a  formation 
must  avoid  scattering  the  troops,  disorganizing 
them,  or  allowing  them  to  use  up  their  cartridges  ; 
it  must  transform  them  into  a  well-commanded 
and  well-supplied  firing-machine. 

2.  A  second  period,  that  of  fire-action  : 
the  object  being  to  secure  superiority  as  soon 
as  it  can  be  effectively  secured  and  kept,  that 
is,  from  about  800  to  600  yards.  Such  an 
achievement  requires  new  faculties  on  the 
part  of  the  rank  and  file  and  of  the  Commander. 

Rank  and  File :  must  be  capable  of  under- 
taking, .keeping  up  for  ten,  fifteen,  twenty, 


172        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

thirty  minutes  and  sometimes  more  an  effi- 
cient, increasingly  violent,  constantly  con- 
trolled and  directed  fire. 

The  Commander :  must  be  aware  of  the 
results  aimed  at,  of  the  technical  means  of 
attaining  them  (nature  of  fire,  number  of 
cartridges,  etc.),  also  of  the  practical  means  of 
directing  troops  in  action,  of  employing  them ; 
of  enabling  such  troops  to  last  out  and  pro- 
duce an  effect,  and  this  in  spite  of  physical 
fatigue,  of  nervous  excitement,  of  confusion, 
etc.,  all  of  which  are  disturbing  factors  which 
cannot  be  suppressed,  and  must  therefore 
be  taken  into  consideration,  as  they  partly 
determine  the  manner  of  employing  troops. 
***** 

An  action  with  the  arms  in  use  to-day 
confirms  and  reinforces  the  accuracy  of  Napo- 
leon's saying  :  '  The  firearm  is  everything ; 
the  rest  is  nothing." 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  modern  rifles  produce 
important  effects  up  to  1500  yards;  guns  at 
a  distance  three  times  greater.  The  "  hail  of 
bullets "  sometimes  becomes  no  metaphor 
but  a  reality.  We  have  nothing  but  numerous 
swarms  of  skirmishers  lying  on  the  ground, 
forming  a  continuous  line,  preventing  the 
enemy  from  advancing,  but  equally  incapable, 
on  the  other  hand,  of  putting  the  enemy  to 
flight  by  the  mere  effect  of  fire. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         173 

If,  then,  the  assault,  attack  with  the  bayonet 
— in  the  powerful  sense  of  Souvarov's  phrase : 
"  The  bullet  is  crazy,  the  bayonet  alone  is 
intelligent  "  —always  reappears  as  a  supreme 
and  necessary  argument  in  order  to  complete 
the  adversary's  demoralization  by  threaten- 
ing to  board  him  as  if  he  were  a  vessel,  also 
in  order  to  create  fear,  which  puts  the  enemy 
to  flight,  it  nevertheless  remains  undeniable 
that  superiority  of  fire  is  an  advantage  one 
ought  to  secure ;  first,  in  order  to  reduce  him, 
to  make  it  easier  to  assault  him ;  and  secondly, 
in  order  to  reach  the  level  in  moral  which  is 
required  for  the  assault. 

INSPIRATION. — Failing  definite  knowledge 
founded  on  security  which  alone  makes  it 
possible  to  act  surely,  the  only  thing  one  can 
rely  on  is  a  more  or  less  happy  inspiration. 

Von  Moltke  does  not  believe  in  his  own 
inspiration  any  more  than  in  that  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles.1  It  is  to  give  some  sort 
of  hint  that  he  imparts  to  the  latter  his  own 
view ;  but  he  is  aware  that  he  cannot  impose 
either  his  view  or  the  prince's.  He  thus 
leaves  the  Commander  of  the  2nd  Army 
free  to  act  according  to  his  own  inspiration 
(which  is  as  well  founded  as  his  own),  and 

1  During  the  Prussian  advance  through  Lorraine  in 
August  1870. 


174        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

to  develop  any  manoeuvres  he  likes,  with  all 
the  means  at  his  disposal,  in  spite  of  the 
known  impossibility  of  a  part  of  the  forces 
of  the  2nd  Army  acting  on  the  i6th  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Moselle.  After  opening  the 
door  to  error,  he,  in  effect,  gives  over  the 
command. 

INSTRUCTION. — Covering  the  point  of  de- 
bouching for  the  arrival,  for  assembly,  and, 
finally,  for  the  entry  into  action  of  the  army 
corps,  becomes  an  important  and  pressing 
matter;  it  is  8.30  a.m.,  the  advance  guard 
will  have  to  perform  that  heavy  covering 
task  unaided  for  nearly  four  hours.  This 
function  is  first  ascribed  to  the  27th  Prussian 
regiment.1  That  regiment  had  not  fired  a 
shot  since  1815.  It  had  not  taken  any  part 
in  the  affray  at  Schleswig-Holstein  in  1864. 
A  fifty  years'  peace-training  was  about  to  be 
applied  here  against  the  Austrian  army  which 
had  fought  recently  (in  1859).  We  shall  soon 
find,  on  one  side,  men  who  know  war  without 
having  made  it,  the  Prussians ;  on  the  other, 
men  who  have  not  understood  war  even  after 
waging  it. 

***** 

No  combat  could  be  maintained  between 
one  body  of  troops  having  neither  theory,  nor 

1  At  Nachod,  as  above. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         175 

training,  nor  fire  discipline,  therefore  deprived 
of  efficiency  in  action,  and  another  body  of 
troops  perfectly  trained,  shooting  and  using 
fire  with  discipline,  undeniably  superior  on 
the  battle-field,  even  though  it  can  display 
there  but  part  of  what  it  knows  and  what  it  is 
able  to  do. 

*  *  *  *  * 

The  truth  is,  no  study  is  possible  on  the 
battle-field;  one  does  there  simply  what  one 
can  in  order  to  apply  what  one  knows.  There- 
fore, in  order  to  do  even  a  little,  one  has  already 
to  know  a  great  deal  and  to  know  it  well. 

THE  INVESTMENT  OF  A  PLACE. — The  same 
principle  applies  to  the  investment  of  towns, 
which  with  a  due  economy  of  forces  may  be 
done  by  besieging  forces  no  more  than  equal 
to  the  besieged  (Metz  and  Paris  in  1870  are 
examples). 

In  what  does  such  an  investment  consist  ? 

In  a  line  of  permanently  occupied  outposts, 
enabling  the  investing  force  to  occupy,  in 
case  of  attack,  a  previously  organized  first 
line  of  resistance.  The  attack  occurring, 
alarm  is  given  by  the  outposts ;  the  first  line 
of  resistance  is  then  occupied;  the  reserves 
prepare.  After  the  attack  has  dealt  (perhaps 
easily)  with  the  line  of  outposts,  it  must,  in 
order  to  advance,  break  this  first  line  of 


176        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 


resistance.  In  this  attempt  it  is  compelled 
to  concentrate  its  efforts  and  therefore  to  dis- 
close the  direction  it  is  taking.  Such  reserves 
and  investing  troops  as  are  not  being  attacked 
and  are  nearest  to  that  direction,  proceed  to, 
and  establish  themselves  on,  a  previously 
organized  main  line  of  resistance,  while  the 
resistance  of  the  first  line  is  maintained. 


They  there  offer  a  further  resistance  which 
gives  the  whole  investing  army  the  time  to 
concentrate  at  I,  in  the  direction  adopted  by 
the  attacking  force,  and  thus  to  fight  there 
with  all  available  forces  combined. 

The  same  principle  applies  to  attack. 
There,  too,  the  maximum  of  efficiency  is 
secured  by  applying  the  principle  of  economy 
of  forces  and  by  arranging  one's  forces  accord- 
ing to  an  organized  system. 

An  attack  could  not  be  efficient  if  it  were 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         177 

made  in  several  directions  at  the  same  time. 
One's  forces  would  be  separated  into  several 
parts.  If  the  enemy  presents  himself  from 
two  different  directions,  the  offensive  is 
organized  in  one  direction  only,  the  most 
advantageous  one;  in  the  other  direction, 
one  does  no  more  than  hold  the  enemy  in 
check.  The  reserves — that  is,  the  main  body 
— are  therefore  placed  (i)  so  as  to  support 
and  accomplish  the  attack  which  has  been 
devised  by  the  commander  and  which  is  the 
main  object  of  his  plan;  (2)  so  as  to  be  able 
if  necessary  to  reinforce  eventually  the  parry- 
ing blow  elsewhere,  which  otherwise  might 
prove  inadequate.  In  proportion  as  decision 
comes  nearer,  all  these  reserves  stream  towards 
the  point  of  attack,  where  the  day  will  be 
decided,  and  thus  bring  into  play  all  available 
forces. 

INVIOLABILITY  OF  THE  FRONT. — In  the  future 
as  in  the  past  there  will  be  armies  of  manoeuvre 
and  armies  of  frontal  attack,  the  first  being 
called  on  to  bring  about  the  decision  which 
the  latter  prepare.  Whether  we  call  these 
last  an  advance  guard,  after  the  Napoleonic 
system,  or  a  "  centre,"  after  the  system  of 
Moltke,  it  is  evident  that  the  tendency  is  to 
increase  the  strength  of  the  first  category, 
which  is  given  the  task  of  the  decisive  attack 


178         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

and  to  reduce  the  effectives  of  the  second  as 
far  as  it  is  possible  consistently  with  keeping 
their  fronts  solid  and  inviolable,  for  that  is 
indispensable.  But  this  quality  can  in  great 
measure  be  furnished  by  a  strong  artillery 
and  defensive  works.  Hence  the  extension 
to-day  of  heavy  artillery  in  the  field,  of 
armoured  guns  and  of  fortifications  upon  the 
field  of  battle. 

MANCEUVRE. —  Every  manoeuvre  must  be 
the  development  of  a  scheme;  it  must  aim 
at  a  goal. 

Napoleon  regarded  manoeuvre  as  no  more 
than  a  development  of  reconnoitring  the  enemy. 
Exploration  is  successively  modified  by  any 
strong  advance  guard  because  it  is  capable, 
first,  of  supporting  exploring  parties  searching 
for  news;  secondly,  the  enemy  having  been 
found,  of  itself  taking  up  the  intelligence 
service,  and,  to  this  end,  of  transforming 
exploration  into  a  reconnaissance;  thirdly, 
capable,  after  finding  and  reconnoitring  the 
enemy,  of  fixing  him  for  such  a  length  of  time 
as  is  necessary  for  the  main  army  to  arrive. 

The  main  body  of  the  army  follows  behind, 
ready  to  utilize  those  results  immediately,  to 
set  up  a  system  or  a  combination.  How  could 
this  army  manoeuvre  otherwise  than  surely 
and  securely,  being  protected  by  those  dis- 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        179 

positions  which  constantly  aim  at  scouting, 
at  covering  and  preparing  the  manoeuvres  ? 

Does  not  every  duel,  moreover,  every  fight 
against  a  living  and  free  adversary,  develop 
in  the  same  way? 

On  guard      .       .       .   Cover  yourself. 
Engage  the  sword        .   Establish  contact. 
Stretch  out  the  arm    .  Threaten   the    adver- 
sary in  the  direct  line 
so  as  to  fix  him. 

Double  or  disengage  or    Manoeuvre  only  when 
what  not.  this  stage  is  reached. 

MANOEUVRE,  A  PRIORI. — In  a  country  of  easy 
communications  like  Hungary  (and  it  is  the 
same  case  in  a  great  part  of  Europe),  the 
enemy  remains  free  to  move  in  every  direction  so 
long  as  we  have  not  seized  him.  The  a  priori 
manoeuvre  on  Raab  x  may  then  : 

1.  Either  strike  into  the  void,  if  the  enemy 
does  not  come  on. 

2.  Or  be  parried  :  forestalled  on  that  point, 
he  will  make  for  another. 

3.  Or  even  bring  about  a  crisis  :   incite  the 
enemy  to  attack  Macdonald  and  to  rout  him. 

MANCEUVRE,  TURNING.—  An  outflanking  ma- 

1  In  1809.     Prince  Eugene's  campaign  under  Napo- 
leon. 


180        PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS 

nceuvre  is  specially  convenient  when  attack- 
ing a  rear  guard,  for  the  latter  cannot  fulfil 
its  mission  once  it  has  been  turned. 

MASS. —  "  They  (the  Austrians)  have  many 
good  generals,  but  they  try  to  keep  an  eye 
on  too  many  things ;  they  try  to  see,  to  keep, 
to  defend  everything :  depots,  lines  of  com- 
munication, the  rear,  such  and  such  a  strong 
position,  etc.  Using  such  methods,  they  end 
by  adopting,  when  on  the  defensive,  the 
cordon  system;  when  on  the  offensive,  they 
end  by  attacking  in  several  directions,  or 
rather  in  conducting  several  attacks  at  the 
same  time;  in  the  one  case,  as  in  the  other, 
they  end  in  dispersion,  which  prevents  them 
from  commanding,  from  combining  one  single 
affair,  from  striking  hard;  they  end  in 
impotence. 

"  /  see  only  one  thing,  the  mass  ;  I  try  to 
destroy  it,  feeling  sure  that  the  accessories  will 
then  tumble  down  of  themselves."  *  That  is 
the  counter-thesis  to  the  old  theory;  the 
destruction  of  the  enemy's  masses  and,  there- 
fore, the  necessity  of  organizing  the  use  of 
our  own  masses. 

There  is  one  absolute  principle,  which  must 
direct  all  our  combinations  and  disposi- 
tions, and  this  is  that,  in  order  to  dispose 
1  Napoleon  on  his  Austrian  campaigns. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         181 

of  the  adversary's  masses,  we  have  to  ensure 
the  working  of  our  own.  Such  must  be  the 
directing  thought  of  any  chief. 

THE  MILITARY  SPIRIT. — In  proportion  as 
numbers  increase,  and  with  them  time  and 
distance,  the  road  the  subordinate  must  follow 
becomes  longer  and  more  difficult.  The 
supreme  command,  in  the  narrow  sense  of 
the  word,  also  loses  something  of  its  precision. 
It  may  still  determine  the  result  to  be 
obtained,  but  no  longer  the  ways  and  means 
to  reach  it.  How  can  these  numerous  scat- 
tered troops  be  sure  of  arriving  in  time,  unless 
each  of  them  keeps  a  clear  vision  of  the  single 
goal  to  be  attained,  unless  each  of  them  keeps 
the  freedom  of  acting  towards  that  end  ?  In 
other  words,  we  must  have  : 

A  mental  discipline,  as  a  first  condition; 
showing  and  prescribing  to  all  subordinates 
the  result  aimed  at  by  the  commanding 
officer. 

Intelligent  and  active  discipline,  or  rather 
initiative,  a  second  condition,  in  order  to 
maintain  the  right  and  power  of  acting  in  the 
desired  direction. 

Here  comes  in  the  superior  notion  of  a 
military  spirit  which  makes  an  appeal,  first 
of  course  to  the  will,  after  that  to  the  intelli- 
gence. Such  a  notion  clearly  involves  an  act 


182        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

of  deliberate  thought,  of  reflection ;  it  excludes 
mental  immobility,  want  of  thought,  intel- 
lectual silence — all  of  which  are  well  enough 
for  the  rank  and  file  who  have  but  to  perform 
(although  it  would  certainly  be  better  for 
them  to  understand  what  they  have  to  per- 
form), but  which  would  never  do  for  the 
subordinate  commander;  the  latter  must 
bring  to  fruit,  with  all  the  means  at  his  dis- 
posal, the  scheme  of  the  higher  command; 
therefore  he  must,  above  all,  understand  that 
thought,  and  afterwards  make  of  his  means 
the  use  best  suited  to  circumstances — of  which, 
however,  he  is  the  only  judge. 

MOBILISATION.— The  3rd  Army1  had  been 
ordered  to  be  the  first  to  be  ready,  therefore 
it  could  not  receive  corps  the  mobilization  of 
which  would  be  slow  or  the  transport  long. 
Thus  we  see  that  the  type  of  battle  designed 
determines  the  concentration  of  troops  in  time 
as  well  as  in  space,  and  therefore  determines 
the  transport  and  conditions  of  mobilization 
to  be  arranged  in  time  of  peace. 

This  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  the  mili- 
tary operations  begin  to-day  in  time  of 
peace,  which  shows  us"  once  more  the  import- 
ance from  the  strategical  point  of  view  of  our 
peace  dispositions,  our  mobilization,  and  our 

1  The  Third  German  Army  in  the  campaign  of  1870. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         183 

transport.  We  cannot  arrange  these  as  things 
apart;  they  are  not  independent  of  our  idea 
of  what  the  coming  battle  will  be.  If  we  wish 
that  battle  to  take  such  and  such  form  we  must 
make  sure  of.  its  preliminaries  beforehand. 

OBJECT  OF  WAR. — The  determination  of  the 
final  goal  of  a  war,  the  decisive  objective,  falls 
evidently  to  the  political  side  of  national  life, 
which  alone  can  tell  us  why  war  is  made  at  all 
and  why  the  nation  takes  up  the  sword  after 
laying  down  the  pen.  The  determination  of 
that  final  objective  is  in  every  case  a  matter 
for  particular  judgment. 

It  was  an  error  in  the  determination  of 
this  final  goal  which  brought  about  the  check 
of  Napoleon  in  1812.  He  erroneously  believed 
that  the  conquest  of  Moscow  and  of  half 
Russia  would  assure  him  the  peace  which  he 
desired.  If  we  consider  our  eastern  neigh- 
bour l  we  find  it  to-day  in  the  shape  of  an 
empire  which  is  a  confederation  of  states 
some  to  the  south  of  the  river  Maine,  others 
to  the  north;  a  northern  Germany  and  a 
southern  Germany,  with  different  interests 
and  different  temperaments,  but  having  its 
head  in  the  north,  in  the  old  Prussian  capital 
of  Berlin.  It  is  there  one  should  go  to  strike 

1  The  German  Empire  organized  by  Prussia  before 
the  war. 


184        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

the  last  blow.  But  on  the  line  of  the  Maine, 
at  Mayence,  one  could,  to  begin  with,  cut 
this  power  into  two  halves.  A  rational  plan 
would  therefore  consist  in  marching  on 
Berlin  by  Mayence.  Not  because  Mayence  is 
a  convenient  place  for  crossing  the  Rhine, 
not  because  the  left  bank  here  dominates  the 
right  bank,  or  vice  versa,  but  because  it  is 
the  point  where  the  interests  of  the  north  and 
those  of  the  south  meet  and  therefore  also 
separate. 

When  Moltke  took  Paris  for  his  objective 
he  was  clearly  aiming  at  the  heart  of  France, 
of  a  France  which  was  largely  centralized  in 
one  point,  its  capital.  Similarly,  when  he 
proposed  to  settle  the  whole  affair  north  of  the 
Loire  he  knew  very  well  what  conditions  led 
him  to  that  determination.  Moltke,  basing 
himself  on  the  usual  formula,  of  course  fixed 
as  his  first  object  the  mass  of  the  enemy's 
forces,  but  even  in  doing  so  he  looked  further, 
to  Paris  and  to  the  Loire,  and  it  was  this 
which  determined  his  manner  of  approach 
towards  the  first  objective. 

His  strategy  consisted  in  marching  on  Paris 
and  on  the  Loire  until  he  could  seize  a  govern- 
ment which  had  lost  its  armed  force  and  had 
no  power  remaining  to  dispute  the  issue.  But 
he  would  do  so  passing  by  Metz  and  by  Sedan 
by  the  north,  by  all  the  points  where  he  could 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         185 

find  a  French  force  to  defeat.  For  that  was 
the  first  condition.  Unless  he  settled  that 
there  was  nothing  done,  and  it  was  the  posi- 
tion of  the  enemy  forces  which  determined 
the  order  to  be  followed  by  the  invasion. 

To  seek  out  the  enemy's  armies — the  centre 
of  the  adversary's  power — in  order  to  beat 
and  destroy  them;  to  adopt,  with  this  sole 
end  in  view,  the  direction  and  tactics  which 
may  lead  to  it  in  the  quickest  and  safest  way  : 
such  is  the  whole  mental  attitude  of  modern 
war. 

OPEN  ORDER. — It  is  by  the  spirit  of  "  a  nation 
in  arms  "  originated  by  the  French  Revolu- 
tion that  fighting  in  open  order  (ordre  en 
tirailleurs)  may  be  understood  as  a  normal 
form  of  fighting,  and  as  having  to  be  rationally 
and  quite  soundly  developed  until  it  becomes 
that  "  rush  of  a  team  "  which  turns  a  modern 
battle  into  a  struggle  between  armed  crowds. 

It  is  doubtful  whether  such  methods  can 
be  applied  with  success  where  the  private  has 
no  direct  interest  in  war  and  is  not  the  true 
defender  of  a  national  cause. 

It  is  not  likely  that  such  methods  would 
succeed  where  you  had  an  army  of  merce- 
naries, or  of  old  soldiers,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  present 1  English  army,  which  necessarily 
1  1901. 


186         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

makes  an  appeal  to  steadfastness  and  dis- 
cipline in  the  ranks  in  order  to  make  up  for 
the  moral  qualities  of  man,  for  individual 
valour  and  initiative;  the  same  applies  to  an 
army  such  as  the  Austrian,  composed  of 
various  races,  of  heterogeneous  elements,  each 
with  distinct  aspirations. 

PLAN  OF  CAMPAIGN.— Here  is  what  cannot 
be  foreseen  at  the  outset  of  operations,  and 
especially  cannot  be  foreseen  so  far  as  regards 
the  details  of  their  execution :  to  steer 
operations  as  circumstances  demand  and 
according  to  conditions  revealed  step  by  step  : 
to  make  such  strategy  go  forward  from  result 
to  result  at  a  slow  and  certain  pace,  but  always 
in  the  direction  aimed  at  and  always  towards 
the  objective  which  has  been  assigned  for 
every  effort,  after  a  preliminary  examination 
of  the  general  situation,  political  as  well  as 
military  :  to  keep  one's  vision  clear  however 
winding  the  road  may  be  which  we  have  to 
follow  if  we  have  to  reach  our  goal. 

The  plan  of  campaign  when  we  look  at  it 
thus  ceases  to  be  a  mere  plan  of  operations, 
and  this  truth  fully  justifies  the  Emperor's 
epigram  that  "  there  was  never  such  a  thing 
as  a  plan  of  operations  " ;  a  remark  which 
certainly  did  not  mean  that  he  did  not  know 
where  he  was  going. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         187 

He  had  his  plan  of  campaign — his  final  goal. 
He  went  forward,  settling  point  by  point  as 
circumstances  might  demand  the  means  of 
approaching  and  reaching  that  goal,  and 
these  were  : 

1.  Dispositions   thoroughly  discussed   long 
before  and  prepared  as  to  their  execution  in 
every  detail  governing  the  first  battle  without 
any  necessity  for  considerable  change. 

2.  Later,  developing  a  governing  idea  which 
would  lead  him  to  the  grasping  of  his  final 
goal.     Upset  or  dominate  the  Government, 
occupy  territory,  and  as  you  go  direct  opera- 
tions as  events  determine,  but  retain  for  your 
master  object  the  defeat  of  the  forces  opposed 
to   you.     Such  is   the   programme   for  war, 
fully  dependent  upon  a  true  plan  of  campaign. 

POSITIONS,  DEFENSIVE. —  Owing  to  their 
volume  of  fire,  modern  arms  make  manoeu- 
vring under  fire  impossible;  owing  to  their 
range,  they  make  it  necessary  to  take  up  fight- 
ing dispositions  at  a  great  distance,  to  deploy 
very  far  away ;  owing  to  the  rapidity  of  their 
fire,  such  necessities  may  be  enforced  by  even 
relatively  small  numbers. 

Any  occupied  position  unavoidably  delays 
the  adversary,  provided  the  position  be  a 
good  one.  What  is  a  good  position  in  the 
modern  sense  of  that  word?  A  ground 


188         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

favourable  to  the  defensive,  which  in  its  turn  is 
composed  of  fire  and  steadiness  ;  it  is  a  site 
provided  to  this  end  with  : 

Points  from  which  one  may  observe  and 
fire  at  a  long  distance; 

Obstacles,  that  is,  "  points  d'appui " : 
strong  points. 

If  that  twofold  condition  is  fulfilled,  the 
enemy  is  compelled  to  manoeuvre  from  a 
distance  until  the  last  moment  (assault  of  the 
obstacles),  to  bring  into  action  all  his  means, 
artillery,  infantry ;  that  is,  to  advance  pain- 
fully, to  lose  time  while  he  should  be  going 
forward  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

PREPARATION  IN  WAR.  —  Preparation  in 
modern  war  is  more  necessary  and  must  be 
pushed  further  than  in  the  past. 

The  necessity  of  pushing  preparation  as 
far  as  possible  is  to  be  found  in  the  conduct 
of  any  tactical  operation. 

THE  PROTECTION  OF  NATIONAL  TERRITORY.— 

Here  l  we  clearly  see  the  part  which  modern 
war  assigns  to  the  idea  of  defence  or  protec- 
tion of  territory.  It  is  summed  up  in  the 
union  of  all  means  at  our  disposal  in  the 
direction  which  is  most  favourable  for  attack, 

1  In  the  plan  of  Moltke  for  the  war  against  France 
in  1870. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         189 

and  this  done,  one  covers  directly  or  in- 
directly the  important  points  of  a  country. 
For  one's  adversary  cannot  menace  those 
points  without  first  facing  the  encounter  of 
our  forces.  And  that  condition  governs 
everything. 

Direct  and  immediate  protection  of  the 
national  soil  is  often  inefficient,  and  as  things 
develop  becomes  useless.  History  has  taught 
us  that  lesson  ever  since  Valmy.  Brunswick 
was  master  of  the  road  to  Paris,  yet  he  could 
do  nothing  against  the  capital,  although  the 
road  to  it  was  open.  Later,  when  he  had 
failed  in  his  effort  of  the  2Oth  of  September,1 
he  had  to  retire  rapidly  to  save  himself  from 
destruction.  You  get  nothing  save  through 
a  victory.  Secondary  interests  should  there- 
fore be  eliminated  unless  they  obscure  our 
view  of  the  principal  objective  and  of  the  sole 
means  of  attaining  it :  which  is  by  a  mass  of 
troops  of  the  utmost  strength  at  our  disposal. 
Let  us  not  divide,  as  would  men  of  short  views 
in  war,  the  defence  of  the  country  into  that 
of  Paris,  of  the  coast,  of  the  Cotentin,  of 
Provence,  or  of  other  frontiers  that  may  be 
menaced.  The  security  of  all  these  points 
depends  upon  the  union  of  our  forces  in  a 

1  The  so-called  Cannonade  of  Valmy,  when  the 
Prussians  failed  to  take  the  heights  on  which  the  French 
Army  stood. 


190         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

central  point  whence  they  may  act  offensively 
against  the  army  of  invasion. 

SUPPLY. — The  millions  of  men  who  will  be 
gathered  to-day  in  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
enemy  who  must  be  ready  to  fight  him  at 
short  notice  can  no  longer  put  into  practice 
the  old  formula,  "Disperse  for  food;  con- 
centrate for  fighting."  That  formula  would 
give  their  effectives  neither  of  the  results 
sought.  The  army  must  at  once  march  and 
feed  itself  in  dense  formation,  and  therefore 
draw  its  sustenance  from  its  immediate  rear. 
The  old  system  of  provisionment  going  for- 
ward with  the  army,  which  was  upset  by  the 
system  of  local  requisitions  under  the  Revolu- 
tion, has  now  again  become  necessary.  It 
has  come  to  birth  again  from  the  very  develop- 
ment of  national  armies.  Railways  being 
necessary  for  the  feeding  of  a  modern  army, 
at  least  at  the  beginning  of  a  war,  that  army 
cannot  go  far  from  the  tracks.  Again,  in 
case  of  check,  it  has  to  retire  towards  the 
interior  zones  which  can  feed  it,  that  is, 
towards  the  regions  where  production  of 
goods  and  food  is  taking  place.  The  national 
territory  becomes  the  base  of  operations  for 
the  forces  in  the  field,  and  the  railways  be- 
come their  necessary  lines  of  communication. 
It  is  thus  that  national  war  as  it  develops 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         191 

has  lessened  the  rdle  of  the  capital  as  the  goal 
of  operations,  and  has  brought  out  the  new 
necessities  of  national  objectives. 

RANK -AND  FILE.— When  under  fire,  the 
man  in  the  rank  and  file  obeys  the  voice  of 
the  officers  he  knows  :  company-commanders, 
section-commanders.  The  line  soon  turns 
into  separate  small  batches  of  individuals 
who  cannot  be  carried  forward  unless  they 
are  led  individually  and  are  known  by  name 
to  their  commanders. 

RECONNAISSANCE. — Such  *  is  a  reconnaissance 
directed  by  Bonaparte  and  by  Massena  under 
very  difficult  circumstances. 

1.  Even  to  these  ardent  men,  the  conduct 
of  troops  did  not  consist  in  rushing  head- 
down  on  the  enemy.     You  must  act  with  full 
knowledge  of  the  case,   and  proportion  your 
aims  and  actions  to  your  available  means. 
You  must  begin  by  reconnoitring. 

2.  In  order  to  reconnoitre,  one  must  compel 
the  enemy  to  show  himself  wherever  he  may 
be.     To  this  end,  he  has  to  be  attacked  until 
his  position  and  his  front  has  been  clearly 
defined.     Hence   several    attacking   columns 
are  necessary.     The  attack,  however,  is  not 

1  The  reconnaissance  towards  Dego  on  the  13  th  of 
April,  1796,  in  the  campaign  of  Italy. 


192         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

made  with  the  intention  of  bringing  on  the 
action;  therefore  each  column  will  only 
supply,  ahead  of  itself,  some  patrols,  some 
skirmishers  who  will  advance,  fall  back,  easily 
disengage  themselves  at  a  given  moment. 
The  best  means  are  :  action  from  a  distance, 
firing  at  the  longest  range  possible,  always  so 
acting  as  to  exercise  pressure  on  the  enemy 
without  allowing  oneself  to  be  tied  up. 

In  the  rear  of  the  combatant  troops  a 
number  of  main  bodies  were  held  ready  to 
act  as  supporting  troops  (being  established  on 
supporting  points  and  on  points  where  there 
was  observation  for  fire).  The  points  of 
communication  and  assembly  in  the  rear 
were  also  held  (Bormida  crossing,  village  of 
Rochetta). 

RESERVE,  STRATEGICAL.  —  The  unforeseen 
appears  as  much  in  strategy  as  in  tactics. 
The  larger  the  dispositions  we  have  to  take 
the  less  the  risk  of  surprise.  Great  strategical 
operations  are  accomplished  as  a  rule  so  slowly 
and  over  spaces  so  vast,  their  results  are 
generally  so  little  subject  to  variation,  one 
has  the  time  to  see  them  coming  and  to  take 
up  one's  dispositions.  Hence  the  consequence 
that  a  strategical  reserve  has  no  reason  for 
existence,  in  so  far  as  it  is  prepared  for  meet- 
ing the  unforeseen,  save  when  one  has  lost 


the  power  to  act  and  is  reduced  to  merely 
awaiting  the  action  of  the  enemy. 

When  our  business  is  that  of  a  strategical 
defensive  the  reserve  appears  again  as  the 
sole  means  at  our  disposal  for  parrying  the 
principal  effort  of  the  enemy  when  it  shall  at 
last  have  been  discovered.  As  spaces  and 
effectives  increase  in  scale  manoeuvre  will 
take  place  upon  greater  and  greater  distances. 
The  three  German  armies  in  line  upon  the 
5th  and  6th  of  August,  1870,  presented,  as  we 
all  know,  a  front  of  about  a  hundred  kilo- 
metres. It  is  no  exaggeration  to  expect  a 
similar  extension  in  the  future.  In  such 
conditions  a  reserve  may  easily  have  fifty  or 
sixty  kilometres  to  go,  or  even  more,  in  order 
to  reach  the  field  of  action  and  to  come  up 
against  the  objective  assigned  to  it.  Such  a 
manoeuvre,  if  it  is  to  have  its  effect  in  time, 
will  need  more  rapid  methods  of  progress  than 
have  hitherto  been  suggested  or  it  will  fail. 
Specially  organized  use  of  the  railways  would 
seem  the  sole  procedure  permitting  a  reserve 
to  come  into  useful  action  under  most 
circumstances.1 

RESERVES.  —  The  scene  took  place  at 
Abukeer,  during  the  battle.  Bonaparte  was 

'  *  Written  before  the  development  of  the  internal 
combustion  engine, 
o 


194        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

dictating  an  order  to  his  Chief  of  Staff, 
Berthier  (a  man  who  kept  everything  in 
mind,  and  particularly  the  filling  up  of 
blank  order  forms) .  Bonaparte  stopped,  and 
Berthier  asked  him  what  troops  he  desired 
to  form  the  reserve. 

"Do  you  take  me  for  MoreauP"  answered 
Bonaparte.  There  was  obviously  no  such  a 
thing  in  his  mind  as  a  necessary  reserve. 
Troops  must  be  reserved,  but  only  in  order 
to  manoeuvre  and  to  attack  with  more  energy 
than  the  others.  Such  was  the  use  of  forces 
he  had  been  led  to  by  the  idea  of  an  attack 
which  must,  in  the  last  result,  exclude  any 
reserve,  any  caution. 

RETREAT. — The  losses  suffered  by  the  Prus- 
sians, at  the  moment  when  they  undertook 
the  retreat  from  Gilly,1  show  well  what  diffi- 
culty troops  experience  in  extricating  them- 
selves from  an  attack  if  they  wait  too  long 
before  beginning  their  movement.  This 
necessity  would  nowadays  be  felt  earlier, 
because  modern  arms  extend  their  powerful 
effects  to  a  far  longer  range. 

ROADS. —  It    is    readily    written    that    one 

should  always  keep  one  road  for  each  army 

corps.     To  act  otherwise,  they  say,  is  to  risk 

famine  for  the  troops  from  the  difficulty  of 

1  In  the  campaign  of  Waterloo. 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        195 

bringing  up  convoys  in  time.  In  practice 
the  rule  often  cannot  be  applied.  Further, 
even  when  the  rule  is  applied  (when  the 
thing  is  possible),  to  restrict  one  road  to  the 
march  of  each  army  corps  leads  one,  if  one 
is  not  very  careful,  to  a  premature  deploy- 
ment of  one's  forces,  and  to  an  order  in  line 
without  depth — incapable  of  manoeuvre.  And 
these  are  very  grave  inconveniences  which  ought 
generally  to  make  us  abandon  the  system. 

SECURITY. —  The  best  commanded  armies 
have  marched,  have  manoeuvred,  amidst  the 
unknown.  It  was  unavoidable.  They  have, 
however,  got  the  better  of  that  dangerous 
situation,  they  have  come  out  of  it  victoriously 
by  resorting  to  security,  which  enabled  them 
to  live  without  suffering  damage  in  an  atmo- 
sphere full  of  dangers. 

A  constant  preoccupation,  while  we  prepare 
and  combine  an  action  against  the  enemy, 
must  be  to  escape  his  will,  to  parry  any 
undertaking  by  which  he  might  prevent  our 
action  from  succeeding.  Any  military  idea, 
any  scheme,  any  plan,  must  therefore  be  con- 
nected with  the  conception  of  security.  We 
must,  as  if  we  were  fencing,  attack  without 
uncovering  ourselves,  parry  without  ceasing 
to  threaten  the  adversary. 

Security  is  based  on  two  elements,   two 


196        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

mathematical  quantities  :  time  and  space ; 
also  it  contains  a  third  element :  the  resisting 
power  of  the  troops. 

This  notion  of  Security,  which  we  express 
by  means  of  a  single  word,  divides  itself  into  : 

1.  Material  security,  which  makes  it   pos- 
sible to  avoid  enemy  blows  when  one  does 
not  desire  to  strike  back  or  cannot  do  so; 
this  is  the  means   of  feeling  secure  in   the 
midst   of  danger,   of  halting  and  marching 
under  shelter. 

2.  Tactical  security,  which  makes  it  possible 
to  go  on  carrying  out  a  programme,  an  order 
received,    in    spite    of   chance   unfavourable 
circumstances  produced  by  war ;  in  spite  of  the 
unknown,  of  measures  taken  by  the  enemy  of 
his  own  free  will;  also  to  act   securely  and 
with  certainty,  whatever  the  enemy  may  do,  by 
safeguarding  ones  own  freedom  of  action. 

The  German  army  of  1870  still  kept  to 
mere  tactical  security.  Yet  we  find  the 
notion  of  strategical  security  in  its  fullest 
sense  in  all  Napoleon's  wars,  as  well  as 
among  the  German  staffs  of  1814  and  1815. 
The  theory  is  likely  to  rise  again  to-day,  for 
it  has  been  fully  alive  in  the  past. 

STRATEGY. — No  strategy  can  henceforth  pre- 
vail over  that  which  aims  at  ensuring  tactical 
results,  victory  by  fighting. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         197 

A  strategy  paving  the  way  to  tactical 
decisions  alone  :  this  is  the  end  we  come  to 
in  following  a  study  which  has  produced  so 
many  learned  theories.  Here,  as  everywhere 
else,  as  in  politics,  the  entrance  upon  the 
stage  of  human  masses  and  passions  neces- 
sarily leads  to  simplification. 

***** 

Strategy  is  but  a  question  of  will  and 
common  sense  ;  in  order  to  keep  that  double 
faculty  in  the  field,  you  must  have  fostered 
it  by  training,  you  must  possess  a  complete 
military  culture  (humaniUs  militaires),  you 
must  have  examined  and  solved  a  number  of 

concrete  problems  in  your  art. 

***** 

It  is  by  movement  that  troops  assemble 
and  prepare  for  battle.  Movement  governs 
strategy. 

You  must  seek  the  shock;  hence  a  new 
set  of  reasons  for  movement :  movement  in 
order  to  seek  battle;  movement  in  order  to 
assemble  one's  forces  on  the  ground;  move- 
ment in  order  to  carry  out  the  attack. 

Such  is  the  first  law  that  governs  the  theory, 
a  law  from  which  no  troop  can  ever  escape 
and  which  has  been  expressed  by  the  military 
formula  :  of  all  faults,  one  only  is  degrading, 
namely  inaction. 


198        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

The  5th  Prussian  Corps  would  not  have 
managed  to  debouch  from  Nachod  if  it  had 
been  definitely  thrown  back.  If  one  observes 
that,  on  the  same  day,  the  ist  Corps  suffered 
a  severe  check  at  Trautenau,  the  entrance 
into  Bohemia  would  have  been  rendered 
impossible  to  the  2nd  Army.  What  would 
then  have  become  of  General  von  Moltke's 
plan?  Let  us  .acknowledge  once  more  that 
strategy,  however  brilliant  it  may  be,  is  at 
the  mercy  of  tactics. 

***** 

Let  us  no  longer  suffer  strategy  to  be  tied 
fast  to  geography,  to  mere  ground,  to  seeking 
positions,  and  the  "  keys  "  of  a  country ; 
but  rather  let  strategy  take  account  in  a 
national  war  of  the  main  national  interests 
and  the  main  organs  by  which  a  nation  lives. 

STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS. —  Strategy  in  the 
first  place  demands  the  seeking  for  our 
particular  battle  and  the  preparation  for  it, 
and  these  in  the  very  best  conditions.  Our 
battle  once  won,  it  enters  a  new  phase  of 
the  same  type  of  object  in  view,  the  next 
battle. 

Tactics  is  concerned  with  the  reasonable 
conduct  of  the  battle  once  engaged.  A  good 
tactic  obeys  at  once  certain  spiritual  laws 
and  certain  mechanical  principles,  aiming 


through  both  to  such  an  overthrow  of  the 
adversary  as  shall  be  beyond  question. 

Though  history  shows  us  these  two  frac- 
tions of  the  art  of  war  reaching  various  mutual 
proportions  in  the  hands  of  a  Napoleon  or  a 
Moltke  or  their  adversaries,  these  two  frac- 
tions none  the  less  remain  dominated  in 
their  combination,  and  characterized  to-day 
by  the  developments  each  military  action 
has  gone  through,  and  especially  by  these 
three,  a  tendency  to  maximum  national 
recruitment,  the  increase  of  available  effec- 
tives, and  the  perfection  of  armament. 

STUDY. —  Men  called  to  the  conduct  of 
troops  should  prepare  themselves  to  deal 
with  cases  more  and  more  varied  upon  an 
ever-increasing  horizon  of  experience.  They 
can  only  be  given  the  capacity  to  arrive  at  a 
prompt  and  judicious  position  by  developing 
in  them  through  study  their  power  of  analysis 
and  of  synthesis;  that  is,  of  conclusion  in  a 
purely  objective  sense,  conclusion  upon  prob- 
lems which  have  been  actually  lived  and 
taken  from  real  history.  Thus  also  can  they 
be  founded  through  the  conviction  that  comes 
from  knowledge  in  a  confidence  sufficient  to 
enable  them  to  take  such  decisions  upon  the 
field  of  action. 

SURPRISE. —  Surprise  consists  in  the  hard 


200        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

fact  that  the  enemy  suddenly  appears  in 
considerable  numbers,  without  his  presence 
having  been  known  to  be  so  near,  for  want 
of  information,  and  without  it  being  possible 
to  assemble,  for  want  of  protection  ;  for  want, 
in  one  word,  of  a  security-service. 

Where  there  is  no  strategical  security,  there 
is  strategical  surprise  ;  that  is,  a  possibility 
for  the  enemy  to  attack  us  while  we  are  not 
in  a  position  to  receive  him  under  good  con- 
ditions; a  possibility  for  him  to  prevent  our 
insufficiently  protected  assembly  from  taking 
place.  Further,  our  forces  as  they  go  into 
action,  go  astray,  imperil  themselves  by 
taking  wrong  directions,  owing  to  lack  of 
reconnoitring,  of  information,  and  owing  to 
imperfectly  understanding  the  notion  of 
security ;  an  idea  which  implies  the  art  of 
acting  not  only  securely  but  also  surely,  that 
is,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  case. 

The  notion  of  strategical  security  was 
completely  ignored  by  the  German  armies 
of  1870,  and  the  result  of  that  fault  in  con- 
ducting the  war  was  that  they  often  found 
themselves  in  a  particularly  critical  situation. 
Nothing  but  the  immobility,  the  complete 
passiveness  of  the  French  made  it  possible 
for  them  to  come  out  of  such  situations 
without  a  disaster. 

Strategical  security  was,  however,  known 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         201 

and  put  in  practice  by  the  Germans  of  1813 
and  1814.  Taught  by  the  severe  lessons 
received  from  the  Emperor,  they  had  grasped 
its  importance. 

*  *  *  *  * 

Material  surprise  means  losing  material 
security;  we  have,  in  case  of  such  surprise, 
the  enemy  freely  firing  into  our  billets,  our 
bivouacs,  or  our  marching  columns. 

Tactical  surprise  means  endangering  tactical 
security,  losing  freedom  of  action.  This  would 
have  been  the  case  with  the  5th  Corps  in  1870, 
more  especially  with  the  Lespart  Division, 
had  the  enemy  come  on  during  the  days  of 
the  5th  or  6th  of  August.  The  marching 
forces  would  have  had  to  risk  a  battle  on  the 
very  road  they  were  following.  Instead  of 
continuing  their  movement,  they  would  have 
had  to  fight ;  they  would  never  have  arrived. 
***** 

The  means  of  breaking  the  enemy's  spirit, 
of  proving  to  him  that  his  cause  is  lost,  is 
surprise  in  the  widest  sense  of  that  word. 

Surprise  bringing  into  the  struggle  some- 
thing "  unexpected  and  terrible "  (Xeno- 
phon) ;  "  everything  unexpected  is  of  great 
effect"  (Frederick).  Surprise  depriving  the 
enemy  of  the  possibility  of  reflection  and 
therefore  of  discussion. 

Here  we  have  a  novel  instrument,  and  one 


202         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

capable  of  destructive  power  beyond  all 
knowledge.  However,  one  cannot  obtain  this 
at  will;  setting  an  ambush,  attacking  in 
reverse,  are  possible  in  a  small  war,  but 
impracticable  in  a  great  one ;  it  is  necessary, 
therefore,  in  great  wars  to  produce  a  danger 
which  the  enemy  shall  not  have  the  time 
to  parry  or  which  he  shall  not  be  able  to 
parry  sufficiently;  a  destructive  force  which 
should  be  known,  or  seem,  to  the  enemy 
to  be  superior  to  his  own ;  to  this  end,  forces 
and  thereby  undisputable  efforts  must  be 
concentrated  on  a  point  where  the  enemy  is 
not  able  to  parry  instantly,  that  is,  to  answer 
by  deploying  an  equal  number  of  forces  at 
the  same  time. 

To  surprise  amounts  to  crushing  an  oppo- 
nent from  a  short  distance  by  numbers  in 
a  limit  of  time ;  otherwise,  the  adversary 
though  overtaken  by  numbers  retains  the 
power  to  meet  the  attack,  to  bring  up  his 
reserves,  in  which  case  the  assailant  loses  the 
advantage  of  surprise. 

He  also  loses  that  advantage  if  surprise 
starts  from  a  great  distance,  for  the  enemy 
may  then,  owing  to  the  range  and  delaying 
power  of  modern  arms,  regain  the  time  to 
bring  up  his  reserves. 

Such  are  the  conditions  of  numbers,  time, 
space,  military  action  must  fulfil  in  order  to 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        203 

contain  these  elements  of  surprise  which  are 
necessary  to  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's 
spirit. 

Hence  the  superiority  of  manoeuvring  armies, 
which  alone  are  capable  of  quickness  and 
nimbleness  in  preparing  an  attack  ;  launching 
it  at  short  distance,  and  carrying  it  out  quickly. 

One  similarly  perceives  the  common  inten- 
tional features  possessed  by  the  attacks  in 
flank  of  former  generations ;  the  oblique  order 
of  Frederick;  the  "  event  "  of  the  Napoleonic 
battle,  and  the  decisive  (generally  enveloping) 
attacks  of  modern  battle. 

Under  these  various  shapes  there  appears 
a  development  of  this  common  idea  of  a 
surprise ;  the  idea  of  trying  to  produce 
among  the  enemy  the  same  moral  effect — 
terror;  of  creating  in  the  enemy's  mind,  by 
suddenly  using  unexpected  and  undeniably 
powerful  means,  a  feeling  of  impotence,  the 
conviction  that  he  cannot  conquer,  that  he 
is  vanquished. 

To  break  the  enemy's  will :  such  is  the 
first  principle  we  derive  from  our  study;  to 
break  it  by  means  of  an  unexpected  and 
supremely  violent  stroke — such  is  the  fir^t 
consequence  of  that  principle. 

TACTICS. —  Individual  valour  in  the  rank 
and  file  is  insufficient  to  create  victory. 


204        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

From  being  decisive  in  the  elementary  origins 
of  combat,  it  gradually  loses  its  influence, 
its  weight,  in  proportion  as  the  numbers 
employed  increase.  Had  Napoleon  developed 
his  thought,  he  would  have  told  us  that  at 
the  battle  of  the  Pyramids,  a  handful  of 
Frenchmen,  commanded  by  him,  had  con- 
quered about  30,000  of  these  Orientals, 
though  the  latter  were  quite  as  valiant  as, 
and  even  individually  .  superior  to,  the 
French. 

What  is  it,  then,  that  determines  the 
result  ?  What  is  it  that  provides  victory  ? 

Tactics,  Order,  Manoeuvre. 

There  are  such  things  as  advantageous 
tactics  and  rational  fighting  dispositions,  that 
is,  a  combination  of  forces  set  up  by  the 
Commander.  The  influence  of  that  Com- 
mander, of  that  directing  mind,  soon  becomes 
considerable  and  decisive;  it  gets  the  better 
of  the  sum  of  individual  valour  whenever 
the  numbers  of  the  fighters  is  large,  as,  for 
instance,  at  the  Pyramids.  Let  us  learn  a 
lesson  from  this.  In  the  presence  of  such  a 
situation,  let  us  admit  self-examination  and 
confirm  our  conclusions. 

We,  the  French,  possess  a  fighter,  a  soldier, 
undeniably  superior  to  the  one  beyond  the 
Vosges  in  his  racial  qualities,  activity,  intelli- 
gence, spirit,  power  of  exaltation,  devotion, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        205 

patriotism  :    he  is  the  mameluke  as  opposed 
to  the  French  cavalrymen. 

If  we  are  beaten,  it  will  be  due  to  the 
weakness  of  our  tactics.  Let  us  then  find, 
and  provide  our  soldiers  with,  those  tactics 
which  get  the  better  of  numbers  and  valour 
as  at  the  Pyramids;  which  will  doubly 
enable  us  to  get  the  better  of  an  army  the 
individual  valour  of  which  is  inferior  to  our 
own. 

TACTICS,  GERMAN.  —  The  same  care  1  for 
effectively  directing  fire  in  action  is  found 
nowadays  to  prevail  in  certain  German 
manoeuvre's.  The  procedure  of  a  body  of 
infantry  may  be  quoted  as  an  instance  among 
others. 

We  find  here  first  a  very  thin  and  dis- 
continuous line.  Behind,  at  a  distance  of 
about  300  yards,  a  few  supports  corresponding 
to  the  intervals  within  the  line.  Three  or 
four  companies  in  all  are  deployed  on  the 
whole  front.  The  remainder  of  the  division 
follows  behind  in  irregular  and  almost  indis- 

1  "  Another  phenomenon  of  some  importance  has 
again  been  observed  since  the  war  of  1870.  What  I 
mean  is  that  new  principle  obtaining  among  the  in- 
fantry, a  principle  according  to  which  infantry  is  careful 
to  submit  its  fire  to  a  more  exacting  discipline  than  in 
the  past,  also  to  accept  a  scientific  direction  in  spite 
of  the  dispersed  order  which  itself  characterizes  its  modern 
mode  of  action." — Von  der  Goltz. 


206        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

tinguishable  lines.  The  echelons  (usually  com- 
panies in  line  on  two  ranks)  follow  each  other 
at  a  distance  of  about  500  yards,  separated, 
moreover,  by  changing  intervals. 

At  about  800  yards  from  the  enemy,  the 
line  opens  fire  and  is  immediately  reinforced 
by  its  supports,  the  intervention  of  which 
produces  one,  two,  or  three  bounds  forward. 

At  600  yards,  the  line  is  formed  by  men  in 
close  alignment  as  a  result  of  the  entry  into 
line  of  other  companies;  a  long  interval  of 
time  then  passes  for  preparing  the  attack. 
The  fire  develops  and  reaches  an  extreme 
violence;  the  dispositions  of  march  are 
condensed  into  dispositions  of  attack. 

The  attack  is  launched,  etc. 

TEACHING,  PRACTICAL  METHOD  OP.—"  Be- 
tween those  two  terms,  scientific  conception 
and  the  art  of  commanding,  there  is  a  gulf 
which  the  method  of  teaching  must  bridge 
if  it  is  to  deserve  the  name  of  a  practical 
method. 

"  Application  must  therefore  be  resorted 
to." 

Here  appears,  at  the  same  time  as  the 
method,  the  object  which  is  being  aimed  at : 
it  consists  in  passing  from  the  scientific 
conception  to  the  art  of  commanding,  from 
truth  mastered  and  known  to  the  practical 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        207 

application  of  that  truth.  The  gulf  was 
bridged  by  the  Prussian  School.  In  proof, 
consider  the  Commanders  of  the  vanguards 
in  1866.  Although  they  had  only  recently 
left  their  school,  they  started  the  business 
of  that  campaign  with  a  pluck,  a  skill,  and 
thereby  an  efficiency  which  had  hitherto 
been  thought  to  belong  exclusively  to  men 
who  had  already  fought  both  often  and  well. 

Let  us  do  the  same;  let  us  cross  the  gulf 
by  the  same  roads,  the  same  bridges. 

In  order  to  do  this,  we  must  have  a  practical 
teaching  including  application  made  to  par- 
ticular cases  of  fixed  principles,  drawn  from 
history,  in  order  (i)  to  prepare  for  experience,  \ 
(2)  to  teach  the  art  of  commanding,  (3)  lastly,  I 
to  impart  the  habit  of  acting  correctly  without 
having  to  reason. 

TENACITY. — Forces  were  lacking  to  carry 
the  offensive  further  and  to  overthrow  the 
enemy.1  Nevertheless,  fatigue  and  slackness 
had  become  general  after  so  long  and  so 
violent  a  struggle.  The  bodily  forces  of  the 
opponents  were  exhausted.  One  last  attack, 
even  were  it  executed  by  small  forces,  might 
in  such  circumstances  produce  a  considerable 

1  This  deals  with  the  evening  of  the  Battle  of  Razon- 
ville,  i6th  August,  1870,  and  the  enemy  in  question 
were  the  French  opposed  to  the  Germans. 


208        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

result.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  that  the 
will  of  the  General  in  command  should  not 
be  overborne  by  the  exhaustion  of  his  troops. 
On  the  contrary,  his  will  had  to  find  some 
way  of  using  the  last  gasp  of  energy  in  his 
men  and  his  horses;  he  had  to  ask  of  them 
one  last  and  supreme  effort  to  march  against 
the  enemy. 

But  the  adversary  might  act  in  the  same 
fashion.  His  resources  also  permitted  him 
to  obtain  in  such  a  moment  not  only  normal 
results  but  effective  success. 

The  enemy's  constant  returns  to  the  offen- 
sive proved  that  he  still  had  fresh  troops. 
His  activity  might  spread;  and  that  was  a 
danger  to  be  avoided  at  all  costs. 

The  necessity  therefore  imposed  itself  of 
forestalling  him,  of  attacking  before  he  did. 
An  order  was  immediately  sent  to  the  reduced 
battalions  of  the  6th  Division,  which  were 
assembled  before  Vionville,  to  attack  by  way 
of  the  sunken  road  of  Razenville  against  the 
French  batteries  of  the  Roman  road.  The 
centre  of  the  German  line  to  the  west  and 
south  of  Vionville  consisted  of  a  great  battery 
which  had  suffered  heavily  in  the  struggles 
of  the  day.  Many  horses  were  lacking.  The 
munitions  were  nearly  exhausted.  By  chang- 
ing position  it  would  lose  the  immediate 
advantage  of  a  calculated  range.  These  con- 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        209 

siderations  were,  under  the  conditions,  of  no 
value.  The  artillery  received  the  order  to  go 
forward,  in  order  to  produce  not  material 
effects — it  lacked  every  means  of  achieving 
them — but  a  result  purely  moral.  It  had  to 
affirm  the  determination  to  win,  the  power 
to  go  forward,  and  hence  to  establish  the 
victory  which  was  still  sought  and  desired. 

THE  UNKNOWN.  —  The  unknown  is  the 
governing  condition  of  war. 

Everybody  is  familiar  with  this  principle 
(so  you  might  think),  and  being  familiar  with 
it  will  distrust  the  unknown  and  master  it; 
the  unknown  will  no  longer  exist. 

This  is  not  true  in  the  least.  All  armies 
have  lived  and  marched  amidst  the  unknown. 

VICTORY. — No  victory  without  battle. 
*  *  *  *  * 

Far  from  being  a  sum  of  distinct  and 
partial  results,  victory  is  the  consequence  of 
efforts,  some  of  which  are  victorious  while 
others  appear  to  be  fruitless,  which  never- 
theless all  aim  at  a  common  goal,  all  drive 
at  a  common  result :  namely,  at  a  decision, 
a  conclusion  which  alone  can  provide  victory. 
***** 

Victory  always  falls  to  those  who  deserve 
it  by  their  greater  strength  of  intelligence  and 
of  will. 


210        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

The  will  to  conquer :  such  is  victory's 
first  condition,  and  therefore  every  soldier's 
first  duty;  but  it  also  amounts  to  a  supreme 
resolve  which  the  commander  must,  if  need 
be,  impart  to  the  soldier's  soul. 

If  the  will  to  conquer  is  necessary  to  offering 
battle  with  any  chance  of  success,  it  is  criminal 
in  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  deliver  or  accept 
battle  without  possessing  that  superior  will 
which  must  provide  direction  and  impulsion 
for  all. 

And  if  battle  is  thrust  upon  him  by  circum- 
stances, he  must  decide  to  give  battle,  to 
fight,  in  order  to  conquer  in  spite  of  it  all. 

On  the  other  hand,  one  must  not  fight  for 
the  sake  of  fighting.  "  Battles  concerning 
which  one  cannot  say  why  and  to  what  purpose 
they  have  been  delivered  are  commonly  the 
resource  of  ignorant  men  "  (Marechal  de  Saxe). 

However  obvious  these  points  may  be, 
they  seem  to  have  been  overlooked  during 
the  tragic  periods  of  our  history. 

E.  g.  :  the  great  battles  round  Metz  (i6th, 
i8th,  and  3ist  August,  1870),  in  which  we  see 
an  army  fighting  bravely  without  its  chief 
desiring  to  secure  victory.  How  could  victory 
be  thus  secured  ? 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  great  events  of 
history,  the  disasters  it  relates  from  time  to 
time,  such  as  the  collapse  of  French  power  in 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        211 

1870,  are  never  accidental,  but  result  from 
dominating  and  general  causes;  from  forget- 
ting the  most  elementary  moral  and  intellectual 
truths,  as  well  as  from  relaxing  that  activity 
of  mind  and  body  which  is  the  very  life  and 
sanity  of  armies. 

WAR,  FORM  OF. — A  war  not  only  arises,  but 
derives  Us  nature,  from  the  political  ideas,  the 
moral  sentiments,  and  the  international  rela- 
tions obtaining  at  the  moment  when  it  breaks 
out. 

This  amounts  to  saying  :  try  and  know 
why  and  with  the  help  of  what  you  are  going  to 
act ;  then  you  will  find  out  how  to  act. 

WAR  (FUTURE). — The  next  *  war,  using  bal- 
loons, telegraphs,  railways,  and  quick-firing 
artillery  and  heavy  artillery  well  hidden  upon 
a  large  scale,  will  treat  the  problems  which 
were  set  for  solution  in  the  past  according  to 
the  same  principles  but  in  a  new  fashion.  In 
this  order  of  ideas  we  shall  see  the  next  war 
presenting  an  organization  of  the  German 
armies  and  of  their  special  engines  of  war, 
corresponding  to  an  object  which  will  be 
assigned  to  each  army  and  which  will  depend 
upon  a  common  manoeuvre  governing  the 
whole  force.  The  next  war  will  further  show 
that  such  a  manoeuvre,  prepared  beforehand 
1  Written  in  1901. 


212        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

with  a  novel  increase  of  forces,  with  a  novel 
variation  of  armament,  and  these  set  to  their 
task  in  adequate  fashion,  will  present  ele- 
ments of  success  which  we  should  never  see 
in  a  manoeuvre  improvised  at  the  last  moment 
without  special  means  already  on  the  spot  to 
reinforce  the  characteristics  of  the  action. 

On  our  side,  in  order  to  check  this  German 
manoeuvre  we  ought  also  to  make  use  of  all 
our  troops  no  matter  of  what  sort,  repartition 
them  between  the  various  armies,  and  give 
them  every  kind  of  new  armament  attached 
to  the  special  r6le  which  will  be  assigned  to 
each  army  in  an  offensive  manoeuvre,  which 
will  be  prepared  in  detail,  or  at  any  rate  at 
the  very  outset,  in  some  defensive  organiza- 
tion. It  will  be  in  vain  to  cite  the  fact  that 
the  data  of  the  problem  are  not  yet  deter- 
mined or  to  quote  that  as  an  argument  for 
putting  off  the  manoeuvre  and  the  organiza- 
tion of  siege  warfare  which  it  will  involve.  It  is 
only  twenty-seven  kilometres  from  Nancy  to 
Chateau-Salins,  fifty  from  the  Metz-Sarrebourg 
railway  to  the  Moselle.  Therefore  the  field  of 
hypothesis  and  of  all  possible  combination  is 
very  limited,  as  are  also  the  material  difficulties 
to  be  overcome  and  the  space  to  be  traversed.1 


1  This  was  written  under  the  conception  that  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  would  be  respected. — Translator. 


PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS        213 

Without  mentioning  the  armies  on  the  wings 
which  will  come  up  against  forts  and  small 
fortified  places,  and  will  therefore  receive  and 
use  howitzer  batteries,  it  is  to  be  presumed 
that  we  shall  also  find  in  the  armies  of  the 
centre  charged  with  frontal  attack  the  same 
type  of  armament  in  great  proportion. 
Troops  flanked  on  either  side  cannot  ma- 
noeuvre; they  are  compelled,  if  they  are  to 
advance,  to  overset  and  destroy  the  obstacles 
which  stop  them.  The  method  to  use  is 
clearly  that  of  heavy  artillery.  When  they 
reach  the  limit  of  their  offensive  power  there 
still  remains  the  task  of  holding  out,  and  to 
achieve  this  task  recourse  will  be  had  to  the 
method  of  siege  warfare.  The  number  and 
calibre  of  guns  will  be  increased  and  protection 
will  be  sought  for  high  trajectory  pieces  in 
the  nature  of  the  ground,  and  for  flat  trajec- 
tory in  armoured  plates  and  turrets. 

WAR,  METHOD  OF. — The  old  systems  of 
war,  above  all  concerned  with  the  conserva- 
tion of  an  army's  strength,  looked  to  achieve 
their  end  by  trick,  by  threat,  by  negotiation, 
by  manoeuvre,  by  local  combat,  by  the 
occupation  of  enemy  territory,  by  the  capture 
of  towns.  Modern  war,  since  Napoleon,  uses 
reckless  of  cost  all  the  means  at  its  disposal. 
It  has  but  one  method,  the  act  of  force.  It 


214        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

does  not  discuss  with  the  enemy  until  it  has 
crushed  him  in  battle  and  completed  his  ruin 
by  pursuit. 

WAR,  OBJECTIVITY  OF.— The  military  art 
is  not  an  accomplishment,  an  art  for  dilet- 
tante, a  sport.  You  do  not  make  war  without 
reason,  without  an  object,  as  you  would  give 
yourself  up  to  music,  painting,  hunting,  lawn 
tennis,  where  there  is  no  great  harm  done 
whether  you  stop  altogether  or  go  on,  whether 
you  do  little  or  much.  Everything  in  war 
is  linked  together,  is  mutually  interdependent, 
mutually  interpenetrating.  When  you  are 
at  war  you  have  no  power  to  act  at  random. 
Each  operation  has  a  raison  d'etre,  that  is  an 
object ;  that  object,  once  determined,  fixes 
the  nature  and  the  value  of  the  means  to  be 
resorted  to  as  well  as  the  use  which  ought  to  be 
made  of  the  forces.  That  object  is,  in  each 
case,  the  very  answer  to  the  famous  question 
Verdy  du  Vernois  asked  himself  when  he 
reached  the  battle-field  of  Nachod. 

In  presence  of  the  difficulties  which  faced 
him,  he  looked  into  his  own  memory  for  an 
instance  or  a  doctrine  that  would  supply  him 
with  a  line  of  conduct.  Nothing  inspired 
him.  "  Let  history  and  principles,"  he  said, 
"go  to '  the  devil !  after  all,  what  is  the 
problem  ?  "  And  his  mind  instantaneously 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        215 

recovered  its  balance.  This  is  the  objective 
way  of  treating  the  subject.  Every  military 
operation  must  be  approached  from  the  side 
of  its  object,  in  the  widest  sense  of  that  word, 
What  is  the  Problem? 

WAR,  PRINCIPLES  OF.— There  is  such  a  thing 
as  a  theory  of  war.  That  theory  starts  from 
a  number  of  principles  : 

The  principle  of  economy  of  forces. 

The  principle  of  freedom  of  action. 

The  principle  of  free  disposal  of  forces. 

The  principle  of  security,  etc.  .  .  . 

This  teaching  of  principles  does  not,  how- 
ever, aim  at  a  platonic  result  such  as  mere 
learning  or  as  merely  filling  your  mind  with  a 
number  of  new  and  certain  truths.  "  War 
is  above  all  a  simple  art,  an  art  wholly  of 
execution  "  (Napoleon). 

Failing  the  conscientious  following  of  the 
lessons  of  history,  peace-time  instruction  is 
bringing  us  slowly,  but  surely,  back  to  the 
false  method  of  "  fencing,"  by  virtue  of  the 
omnipotence  falsely  ascribed  to  material 
power. 

The  French  of  1870,  just  like  the  Prussians 
of  1806,  are  a  proof  of  this  truth.  In  both 
cases,  as  von  der  Goltz  puts  it,  "  when  the 
enemy  became  threatening,  strategists  gave 
themselves  up  to  the  study  of  the  ground, 


216        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

established  imaginary  plans  of  campaign  and 
looked  for  positions  which  they  might  or 
might  not  discover." 

Is  this  not  the  very  summary  of  our  last  war 
and  its  pitiful  history? 

1.  Positions  :    there  is  Cadenbronn,  there 
is  Froeschwiller,  there  is  the  forest  of  Haye, 
all  of  which  are  supposed  in  turn  to  ensure 
the  country's  salvation. 

2.  Imaginary  plans.     We  decide  that  the 
Rhine  must  be  passed  :    where,  when,  how, 
with  what  means  ?     It  does  not  matter.     The 
junction  with  the   Austrians  will  be   made 
in   Bohemia.     The  generals   think   they  can 
pigeon-hole  military  plans.     They  believe  any 
combination  to  be  valid  by  itself,  independ- 
ently from  circumstances  of  time,  place,  goal 
to  be  reached.     It  reminds  one  of  a  lawyer 
preparing    what    is    called    an    "  omnibus " 
speech,    a   speech   suitable   to   any   possible 
case. 

3.  The  notion  of  battle  has  totally  disap- 
peared— and  it  has  disappeared  because  people 
believe  they  can  do  without  it,  because  they 
believe  they  can,  like  the  immortal  Berwick, 
earn    victory    without    fighting — that    when 
troops  are  being  led  into  the  fight,  it  is  from 
a  skilful  handling  of  these  troops,  mutually 
related  to  each  other,  from  a  perfect  way  of 
falling  in,  from  some  new  formation  or  general 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        217 

disposition,  that  success  will  come.  A  battle 
is  prepared  for  as  if  it  were  a  parade;  no 
mention  is  made  either  of  the  enemy,  or  of 
blows  to  be  delivered  (see  the  orders  for  the 
battle  of  Champigny),  or  of  the  hammer  that 
must  strike  the  blow.  No  mention  is  made 
of  the  use  of  Force. 

These  erroneous  considerations  will  fre- 
quently reappear,  without  your  knowing  it, 
in  your  own  decisions;  they  will  call  forth 
my  criticism  whenever  you  undertake  out- 
flanking operations  or  operations  on  the  rear 
of  the  enemy  which  will  draw  all  their  assumed 
value  from  the  mere  direction  in  which  they 
will  be  made;  whenever  you  undertake  to 
threaten  without  attacking ;  whenever  you 
resort  to  mere  plans,  geometrical  drawings,  as 
if  certain  dispositions,  certain  figures  possessed 
a  virtue  in  themselves. 

All  this  is  as  flimsy  as  a  paper  wall. 

You  cannot  push  a  staunch  adversary  back 
by  means  of  a  skilfully  selected  direction. 
You  cannot  even  stop  him  without  really 
attacking,  any  more  than  a  paper  wall  can 
prevent  rain  and  frost  from  entering  a 
house. 

Being  positive  in  its  nature,  war,  which  we 
are  about  to  study,  only  admits  of  positive 
solutions.  There  is  no  effect  without  a 
cause ;  if  you  want  to  produce  an  effect,  you 


218        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

must  develop  the  cause;    and   in  war  you 
must  apply  force. 

If  you  want  to  push  the  enemy  back,  beat 
him  ;  otherwise,  nothing  is  done ;  and  there 
is  only  one  means  of  doing  this  :  namely 
fighting.  No  victory  without  fighting. 

WAR,  SCIENCE  OF.  —  Nobody  will  venture 
to-day  to  assert  that  there  could  be  a  science 
of  war.  It  would  be  as  absurd  as  a  science 
of  poetry,  of  painting,  or  of  music.  But  it 
does  not  in  the  least  follow  that  there 
should  not  be  a  theory  of  war,  just  as  there  is 
one  for  each  of  these  liberal  and  peaceful  arts. 
It  is  not  theory  which  makes  a  Raphael,  a 
Beethoven,  or  a  Goethe,  but  the  theory  of  their 
art  placed  at  their  disposal  a  technique  with- 
out which  they  could  not  have  risen  to  the 
summits  they  reached. 

WAR,  TRANSFORMATION  OF.— War,  like  all 
other  human  activities,  undergoes  changes; 
it  does  not  escape  the  law  of  evolution.  We 
live  in  the  century  of  railways,  coaches  were 
none  the  less  useful  in  their  day.  But  we 
must  not  use  coaches  to-day  when  we  want 
to  travel  fast  and  well. 

To  deny  the  change  wrought  in  warfare 
amounts  to  denying  the  effects  of  the  French 
Revolution,  which  was  not  only  philosophical, 
social,  and  political,  but  also  military.  Not 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        219 

only  did  it  dare  to  declare  war  on  kings  and 
tyrants,  but  also  victoriously  to  oppose  the 
inexperienced  but  at  the  same  time  violently 
impassioned  bands  of  the  levee  en  masse  to 
the  minutely  and  rigidly  trained  troops  of  the 
older  Europe. 

To  us,  at  this  moment  of  history,  in  the 
midst  of  modern  Europe,  that  old  fencing 
and  those  antiquated  methods  are  illustrated 
by  a  certain  kind  of  warfare  in  which  there 
is  no  decisive  solution,  nothing  but  a  limited 
end — a  warfare  consisting  in  manoeuvres 
without  fighting,  submitted  on  the  other 
hand  to  absolute  rules,  of  which  I  will  here 
give  a  few  typical  instances  : 

Joly  de  Maizeroy  gave  the  following  defini- 
tion of  war  :  '  The  science  of  war  consists 
not  only  in  knowing  how  to  fight  but  even 
more  in  avoiding  combat,  in  selecting  posts, 
in  directing  the  marches  so  as  to  reach  the 
goal  without  committing  oneself  ...  so 
again  as  to  decide  to  fight  a  battle  only  when 
it  is  deemed  indispensable."  To  defer,  to 
put  off,  such  is  the  formula. 

We  again  come  across  this  "  war  without 
battle  "  in  the  pages  of  Massenbach,  who  con- 
sidered it  the  supreme  form  of  the  military 
art. 

Again,  the  same  kind  of  warfare  was  charac- 
terized in  the  following  way  by  Marshal  de 


220        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

Saxe,  a  man  of  undeniable  ability  :  "I  am 
not  in  favour  of  giving  battle;  especially  at 
the  outset  of  a  war.  I  am  even  convinced 
that  a  clever  general  can  wage  war  his  whole 
life  without  being  compelled  to  do  so." 

Entering  Saxony  in  1806,  Napoleon  writes 
to  Marshal  Soult :  "  There  is  nothing  I  desire 
so  much  as  a  great  battle."  The  one  wants 
to  avoid  battle  his  whole  life;  the  other 
demands  it  at  the  first  opportunity.  Further, 
these  theories  have  the  vice  of  building  up 
magnificent  systems  on  the  mere  properties 
and  intrinsic  value  of  ground. 

Again,  we  see  Schwartzemberg,  in  1814, 
proceed  by  Bale,  run  up  against  the  obstacles 
of  Switzerland,  completely  isolate  his  own 
army  and  expose  it  a  hundred  times  to  the 
striking  blows  of  an  even  disarmed  Napoleon, 
face  all  these  risks,  in  order  to  secure  the 
advantage  of  entering  France  through  the 
Langres  plateau ;  because  the  Langres  plateau 
gives  birth  to  the  Marne,  the  Aube,  the  Seine, 
etc.  .  .  .  and  constitutes  (geographically)  the 
strategical  key  to  France.  Bliicher's  judgment 
about  this  view  is  well  known. 

To  be  brief,  the  idea  of  a  result  to  be  ob- 
tained by  conquering  had  totally  disappeared 
from  all  these  conceptions.  The  notion  of 
force  had  been  replaced  by  the  notion  of 
figure  ;  the  mechanics  of  war  had  become  the 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        221 

geometry  of  war;    intention  stood  instead  of 
fad  ;  threat  instead  of  stroke,  of  battle. 
***** 

Such  a  formalism  also  leads  to  pedantry. 
The  Austrian  Generals,  after  they  had  been 
beaten  by  Bonaparte,  were  heard  to  exclaim  : 
"It  is  not  possible  to  disregard,  as  much  as 
does  this  man,  Bonaparte,  the  most  essential 
principles  of  the  art  of  war !  " 

Truly  enough,  a  new  era  had  begun,  the 
era  of  national  wars,  of  wars  which  were  to 
work  at  a  fearful  potential;  for  those  wars 
were  destined  to  throw  into  the  fight  all  the 
resources  of  the  nation;  they  were  to  set 
themselves  as  their  goal,  not  a  dynastic 
interest,  not 'the  conquest  or  possession  of 
a  province,  but  the  defence  or  the  propaga- 
tion of  philosophical  ideas  in  the  first  place, 
next  of  principles  of  independence,  of  unity, 
of  immaterial  advantages  of  various  kinds. 
Lastly  they  staked  upon  the  issue  the  interests 
and  fortune  of  every  individual  private. 
Hence  the  rising  of  passions,1  that  is,  elements 
of  force,  hitherto  in  the  main  unused. 

Do  you  now  catch  the  antithesis  of  these 
two  epochs — that  before  and  that  after  the 
Revolution  ? 

1  Already,  in  the  past,  the  most  violent  contests  had 
been  caused  by  the  religious  wars,  which  were  wars  for 
an  idea. 


222        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

On  one  side,  an  extreme  utilization  of 
human,  ardently  impassioned,  masses;  an 
absorption  of  all  the  activities  of  society; 
an  entire  subordination  to  the  needs  of  the 
hour  of  the  material  parts  of  the  system, 
such  as  fortification,  supply,  use  of  ground, 
armament,  billeting,  etc. 

On  the  other  side  (eighteenth  century),  a 
regular  and  methodical  utilization  of  those 
material  parts  which  become  the  bases  for 
various  systems;  for  systems  which  would 
of  course  change  with  the  moment,  but  would 
none  the  less  always  tend  to  make  such  a  use 
of  the  troops  as  to  spare  the  army,  the  capital 
of  the  sovereign  :  an  army  not  really  caring 
for  the  cause  for  which  it  is  fighting,  though 
not  lacking  in  the  professional  virtues,  in 
particular  the  virtues  of  military  spirit  and 
honour. 

The  fancy  for  the  "  old  fencing,"  for 
"  antiquated  methods,"  for  "  ancient  pro- 
cesses," periodically  reappears  in  peace-time 
among  those  armies  which  do  not  study 
history  and  therefore  forget  the  very  thing 
which  above  all  gives  life  to  war :  namely 
action,  with  all  its  consequences. 

The  undeniable  reason  for  this  is  that  all 
these  systems  are  wholly  based  on  things  you 
can  touch  in  peace-time,  on  the  material 
factor  which  keeps  all  its  importance  in  mere 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        223 

drill  and  manoeuvres,  while  in  peace-time  the 
moral  factor  cannot  be  either  clearly  grasped 
or  made  use  of. 

For  instance,  the  battle  of  the  Alma  or 
any  similar  one,  if  it  were  reproduced  in  the 
course  of  manoeuvres,  would  turn  out  a 
Russian  victory  and  a  French  defeat;  the 
ground  demands  such  a  result.  You  would 
conclude  :  escarpments  of  such  a  nature  as 
those  of  the  Alma  being  insurmountable,  it 
is  useless  to  guard  them. 

Such  and  such  a  percentage  is  attained  by 
rifle-fire  against  a  target;  such  and  such  are 
the  effects  of  artillery.  Therefore  attack 
must  be  utterly  incapable  of  success.  The 
conclusion  drawn  from  this  would  be  that 
you  must  yourself  avoid  attack,  and  wait 
for  that  of  your  adversary  :  go  back  to  the 
war  of  positions  and  skilful  manoeuvring; 
starve  your  enemy  of  supplies  by  outflanking 
him,  etc.  At  each  improvement  in  armament 
you  would  have  to  return  to  the  defensive. 

Now  the  same  problems,  if  studied  in  the 
book  of  history,  suggest  an  exactly  contrary 
answer. 

The  battle  of  the  Alma  was  undeniably  a 
French  victory.  It  follows  therefrom  that 
any  ground  may  be  successfully  stormed  by 
the  enemy  if  it  is  not  defended  by  rifle-fire, 
that  is  by  watchful  and  active  men. 


224        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

Any  improvement  of  firearms  is  ultimately 
bound  to  add  strength  to  the  offensive,  ta  a 
cleverly  conducted  attack.  History  shows  it, 
reason  explains  it. 

*  *  *  *  * 

War  became  national  in  the  first  instance 
as  a  means  of  conquering  and  guaranteeing 
the  independence  of  each  existing  nation. 
(French  of  1792-3,  Spaniards  of  1804-14, 
Russians  of  1812,  Germans  of  1813,  Europe 
of  1814.)  It  was  marked  at  this  stage  by 
those  glorious  and  powerful  manifestations 
of  national  passions  which  are  named  Valmy, 
Saragossa,  Tarancon,  Moscow,  Leipsig,  etc. 

Later  on,  war,  though  still  national,  was 
made  with  the  object  of  acquiring  by  force 
unity  of  races,  nationality.  This  was  the  thesis 
of  the  Italians  and  Prussians  in  1866,  1870. 
This  will  be  the  thesis  in  the  name  of  which  the 
King  of  Prussia,  made  Emperor  of  Germany, 
will  claim  the  German  provinces  of  Austria. 

But  we  find  to-day  a  third  kind  of  national 
war  arising,  bent  on  conquering  economic 
advantages  and  advantageous  treaties  of 
commerce  for  each  nation. 

After  having  been  the  violent  means  by 
which  peoples  enforced  their  own  admittance 
into  the  world  of  nations,  war  is  now  becoming 
the  means  they  use  to  enrich  themselves. 

National  egotism,  breeding  self-interest  in 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        225 

politics  and  war,  and  making  war  a  means 
of  satisfying  the  growing  cravings  of  the 
nations,  these  nations  therefore  bringing  into 
the  fight  a  growing  concentration  of  passion ; 
a  more  and  more  excessive  feeding  of  war, 
including  the  use  of  the  human  factor  and  of 
all  the  resources  of  the  country — such  is  the 
picture  of  modern  warfare.  It  was  truly 
said,  then,  that  "  Nations  are  like  men  who 
prefer  losing  their  life  to  losing  their  honour, 
and  who  prefer  staking  their  last  resources  to 
confessing  themselves  vanquished.  Defeat 
is  the  ruin  of  all  "  (von  der  Goltz).  Such  are 
the  origins  of  modern  war.  Here  is  its  moral : 
you  must  henceforth  go  to  the  very  limits 
to  find  the  aim  of  war.  Since  the  vanquished 
party  now  never  yields  before  it  has  been 
deprived  of  all  means  of  reply,  what  you 
have  to  aim  at  is  the  destruction  of  those  very 
means  of  reply.  f 

What,  then,  are  the  means  of  furthering 
this  more  and  more  national,  more  and  more 
interested,  more  and  more  egotistic  policy;  of 
furthering  a  more  and  more  impassioned, 
violent  war? 

"  Mobilization  nowadays  takes  up  all  the 
intellectual    and   material   resources   of   the 
country  in  order  to  ensure  a  successful  issue  " 
(von  der  Goltz). 
Q 


226        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

All  resources :  a  noteworthy  difference 
with  previous  systems  of  recruiting  (such  as 
enlistment,  drawing  of  lots,  substitution,  etc.), 
which,  even  under  the  Revolution  and  the 
Empire,  left  unused  a  great  number  •  of 
citizens. 

All  intelligent  resources :  while  previous 
systems  allowed  the  wealthy  and  educated 
part  of  the  nation  to  escape. 

Moreover,  mobilization  takes  men  already 
trained  to  military  service;  they  have  all 
previously  gone  through  a  course  of  military 
training,  while  the  mass-levies  of  1793  or 
the  German  landwehrs  of  1813  embodied  in- 
experienced men  only. 

Therefore,  while  being  more  considerable 
in  numbers  and  better  trained,  the  modern 
mass  is  also  more  sensitive. 

The  human  factor  already  possessed  an 
undeniable  predominance  over  the  material 
factor  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  Is  it  not  clear  that  this  predomi- 
nance is  still  growing  in  every  way  ? 

But,  again,  the  army  we  propose  to  set 
up  is  not  a  professional  army.  It  is  an  army 
of  civilians  belonging  to  all  callings,  to  all 
ranks  of  society,  and  wrung  from  their  own 
people  :  which  callings,  society,  people,  cannot 
indefinitely  do  without  them.  War  brings 
discomfort,  puts  everywhere  a  stop  to  life. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        227 

Hence  the  consequence  that  such  war  cannot 
last  long,  that  it  must  be  conducted  with 
violence  and  reach  its  goal  quickly ;  otherwise 
it  will  remain  without  result. 

It  may  be  stated,  then,  that  such  features 
as  war  already  possessed  at  the  beginning 
of  the  nineteenth  century  are  still  more 
marked  at  the  end  of  the  century  :  a  national 
war;  a  war  of  numbers;  a  war  violent  and 
at  quick  march. 

***** 

The  nature  of  war  at  the  end  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  :  a  more  and  more  national 
war;  more  and  more  considerable  masses; 
ever-increasing  predominance  of  the  human 
factor. 

ZONE  OP  MANOEUVRE.— Troops  should  always 
be  the  masters  of  the  ground  of  their  neigh- 
bourhood to  the  limit  of  their  range;  other- 
wise they  may  be  outflanked,  caught  and 
destroyed  before  being  able  to  fight,  and  this 
space  which  has  to  be  kept  free  from  the  view 
and  attack  of  the  enemy  we  call  the  "  Zone  of 
manoeuvres." 


JUDGMENTS 


ON   WARS 

The  Civil  War  in  Vendee  and  (the  Napoleonic) 
Spanish  War 

THE  enlightened  soldiers  and  German 
patriots  of  1812-13  had  discovered  how  to 
hold  their  own  against  the  French  armies  by 
studying  the  occasionally  victorious  resistance 
which  Vendee  and  Spain,  acting  alone  and 
unsupported,  had  furnished.  From  that 
study  they  had  deduced  processes  which, 
once  transferred  from  the  Bocage  of  Vendee, 
or  from  the  hilly  ground  of  the  Peninsula 
into  the  plains  of  Northern  Europe,  proved 
totally  inapplicable  or  powerless.  The  prin- 
ciple of  a  national  rising  had,  none  the  less, 
survived.  They  had,  therefore,  only  to  deter- 
mine the  forms  of  war  which  suited  best  their 
own  temperament  and  country  in  order  to 
attain  at  last  those  results  which  we  know 
they  did  attain. 

Conversely,  the  misappreciation  of  "  the 
nature  of  one's  material  "  explains,  to  a  large 
extent,  the  impotence  of  our  armies  on  the 

231 


232         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

Loire  in  1870-71.  The  mass-levy,  revolution- 
ary in  its  essence,  decreed  by  the  dictator 
Gambetta,  ill  suited  a  certain  type  of  mind 
which  issued  from  the  imperial  armies  and 
had  been  trained  to  expect  little  more  than 
order,  method  and  perfect  regularity  in  an 
armed  force. 

Campaign  of  1796  in  Italy 

See  the  section  "  Economy  of  Force  "  in 
The  Principles  of  War. 

Wars  of  Napoleon 

The  whole  of  this  art  consisted  in  "  creating 
number,"  that  is,  in  having  number  on  one's 
side  at  the  chosen  point  of  attack;  and  the 
means  of  obtaining  this  was  economy  of  force. 
Having  secured  this  "  creation  of  number," 
the  next  step  was  to  prolong  the  action  of 
one's  machine  by  making  the  fullest  possible 
use  of  the  disorder  into  which  the  appearance 
of  superior  numbers  at  the  decisive  point  will 
have  thrown  the  enemy's  army,  and  also  the 
fullest  possible  use  of  the  moral  superiority 
which  such  a  situation  will  have  created  in 
one's  own  force.  ...  In  such  a  summary 
you  have  the  formula  of  Napoleonic  war. 

Campaign  of  1809  in  Austria 
See  the  passage  on  "  Moral  Ascendancy  "  in 
The  Principles  of  War. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        233 

Campaign  of  1809  in  Italy 

See  the  passage  on  "  Strategic  Security  "  in 
The  Principles  of  War. 

Campaign  of  Prussia  (1806).     (Battle  of 
Saalfeld) 

The  troops  set  out  at  a  brisk  pace,  on  a 
fine  autumn  morning,  before  dawn  (5  a.m.), 
the  air  being  fresh  and  biting. 

The  men  were  rather  heavily  loaded  with 
three  days'  food  in  their  haversacks;  they 
carried  only  three  days'  supply  because  they 
had  already  consumed  five  days'  supply  out 
of  the  eight  with  which  they  had  started  :  at 
Wiirtzburg  (four  days'  biscuits) ;  at  Schwein- 
furt  (four  days'  bread). 

They  marched  well,  in  spite  of  that.  We 
have  here  the  Grand  Army  in  full  possession 
of  its  powers.  Songs  were  heard  all  along 
the  column ;  new  songs  written  for  this  new 
war. 

At  the  first  halt,  the  Emperor's  proclama- 
tions were  read  to  the  troops  :  the  proclama- 
tion to  the  army,  and  that  to  the  peoples  of 
Saxony,  through  which  the  army  was  about 
to  march.  They  were  greeted  by  thousands 
of  cheers  :  "  Vive  1'Empereur  !  "  which  woke 
the  remotest  echo  of  those  silent  passes. 
Then  the  march  was  resumed  at  the  same 
brisk  pace. 


234        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

At  the  head  of  the  troops  rode  Marshal 
Lannes,  the  most  brilliant  commander  of  an 
advance  guard  ever  known,  the  victor  of 
Montebello,  in  whom  we  shall  soon  find  cause 
to  admire  calm,  measure,  caution,  as  well  as 
decision  and  energy.  He  was  just  thirty- 
seven  years  old. 

His  Chief  of  Staff  represented  the  elder 
element  in  the  column  :  General  Victor,  forty 
years  old.  Then  came :  Divisional  Com- 
mander, Suchet,  thirty-four  years  old ;  Briga- 
dier Claparede,  thirty-two ;  and  Brigadier 

Reille,  thirty-one. 

*  *  *  *  * 

The  Prussian  division  had  its  back  to  the 
Saale ;  in  case  of  a  check,  it  could  only  retire 
over  the  bridge  of  Saalfeld  or  over  that  of 
Schwarza.  It  was  easy  to  measure  its  forces. 
It  could  not  be  reinforced  for  a  long  time. 
Lannes  therefore  determined  to  attack,  thus 
keeping  to  the  spirit  of  the  instructions  he  had 
received. 

What  did  Prince  Louis  intend  to  do  on 
his  side  ? 

Led  by  a  very  Prussian  instinct,  he  left 
to  the  French  the  uncomfortable  and  difficult 
slopes  which  rise  towards  the  woods,  made  for 
the  plain  and  kept  to  the  bottom  of  the 
valley,  where  regular  manoeuvres  would  be 
easier.  It  was,  indeed,  at  that  time  a  matter 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        235 

of  principle  with  the  Prussian  Army  that  one 
should  attack  in  such  fashion  to  rehearse 
Rosbach  all  over  again;  that  attack  must 
take  place  when  the  enemy  debouches  from 
difficult  ground,  out  of  a  pass,  for  instance; 
to  attack  in  echelon  was  (then)  with  them 
the  last  word  of  military  science.  In  order 
to  achieve  that  manoeuvre,  what  you  need 
before  all  else  is  an  open  ground  for  manoeuvre. 
The  Prussians  at  that  time  did  not  know  how 
to  fight  in  any  other  fashion.  Caput  mortuum, 
as  Frederick  would  have  said. 

Moreover,  as  a  result  of  the  eighteenth- 
century  views  prevailing  within  the  Prussian 
Army,  they  did  not  doubt  that  the  French 
would  take  Saalfeld  as  an  objective.  Saalfeld 
was  a  storehouse,  a  road  junction,  a  crossing 
of  the  Saale,  a  complete  geographical  ob- 
jective. Unfortunately  for  Prince  Louis, 
generals  trained  by  the  French  Revolution 
ignored  that  whole  science  of  geographical 
points,  which  is  foreign  to  war,  which  is  the 
very  negation  of  struggle,  which  is  a  symptom 
of  decay,  which,  in  any  case,  is  ce  fin  du  fin 
qui  est  la  fin  des  fins.  They  knew  one  thing 
only,  they  desired  but  one  thing,  a  thing 
which  is  undeniably  the  true  goal :  the  defeat 
of  the  enemy. 

The  Prussian  Army  not  only  lacked  sound 
views;  it  also  lacked  food.  To  mention  but 


236        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

one  point,  they  found  it  extremely  difficult, 
in  this  pasture  country,  and  in  October  to 
feed  the  horses  of  one  small  division  ! 

There  is  irony  here.  An  order  arrived 
during  the  battle  to  the  effect  "  that  the 
forage  rations  must  be  equalized  with  the 
greatest  care,"  such  rations  not  being  in 
existence  at  all.  Formalism  was  expected 

to  save  everything. 

***** 

Scouting  was  undertaken  ahead,  to  the 
right,  and  to  the  left;  insufficiently  strong 
patrols  were  supported  by  the  cavalry  brigade ; 
the  latter  had  been  reinforced  by  an  "  elite  " 
-battalion.  It  further  disposed  of  certain 
artillery  with  a  view  to  "  taking  soundings  " 
of  the  ground  as  well  as  for  resistance. 

The  opportunity  had  come  for  tearing 
through  the  screen  formed  by  the  enemy 
outposts  at  the  issue  of  woods ;  the  advance 
guard  had  immediately  intervened,  and,  owing 
to  its  composition,  it  had  succeeded  in  getting 
a  clear  view  of  things,  at  least  towards  Saalfeld 
and  Crosten. 

Light  cavalry  parties  had  also  occupied 
Beulwitz  as  well  as  the  eastern  corner  of  the 
forest,  on  the  right  above  the  gap  of  the  Saale. 
They  scouted  from  that  point  in  all  directions 
in  order  to  confirm  such  reports  as  had 
already  been  received  concerning  the  enemy. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        237 

In  the  presence  of  this  situation,  once  the' 
Marshal  has  decided  to  attack,  how  will  the 
action  develop  against  the  enemy  who  stood 
so  neatly  drawn  up  at  the  foot  of  the  hills  ? 

Before  organizing  the  attack,  its  direction 
must  first  of  all  be  fixed.  Shall  he  attack 
by  the  right  ?  There  is  no  manoeuvring  space 
in  that  direction;  moreover,  Saalfeld,  a 
strong  "  point  d'appui,"  closely  bordered  by 
the  Saale,  would  have  in  that  case  to  be 
carried  as  a  first  step. 

Shall  he  attack  in  front  ?  This  would 
amount  to  taking  the  bull  by  the  horns,  to 
making  it  possible  for  the  enemy  to  use  the 
advantages  of  his  line  by  means  of  fire  and 
march.  It  would  mean  attacking  him  in  his 
strongest  part. 

By  the  left  ?  There  covered  ways  of  access 
are  available  as  well  as  an  easy  manoeuvring 
ground,  that  is,  a  wide  ground  without 
obstacles  yet  well  provided  with  cover. 

In  that  direction,  the  attack  may  be  pre- 
pared without  the  enemy  being  aware  of  it ;  it 
may  be  launched,  without  being  stopped  by 
important  obstacles;  it  may  develop  upon 
the  fullest  scale  which  the  forces  available 
allow. 

The  attack  will  therefore  be  launched  on 
that  side,  in  the  space  extending  between 
Aue,  the  Sandberg  and  Wolsdorf,  which 


288        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

ground  is  easy  to  advance  over,  though 
hilly. 

It  was  now  10  a.m.  The  French  column 
was  arriving,  but  its  march  grew  slower, 
owing  to  the  heat  of  the  day  and  the  con- 
gestion of  the  roads;  three  or  four  hours 
passed  before  all  the  forces  could  be  assembled 
on  the  reconnoitred  ground. 

But  during  such  a  long  lapse  of  time,  the 
enemy  might  attack  the  debouching  column ; 
he  must  be  prevented  from  doing  so ;  that  is 
the  task  of  the  advance  guard. 

To  stand  on  guard  by  getting  hold  of  every- 
thing that  helps  one  to  check  the  enemy's 
advance,  such  is  the  first  act  in  the  prepara- 
tion for  battle.  Hence  the  occupation  of 
ridges  from  which  to  fire ;  hence  the  occupa- 
tion and  defensive  organization  of  villages, 
so  as  to  increase  the  resisting  power  of  a  force 
the  numbers  of  which  are  reduced  to  a 
minimum. 

The  assembled  enemy  may  also  change  place, 
undertake  a  manoeuvre,  in  short,  alter  the 
dispositions  against  which  our  attack  is  being 
organized.  How  can  he  be  prevented  from 
doing  so?  By  attacking  him,  but  without 
risking  anything;  with  weak  numbers  but 
on  a  wide  front,  so  as  to  spare  the  forces. 
Hence  an  offensive  made  by  small  units 
starting  from  villages  which  shall  remain 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        239 

occupied.  Thus  we  shall  see  in  this  battle 
swarms  of  skirmishers  advancing  through 
gardens,  orchards,  hollow  roads,  in  order  to 
threaten  the  enemy  and  to  extend  the  action 
far  ahead  from  the  outskirts  of  the  villages. 

After  having  been  first  used  as  centres  of 
resistance,  those  villages  next  become  starting- 
points  for  a  number  of  offensive  actions. 

To  sum  up,  a  number  of  occupied  villages 
marking  the  ground  with  strong  points,  and 
connected  with  each  other  by  means  of  lines 
of  skirmishers,  who,  being  on  the  ridges,  can 
see  and  act  while  under  cover  and  provide 
elements  for  a  partial  offensive  :  such  is  the 
first  line. 

There  must  be  in  the  rear  a  reserve  of 
mobile  troops  kept  for  an  emergency.  This 
reserve  will  be,  in  our  present  case,  composed 
of  cavalry. 

*  *  *  *  * 

From  the  corner  of  the  wood  to  Beulwitz 
the  distance  was  3500  yards ;  Lannes  was 
not  afraid,  as  we  have  seen,  to  spread,  for  the 
purposes  of  an  advance  guard,  over  so  con- 
siderable a  front,  only  three  battalions  and 
a  half  and  the  cavalry  brigade ;  and  this  with 
muskets  the  efficient  range  of  which  was  not 
superior  to  150  or  200  yards.  Such  are  the 
dispositions,  such  the  dispersion,  to  which 
some  people  object  even  nowadays,  with 


240        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

quick-firing  rifles  which  really  and  powerfully 
sweep  the  ground  over  a  range  of  1200  to 
1500  yards.  They  object  to  such  dispositions 
by  quoting  the  regulations  which  prescribe 
that  the  front  of  a  battalion  in  action  must 
never  be  more  than  300  yards.  Those  regula- 
tions were  never  meant  to  contradict  what  we 
see  Marshal  Lannes  doing  here.  For  the 
object,  here,  is  not  to  beat  the  enemy,  there- 
fore no  "  front  of  action  "  is  in  question. 
Troops  are  so  far  only  taking  possession  of  the 
ground,  which  they  do  by  putting  a  certain 
number  of  watchmen  at  all  the  entrances — 
watchmen  who  should  be  able  to  shut  the 
doors  if  a  thief  comes,  and  also,  after  having 
strongly  established  themselves,  to  beat  up 
the  neighbourhood  and  see  what  has  become 
of  the  thief,  and,  if  need  be,  to  chase  him. 

We  shall  soon  have  the  combat,  the  attack 
proper;  then  we  shall  see  the  fronts  comply 
with  the  rules ;  then  we  shall  find  the  average 
front  of  a  battalion  to  be  far  less  than  300 
yards. 

Such  a  situation,  once  secured  on  the 
French  side,  was  to  continue  for  some  time 
without  much  change.  Meanwhile  the  whole 
first  part  of  the  programme  was  carried  out, 
that  is,  preparation. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        241 

i 

At  the  same  time  an  order  arrived  from 
Prince  Hohenlohe  to  remain  at  Rudolstadt 
and  not  to  attack.  A  retreat  by  Schwarza, 
in  case  of  a  check,  became  more  and  more 
important.  Prince  Louis  ordered  the  foot 
battery  and  the  ist  Mufling  battalion  to 
occupy  the  Sandberg. 

*  *  *  *  * 

We  have,  then,  the  whole  of  the  French 
cavalry,  the  whole  of  the  French  artillery  (less 
two  guns)  and  four  infantry  regiments  (out  of 
five)  attacking  at  once  an  enemy  already 
shaken  by  fire,  so  as  to  finish  him  off ;  attack- 
ing by  surprise,  that  is,  with  an  undeniable 
superiority  of  means,  suddenly,  and  from  a 
short  distance,  that  very  point  of  the  enemy 
line  which  had  been  selected  as  the  easiest 
to  approach  and  had  been  specially  prepared 
as  a  point  of  attack  :  the  front  of  the  attack 
is  1500  or  1800  yards  wide  for  all  the  acting 
troops;  this  is  less  than  the  300  yards  of 
front  to  a  battalion  prescribed  by  the  regula- 
tions. 

The  theory  which  has  been  put  in  practice 
is  here  obvious  :  one  clearly  sees  how  the 
manoeuvre  of  long  duration  (from  9  a.m.  to 
3  p.m.)  aims  exclusively  at  bringing  about 
the  powerful,  undisputable  conclusion  by 
means  of  all  the  main  forces ;  such  a  conclu- 
sion being  preceded  by  a  preparation  to 


242        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

which    the    smallest    numbers    possible    were 
devoted. 

That  preparation  includes  the  combat  of 
the  advance  guard,  the  object  of  which  was 
reconnoitring,  fixing,  if  need  be  stopping  the 
enemy;  this  combat  is  followed  by  a  frontal 
attack  which  completes  the  enemy's  im- 
mobilization and  wears  him;  it  ends  in  a 
decisive  attack,  a  surprise  in  time  and  space, 
effected  by  means  of  number,  speed,  choice  of 
starting-point,  and  of  a  peculiar  violence 
which  turns  the  attack  into  an  avalanche. 

When  we  try  to  apply  our  theory  to  modern 
circumstances,  changes  must  of  course  be 
made,  so  as  to  take  into  account  the  influence 
of  modern  arms  upon  battle ;  but  the  picture 
remains  the  same  in  the  main. 

The  battle  of  Saalfeld,  had  it  to  be  fought 
to-day,  would  not  be  conducted  in  any  other 
fashion. 

***** 

What  a  methodical  spirit  there  is  in  this 
action  conducted  by  the  young  Marshal ! 
One  wonders  which  deserves  to  be  most 
admired  in  him,  the  enlightened  wisdom  with 
which  he  patiently  prepared  the  battle  for 
six  hours,  or  the  fitness  and  dash  with  which 
he  launched  his  final  attack.  So  true  is  it 
that  the  art  of  fighting  does  not  consist,  even 
with  the  most  eager  and  energetic  of  chiefs, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        243 

even  when  the  best  of  troops  are  available,  in 
falling  on  the  enemy  blindly. 

***** 

The  Simonet  artillery  section  had  fired 
264  rounds.  The  divisional  artillery  had  not 
used  up  quite  so  much  ammunition — about 
236  rounds.  The  infantry  had  fired  about 
200,000  cartridges,  which  makes  the  rather 
considerable  average  of  20  per  man. 

Campaign  of  1813-1814 

See  the  passage  on  "  Strategical  Security  " 
in  The  Principles  of  War. 

Campaign  0/1815 

See  the  passage  on  "  Strategical  Security  " 
in  The  Principles  of  War,  and  also,  in  the  Judg- 
ments on  Men,  see  "  Bliicher,"  "  Wellington  " 
and  "  Ziethen." 

The  War  of  1866  (The  Battle  of  Nachod) 

The  contrasting  distribution  on  the  ground 
of  each  of  these  two  opposing  army  corps, 
5th  Prussian  and  6th  Austrian,  shows  better 
than  any  words  could  do  how  each  side 
understood  war,  how  each  side  made  war. 

On  the  Prussian  side  we  see  : 

An  army  corps  assembled,  astride  of  the 
road  it  is  to  follow,  its  reserves  behind  it  on 
the  same  road ;  it  is  ready  to  act  with  all  its 


244        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

means;  its  commander  is  with  the  troops, 
effectively  commanding ;  here  we  have  a  true 
combination  of  a  force  and  a  will.  Moreover, 
after  Steinmetz  shall  have  moved  his  army 
corps,  he  will  have  effected  a  junction  with 
the  advance  guard;  he  will  be  on  the  27th, 
at  8  a.m.,  at  Nachod. 

An  advance  guard  is  already  holding  the 
road  far  ahead,  on  the  Mettau,  ensuring  the 
tactical  security  of  that  corps,  clearing  the 
road  for  it ;  so  deeply  conscious  of  its  mission 
that,  as  early  as  in  the  evening  of  the  26th, 
it  has  got  up  as  far  as  Nachod. 

Early  on  the  27th,  a  flank  guard  will  be 
sent,  to  Giesshiibel  in  order  to  protect  the 
movement.  Giesshiibel  lies  in  Austrian  terri- 
tory; by  occupying  it  on  August  26th,  the 
offensive  scheme  which  had  just  been  framed 
was  sure  to  be  disclosed.  None  the  less  occu- 
pied it  was,  in  order  to  protect  the  movement 
of  the  army  corps  once  that  movement  had 
begun. 

Such  dispositions  clearly  show  what  sense 
of  action  inspired  to  the  highest  degree  the 
commander  of  the  army  corps  and  the  com- 
mander of  the  advance  guard.  They  were 
both  securing,  by  means  of  that  advance 
guard  (preparation),  of  that  flank  guard  (pro- 
tection) the  possibility  of  carrying  out  the 
single  action  which  was  to  be  undertaken  with 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        245 

all   forces   well  in  hand  and  in   the   same 
direction. 

Their  idea  was  to  act  with  everything  on 
one  point ;  they  were  free  to  do  it,  owing  to 
security ;  they  were  about  to  attain  a  decision 
owing  to  the  economy  of  forces  which  had 
been  achieved  in  apportioning  those  forces 
throughout  the  column. 

On  the  Austrian  side  : 

The  army  corps  has  deployed  on  a  front 
of  more  than  six  miles,  which  enables  it  to 
get  housing,  to  live,  and  to  march  comfort- 
ably. It  is  a  situation  which  does  well  enough 
so  long  as  no  enemy  is  present,  but  it  little 
corresponds  to  the  necessities  of  war.  Be- 
sides, the  army  corps  is  distributed  in  five 
distinct  elements :  four  brigades  and  an 
artillery  reserve. 

Suppose,  then,  the  enemy  (who  in  war  is 
always  the  prime  objective  of  all  combina- 
tions) should  disclose  his  presence,  the  6th 
Corps  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  act  owing 
to  its  being  scattered  :  it  ought  to  be  possible 
for  the  Austrian  forces  to  join  up,  but  no  time 
is  left  for  that ;  there  is  no  service  of  security 
which  might  provide  the  two  or  three  quiet 
hours  required  for  concentration  on  the  front  of 
more  than  six  miles  which  has  been  taken  up. 

The  Austrian  Higher  Command  perceived 
only  the  subjective  part  of  its  task  :  securing 


246        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

the  means  of  keeping  and  leading  an  army. 
It  had  completely  lost  sight  of  the  object 
to  which  that  army  is  devoted :  fighting. 
Nothing  was  prepared  for  carrying  on  fighting 
under  good  conditions.  The  notion  of  war, 
the  sense  of  action,  had  disappeared;  they 
had  been  replaced  by  mere  staff  work,  though 
staffs  have  always  been  incapable  of  creating, 
of  themselves  alone,  such  a  thing  as  victory. 
***** 

The  Prussian  cavalry  remained  in  action 
right  up  to  the  end.  After  breaking  the 
attempts  made  by  the  enemy  infantry  to 
debouch  from  the  wood,  they  attacked  the 
enemy  artillery,  captured  three  guns,  and 
afterwards  carried  out  the  pursuit.  Although 
their  professional  value  was  inferior  to  that 
of  the  Austrian  cavalry,  they  knew  how  to 
fulfil  their  mission  in  the  battle,  how  to  act 
in  compliance  with  the  advance  guard's 
tactics ;  above  all,  they  were  handled  by  a 
commander  who  utilized  them  to  the  utmost 
right  up  to  the  end. 

The  Austrian  artillery  had  also  proved 
very  superior  to  the  Prussian  artillery  in 
armament,  in  tactics  and  in  training;  they 
were,  in  consequence,  superior  in  their  fire. 
They  inflicted  on  the  successively  arriving 
Prussian  batteries  losses  which  prevented 
the  latter  from  keeping  up  the  struggle.  In 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        247 

spite  of  that,  the  Prussians  conquered  at  the 
end  of  the  day.  Artillery  action  is  not,  then, 
any  more  than  cavalry  action,  of  such  a  de- 
cisive character  as  definitely  to  decide  the 
issue  of  any  contest. 

We  shall  in  future  wars  frequently  see  an 
artillery  duel  remain  undecided  on  account 
of  the  length  of  range  and  of  the  difficulty  of 
finding  cover  against  the  various  directions 
from  which  the  enemy  may  present  his  fire. 
The  batteries  occupied  in  this  function  of 
meeting  the  enemy's  fire  ought,  therefore,  to 
seize  those  points  on  the  flank  of  the  attack 
whence  an  artillery  surprise  might  appear, 
and  also  to  discover  and  receive  the  general 
counter-attack  which  cannot  fail  to  take  place 
in  the  course  of  the  action. 

The  War  of  1870 

(The  reader  must  not  expect  under  this  heading  even 
the  briefest  summary  of  the  military  operations  which 
have  been  dealt  with  in  so  masterful  a  fashion  in 
Marshal  Foch's  book  The  Conduct  of  War.  Save  for 
several  leading  episodes  and  a  few  explanations  which 
were  absolutely  necessary  for  the  comprehension  of  the 
events  described,  the  only  things  here  reproduced  are 
the  judgments  of  the  Marshal  on  the  more  prominent 
points  of  the  campaign.) 

(a)  Moltke's  Plan  and  Concentration 

[Following  his  plan,  which  had  been  drawn  up 
in  1869,  Moltke  did  not  cover  the  concentration 


248        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

of  the  German  armies  which  were  to  operate 
against  France  by  any  force  capable  of  resisting 
an  enemy  offensive.  The  thirteen  army  corps 
were  concentrated  in  three  masses  : 

The  ist  Army  (Steinmetz),  (jth,  8th,  and 
later  the  ist  Corps  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry), 
in  the  region  of  Treves. 

2nd  Army  (Frederick  Charles),  fard,  ^th 
and  loth  Corps,  Guard,  and  two  divisions  of 
cavalry),  in  the  region  of  Mayence. 

$rd  Army  (Prince  Royal  of  Prussia),  ($th 
and  nth  Prussian  Corps,  ist  and  2nd  Bavarian 
Corps,  the  Wurtemburg  Corps,  and  two  divisions 
of  cavalry),  in  the  region  of  Landau. 

The  6th  and  jth  Corps  formed  for  the  moment 
a  Strategic  Reserve.} 

If  Moltke  found  security  for  his  concentra- 
tion in  distance  alone  and  forbade  himself  all 
effective  covering  troops,  he  was  guided  to 
this  conclusion  by  political  reasons.  He  had 
a  high  idea  of  the  value  of  the  French,  as  he 
had  followed  them  in  the  Crimea,  in  Italy, 
and  in  Mexico ;  and  he  desired  at  the  outset 
to  preserve  the  German  troops  from  any  kind 
of  check,  even  from  any  retirement.  The 
neutrality  of  Austria  and  of  Italy  and  the 
alliance  of  southern  Germany  could  only 
thus  be  made  absolutely  certain.  Further, 
would  the  ist  Prussian  Corps  thrown  forward 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        249 

as  covering  troops  manoeuvre  with  sufficient 
suppleness  to  escape  ruin  and  disaster? 
The  crude  doctrine  of  "  going  forwards," 
which  had  been  so  warmly  taught  for  several 
years  past,  might  have  received  at  the  very 
threshold  of  the  war  a  formal  contradiction 
and  a  blow  which  would  have  definitely 
ruined  its  prestige.  And  how  would  it  have 
been  possible  to  have  made  such  an  army 
fight  in  retreat  and  then  afterwards  launch  it 
again  to  the  attack? 

These  were  no  doubt  the  difficulties  which 
had  struck  Moltke,  although  he  was  a  disciple 
of  Clause witz.  He  was  an  example  of  the 
gulf  that  separates  theory  from  practice. 
He  believed  in  mathematics  rather  than  in 
manoeuvre,  and  in  number  rather  than  in 
moral  force.  He  did  not  judge  himself 
capable  of  a  greater  hazard  than  that  which 
he  adopted,  and  though  he  thus  proved  him- 
self upon  a  lower  plane  than  Napoleon,  one 
cannot  avoid  admiration  for  the  wisdom  of 
a  man  who  co-ordinated  his  views  with  his 
means,  and  who,  though  by  way  of  less  genius 
and  in  a  more  plodding  fashion,  yet  through 
an  -exact  knowledge  and  a  just  observation 
of  his  adversary,  discovered  the  way  to 
dominate  that  adversary  continuously  and 
to  attain  results  which  have  never  been 
surpassed  in  history. 


250         PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

[Moltke  proposed  to  march  upon  Paris, 
leaving  on  one  side  the  French  Army,  which  he 
was  persuaded  would  come  up  to  accept  battle.] 

He  did  not  envisage  the  case  of  the  French 
manoeuvring  otherwise  than  upon  the  direct 
line,  changing  their  groupment,  condensing 
their  forces  to  the  right  or  to  the  left  and 
striking  against  one  of  his  wings.  The  idea 
of  a  manoeuvre  seemed  to  him  as  unrealizable 
for  his  adversary  as  for  himself. 

[Moltke  put  together  a  general  advance  guard 
of  seventy-six  squadrons,  distributed  across  all 
his  front,  supported  by  an  infantry  division, 
and  proceeding  about  one  day's  march  in  front 
of  the  army.] 

The  task  of  reconnaissance  was  set  to 
detachments  of  cavalry  sent  out  in  the  most 
diverse  directions  and  supported  by  infantry 
units,  some  of  which  were  carried  by  vehicles. 

Such  a  method  as  this  is  very  weak;  for 
it  is  incapable  of  seeing  through  any  service 
of  security  which  has  been  seriously  organized. 
It  is  incapable  from  its  lack  of  means  of  attack 
(infantry  and  artillery)  of  compelling  the 
enemy  to  show  himself  if  he  does  not  wish  to 
do  so.  Therefore  this  system  of  reconnais- 
sance only  allows  you  to  discover  what  the 
enemy  has  been  good  enough  to  allow  you 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        251 

to  discover.  Under  this  system  to  get  to 
work  Moltke  needed  twenty-four  hours.  He 
would  have  that  space  of  time  at  his  disposal, 
so  it  seemed,  if  the  enemy  were  to  strike 
against  the  5th  Division.  But  at  the  end  of 
that  space  of  time  what  would  he  have  been 
able  to  concentrate?  Obviously  no  more 
than  the  forces  within  one  day's  march. 
And  of  what  strength  were  they? 

[Turning  to  the  programme  of  the  marches 
which  had  been  arranged,  we  see  that  the  con- 
centrations possible  within  a  limit  of  twenty-four 
hours  were  as  follows.] 

The  2nd  Army  could  concentrate  on  itself. 

The  ist  Army  could  concentrate  on  itself. 

The  3rd  Army  could  concentrate  on  itself. 

Therefore  if  the  enemy  were  to  attack  at 
the  end  of  the  period  allowed  he  would  strike 
one  of  these  armies,  the  2nd,  the  ist,  or  the 
3rd,  but  only  one.  In  other  words,  he  would 
have  only  one-third  of  the  total  adversary 
forces  opposed  to  him.  .The  three  armies 
were  too  far  apart  one  from  the  other  to  join 
and  take  part  in  a  common  affair. 

He  would  come  to  the  same  result  if, 
instead  of  concentrating  each  army  upon 
itself,  a  general  concentration  were  attempted 
upon  some  one  point  of  the  front. 

And  this  inconvenience  would  be  exagger- 


252         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

ated  if  the  enemy  were  to  appear  without 
attacking  the  5th  Division.  Now  the  enemy 
might  very  well  so  appear,  as  we  see  when 
we  consider  the  extent  of  ground  over  which 
he  had  the  choice  of  attack.  In  that  case 
even  the  twenty-four  hours'  delay  would  be 
eliminated. 

\Moltke  envisages  and  organizes  a  priori 
according  to  a  set  plan  a  battle  upon  the  Sarre 
before  he  has  any  precise  information  upon  the 
French  Army.} 

I.  He  could  get  this  battle  of  his  upon  the 
Sarre  on  the  8th  and  gth  of  August :  (a)  if 
the  French  did  not  attack  before  the  date 
fixed;    (b)  if  the  French  did  not  retire;    or 
(c)  if  the  French  manoeuvred  neither  to  right 
nor  to  left.     In  a  word,  this  combination  of 
Moltke's  could  only  succeed  against  an  enemy 
who  was  of  his  own  nature,  as  it  were,  im- 
mobile;  since  there  was  nothing  in  the  plan 
of  attack  to  pin  and  hold  him  in  the  interval 
between  the  making  of  that  plan  and  the  day 
fixed  for  the  battle. 

II.  Further  : 

(a)  If  the  French  were  to  attack  before  the 
8th  or  the  Qth  not  all  the  three  German 
armies  could  be  present  at  the  battle — as  we 
saw  above. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        253 

(b)  If    the    French    were    to    retire    the 
manoeuvre  would  strike  a  blow  in  the  void. 
It  would  be  necessary  to  plan  out  another 
manoeuvre,   and   a   critical   situation   would 
arise  and  would  remain  in  being  during  the 
whole  period  of  such  preparation.     For  the 
armies  would  not  only  have  struck  in  the 
void,  but   would  have  also  effected  a  con- 
centration  for  that  purpose.      They   would 
have  got  into  a  dense  formation  which  would 
necessarily  hold  them  immobile  for  some  days. 

(c)  Were  the  French  to  manoeuvre  by  the 
right  or  by  the  left  of  the  point  of  attack 
chosen  by  the  Germans,  notably  were  they 
to    attack    towards    the    east,    the    German 
manoeuvre  which  had  thus  been  settled  in 
advance  would  create  an  entanglement  which 
might  last  indefinitely,  and  in  the  midst  of 
which  it  would  be  necessary  to  take  up  a  new 
direction  and  to  plan  and  put  in  movement 
the  new  manoeuvre  required. 

III.  A  decision  was  obtained  by  a  single 
army  upon  one  wing  (the  3rd  Army  in  the 
Battle  of  the  Sarre). 

It  was  about  one-third  of  the  total  forces 
available.  A  large  mass,  no  doubt,  and 
capable  of  securing  a  tactical  result,  a  day's 
victory;  but  on  the  other  hand  incapable 
of  drawing  from  that  result  the  immense 


254        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

consequences  which  follow  from  manoeuvre 
and  from  the  Napoleonic  type  of  battle,  in 
which,  as  we  shall  see  below,  the  obtaining 
of  a  decision  depends  upon  the  use  of  the  bulk 
of  one's  forces. 

IV.  The  reunion  of  forces  had  to  be  made 
upon  the  battlefield  itself,  and  during  the 
action ;  the  ist,  2nd  and  3rd  armies,  uniting 
upon  the  Sarre  towards  the  Qth  of  August. 
(So  it  was  with  Sadowa,  for  the  three  armies 
of  1866).  This  operation  therefore  remained 
up  to  the  very  last  day  uncertain,  hazardous, 
and  at  the  mercy  of  the  adversary's  ma- 
noeuvre. It  left  in  the  same  uncertainty  the 
final  tactical  result  to  be  obtained,  the  decision. 

Let  us  contrast  against  this  conception  of 
attack — Moltke's — (that  is,  against  the  direct 
manoeuvre  effected  with  the  same  force  as 
that  which  gives  battle)  the  system  of 
Napoleon.  Whether  we  are  dealing  with  the 
campaign  of  1805,  of  1806,  or  of  1807,  the 
force  that  gives  battle,  organized  in  triple 
column  or  mass,  possesses  a  head,  a  special 
organ,  which  is  the  general  advance  guard — 
in  1806  this  was  the  ist  Reserve  Corps  of 
cavalry,  under  the  orders  of  Murat.  The 
manoeuvre  consists  in  seeking  out  the  adver- 
sary with  this  advance  guard,  which  is  of 
sufficient  strength  for  such  a  task,  and  which 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         255 

can,  if  necessary,  be  reinforced.  Then  only, 
with  the  mass  of  his  troops,  with  his  whole 
army,  with  his  battle  force  informed  upon 
the  enemy's  position,  and  reunited  in  one 
whole  before  the  action,  the  Emperor 
manoeuvred  and  attacked  the  adversary, 
already  pinned  by  his  advance  guard.  He 
turned  that  adversary  with  the  mass  of  his 
army,  appearing  and  acting  in  one  gesture 
against  the  lines  of  communication.  It  is 
thus  that  we  get  those  battles  with  reversed 
fronts  which  are  the  characteristic  of  Napo- 
leonic wars  and  the  consequences  of  which 
are  so  considerable. 

When  we  compare  these  leaders  of  armies 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  way  in  which 
they  join  battle,  we  see  Napoleon  turning  the 
enemy's  army  before  the  battle  with  the  mass 
of  his  own  army  which  he  has  already  gathered 
together,  and  only  attacking  after  this  had 
been  done.  We  see  Moltke  turning  his 
adversary  during  the  battle  with  only  a  part 
of  his  forces  (the  3rd  Army  in  the  Battle  of 
the  Sarre),  and  effecting  his  concentration 
upon  the  battlefield  itself  by  the  convergence 
of  columns.  The  first  leader  aims  with 
more  security  at  a  victory  which  will  be  more 
fruitful  in  results,  thanks  to  a  strategy 
moulded  upon  an  axis  of  attack  which  would 
allow  such  result,  and  thanks  to  the  conduct 


256        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

of  troops  which  he  can  combine  with  mastery 
both  of  time  and  of  space  through  his  use  bf 
an  advance  guard. 

In  Napoleon's  manoeuvre  there  appears  a 
very  real  danger,  which  is  that  while  one  is 
preparing  to  turn  one's  adversary  one  may 
oneself  be  turned,  and  that  in  advancing 
to  cut  the  communications  of  one's  adversary 
one  may  lose  one's  own.  Hence  it  is  that  we 
see  that  great  man  so  much  preoccupied  with 
his  line  of  operations.  Hence  it  is  also  that 
in  1806,  to  quote  but  one  example,  he  provides 
himself  with  a  double  base,  the  Danube  and 
the  Rhine. 

With  modern  armies,  which  are  too  large 
to  be  supported  on  occupied  country  alone, 
and  which  can  only  exist  by  being  fed  from 
the  country  behind  them,  the  consequences 
of  a  manoeuvre  against  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion are  considerably  increased.  If  it  makes 
good  the  enemy  is  ruined.  On  the  other 
hand,  since  these  communications  are  re- 
latively short  they  are  easy  to  cover.  It  is 
very  difficult,  indeed,  to  reach  them,  as  also 
to  prepare  and  to  execute  a  battle  with 
reversed  front,  seeing  the  vast  numbers  of 
modern  effectives  and  certain  other  modern 
conditions. 

[The   immense   size   of  the   means   at   our 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        257 

disposal  to-day  of  men  and  provisionment  of 
all  kinds,  the  vastness  of  what  one  has  to  trans- 
port, and  consequently  the  necessity  of  arranging 
long  beforehand  a  relatively  rigid  plan  of  trans- 
port, have  this  consequence  :  that  concentration 
must  be  decided  and  carried  out  almost  fully 
before  any  information  upon  the  enemy  has 
reached  us.] 

Perhaps  we  ought  to  seek- in  these  modern 
difficulties  of  execution  the  reason  which 
made  Moltke  confine  himself  to  a  more 
prosaic  manoeuvre  than  the  manoeuvre  of 
Napoleon  with  its  artistry  and  genius.  For 
that  prosaic  manoeuvre  is  easier  to  bring  to 
success.  If  so,  we  must  recognize  once  more 
the  prudence  and  wisdom  of  a  theory  which 
maintained  the  principle  of  force  in  action, 
which  is  always  true.  He  relied  on  frontal 
attack  and  on  such  an  attack  being  decisive, 
but  only  because  it  seemed  to  him  the  best 
application  of  force  that  could  be  made,  given 
the  proportion  of  the  effectives  and  the 
manner  to  which  he  was  limited  in  his  conduct 
of  his  enterprise.  Such  as  it  was,  this  method 
determined  an  arrangement  of  forces  un- 
doubtedly judicious,  if  we  analyze  it  as  an 
occupation  of  the  front,  but  equally  doubtful 
if  we  analyse  it  in  depth. 

For  so  far  as  the  forces  are  organized  in 


258        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGEMENTS 

depth — that  is,  if  we  are  considering  the 
relations  between  the  more  advanced  and 
the  less  advanced  troops — we  have  seen  that 
Moltke's  theory  of  an  advance  guard  was  that 
of  a  large  cavalry  body  supported,  but  at 
some  marches'  distance  behind,  by  a  division 
of  infantry ;  and  that  this  suffered  from  two 
defects  :  (i)  it  was  doubtful  as  an  organism 
for  obtaining  information;  (2)  it  was  an 
organism  with  an  insufficient  power  of 
resistance. 

But — what  is  much  more  important — he 
did  not  even  call  this  organ  into  being  as  one 
united  force,  and  he  did  not  keep  it  under  his 
sole  orders.  He  distributed  all  his  disposable 
forces  between  his  three  armies.  With  what 
result?  Each  army  having  its  own  goal 
devotes  to  the  attainment  of  that  goal  all 
the  means  at  its  disposal.  Therefore  the 
cavalry  corps,  which  the  theory  takes  for 
granted,  no  longer  really  exists,  and  the  task 
which  was  thought  indispensable  for  the 
development  of  the  general  and  common 
manoeuvre  is  not  fulfilled. 

We  learn  a  lesson  directly  from  this  con- 
sideration. In  order  that  the  service  of  an 
advance  guard — which  even  Moltke  had 
recognized  to  be  necessary — should  be  as- 
sured, it  is  essential  that  this  advance  guard 
should  be  constituted  as  one  organism, 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        259 

independent  of  the  armies  and  under  the 
direct  orders  of  the  General  Commanding-in- 
Chief. 

As  for  Moltke,  seeing  that  he  had  no  such 
particular  organ  to  hand,  we  can  easily  foresee 
that  two  things  will  happen  to  him  : 

1.  He  will  not  get  information,  or  if  he 
does  he  will  be  the  last  to  obtain  it ;   and  in 
the   absence   of  information   he   will   either 
postpone  his  decisions  or  he  will  make  them 
upon  hypothetical  situations,  and  to  do  that 
is  to  act  blindly. 

2.  In  the  lack  of  covering  troops  to  render 
secure   the   concentration   of  all  his   forces, 
those   forces,   dispersed   for  the  purpose   of 
marching,  will  come  upon  the  enemy  by  sur- 
prise without  having  had  the  time  to  unite. 

We  may  sum  up  by  saying  that  all  informed 
strategic  direction  is  organically  forbidden 
him  by  the  very  nature  of  his  disposition, 
and  that  he  will  be  condemned  to  advance 
his  armies  from  one  surprise  to  another.  And 
what  will  be  the  result  of  that  ?  The  action 
of  his  troops  answers  the  question.  Thus 
led,  they  will  of  course  strike  the  moment 
they  meet  the  enemy,  not  because  they  have 
orders  to  do  so,  but  because  they  have  no 
orders  to  the  contrary — nor  could  they  have, 
since  they  did  not  know  where  the  enemy 
was  to  be  found.  Thrust  suddenly  into  the 


260         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

presence  of  the  adversary,  they  have  to  decide 
for  themselves,  and  nothing  but  the  military 
spirit  can  dictate  the  conduct  they  shall 
pursue. 

While  the  Higher  Command  still  keeps  its 
decisions  in  reserve  the  troops  conclude  their 
action.  While  the  Higher  Command  abstains 
from  effective  direction  on  account  of  the 
mist  which  surrounds  it,  the  armies  take 
direction  upon  their  own  account.  It  is  they 
that  conduct  the  strategic  manoeuvre,  which 
in  effect  has  passed  into  other  hands  than 
that  of  the  Higher  Command. 

Lacking  all  foundation  for  action,  all  know- 
ledge of  the  subject  in  hand,  the  primordial 
instinct  of  action  inspires  the  troops  and  they 
attack.  The  strategical  manoeuvre  designed 
increases  its  activity,  but  can  it  continue  to 
exist  as  a  deliberate  manoeuvre  ?  That  is 
what  we  are  about  to  examine. 

The  troops  join  battle  in  a  complete 
ignorance  of  the  enemy's  general  situation 
and  of  the  situation  of  the  particular  army 
they  are  meeting.  Hence  you  have  two  grave 
flaws  at  the  very  outset  of  their  action. 
First,  from  the  tactical  point  of  view  they  are 
in  very  great  danger  of  striking  an  adversary 
far  superior  to  themselves;  secondly,  from 
the  strategic  point  of  view,  battle  would  be 
joined  in  a  point  not  chosen  by  the  Higher 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        261 

Command  at  a  moment  not  chosen  by  it 
either,  and  in  a  fashion  which  its  will  has  not 
decided.  Battle  thus  conducted  is  impro- 
vised, unforeseen,  and  cannot  be  fully  guided. 
Such  are  the  necessary  conclusions  of  this 
method.  The  issue  would  be  fatal  in  the 
presence  of  an  active  adversary,  and  we 
sum  up  the  whole  by  saying  that  an  action 
which  has  been  engaged  ill  by  its  strategy 
leads  surely  to  disaster,  save  where  superior 
tactics  turn  the  scale  in  its  favour :  for 
these  last  are  always  decisive. 

Let  us  then  retain  the  following  con- 
clusion :  The  superiority  of  the  Napoleonic 
combination,  with  its  advance  guard,  which 
not  only  procures  an  attack  with  those  great 
effects  of  which  we  have  just  spoken,  but 
also  gives  security.  For  that  advance  guard 
allows  one  to  strike  where  one  wills,  as  one 
wills  and  when  one  wills,  and  that  with  full 
information ;  the  advance  guard  being  organ- 
ized to  discover,  to  attack,  to  resist,  and  to 
retire. 

Let  us  take  things  as  they  stood  after  the 
campaign  of  1806. 

As  against  this  avowed  incapacity  of  the 
German  organization — that  is,  of  the  German 
Higher  Command — as  against  this  necessity 
in  which  it  found  itself  of  always  consulting 
the  decisions  of  subordinates,  are  not  both 


262        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

the  organization  and  the  theory  of  Napoleon 
superior?  His  theory  guaranteed  the  power 
of  really  commanding  by  organizing  security 
against  the  enterprise  of  the  enemy,  and  there- 
fore against  the  premature  action  of  his  own 
troops.  It  prevented  his  projects  from  being 
blocked  and  his  calculations  upset.  That 
theory  further  guaranteed  his  troops  against 
the  attractive  effect  of  battle  until  the  moment 
when  he  himself  desired  to  exercise  it.  It 
gave  endurance  to  that  which  is  commonly 
only  a  flash  of  light,  and  it  gave  it  such 
endurance  by  making  security  permanent 
in  the  hands  of  the  General  in  Command, 
and  thus  making  him  capable  of  effectively 

directing  operations. 

***** 

We  can  easily  see  in  this  twentieth  century 
where  such  conceptions  as  Bernhardi's  would 
lead  to.  Napoleon's  higher  conception  of 
surprise  was  a  surprise  effected  first  in  space 
and  then  in  time.  But  Bernhardi  uses  only 
one  of  these  terms.  He  depends  upon  a 
surprise  in  terms  of  time,  that  is,  upon  the 
rapidity  of  executon  dependent  upon  very 
minute  preparation,  and  therefore  he  leaves 
aside  the  other  elements  on  which  a  manoeuvre 

should  be  built. 

***** 

The  German  General  Headquarters  reached 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        263 

Mayence  on  the  7th  August,  1870.  If  the 
French  had  attacked  before  that  date  they 
would  not  only  have  found  armies  in  the 
disorder  of  formation,  but  even  armies  not 
yet  provided  with  command. 

And  when  the  command  was  organized 
it  continued  at  Mayence.  General  Head- 
quarters proposed  to  direct  operations  upon 
the  basis  of  information  coming  from  the 
Saar,  seventy-five  miles  off,  information  to 
be  obtained  for  it  by  the  cavalry  screen  of 
the  2nd  Army. 

That  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  the  infor- 
mation would  be  insufficient.  For  though 
the  telegraphic  transmission  of  news  in  a 
sense  eliminates  distance,  yet  Headquarters, 
under  these  conditions,  would  get  a  very 
distant  impression  :  Headquarters  would  not 
have  that  real  knowledge  which  can  only  be 
provided  by  local  atmosphere.  Moreover, 
the  cavalry  screen  in  question,  squadrons 
reconnoitring  and  directed  to  their  task  by 
the  Commander  of  the  2nd  Army,  could  not 
be  fully  conversant  at  every  moment  with  the 
intentions  or  needs  of  General  Headquarters 
at  Mayence.  The  result  was  that  the  latter 
either  did  not  get  the  information  it  needed,  or 
got  it  tardily  or  incompletely;  and  all  this 
was  due  to  the  lack  of  an  organ  at  once  suit- 
able to  its  function  and  under  its  direct  orders, 


264        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

In  a  similar  situation  Napoleon  would  have 
visited  his  own  advance  guard,  not  only  with 
the  object  of  learning  things  more  rapidly 
but  also  with  the  object  of  seeing  things  for 
himself  and  at  first  hand;  with  the  object 
of  himself  directing  his  own  service  of  infor- 
mation, and  of  keeping  in  hand  the  conduct 
of  that  advance  corps  upon  whose  discoveries 
and  progress  his  manoeuvre  would  be  founded. 

(b)  The  March  to  the  Saar  (from  3rd  to  6th 
August,  1870). 

[Moltke  took  the  offensive  on  the  3rd  August. 
The  ^rd  Army  had  orders  to  cross  the  river 
Lauter  and  enter  Alsace.  The  ist  and  2nd 
Armies  were  to  march  to  the  Saar  River. 
Orders  which  had  been  misunderstood  led  to  a 
disputebetweenSteinmetz  and  Frederick  Charles. 
The  former  refused  to  leave  free  the  roads  which 
were  necessary  to  the  marching  of  the  latter. 
Meanwhile,  Napoleon  III  launched  the  whole 
of  the  2nd  Corps  (under  Frossard)  reconnoitring 
in  the  direction  of  Saarbriick,  where  there  was 
nothing  but  a  thin  covering  screen  of  the  enemy.] 

The  concentration  of  the  German  2nd 
Army  was  protected  by  nothing  but  distance. 

Its  cavalry,  disposed  in  three  groups,  was 
to  be  employed  according  to  this  same  absence 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        265 

of  principle,  the  neglect  of  an  advance  guard. 
The  Commander  went  so  far  as  to  divide  it 
into  four  columns,  to  wit,  on  the  right  two 
columns :  the  Redern  Brigade  of  the  5th 
Division  was  to  march  on  Volklingen  by 
Nahe,  and  the  Barby  Brigade  of  the  same 
division  was  to  march  on  the  same  place  by 
another  road  to  the  left.  In  the  centre,  the 
6th  Division  of  Cavalry  was  to  march  on 
Neunkirchen  by  way  of  the  Glau  Valley,  while 
on  the  left  the  Bredow  Brigade,  reinforced 
by  one  more  regiment  and  accompanied  by 
General  Rheinbaben,  was  to  march  by  way 
of  Alzey  to  Durckheim,  Kaiserslautern  and 
Homburg. 

These  mounted  troops  had  been  given  the 
mission,  according  to  the  instructions  of 
Frederick  Charles,  to  hide  the  movement 
of  his  forces  from  the  enemy,  and  at  the  same 
time  to  discover  the  general  situation,  posi- 
tions and  movements  of  the  enemy.  In 
particular  to  appreciate  at  their  just  value 
any  incursions  which  the  French  might  make 
into  German  territory. 

This  cavalry  was  followed  at  an  interval 
of  a  day's  march  by  two  divisions  of  infantry 
marching  by  two  separate  roads  :  the  5th 
Division  of  the  3rd  Prussian  Corps  and  the 
8th  Division  of  the  4th. 

But  the  army  could  only  have  been  informed 


266        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

during  its  march  by  this  large  body  of  cavalry 
on  the  one  condition,  that  the  enemy  should 
continue  motionless,  and  should  leave  an 
empty  space  between  him  and  the  German 
advance.  In  the  contrary  case,  that  is,  in 
the  case  of  a  partial  offensive,  however 
restricted,  the  French  would  have  compelled 
the  German  cavalry  to  retreat,  and  that 
without  this  cavalry  being  in  any  way  able 
to  measure  the  importance  of  the  attack ;  and 
in  such  a  case  the  German  cavalry  would 
have  lacked  means  of  resistance.  The  Ger- 
man Command  suspended  the  march  across 
the  wooded  region  without  any  serious  reason, 
then,  without  waiting  further,  it  chose  to 
abandon  information,  and  on  the  3ist  July 
ordered  the  2nd  Army  to  advance. 

But  observe  that  if  the  French  had  taken 
the  offensive,  had  sent  one  of  their  Army 
Corps  to  observe  the  ist  Army,  and,  with 
their  other  four  Army  Corps,  had  marched 
against  the  2nd  Army,  they  would,  at  the 
opening  of  August,  have  found  that  2nd 
German  Army  in  the  following  position  :  its 
3rd  Corps  would  have  been  debouching  from 
Worrstadt  with  the  loth  Corps  behind  it  on 
the  march,  and  its  4th  Corps  would  have 
been  debouching  from  Kaiserslautern  eighteen 
miles  away  from  the  road  by  which  the  last- 
named  bodies  were  debouching,  and  behind 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        267 

that  4th  Corps — a  long  way  behind — was  the 
Guard. 

Clearly  a  situation  of  that  kind  was  excel- 
lent for  the  four  French  army  corps.  They 
would  have  arrived  without  meeting  any 
obstacle  capable  of  checking  their  march 
and  have  found  themselves  able  to  strike 
at  three  German  corps  at  the  most.  What 
would  then  have  become  of  Moltke's  thesis  : 
"  Prince  Frederick  Charles  will  have  at  his 
disposition  more  than  194,000  infantry "  ? 
The  Prince  would  indeed  have  had  that 
number  at  his  disposition,  but  he  could  not 
have  withdrawn  them  in  time  from  the 
wooded  district  which  was  crossed  by  only 
two  roads,  and  he  therefore  could  not  have 
presented  them  all  together  against  his  adver- 
sary. His  weakness  would  have  been  due 
to  the  lack  of  an  advance  guard,  which, 
had  it  existed,  would  have  been  able  both  to 
have  informed  him  of  the  urgent  need  for 
concentration  and  also  guaranteed  him  by  its 
resistance  the  time  in  which  to  realize  that 
concentration.  Security,  which  the  Germans 
had  thought  to  establish  by  the  mere  deploy- 
ment of  their  cavalry  screen,  was  lacking,  and 
the  situation  of  their  army  was  precarious. 

On  the  3ist  July,  Napoleon  III  received 
information  that  Steinmetz  at  the  head  of 
the  7th  and  8th  German  Army  Corps  was 


268        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

marching  southwards.  He  further  heard  that 
great  masses  of  troops  were  concentrating  at 
Mayence  and  at  Mannheim. 

But  the  Commanders  of  the  French  army 
corps  informed  him  that  they  were  not  yet 
ready  to  pass  the  offensive,  and  in  conse- 
quence of  this  situation  the  French  General 
Headquarters  decided  on  a  compromise.  It 
was  a  decision  which  would  necessarily  fail 
to  reach  any  object.  What  was  ordered  was 
an  offensive  reconnaissance  which  would, 
as  they  thought,  compel  the  enemy  to  dis- 
close his  strength.  This  reconnaissance  was 
conducted  by  the  2nd  French  Corps  marching 
on  Saarbriick  and  supported  on  its  right  by 
a  division  of  the  5th  French  Corps  debouching 
from  Sarreguemines  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Saar,  and  on  its  left  by  a  division  of  the 
3rd J  French  Corps  acting  against  Wehrden. 
Further  to  the  west  there  was  to  be  a 
demonstration  by  the  4th  French  Corps  at 
Saarlouis. 

It  was  under  such  conditions  as  these  that 
the  affair  of  Saarbriick  was  engaged  on  the 
2nd  August.  This  affair,  in  which  were 
engaged  the  French  forces  just  enumerated, 
began  at  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  ended 
shortly  after  noon.  All  this  great  mass  of 
French  troops  only  came  across  two  Prussian 
companies  and  afterwards  one  Prussian  bat- 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        269 

talion  (the  2nd  Battalion  of  the  4oth 
Regiment),  and  these  were  soon  compelled  to 
retreat  with  a  loss  of  four  officers  and  seventy- 
nine  men.  That  was  the  affair  of  Saarbriick, 
which  has  been  called  ironically,  but  very 
justly,  "  A  battle  of  three  divisions  against 
three  companies,"  or,  again,  "  A  manoeuvre 
against  an  imaginary  enemy." 

One  lesson  stands  out  clearly  from  the 
event. 

Quite  a  weak  force  (the  one  Prussian 
battalion  in  this  case),  even  though  attacked 
by  vastly  superior  forces,  will  be  neither 
surprised  nor  destroyed  if  it  puts  up  a  guard 
and  knows  how  to  manoeuvre  a  retreat ; 
knowledge  which  is  the  proper  role  of  covering 
troops,  whose  business  is  not  to  obtain  victory 
but  to  permit  the  preparation  thereof. 

On  our  side  the  very  contrary  to  this  took 
place.  The  day  after  the  morrow  of  Saar- 
briick, the  Douai  Division,  which  had  for  its 
mission  the  role  of  acting  as  advance  guard 
to  the  army  of  Alsace,  was  thrown  away  in 
sheer  loss  at  Wissembourg  because  it  had  not 
guarded  itself  but  had  allowed  itself  to  be 
surprised ;  that  is,  because  it  had  not  known 
how  to  carry  out  the  functions  of  a  covering 
organ. 

As  for  the  final  result  of  the  French  opera- 
tion of  the  2nd  August,  it  was  nil.  Nor 


270        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

could  it  be  otherwise.  The  French  had  mere 
empty  spaces  before  them;  they  were  per- 
fectly free  to  cross  the  Saar.  But  their 
Commanders  had  not  the  intention,  nor  had 
they  put  themselves  into  a  position,  to 
profit  by  those  circumstances,  and  had  the 
spaces  not  been  empty,  but  filled  with  the 
adversary  in  force,  then  the  action  of  the 
French  Commanders  would  have  called  down 
upon  them  a  storm  which  they  had  not  the 
means  to  receive.  Once  more  do  we  see  an 
example  of  this  prime  truth  :  one  does  not 
reconnoitre  with  the  mere  object  of  recon- 
naissance but  with  the  object  of  obtaining 
information  for  an  operation  which  one  has 
all  the  means  for  carrying  out. 

On  the  German  side  there  continued  to 
exist  divergent  views  in  the  command  of  the 
ist  Army,  because  Moltke  did  not  explain 
himself  sufficiently,  and  issued  dispatches 
that  were  too  brief.  The  Supreme  Command 
was  not  properly  obeyed  because  it  was  not 
understood.  Its  plan  for  reaching  and  fight- 
ing its  adversary  was  upset  by  an  insufficiently 
directing  order,  even  before  it  was  begun. 
We  conclude  that  it  is  not  enough  to  draw 
remarkable  plans,  but  that  it  is  necessary 
to  add  to  these,  from  the  very  opening  of 
operations  and  during  all  their  execution, 
an  effective  command  which  fully  communi- 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        271 

cates  its  thought  and  its  will  and  gets  that 
thought  and  will  fully  executed  by  its  subor- 
dinates. Moltke,  as  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  achieved  only  half  of  each  of  these  two 
tasks. 

Contrast  him,  here,  with  the  way  in  which 
Napoleon  acted  during  the  period  of  "  fog  " 
which  is  always  characteristic  of  the  opening 
of  a  campaign.  In  spite  of  his  uncontested 
authority  we  find  him  writing  to  his  Marshals 
letters  several  pages  long  with  the  sole  object 
of  thoroughly  indoctrinating  them  :  showing 
them  exactly  what  he  wants.  For  Napoleon 
knew  very  well,  essentially  authoritative  man 
though  he  was  and  chary  of  superfluous  ex- 
planation, that  an  order  which  through  its 
short  and  imperative  form  eliminates  argu- 
ment and  prevents  discussion  may  well,  on 
that  very  account,  prove  insufficient  to  fully 
"  brief  "  those  subordinates  who  stand  in  the 
highest  places  of  the  military  hierarchy.  He 
knew  that  mere  blind  obedience  does  not 
necessarily  involve  a  rational  and  logical 
execution  of  an  order,  an  execution  conform- 
able to  the  intention  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief.  To  get  oneself  understood  one  must 
explain  :  one  must  speak  or  write  at  some 
length.  Apart  from  mere  orders  a  General 
has  to  give  to  his  subordinates  directions ;  and 
apart  from  directions  he  must  maintain  an 


272        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

ordinary  correspondence  with  them.  In  mili- 
tary, as  in  civil  life,  if  people  wish  to  under- 
stand each  other  they  must  write  and  they 
must  speak  to  each  other.  Silence  or  laconical 
phrases  only  suffice  the  Commander  under 
those  conditions  where  he  is  making  no 
demand  upon  the  intelligence  of  his  sub- 
ordinates. 

(c)  The  Battle  of  Spicheren  (6th  August) 

[The  2nd  French  Corps  (Frossard)  lay 
between  Saarbruck  and  Forbach  on  the  heights 
of  Spicheren.  The  four  Divisions  of  the  $rd 
Corps  under  Bazaine  lay  round  Sarreguemines, 
Marienthal,  Puttelange  and  St.  Avoid  on  the 
sector  of  a  circle  which  had  Saarbruck  for  its 
centre  and  a  radius  of  about  twelve  miles.  The 
4th  French  Corps  under  Ladmirault  was  at 
Boulay,  the  Guard  at  Courcelles.  Steinmetz, 
who  had  been  wrongly  directed  by  Moltke, 
launched  the  jth  German  Corps  on  the  Saar. 
Kamecke  attacked  the  French  with  the  i^th 
German  Division.  The  8th  German  Corps 
came  up  in  aid.  On  our  side  the  four  Divisions 
of  the  3rd  French  Army  Corps  did  not  move. 
Their  intervention  on  the  evening  of  the  6th 
August  might  have  led,  to  the  destruction  of  the 
whole  ist  German  Army,  which  had  engaged 
itself  up  to  the  hilt  and  was  by  that  evening 
thoroughly  worn  out.] 


PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS        273 

The  decision  which  the  German  General 
Kamecke,  though  he  commanded  no  more 
than  a  division,  had  taken  off  his  own  bat, 
produced  the  Battle  of  Spicheren.  As  this 
German  offensive  had  been  neither  desired 
nor  prepared  by  the  German  Higher  Command 
it  ran  the  risk  of  falling  with  insufficient  forces 
and  without  any  general  direction  upon  an 
intact  enemy  with  regard  to  whom  the  Staff 
of  the  I4th  Division  had  only  the  vaguest 
information. 

The  consequences  of  this  decision  were 
incalculable.  Common  sense  demanded  that 
before  attempting  the  adventure  of  the 
Rotherberg  its  results  should  have  been 
gauged.  Common  sense  demanded  that, 
before  attacking,  the  adversary  should  have 
been  reconnoitred  in  order  to  find  out  in 
what  strength  he  was  on  this  point  and  on 
the  neighbouring  heights;  for  on  this  point, 
as  on  others,  General  Kamecke's  decision  went 
wrong  from  lack  of  information.  He  attacked 
without  knowing  what  he  had  in  front  of  him 
and  without  seeking  to  know  it.  General 
Kamecke's  decision  proceeded  neither  from 
a  rational  interpretation  of  his  own  r61e  as 
Commander  of  a  ist  Line  Division  in  a  group 
of  several  armies,  nor  from  an  acquired 
knowledge  of  the  enemy's  situation,  which  he 
systematically  left  unconsidered.  His  deci- 


274        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

sion  proceeded  simply  from  military  ardour, 
from  the  preconceived  and  fixed  idea  of 
always  attacking.  It  is,  no  doubt,  a  senti- 
ment which  a  soldier  must  respect,  but  it  is 
not  sufficient  to  settle  the  conduct  of  advance- 
guard  Commanders.  It  is  their  business, 
above  all,  to  work  for  the  advantage  of  the 
masses  following  them,  to  prepare  for  a 
manoeuvre  which  has  been  planned  by  a 
higher  command  (which  aims,  of  course,  at 
fighting  with  all  its  strength),  and  of  this 
manoeuvre  the  Commanders  of  the  advance 
guard  had  neither  the  task  of  hastening  the 
date  nor  determining  the  site. 

Let  no  one  read  into  the  above  criticism 
any  attack  upon  those  most  necessary  military 
virtues,  initiative  and  the  offensive  spirit. 
They  are  present  in  more  than  one  Chief  of 
Napoleon's  Grand  Army,  but  their  acts  con- 
stantly show  us  that  they  associated  these 
virtues  with  another  equally  necessary  one — 
discipline — and  especially  discipline  of  the 
intelligence.  They  show  further  how  this 
virtue  of  discipline  in  the  Subordinate  Com- 
mand, by  extending  the  action  of  the  Superior 
Command  (which  continually  enlightens  and 
leads  them)  made  it  possible  to  realize  great 
general  operations  which  the  German  School 
of  1870  thought  to  reach  by  the  mere  initiative 
of  subordinates  left  to  themselves :  sub- 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        275 

ordinates  who  were  ignorant  of  what  an 
absent  Higher  Command  desired,  and  found 
themselves  in  front  of  an  enemy  of  whom 
they  had  very  little  information. 

To  return  to  Spicheren. 

The  sound  of  Kamecke's  cannon,  that  of 
the  I4th  Division,  called  to  the  field  of  battle 
the  i6th  Division,  and,  further,  called  to  the 
field  the  5th  Division  of  the  German  2nd 
Army.  There  was  a  unity  in  views,  an 
activity,  an  initiative,  a  confidence  and  a 
solidarity  in  the  Prussian  Army,  which  ran 
through  all  ranks;  and  thus,  immediately 
called  on  to  an  improvised  battle,  these  three 
divisions  from  three  different  corps  turned 
what  might  have  been  a  death-stroke  into  a 
living  action.  Every  Commander  had  the 
hardihood  to  act  and  to  decide,  and  the 
superior,  though  his  inferior  had  acted  too 
hastily,  adopted  and  approved  of  the  decision 
which  was  taken  and  modelled  his  conduct 
upon  the  dispositions  which  had  resulted. 
On  every  side  you  have  the  feeling  for  action, 
the  necessity  for  the  offensive  in  all  its 
splendour.  An  army  which  is  thus  electrified 
from  top  to  bottom  with  such  a  spirit  of  drive 
is  already  very  nearly  victorious. 

The  Battle  of  Spicheren  arose  from  the 
interpretation  of  a  certain  situation  on  the 
part  of  Commanders  of  ist  line  troops,  which 


276        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

situation  was  unexpected  and  which  situation 
they  were  not  in  a  position  to  judge  fully; 
yet  before  the  end  of  the  day  the  equivalent 
of  two  whole  army  corps  was  working  together 
on  that  chance  battlefield. 

That  is  a  result  which  is  very  well  worthy 
of  remark,  especially  if  we  observe  that  it 
was  uniquely  due  to  the  spirit  of  solidarity 
and  of  comradeship  and  not  to  the  action 
of  the  Higher  Command.  Nevertheless  these 
effectives  were  quite  insufficient  for  the  attack 
upon  a  powerful  and  intact  army  in  excellent 
moral,  such  as  was  the  French  Army  on  the 
6th  August,  1870. 

In  sum  total :  the  battle  was  not  prepared 
in  any  way.  It  broke  out  in  a  fashion  not 
considered.  It  was  engaged  without  order 
and  was  conducted  in  a  fashion  which  could 
not  be  explained.  In  undertaking  this  action 
the  Commanders  of  the  advance  guard, 
General  Kamecke  especially,  trod  underfoot 
that  idea  of  the  manoeuvre  and  the  "  Battle 
between  all  the  armies,"  to  which  idea  their 
Chief,  Moltke,  was,  unknown  to  them,  sub- 
ordinating everything.  They  began  to  plead 
without  having  all  their  brief.  They  launched 
that  great  argument,  the  battle,  without 
having  it  fully  in  hand.  They  ran  the  very 
greatest  risks  for  the  obtaining  of  a  victory 
which  had  no  appreciable  result.  In  place 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        277 

of  that  battle  of  two  whole  armies  which 
had  been  prepared  by  the  Germans  on  the 
Lauter  for  the  7th,  in  place  of  that  battle  of 
three  whole  armies  prepared  upon  the  Saar 
for  the  gth,  what  had  taken  place  was  an 
awkward  blow  with  three  divisions  only 
against  a  single  French  corps.  There  was 
indeed  a  tactical  success  but  none  of  those 
great  results  which  might  have  been  expected 
from  Moltke's  full  manoeuvre.  That  ma- 
noeuvre aimed  a  blow,  with  the  whole  of  his 
forces  acting  in  surprise  against  the  still 
incomplete  and  inactive  mass  of  the  various 
French  corps.  It  would  logically  have  re- 
sulted in  a  Sedan  in  Lorraine.  Kamecke's 
decision  produced  the  thunderclap  of  Spi- 
cheren,  and  that  thunderclap  warned  the 
French  and  saved  them  (for  the  moment) 
from  complete  destruction. 

We  conclude  that  no  system  of  command 
will  work  which  thus  leaves  some  projected 
manoeuvre  (and  battle  especially)  at  the 
mercy  of  a  decision  taken  rightly  or  wrongly 
by  a  subordinate  Commander  who  is  neces- 
sarily ignorant  of  the  general  situation. 

Moltke  thought  he  could  provide  for  every- 
thing, either  commanding  informed  from  day 
to  day,  as  in  1866,  or  himself  arranging  the 
movements  of  his  army  corps.  In  the  place 
of  the  directions  and  general  instructions 


278        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

which  Steinmetz,  finding  himself  left  ignorant, 
demanded,  and  in  place  of  those  long  letters 
from  Napoleon  to  his  Marshals,  Moltke  gave 
nothing  but  short  telegrams,  and  events  show 
how  wrong  was  this  method  of  action. 

The  truth  is  that  there  was  lack  of  any  true 
Higher  Command.  Moltke  was  no  more 
than  a  Chief  of  a  Staff,  and  his  action  never 
exceeded  the  intellectual  functions  of  that 
position.  He  constantly  appeals  to  brain- 
work,  to  reason,  and  especially  to  calculation 
when  he  is  projecting  a  manoeuvre;  but  he 
then  remains  content  with  confiding  it  to 
paper,  he  remains  content  with  a  daily  order, 
concise  and  terse,  instead  of  being  at  the  pains 
to  make  it  thoroughly  understood  and  there- 
fore realized.  The  German  armies  lacked  a 
united  command  at  their  head  which  could 
hope  to  impose  his  plan  upon  men  and  chiefs 
and  realize  it  :  which  at  the  right  moment 
could  take  in  one  hand  and  direct  the  unique 
and  decisive  argument  of  war  to  action  of 
battle.  It  is  because  Moltke  had  not  this 
faculty  of  command  that  he  had  to  carry  on, 
right  up  to  the  i8th  of  August,  the  attack 
which  he  had  prepared  upon  the  Saar  for 
the  gth,  and  which  had  escaped  him  not 
through  his  enemy's  action  but  through  the 
initiative  of  his  subordinates. 

Even  admitting  that  Moltke  should  have 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        279 

acted  in  the  clearest  fashion  and  should  have 
been  thoroughly  obeyed,  he  could  not,  lacking 
an  advance  guard,  guarantee  any  duration  to 
the  manoeuvre  he  had  projected;  for  he  was 
not  able  to  prevent  his  battle  force  from 
stumbling  into  a  premature  action  which 
should  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  great  affair 
he  had  in  mind.  His  system  of  attack  with 
the  centre  and  two  wings  would  only  work 
with  an  enemy  who  himself  did  not  attack, 
did  not  retire,  did  not  manoeuvre,  wholly 
infirm  and  yielding  to  any  foreign  seizure. 

The  French  dispositions  had  permitted  by 
the  7th  August  the  following  concentration  : 
the  3rd  French  Corps  at  Puttelange,  the  4th 
French  Corps  at  High  Homburg,  and  the 
French  Guard  in  the  neighbourhood  of  St. 
Avoid ;  and,  to  unite  with  that  mass  of  men, 
the  2nd  Corps  which  had  not  been  destroyed 
at  Spicheren.  They  could  therefore  attack 
upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Saar  the  three 
German  Corps — 7th,  8th  and  3rd — which 
were  quite  isolated,  and  could  attack  them 
with  a  mass  of  130,000  men.  During  two 
whole  days,  the  7th  and  8th  August,  these 
three  German  corps  were  in  the  presence,  and 
at  the  mercy,  of  the  whole  united  French 
forces  of  Lorraine.1 

1  As  this  passage,  like  many  others  in  the  book, 
consists  of  portions  of  a  main  work  put  together  for 


280        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

[Owing  to  the  lack  of  a  general  advance 
guard  Moltke  marched  with  bandaged  eyes,  and 
after  the  Battle  of  Spicheren  lost  contact  with 
the  French  during  their  retreat.} 

On  the  evening  of  the  8th  August,  the 
Commander  of  the  German  2nd  Army  having 
'found  nothing  in  front  of  him  during  his 
manoeuvre  against  the  French  forces  in  Alsace, 
and,  further,  receiving  no  instruction  from 
General  Headquarters,  which  was  no  better 
informed  than  himself,  took  no  further  dis- 
position for  the  gth  and  limited  himself  to 
ordering  the  corps  in  the  ist  line  to  bring 
up  their  columns  to  the  advance  positions, 
and  to  those  of  the  2nd  line  to  concentrate. 
Once  more  the  necessary  consequence  of 
giving  up  the  principle  of  seeking  the  enemy's 
principal  army  in  order  to  fight  it  was  im- 
mobility. For  the  same  reasons  the  German 
General  Headquarters  at  Homburg,  being 

the  sake  of  brevity,  the  general  thesis  may  need  some 
explanation.  I  would  point  out  to  the  reader  that 
Marshal  Foch's  object  in  this  examination  of  the  War 
of  1870  is  twofold  :  first,  he  shows  how  the  German 
Higher  Command  neglected  the  use  of  the  advance 
guard,  and  how,  therefore,  it  missed  any  great  oppor- 
tunities and,  at  the  same  time,  continually  exposed 
itself  to  risk.  Secondly,  he  desires  to  insist  upon  the 
fact  that  the  lack  of  initiative  and  the  proper  com- 
prehension of  war  on  the  French  side  missed  all  the 
opportunities  thus  afforded,  and  led  necessarily,  in  spite 
of  Moltke's  defect,  to  disaster. — Translator. 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        281 

far  from  all  contact  with  the  adversary, 
could  give  no  orders,  and  the  situation  might 
have  been  prolonged  indefinitely  if  the  sub- 
ordinate Chiefs  of  the  ist  Line,  using  their 
own  initiative,  had  not  themselves  determined 
the  directions  in  which  that  Higher  Command 
should  have  fixed  them.  How  much  easier 
would  the  task  have  been,  or,  at  any  rate, 
how  much  fuller  the  conceptions  of  a  German 
Army  Commander,  who,  in  coming  up  on  the 
6th  to  give  battle,  should  on  the  yth  have 
undertaken  the  necessary  reconnaissance  and 
have  summoned  for  this  all  available  cavalry 
and  thrown  forward  a  strong  advance  guard 
on  to  the  road  from  St.  Avoid  to  Metz  !  He 
would  have  discovered  the  situation  of  his 
adversary  in  that  direction  and  pinned  him; 
he  would  have  done  the  same  on  the  neigh- 
bouring roads;  and  with  each  successful 
discovery  he  would  have  "  framed  "  the  mass 
of  his  adversary's  forces.  But  Moltke  re- 
mained no  more  than  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  an 
elderly  King  :  he  would  not  himself  intervene 
in  the  great  decisions  of  the  war.  Such  a 
Supreme  Command  at  the  head  of  the  Ger- 
man armies  could  never  give  to  a  struggle 
that  continuous  and  crushing  effect  which 

Napoleon  gave  it. 

***** 

Alvensleben,  the  General  in  command  of 


282        PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS 

the  3rd  German  Army  Corps,  having  heard 
during  the  night  of  the  8th-gth  August  from 
the  6th  Division  of  German  cavalry  that  the 
French  had  evacuated  St.  Avoid,  decided  to 
take  his  own  corps  thither. 

As  usual,  those  in  the  ist  line  saw  what 
was  going  on  better  than  did  those  behind 
them.  The  Commander  who  occupies  that 
ist  line,  especially  if  he  has  forces  capable  of 
penetrating  in  some  degree  the  fog  with  which 
he  is  surrounded  in  those  directions  which 
are  vital,  is  soon  able  to  judge  his  opponent's 
situation,  or,  at  any  rate,  to  occupy  the 
gaps  his  opponent  leaves  and  to  profit  by 
them. 

Moltke,  though  instructed  on  the  morning 
of  the  gth  quite  certainly  of  the  situation 
in  the  Boulay-Bouzonville  region,  and  begged 
by  Steinmetz  to  "  feel  "  the  enemy's  left  with 
infantry  and  artillery,  still  kept  the  Ist  Army 
motionless;  and  the  reason  of  this  was  that 
he  was  little  occupied  with  his  enemy's  move- 
ments :  that  which  concerned  him  was 
getting  his  own  armies  into  line  for  the 
manoeuvre  on  the  Moselle  which  he  was 
preparing.  The  2nd  Army  could  only  get 
his  last  corps  up  on  to  the  Saar  by  the  loth, 
and,  preoccupied  with  this  idea,  Moltke  could 
see  no  object  in  moving,  and  it  would  have 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        283 

been  contradictory  to  this  idea  for  Moltke 
to  have  moved  his  ist  Army  on  the  gth.1 

(d)  The  March  on  to  the  Moselle 

[German  General  Headquarters  came  to  Saar- 
bruck  on  the  gth  August  and  made  arrangements 
to  continue  the  offensive  movement  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Moselle,  whither  it  was  thought  that  the 
enemy  (the  French)  had  retired,  whereas,  as  a 
fact,  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  on  Metz.] 

The  halt  of  the  German  armies  on  the 
Saar  continued.  The  movement  was  not 
definitely  renewed  until  the  nth.  The  ist 
and  2nd  German  armies  which  had  crossed 
the  Saar,  having  been  attacked  and  beaten 
on  the  6th  August,  were  still  without  move- 
ment on  the  loth.  They  devoted  all  that 
day  to  repose  or  to  arranging  themselves  upon 
the  roads  that  they  were  to  follow. 

Therefore  the  immediate  effect  of  the 
German  victory  at  Spicheren,  though  there 

1  For  this  passage  the  reader  also  requires  some 
amplification.  The  point  is  that  Moltke,  lacking  the 
advance  guard,  instead  of  keeping  in  touch  with  the 
French  retreat  was  uniquely  preoccupied  with  an  a 
priori  manoeuvre  of  getting  all  his  main  troops  in  line 
for  an  action  which,  he  supposed,  would  take  place  on 
the  Moselle.  Had  he  possessed  or  used  an  advance 
guard  he  would  have  known  the  direction  of  the  French 
retirement,  which,  as  a  fact,  he  wholly  misconceived. 


284        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

was  added  to  it  another  victory  at  Frce- 
schwiller  on  the  same  day,  was  to  check  the 
German  masses.  They  could  not  sustain  and 
pursue  these  good  results  without  stopping, 
taking  breath  and  rearranging  themselves. 
It  took  them  four  days.  Their  system  of 
attack,  of  which  we  have  already  analyzed 
the  military  weakness,  would  seem  to  be  still 
weaker  from  the  general  point  of  view  of  the 
whole  nation  at  war.  For,  after  all,  victory 
is  only  a  means  of  arriving  at  the  end  of  war  : 
at  the  destruction  of  the  organized  forces  of 
the  adversary,  which  alone  can  give  one  the 
power  of  immediately  using  the  moral  and 
material  victory  given  us  by  victory.  To 
admit  a  check  in  time,  therefore,  is  to  give 
the  adversary  a  chance  of  recovering  from 
the  first  blows.  If  we  look  back  upon  those 
first  battles  of  August  1870  we  discover  that 
they  had  indeed  thrown  the  French  Com- 
mand into  the  most  complete  disarray,  for 
that  Command  was  quite  unequal  to  the  task 
which  it  had  undertaken;  but  the  French 
troops  were  not  shaken.  Dispersed  as  they 
were  they  could  only  discover  that  they  had 
been  overborne  by  a  crushing  numerical 
superiority.  All  they  asked  was  to  be  allowed 
to  avenge  their  initial  checks.  They  still  felt 
certain  of  victory  if  they  could  be  launched 
all  combined  to  the  attack.  To  stand  fast 


PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS        285 

upon  the  Saar,  as  the  Germans  did,  had  not 
only  the  effect  of  saving  their  adversary  from 
destruction :  it  also  allowed  the  French 
Command  to  pull  itself  together,  to  use  the 
strong  military  feeling  of  its  soldiers,  and  its 
considerable  material  means  of  action.  The 
French  Command  might  have  struck  on  the 
yth,  8th  or  Qth  with  the  whole  French  Army 
of  Lorraine  against  those  three  German  corps 
blinded  and  cut  off  in  the  country  in  front  of 
Saarbriick.  They  might  have  set  the  whole 
campaign  on  a  new  footing.  They  might 
have  put  up  any  plan  they  chose.  They 
were  free  to  retreat  whither  they  would  for 
the  purposes  of  reorganization,  reinforcement 
and  advance;  or  they  could,  alternatively, 
concentrate  on  any  point  they  might  choose 
in  the  whole  district  and  thence  attack  with 
all  their  forces  any  sector  they  might  select 
on  the  long  line  of  the  invading  armies. 

Remember  how  Napoleon  "  fell  like  light- 
ning "  on  a  part  of  the  opposing  army, 
overthrew  it  and  then  "  taking  advantage  of 
the  disorder  which  this  manoeuvre  never 
failed  to  create  with  the  enemy's  forces, 
attacked  in  another  quarter  with  the  least 
possible  delay."  Remember  the  stages  of 
that  rapid,  uninterrupted  march  of  1806  : 
Saalfeld  on  the  loth  October;  Jena,  Auer- 
stadt  on  the  i4th;  Halle  on  the  lyth;  the 


286        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

entry  into  Berlin  on  the  25th ;  Prentzlow  on 
the  28th;  Liibeck  on  the  6th  November; 
from  such  a  series  of  dates  one  gets  a  very 
different  idea  of  war,  and  one  also  gets  from 
it  the  impression  of  a  more  powerful  brain,  a 
more  energetic  will,  a  more  elastic  armed  force 
at  the  service  of  both,  strongly  and  intimately 
united.  If  the  Germans  were  compelled  to 
halt  upon  the  Saar,  as  history  seems  to 
prove,  is  it  not  clear  evidence  of  the  difficulty 
the  German  Higher  Command  had  in  re- 
taking possession  of  itself  and  of  its  army  in 
unforeseen  events,  the  conduct  of  which  had 
entirely  escaped  that  Command ;  is  it  not  a 
proof  that  the  artist  was  using  a  tool  too 
heavy  for  his  hand  :  a  tool  that  slipped  from 
his  fingers  or  dragged  him  onward  by  its 
weight  the  moment  he  began  to  use  it,  and 
so  disturbed  him  that  he  lost  sight  of  his 
object,  which  was  the  destruction  of  the 
principal  enemy  army? 

Moltke  disposed  of  the  ist,  3rd,  5th,  6th 
and  1 2th  Cavalry  Divisions  and  a  Division 
of  the  Guard — six  Divisions  all  told.  What 
a  capacity  for  discovery  had  he  in 'hand  if 
he  had  made  of  all  of  these,  or  even  of  a  part, 
one  body  !  That  he  refrained  from  doing  so 
proves  that  he  did  not  really  believe  informa- 
tion to  be  indispensable :  that  he  no  more 
pursued  the  art  of  acting  in  full  knowledge 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        287 

of  his  circumstance  than  he  did  the  art  of 
acting  in  security  from  an  adverse  surprise. 
The  idea  of  strategic  security,  of  obtaining 
knowledge  of  one's  foe  in  order  to  make  that 
knowledge  the  basis  of  one's  decisions,  escaped 
him ;  as  did  also  the  idea  of  covering  oneself 
in  order  to  obtain  security  for  later  move- 
ments. He  based  his  decisions  on  deductive 
reasoning,  on  chances  logically  established. 
He  planned,  and  he  even  acted  upon,  a  basis  of 
no  more  than  hypothesis. 

He  said  to  himself  that  after  the  double 
check  of  the  6th  August  (Frceschwiller  and 
Spicheren)  that  adversary  ought  if  he  were 
acting  logically  : 

(a)  First  to  concentrate  his  forces  in  Lor- 

raine and  retire  them  beyond  the 
line  of  the  Moselle. 

(b)  To  bring  up  as  quickly  as  possible  his 

forces  from  Alsace,  retiring  them  with 
that  object  through  Nancy  and  join- 
ing them  up  with  the  forces  of 
Lorraine  behind  the  Moselle. 

(c)  To  effect  all  this  rapidly  lest  his  com- 

munications with  Paris  should  be  cut 
by  the  German  3rd  Army. 

Upon  such  reasoning  the  French  Army, 
from  Moltke's  point  of  view,  ought  to  have 
been  in  full  retreat  on  the  gth.  It  would  be 


288        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

impossible  to  catch  it  up  before  it  crossed  the 
Moselle.  Hence  Moltke's  new  manoeuvre. 

His  deductions  were  clearly  logical  and 
rational.  The  way  in  which  he  thought  his 
enemy  would  behave  was  the  way  in  which 
his  enemy  probably  would  behave.  It  was 
,not  the  way  in  which  his  enemy  did  behave. 
Here  we  perceive  the  character  peculiar  to 
the  man  who  works  in  his  study,  which  was 
essentially  that  of  the  German  Staff.  He 
constantly  appeals  to  reason  and  then  bases 
his  projects  on  rational  conjectures  and 
hypotheses,  but  unfortunately  this  method 
did  not  always  square  with  the  reality  of 
things,  which  reality  is  often  odd  and  unlikely 
because  it  arises  from  causes  which  one  cannot 
grasp  or  even  from  causes  which  remain 
permanently  incapable  of  explanation.  Had 
Moltke  been  a  man  of  action  in  a  higher 
degree  he  would  have  taken  more  account  of 
the  human  factor,  with  its  highly  variable 
effects.  He  would  have  tried  to  have  founded 
his  military  plans  upon  some  reality  which 
had  first  been  sought  and  at  last  possessed. 

With  that  object  he  would  have  organized 
that  prime  agent  of  intelligence,  the  advance 
guard  of  all  arms ;  or  even  that  mere  mass  of 
cavalry,  the  necessity  of  which  had  struck 
him  in  Berlin  as  early  as  the  6th  of  May,  but 
which  he  could  not  constitute  in  the  theatre 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        289 

of  war  itself  because  he  was  not  in  command 
of  troops,  but  only  a  Chief  of  Staff. 

Moltke's  way  of  reasoning,  his  way  of 
dealing  with  the  unknown,  became  traditional 
in  the  Prussian  Army.  Von  der  Goltz  has 
said  :  "  Surely  the  dispositions  which  your 
adversary  should  reasonably  take  up  are  the 
best  foundations  upon  which  we  can  build 
our  own  plans. ' '  But  the  history  of  Napoleon, 
the  clearest-headed  and  the  most  intuitive 
of  military  leaders  (in  1806),  gives  one  the 
immediate  answer.  It  denies  such  a  thesis. 
It  shows  us  the  great  Captain  going  forward 
only  when  he  has  a  path  well  lit  and  therefore 
sure,  and  that  because  he  always  worked 
upon  the  fullest  information. 

A  cavalry  screen  thrown  out  along  the 
whole  front  can  grasp  the  outline  of  the  situa- 
tion ;  it  cannot  grasp  the  arrangement  of 
troops  behind  the  front,  nor  their  distances 
from  that  front.  As  for  the  infantry  sent 
forward  to  support  such  cavalry,  all  it  can  do 
is  to  guarantee  the  cavalry  a  retirement  :  it 
has  no  other  function. 

When  it  is  used  as  an  advance  guard  to 
attack  and  to  be  attacked  they  drag  in  the 
corps  to  which  they  are  attached,  and  these, 
in  turn,  drag  in  more  or  less  the  neighbouring 
columns  of  troops.  It  is  Spicheren  all  over 
again  :  that  is,  the  very  contrary  of  an  action 
u 


290        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

determined  and  conducted  by  an  enlightened 
will. 

In  this  the  inferiority  of  Moltke's  system  of 
attack  is  notorious.  He  asked  of  his  battle- 
force  every  function  combined.  It  had  to 
reconnoitre,  to  cover  itself,  to  march,  to 
manoeuvre  and  to  fight.  As  any  one  could 
see,  and  as  events  proved,  no  one  of  these 
acts  could  be  fully  carried  out.  Recon- 
naissance was  only  made  at  short  range;  of 
protection  there  was  none;  marching  was 
slow;  concentration  was  never  complete. 
When  the  battle  came  nearly  half  the  troops 
were  missing;  even  on  the  i8th  August  the 
whole  of  the  3rd  German  Army  was  absent 
and  the  4th  Corps  of  the  2nd. 

This  marching  disposition,  imperfect  of 
itself,  became  still  more  imperfect  through 
the  direction  given  to  the  advance.  That 
direction  was  not  aimed  at  the  mass  of  the 
adversary,  intact  though  that  mass  still  was. 
If  we  consider  the  three  zones  of  action 
adopted  by  Moltke  in  its  defence  we  shall  see 
that  the  centre  of  the  German  forces  was 
directed  on  to  the  region  just  on  the  south  of 
Pont-a-Mousson.  The  manoeuvre  was  firmly 
based  upon  Pont-a-Mousson  and  remained  so 
quite  independently  of  what  the  position  on 
the  Moselle  might  be.  This  disposition  had 
been  given  its  different  direction  once  and 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        291 

for  all,  and  being  highly  rigid  by  the  very 
nature  of  its  organization  could  only  march 
on  the  Moselle  with  its  centre  aiming  at  the 
district  of  Pont-a-Mousson  and  Dieulouard. 
Yet  even  theoretically  the  mass  of  the  enemy 
was  not  in  this  district,  and  the  whole  value 
of  the  advance  turned  upon  the  condition 
that  the  adversary,  who  could  be  neither 
sought,  nor  pinned  down,  nor  even  observed, 
should  remain  absolutely  inactive. 

Lacking  its  own  organ  of  information,  the 
German  General  Headquarters  was  the  last 
to  be  informed  of  the  position  and  movements 
of  the  enemy. 

This  kind  of  war  eliminates  the  idea  of  an 
active  enemy  who  may  appear  at  any  moment 
and  attack.  It  is  based  on  the  idea  of  going 
forward  without  seeking  one's  opponent, 
without  standing  on  guard  against  him,  at 
least  until  the  moment  when  the  work  really 
opens  and  when  one  finds  oneself  before  the 
position  where  one  supposes  the  adversary 
to  be.  It  is  a  strategy  terribly  at  ease  with 
itself,  and  the  weakness  of  such  conception 
appears  even  in  the  presence  of  such  a  Higher 
Command  as  was  the  French  Higher  Com- 
mand of  1870. 

(e)  The  Surprise  on  the  River  Nied 
During  the  loth  of  August  the  squadrons 


292        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

which  were  reconnoitring  for  the  right  wing 
and  centre  of  the  2nd  German  Army  had  re- 
established contact  with  the  French  Army, 
and  by  evening  had  reached  the  river  called 
the  "  French "  Nied.  This  cavalry  there 
discovered  a  line  strongly  held,  and  they  saw 
behind  it  important  enemy  masses  in  good 
positions.  It  observed  the  enemy's  bivouacs, 
camps  and  posts,  and  the  columns  on  the 
march  from  Metz  towards  Courcelles,  Pange 
and  Mont.  Here  we  have  a  clear  case  of 
strategic  surprise.  Great  enemy  masses  have 
been  suddenly  discovered,  there  is  no  chance 
of  holding  them  before  the  I4th,  and  as  yet 
we  are  but  on  the  eve  of  the.  nth. 

If  it  be  necessary  to  attack,  attack  will  be 
impossible  before  the  i6th  or  lyth. 

The  3rd  German  Army  had  no  choice  but 
to  fight  where  it  stood,  with  no  chance  of 
success.  It  was  compelled  to  form  the  pivot 
of  the  German  conversion,  and  that  for  several 
days.  The  situation  of  the  general  advance 
corps  would  have  been  very  different  from 
that  of  this  cavalry,  thus  dragging  in  the  3rd 
Corps.  It  would  have  had  plenty  of  space 
behind  it,  it  could  have  manoeuvred  the 
retreat  without  fear  of  destruction  and  at 
the  same  time  it  would  have  covered  and  made 
secure  the  German  concentration  and  the 
manoeuvre  that  was  projected.  Here  we 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        293 

find,  for  the  first  time,  the  weakening  effect 
of  this  marching,  happy-go-lucky,  towards  the 
Moselle  :  the  weakening  effect  of  that  easy 
strategy  which,  since  it  principally  derives 
from  logical  reasoning  exclusive  of  informa- 
tion upon  realities,  is  wholly  abandoned  to 
abstract  conclusions. 

.  The  enemy  (the  French  in  this  case)  had 
been  left  free  in  his  movements,  and  could, 
whenever  he  chose,  make  the  German  con- 
version towards  the  Nied  useless.  Neverthe- 
less the  German  General  Headquarters  stuck 
to  the  plan  of  that  conversion  and  only  modi- 
fied it  in  its  execution  by  making  the  troops 
on  the  left  wing  march  in  echelons  so  as  to 
give  them  power  to  take  up  as  quickly  as 
possible  the  direction  at  Pont-a-Mousson. 
As  a  fact  this  position  was  to  lead  them  a 
little  later  on  to  the  line  of  Faulquemont - 
Verney.  For  this  modification  was  but  a 
half  measure  derived  from  the  fact  that  the 
Command  did  not  know  how  it  was  to  act 
in  the  long  run,  and  that  half  measure  weak- 
ened the  final  action.  The  total  of  the  forces 
available  could  only  arrive  at  the  desired 
point  later,  and  from  this  erroneous  idea  more 
than  one  crisis  arose. 

As  early  as  the  nth  of  August  a  piece  of 
reconnaissance  carried  out  by  an  officer  of 
the  ist  Army  which  reached  Pontigny  at 


294         PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

2.15  in  the  afternoon  gave  information  that 
the  banks  of  the  River  Nied  had  been  evacu- 
ated by  the  French  between  Pontigny  and 
Northen.  The  heights  behind  this  line  were 
no  longer  occupied;  a  camp  established  at 
Northen  the  day  before  and  estimated  at 
50,000  men  had  disappeared.  This  informa- 
tion reached  German  Headquarters  by  tele- 
gram at  quarter-past  nine  in  the  evening  of 
the  same  day.  At  the  very  moment,  there- 
fore, when  Moltke  had  given  his  order  for 
concentration  in  front  of  the  River  Nied 
the  situation  turned  out  to  be  changed,  and 
the  order  no  longer  corresponded  to  that 
situation. 

On  that  same  day,  nth  August,  another 
reconnaissance  thrown  out  by  the  3rd  German 
Cavalry  Division  remarked  as  early  as  five 
o'clock  in  the  morning  that  a  camp  of  about 
40,000  men  in  the  region  of  the  Ponds  was 
striking  its  tents.  "  From  the  west  of  the 
French  Nied  the  roads  leading  from  St. 
Avoid  and  from  Boulay  to  Metz  were  covered 
with  deep  columns  of  all  arms  going  towards 
that  fortress.  The  reconnaissance  followed 
them  up  beyond  the  Ponds  and  at  half-past 
eleven  in  the  morning  it  saw  the  enemy  rear 
guard  halt  at  Bellecroix,  the  fork  of  the  two 
roads.  Other  information  came  in  con- 
firming this." 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        295 

On  the  morrow,  the  I2th  August,  the 
German  reconnaissance  passed  Bellecroix  and 
caught  sight  of  numerous  French  encamp- 
ments which  seemed  to  stretch  up  to  the  very 
walls  of  Metz. 

Important  groups  of  French  troops  were 
also  seen  to  the  west  of  Puche  (the  ist  Division 
of  Cavalry),  to  the  west  of  Laquenexy  and  of 
Coincy  (6th  Division),  and  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Grigy  and  Borny  (6th  Division). 

In  front  of  the  German  left  wing  recon- 
naissance parties  gave  information  that  the 
countryside  was  clear  between  Moyenvic  and 
Nancy.  Nancy,  Dieulouard  and  Pont-a- 
Mousson  were  not  occupied  by  the  French. 
It  was  the  same  thing  on  the  right  wing 
between  the  Nied  and  the  Moselle.  The 
weakness  of  Moltke's  disposition  of  troops 
which  we  have  already  seen  in  the  march 
on  the  Saar  and  then  in  the  march  on  the 
Moselle  occurred  again  when  he  had  to  cross 
that  river  in  the  presence  of  his  adversary; 
for  it  was  a  system  which  attempted  to  do 
everything  at  once,  both  to  act  and  to  cover, 
and  it  showed  itself  powerless  to  fulfil  these 
two  tasks.  Being  faced  with  the  chance  of 
reaching  the  left  bank  of  the  Moselle  and  of 
holding  up  the  enemy  on  the  right  bank  the 
German  Command  tried  to  take  both  objec- 
tives at  the  same  time  and  ended  in  a  forma- 


296        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

tion  in  two  masses  separated  by  the  obstacle 
of  the  river,  let  alone  by  the  distance  between 
them.  The  consequence  was,  as  at  Rohr- 
bach,  an  extreme  dispersion  of  troops.  After 
having  guaranteed  themselves  in  a  certain 
measure  from  the  most  immediate  danger, 
which  was  that  of  the  right  bank,  their  dis- 
position gave  rise  to  another  peril  equally 
great  upon  the  left  bank,  and  they  had  not 
the  power  to  bring  up  succour. 

(f)  The  Battle  of  Borny  (iqth  August) 

Steinmetz,  since  he  left  his  subordinate 
Commanders  in  such  ignorance  of  his  plans, 
might  at  least  have  nourished  a  desire  to 
command  fully  on  his  own  account;  but  he 
did  not  do  so.  He  kept  his  headquarters  at 
Varize,  nearly  twelve  miles  from  the  7th 
Corps,  and  never  left  them.  He  seemed 
no  keener  on  leading  his  army  than  on 
informing  it. 

[Bazaine,  having  been  given  the  command 
of  the  2nd,  ^rd  and  ^th  French  Corps  and  of 
the  Guard,  decided  to  abandon  the  Nied  and  to 
fall  back  on  Verdun.  The  crossing  of  the 
Moselle  was  a  longer  operation  than  he  allowed 
for.  On  the  i^th  August  the  26th  German 
Brigade,  under  General  von  der  Goltz,  which 
formed  the  advance  guard  of  the  jth  German 


PRECEPTS    AND   JUDGMENTS         297 

Corps,  attacked  those  French  forces  which  had 
not  yet  crossed  the  river  (the  $rd  Corps,  the  Guard 
and  a  division  of  the  qth  Corps]  at  Borny.] 

General  von  der  Goltz,  with  the  7th  Corps, 
was  in  command  of  its  advance  guard  at 
Laquenexy.  He  there  received,  during  all 
the  morning  of  the  I4th  August,  information 
which  indicated  that  the  French  were  retreat- 
ing towards  Metz.  At  one  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  a  Reserve  officer  reached  him  with 
the  message  that  the  ist  German  Corps  was 
about  to  attack.  The  General,  therefore, 
began  to  take  stock  of  his  attitude,  and,  bit 
by  bit,  came  to  a  decision.  In  spite  of  the 
storm  which  it  would  certainly  raise  against 
himself  on  the  part  of  the  Army  Commander 
(Steinmetz),  under  whom  he  had  recently 
directly  served  and  whose  hasty  character  he 
knew,  he  prepared  to  attack.  At  a  quarter 
to  two  he  communicated  his  decision  to  his 
Army  Corps  Commander,  General  Zastrow. 
Then,  as  information  kept  flowing  in  and  con- 
firming the  French  retreat,  he  gave  the  order 
to  attack  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 

The  decision  so  taken  was  at  once  com- 
municated to  the  Commanders  of  the  I3th 
and  I4th  Divisions,  to  the  Commander  of  the 
ist  Army  Corps,  and  to  the  Commander  of 
the  ist  Division  of  Cavalry. 


298         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

The  ist  German  Army  Corps  had  not  re- 
ceived its  instructions  from  Steinmetz,  any 
more  than  had  the  7th ;  but  Lieut. -Col. 
Brandenstein  from  General  Headquarters  had 
given  the  ist  Corps  an  idea  of  the  general 
situation. 

At  half-past  three  General  von  der  Goltz 
had  concentrated  his  advance  guard  at 
Laquenexy  and  had  begun  his  movement. 
He  was  master  of  the  Chateau  of  Aubigny, 
of  part  of  Colombey  and  of  the  heights  to 
the  south  of  that  village.  These  points  he 
held  with  three  battalions.  He  soon  found 
himself  threatened  by  the  Saarbriick  road 
towards  Montoy.  He  engaged  two  further 
battalions  in  that  direction  and  managed  to 
occupy  La  Planchette.  His  two  batteries 
had  taken  up  their  positions  to  the  south- 
west of  Coincy.  It  was  by  this  time  past 
five  o'clock.  The  enemy  (the  French)  opened 
the  attack  (by  which  they  proposed  to  turn 
and  dislodge  the  weak  Prussian  advance 
guards)  with  a  heavy  fire.  This  new  phase 
of  the  action  was  not  without  peril  for  the 
Germans,  but  just  at  that  moment  reinforce- 
ments appeared  upon  their  side.  The  second 
half  of  the  3Oth  Division  came  up  from  the 
east  to  the  aid  of  its  advance  guard,  which 
was  being  severely  pressed,  while,  towards 
the  north,  the  ist  Corps  answered  von  der 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        299 

Goltz's  call  at  top  speed  and  was  already 
engaged. 

The  advance  guard  of  the  two  divisions 
of  the  ist  German  Corps  appeared,  the  first 
by  the  Saarbrtick  road,  the  second  by  the 
Saarlouis  road,  and  they  came  up  nearly 
simultaneously.  First,  they  brought  their 
artillery  into  play — that  of  the  ist  Division 
to  the  south-west  of  Montoy,  that  of  the 
2nd  to  the  south  of  the  Noisseville  brewery ; 
while  their  infantry  tried  to  force  its  way 
southward — the  ist  Division  by  Montoy  and 
La  Planchette  towards  Nauvillier,  the  2nd 
Division  round  Noisseville  towards  Nouilly. 

About  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  the  greater 
part  of  the  infantry  of  all  three  German 
advance  guards  (i.  e.  the  advance  guard  of 
the  I3th,  the  ist,  and  the  2nd  Divisions)  was 
engaged  in  a  very  uncertain  action,  .which, 
happily  for  the  Germans,  became  stronger 
as  the  artillery  line,  composed  at  first  of  no 
more  than  the  batteries  of  their  advance 
guard,  was  reinforced  every  moment  by  the 
batteries  of  the  mass  of  the  army.  By  six 
o'clock  in  the  evening  no  less  than  sixty 
Prussian  pieces  were  in  action. 

By  a  quarter-past  'five  General  Zastrow 
took  over  the  direction  of  the  action.  He  had 
been  informed  at  four  o'clock  of  the  decision 
which  had  been  taken  by  the  Commander  of 


300        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

his  advance  guard,  and  a  quarter  of  an  hour 
later  he  heard  that  action  was  in  progress. 
He  immediately  retired  to  the  heights  of 
Colombey.  He  could  not  approve  the  initia- 
tive taken  by  his  subordinate,  for  it  was 
contrary  to  the  instructions  which  the  Com- 
mander of  the  army  had  given,  but  he  under- 
stood that  the  affair  had  become  serious,  that 
it  was  no  longer  possible  to  break  it  off,  and 
he  therefore  took  direction  of  the  battle  from 
the  left  wing  of  the  line. 

Towards  seven  o'clock  Zastrow  received  an 
order  from  Steinmetz,  which  order  was 
brought  by  an  artillery  officer  who  had  left 
Varize  at  5.30.  It  ran  thus  :  "  The  battle 
must  be  broken  off  and  the  troops  must 
return  to  the  positions  occupied  earlier  in  the 
day."  Zastrow  replied  that  the  action  was 
too  far  advanced  for  such  a  thing  to  be 
possible :  "In  the  present  situation  it  is 
impossible  to  break  away  without  exposing 
ourselves  to  the  most  cruel  losses.  Your 
order  shall  be  obeyed  as  soon  as  the  thing 
shall  become  at  all  possible,  especially  after 
the  evacuation  of  the  wounded."  But  when 
night  had  fallen  Zastrow  ordered  the  con- 
quered positions  to  be  occupied  in  order  to 
confirm  his  victory. 

General  Manteuffel,  commanding  the  ist 
Corps,  received  the  same  order  from  Stein- 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        301 

metz  just  as  the  action  was  drawing  to  a 
close,  and  he  gave  identically  the  same  answer 
as  Zastrow  had  given  :  "  We  have  thrown  the 
enemy  back.  Short  of  a  directly  contrary 
order  I  shall  continue  to  hold  the  ground 
now  conquered  in  order  to  evacuate  my 
wounded  and  to  confirm  the  victory." 

As  for  the  Commander  of  the  8th  Corps 
(who  was  placed  in  reserve  of  the  ist  Army), 
since,  like  all  the  rest,  he  knew  nothing  of 
his  Chief,  Steinmetz',  intention  and  had 
heard  nothing,  he  asked  Headquarters  at 
Varize  (towards  four  o'clock)  whether  he 
ought  to  advance,  and,  if  so,  in  what  direc- 
tion. Steinmetz  replied,  with  exasperation, 
that  he  must  wait  for  orders;  and  the  Com- 
mander of  the  8th  Corps,  although  his  Generals 
.of  Division,  and  Manteuffel  from  the  ist 
Corps,  begged  him  to  go  forward,  refused  to 
move  on  account  of  Steinmetz'  prohibition. 
About  half-past  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening 
he  received  an  order  from  Steinmetz  to  move 
the  32nd  Brigade  to  the  Ponds  and  the  army 
corps  as  a  whole  to  Varize.  He  replied  that 
on  account  of  the  lateness  of  the  hour  the 
movement  could  not  be  immediately  executed, 
but  it  should  be  undertaken  on  the  morrow 
at  the  earliest  moment. 

To  sum  up  :  Of  three  Commanders  of  army 
corps,  two  had  received  the  order  to  break  off 


302        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

the  battle,  and  the  third  had  received  the 
order  to  go  forward  and  support  the  troops 
engaged  in  the  battle  ! 

No  one  of  the  three  had  obeyed  orders,  and 
Steinmetz  flew  into  the  most  violent  passion. 
He  went  himself  to  Manteuffel.  The  meeting 
took  place  at  a  quarter-past  nine  in  the  evening 
near  the  Amitie  Farm,  not  far  from  Noisse- 
ville.  It  was  extremely  violent.  Steinmetz 
reproached  Manteuffel  with  having  given 
battle  against  his  orders,  with  "having  suffered 
defeat,  and  with  being  the  cause  of  the  con- 
siderable losses  which  had  been  sustained. 
The  two  men  stood  facing  each  other  at  the 
entry  to  the  burning  village,  the  one  in  a 
passion,  carried  away,  and  quite  forgetting 
his  duties  as  a  Chief;  the  other  in  a  calm, 
respectful  attitude.  As  they  so  stood  the 
band  of  a  regiment  passed  by  playing  a 
victorious  march. 

With  men  like  Steinmetz  weak  characters 
lose  all  confidence  in  themselves,  strong  char- 
acters resist.  Manteuffel  said  what  he  had 
to  say  with  all  possible  courtesy ;  he  pointed 
out  that  there  were  circumstances  in  which  a 
General  could  only  depend  upon  his  own 
judgment  and  must  act  upon  his  own  re- 
sponsibility even  if  he  had  to  act  against 
orders  received.  He  said  that  such  a  case 
had  presented  itself  during  that  day.  He 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         303 

asked  that  bivouacs  might  be  placed  upon  the 
conquered  positions  in  order  to  'confirm  the 
victory  that  had  been  won.  Steinmetz,  how- 
ever, kept  to  his  original  decision  of  retiring 
the  army  corps.  He  again  reproached  Man- 
teuffel  with  lack  of  discipline,  and  gave  him 
one  hour  only  in  which  to  get  his  troops  into 
some  sort  of  order,  pick  up  his  wounded,  and 
retire.  At  eleven  o'clock  the  ist  Corps 
retreated. 

Zastrow  did  not  see  Steinmetz  that  night. 
After  he  received  the  order  mentioned  above 
and  had  told  his  troops  to  bivouac  on  the  field 
of  action  he  was  joined  (at  a  quarter  to  eleven 
at  night,  as  he  sat  at  dinner  with  his  Chief  of 
Staff  in  the  Chateau  of  Penge)  by  Steinmetz' 
orderly  officer,  who  had  brought  him  the  order 
to  retreat.  Luckily  he  had  at  his  side  Lieut.- 
Col.  Brandenstein  of  General  Headquarters, 
who  during  all  the  early  part  of  the  day  had 
urged  the  reconnaissance,  and  later  had  called 
vigorously  for  action. 

Strong  in  the  support  which  Brandenstein 
gave  him,  Zastrow  sent  back  word  to  Stein- 
metz that  his  (Zastrow's)  orders  for  the  night 
to  his  troops  had  already  been  delivered,  and 
that  the  retreat,  which  it  would  be  very 
difficult  to  undertake  at  that  moment,  should 
be  taken  in  hand  as  early  as  possible  the  next 
day. 


804        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

Lieut. -Col.  Brandenstein  left  Penge  at 
once,  and  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  of 
the  I5th  he  had  got  back  to  General  Head- 
quarters at  Herny,  which  he  had  left  for 
twenty-four  hours.  All  that  space  of  time 
had  been  given  up  to  inspiring  and  supporting 
the  decisions  of  the  Troop  Commanders  on 
the  front  line.  He  immediately  explained  to 
Moltke  what  had  taken  place,  and  Moltke, 
conforming  himself  as  usual  to  events,  sent 
at  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  this  telegram 
to  the  ist  Army  :  "  The  ist  Army  will  occupy 
the  ground  it  has  conquered." 

Steinmetz  yielded  and  betook  himself  to 
the  ground  in  question. 

The  King  was  already  on  the  spot.  He 
received  Steinmetz  on  the  heights  of  Flan- 
ville ;  then  he  sent  for  Manteuffel  and  Zastrow 
and  thanked  them  for  having  undertaken  the 
battle.  Turning  particularly  to  Zastrow  and 
holding  out  his  hand  he  said  :  "I  thank  you 
above  all  for  having  kept  your  army  corps 
upon  the  conquered  positions." 

Then,  after  a  moment  of  silence,  the  King 
added  :  "  Goltz  is  a  lucky  man.  This  is  the 
second  time  that  he  has  shown  initiative  and 
resolution." 

Here  we  see  what  character  a  really  strong 
Command  should  bear.  It  should  be  careful, 
when  it  has  once  chosen  and  instructed  its 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        805 

agents,  to  trust  to  their  initiative  and  to 
leave  them  to  take  the  very  gravest  decisions, 
even  though  those  decisions  be  sometimes 
contrary  to  orders  actually  given.  It  should 
trust  them  to  fill  upon  the  spot  those  gaps 
which  the  strategy  of  the  study  is  bound  to 
leave,  because  such  strategy  cannot  have  its 
eyes  everywhere. 

Brigadier-General  von  der  Goltz,  after 
warning  the  neighbouring  troops,  launched 
off  into  the  fight  with  his  one  brigade,  and 
this  it  was  which  saved  the  strategical 
manoeuvre  of  Moltke.  Since  an  unexpected 
attack  is  imposed  by  equally  unexpected 
circumstances,  and  since  the  tactical  result 
may  be  compromised  by  troops  acting  spon- 
taneously and  without  plan,  we  must  prepare 
for  such  circumstances  a  special  force  which 
should  be  capable  by  its  organization  and 
by  its  range  of  manoeuvre  to  act  without 
involving  the  mass  of  the  army.  Such  a 
force  is  the  strategic  advance  guard.  But 
let  the  Higher  Command  keep  in  proximity 
to  that  advance  guard  and  in  touch  with  it; 
that  is  the  point  from  which  he  can  best  seize 
his  adversary's  situation  and  the  attitude 
of  the  enemy,  and  that  is  the  point  where  he 
can  design  the  conduct  to  be  followed  by 
his  own  troops  with  the  greatest  judgment. 
That  is  also  the  point  where  he  can  make  his 


806        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

own  thought  best  understood  and  give  it  his 
greatest  value.  It  is  there  alone  that  he  can 
guarantee  the  rational  development  of  the 
manoeuvre  he  has  undertaken. 

We  have  seen  how  the  absence  of  this 
direction  by  the  Higher  Command  caused 
one  of  the  chief  inconveniences  in  the  im- 
provised attack  of  von  der  Goltz,  which 
inconvenience  was  the  obvious  disarray  in 
the  Command  of  the  ist  Army  on  the  night 
on  the  I4th.  Von  der  Goltz,  in  trying  to  fill 
the  gap  which  Moltke  had  left  in  his  strategy, 
the  Commanders  of  army  corps  in  trying  to 
help  von  der  Goltz  in  this  task  which  was 
beyond  his  own  strength,  escaped  wholly 
from  the  authority  of  the  army  Commander, 
who  was,  so  to  speak,  partially  blind  of  his 
own  will  to  begin  with,  and  later  entirely  so. 
Finally,  we  have  seen  that  nothing  less  than 
the  direct  intervention  of  a  particular  organ — 
to  wit,  the  Prussian  Grand  General  Staff, 
directly  supported  by  the  Royal  Power — was 
necessary  to  put  things  right  again.  But 
such  a  method  of  going  to  work  is  to  follow 
the  perilous  road  of  reaching  order  by  way  of 
anarchy. 

(g)  The  Battle  of  Gravelotte  (i6th  August) 

[Bazaine,  marching  on  Verdun,  had  to  halt 
at  the  cross-roads  of  Gravelotte,  a  point  which 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS         307 

had  got  congested,  and  his  army  corps  bivouacked 
along  the  road  from  Rezonville  to  Metz.  The 
ist  and  2nd  German  Armies  crossed  the  Moselle 
at  Pont-a-Mousson,  Dieuloiiard  and  Malbach. 
They  left  Metz  and  the  French  to  the  north  and 
launched  off  in  pursuit  of  an  enemy  which 
Moltke  imagined  to  be  upon  the  Meuse.  A 
cavalry  reconnaissance  sent  by  chance  towards 
the  north  discovered  the  bivouacs  of  the  army 
of  Metz,  and  the  German  Corps  immediately 
gave  battle.  But  even  by  the  end  of  the  day 
these  corps  could  only  put  in  line,  after  a  most 
violent  action,  90,000  men  against  135,000  of 
the  French.  The  Germans  were  thrown  back. 
But  Bazaine,  instead  of  following  up  the 
offensive,  fell  back  upon  Metz.} 

The  whole  of  the  2nd  German  Army,  with 
its  cavalry  division,  its  regular  army  corps 
organization,  and  even  its  rear  service,  was 
hurried  forward  to  the  Meuse,  the  crossing 
of  which  Moltke  was  determined  to  secure. 

On  the  morning  of  the  i6th,  the  various 
fractions  of  the  German  army  started  without 
the  above-mentioned  decisions  having  been 
altered,  without  anybody,  as  we  have  seen, 
attempting  to  verify  the  accuracy  of  the 
initial  assumption;  besides,  until  i  p.m., 
nothing  in  the  reports  received  by  the  3rd 
Corps  had  appeared  to  Prince  Frederick 


808        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

Charles  to  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  induce 
him  to  alter  in  any  way  the  measures  he  had 
adopted.  The  true  situation  was  only  known 
at  that  moment  at  the  headquarters  of  the 
2nd  Army.  It  would  have  been  known 
earlier  if  it  had  only  been  sought  for,  as  is 
clearly  shown  by  the  facts  now  known. 

But  the  certainty  and  quietude  which 
occupied  Prince  Frederick  Charles's  mind 
were  not  shared  by  all  his  subordinates  : 

"  Infantry  General  von  Voigts-Rhetz  (com- 
manding the  loth  Corps),  feeling  some  anxiety 
on  account  of  those  French  bivouacs,  the 
existence  of  which  had  been  reported  on  the 
preceding  day,  thought  it  necessary  to  com- 
bine, with  the  movement  of  his  army  corps 
on  Saint-Hilaire,  a  strong  reconnaissance  on 
the  camps  observed  in  the  evening  of  the 
I5th  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Rezonville. 
He  had  attached  to  that  operation  the  5th 
Cavalry  Division  under  General  von  Rhein- 
baben,  which  he  also  reinforced,  very  early 
on  the  i6th,  with  two  horse  batteries  from  the 
corps  artillery  brought  from  Thiaucourt  to 
Xonville  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  loth 
Army  Corps,  Lieut. -Col.  von  Caprivi,  under 
escort  of  the  2nd  squadron  of  the  2nd  Regi- 
ment of  Dragoon  Guards.  In  order  to  sup- 
port this  reconnaissance,  the  order  was  also 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        309 

given  to  half  the  37th  Infantry  Brigade  which 
was  at  Thiaucourt  to  join,  at  Chambley,  the 
detachment  of  Colonel  von  Lynker,  sent  out 
from  Noveant  in  the  Moselle  valley.  General 
von  Voigts-Rhetz  intended  to  march,  mean- 
while, from  Thiaucourt  on  Saint-Hilaire,  with 
the  remainder  of  the  I5th  Division.  ..." 

Here  is  a  highly  practical  lesson.  People 
in  high  quarters  believed  they  could  do 
without  security ;  the  performers  in  the  front 
rank  reinstate  security.  They  do  not  advance 
blindfold  in  the  midst  of  danger.  It  was 
merely  human ;  such  a  game  would  have 
proved  too  risky  for  them.  However,  they 
reinstated  security  imperfectly  and  too  late 
to  undo  the  harm  that  had  been  done.  Prac- 
tice as  well  as  theory  show,  then,  that  the 
best  way  is  to  attend  to  security  before  doing 
anything  else,  and  to  form  an  advance  guard. 
***** 

The  3rd  Corps  had  marched  into  an  ant- 
hill. The  French  army,  instead,  of  being  in 
full  retreat  towards  the  Meuse,  was  com- 
pleting the  evacuation  of  Metz;  its  moral 
was  excellent,  having  been  even  enhanced 
by  the  fight  on  the  I4th.  It  was  assembled 
between  the  two  roads  to  Conflans  and  Mars- 
la-Tour,  four  miles  from  Gorze.  The  3rd 
Corps  came  up  and  struck  full  against  that 
assembly.  Under  what  conditions  will  the 


310        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

2nd  German  Army  meet  the  main  and  yet 
unbeaten  forces  of  the  adversary  ? 

At  ii  a.m.,  when  the  battle  was  in  full 
swing,  all  the  various  army  corps,  other  than 
the  3rd,  were  on  their  way  to  reach  the 
cantonment  assigned  to  each  :  the  loth  was 
marching  by  the  road  to  Thiaucourt,  Saint 
Benoit,  and  Maizeray,  at  an  average  distance 
of  10 1  miles  from  Vionville ;  the  Guard,  at  a 
double  distance,  about  24  miles;  the  4th  at 
a  triple  distance,  33  miles;  the  I2th,  gth  and 
2nd,  in  second  line,  were  more  than  a  day's 
march  to  the  rear. 

Under  those  conditions,  the  2nd  Army 
could  only  oppose  to  the  French  forces 
debouching  from  Metz,  on  the  i6th,  one  full 
army  corps,  the  3rd  and  the  greater  part  of 
the  loth,  on  the  I7th,  three  or  four  army 
corps. 

It  had  to  wait  until  the  i8th  to  assemble 
the  largest  part  of  its  forces. 

We  have  here,  then,  a  strategical  surprise 
in  the  fullest  sense  of  the  word.  In  the 
presence  of  an  enemy  who  should  have  been 
an  active  and  able  tactician,  or  even  in  the 
presence  of  a  Commander  who  had  the  object 
of  war  in  mind,  it  would  have  become  im- 
possible for  the  2nd  Army  to  assemble  on 
the  i6th  or  even  on  the  lyth,  for  assembly 
would  have  meant  disaster;  it  would  have 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        311 

become  impossible  for  the  two  other  armies 
to  lend  that  2nd  Army  any  efficient  help  : 
else,  what  would  have  become  of  their  own 
situation  ? 

*  *  *  *  * 

Following  the  order  given  on  the  i6th  of 
August,  1870,  at  midday,  the  2nd  German 
Army  was  dispersed  on  the  I7th  over  a  front 
and  depth  each  of  some  twenty-five  miles. 
On  the  i8th  it  was  to  be  still  more  dispersed, 
reconnoitring  towards  the  Meuse.  Three 
army  corps  were  to  march  to  the  north-west 
and  the  rest  of  the  army  (four  corps)  to  go 
westward,  i.  e.  to  turn  its  back  on  what  had 
been  seen  of  the  enemy. 

Everything  developed  according  to  plan. 
Everything  was  envisaged  except  battle. 
It  was  a  fashion  of  conducting  war  which 
eliminated  all  consideration  of  the  enemy  : 
the  enemy  was  regarded  as  a  negligible 
quantity.  This  enemy  was  to  be  thrown 
back  upon  Thionville  or  upon  the  Belgian 
frontier  by  the  three  army  corps  that  were 
marching  northward,  while  the  other  four 
were  to  go  forward  at  their  ease  towards  the 
Meuse  in  order  to  seize  the  crossings  of  that 
river.  One  of  them,  even,  the  4th  Army 
Corps,  had  a  special  objective  given  to  it; 
the  Fortress  of  Toun. 

When  actual  battle  unexpectedly  took  the 


312        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

place  of  this  imaginary  pursuit  which  had 
been  planned  in  the  blindness  of  the  Higher 
Command,  Alvensleben,  like  Frederick  Charles 
a  little  later,  had  no  choice  but  to  accept  that 
battle  and  solve  the  problem  as  best  he  could. 
In  that  very  hard  task  both  men  showed 
themselves  to  be  models  which  we  can  admire 
without  reserve.  They  resolutely  took  the 
offensive  and  kept  it  up  till  the  end  of  the  day 
with  the  object  of  acquiring  and  maintaining 
over  their  adversary,  in  spite  of  every  diffi- 
culty, that  moral  ascendancy  which  is  the 
true  stuff  of  victory. 

The  German  troops  were  found  to  have  lost 
in  the  course  of  the  battle,  when  it  was  over, 
15,000  men  and  more  than  700  officers,  and 
this  out  of  only  two  army  corps.  The  French, 
out  of  no  less  than  five  army  corps,  had  only 
lost  16,000  men  and  rather  more  than  800 
officers. 

Such  was  the  price  which  the  German 
Higher  Command,  having  the  sense  of  war, 
and  with  their  judgment  informed  by  the 
sight  of  the  battlefield,  were  willing  to  pay  in 
order  to  repair  the  errors  and  mechanical 
blindness  of  work  elaborated  in  the  study. 
And  once  again  tactics  turned  the  tables  and 
redeemed  the  disasters  of  strategy :  the 
soldier  saved  the  Higher  Command. 
***** 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        313 

The  dispositions  of  the  Prince  had  been 
brought  up  during  the  night  at  Gorze  and 
had  been  happily  expanded  and  completed 
by  his  subordinates,  and  were  in  process  of 
execution  in  the  first  hours  of  the  morning 
of  August  I7th.  And  there  we  see  that 
unity  of  doctrine,  still  more  that  unity  of 
feeling,  which  between  them  create  victory. 
But  can  one  admit  that  the  conditions  corre- 
sponded completely  to  the  needs  which  the 
situation  had  admittedly  produced,  or  to  the 
dangers  which  might  well  be  expected,  or  to 
the  results  which  were  aimed  at  ? 

***** 

In  these  orders  may  clearly  be  perceived 
the  mind  of  Moltke,  as  also  the  manoeuvre 
which  he  thought  he  could  realize.  In  his 
view,  as  in  that  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles, 
the  French  were  in  retreat,  and  in  retreat 
towards  the  north. 

***** 

Let  us  remember  Napoleon's  quotation  on 
the  necessity  for  an  army's  always  being  in 
a  position  to  put  forth  the  whole  resistance  of 
which  it  is  capable;  on  the  necessity,  for  a 
General,  of  never  basing  his  decisions  on  any- 
thing but  reports  which  are  certain  and  true 
at  the  moment  when  those  decisions  are  to 
be  carried  out. 

Whenever  men  like  von  Moltke  and  Prince 


314        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

Frederick  Charles  are  seen  to  err,  people  are 
inclined  to  think  that  the  problem  outreaches 
the  limits  of  human  perception;  they  feel 
inclined  to  charge  with  foolish  conceit  any 
one  attempting  to  be  more  clearsighted  or 
more  farsighted.  Theory,  at  any  rate,  is 
tempted  to  such  a  conclusion.  But  is  it  not 
the  chief  characteristic  of  study  that  it 
attempts  to  discover  the  means  of  reducing 
the  chances  of  committing  those  errors  of 
which  human  nature  is  always  capable,  or 
of  lessening  the  consequences  of  such  errors 
once  they  are  made ;  of  removing  the  limits 
of  the  unknown,  of  bringing  the  mind  from 
ignorance  to  knowledge,  so  as  to  make  our 
intelligence  more  efficient  ?  Is  it  not  char- 
acteristic of  science  that  it  should,  by  means 
of  a  series  of  discoveries,  place  within  reach 
of  average  men  the  possibility  of  doing  better 
than  did  the  superior  men  of  the  past,  by 
teaching  them  processes  which  genius  has 
discovered  ? 

It  is  in  a  slowly  progressive  manner  that 
truth  is  mastered. 

(h)  The  Battle  of  St.  Privat  (iSth  August) 

[After  Resonville,  Moltke  thought  that  the 
French  were  in  retreat  towards  the  north.  In 
reality  they  had  retired  upon  Metz,  and  had 
taken  up  a  position  facing  west.  The  two 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        315 

German  armies  were  sent  towards  the  north, 
marching  by  echelons  of  army  corps,  the  left 
forward.  Therefore,  when  the  enemy  was  at 
last  discovered,  the  German  army  corps  had  to 
execute  a  conversion  by  the  right  in  order  to 
come  into  the  battle.  There  was  even  a  plan 
of  attack  in  such  a  fashion  as  to  turn  the  French 
Right,  which  Moltke  thought  to  be  at  Aman- 
villers,  then  at  St.  Privat,  while  it  was,  as  a 
fact,  at  Roncourt,  still  further  to  the  north.} 

Moltke,  it  has  been  said,  ordered  a  recon- 
naissance, and  there  is  quoted  as  proof  his 
order  of  the  lyth.  It  was  indeed  judged  by 
him  that  the  enemy's  positions  should  be 
reconnoitred  and  the  results  communicated 
to  Flavigny,  where  General  Headquarters 
designed  to  be  early  upon  the  i8th,  in  order 
to  pick  up  the  information  which  would  be 
necessary  to  the  direction  of  the  action ;  but 
such  a  proceeding  was  hardly  an  order 
necessitating  certain  execution.  The  vague 
expression  of  need  is  a  very  different  thing 
from  command.  Apart  from  the  necessary 
feebleness  which  accompanies  age,  we  are 
bound  to  admit  in  the  German  Command  a 
weakness  of  strategic  doctrine  ;  for  that  Com- 
mand proposed  to  solve  the  unknown  (which 
is  inherent  in  war)  by  mere  logic.  The  result 
was  that  on  the  i8th  it  stumbled  from  one 


316         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

surprise  into  another.  It  lost  from  the  very 
beginning  of  the  day  all  power  of  direct 
action.  The  result  is  easy  to  foresee,  and  the 
sequel  will  show  from  what  source  victory 
did  as  a  fact  arise.  For,  I  repeat,  the  Germans 
had  to  do  with  an  adversary  condemned  by 
his  chiefs  to  a  complete  immobility,  to  a 
mere  defensive  attitude,  and  to  being  riveted 
to  the  Fortress  of  Metz. 

While  General  Headquarters  were  getting 
to  Pont-a-Mousson,  Steinmetz  had  come  to 
the  south  of  Gravelotte  and  had  observed  the 
enemy's  positions  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
the  points  called  Point-du-Jour  and  Moscow. 
He  noted  a  great  animation  among  them, 
and  he  had  seen  the  adversary  making  field 
defences.  He  had  concluded  that  the  French 
neither  meant  to  march  northward  nor  to 
attack,  but  simply  to  resist  on  the  spot. 
Moreover,  the  enemy  masses  which  could 
thus  be  seen  were  a  real  peril  on  account  of 
their  proximity  to  the  7th  German  Corps, 
which  the  ist  German  Army  could  not  sup- 
port on  account  of  the  nature  of  the  ground. 
We  see,  then,  that  Steinmetz  had  the  best 
appreciation  of  the  enemy's  position.  But 
as  he  kept  entirely  apart  from  the  meeting 
at  Flavigny  his  observations  remained  without 
profit. 

Towards  four  o'clock,  as  he  reached  Ars, 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        317 

his  headquarters,  he  received  the  order  from 
Moltke  dated  two  o'clock.1  He  fell  into  a 
violent  passion,  said  that  this  way  of  going 
to  work,  giving  orders  to  his  army  corps  over 
his  head,  was  lacking  in  decency,  and  that 
there  was  no  reason  left  for  his  occupying  his 
command  at  all.  What  had  happened  was 
that  the  authorities  had  kept  the  ist  Corps 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Moselle  out  of  his 
sphere  of  action  and  withdrawn  the  8th 
Corps,  and  left  him  commanding  but  the  yth 
Corps.  Two  Generals — its  own  Commander 
and  Steinmetz  himself — were  more  than  was 
necessary  (he  said)  to  command  this  single 
army  corps.  Steinmetz  belonged  to  that 
category  of  officers  who  think  they  own  their 
troops,  and  if  he  saw  the  greater  part  of  his 
Command  withdrawn  from  him  his  bitterness 
soon  led  to  personal  attacks. 

To  pass  from  this  :  shortly  after  six  o'clock 
in  the  evening  he  communicated  to  his  army 
the  order  which  he  had  received,  and  par- 
ticularly gave  directions  to  the  /th  Corps  to 
occupy  on  the  morrow  from  five  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  and  to  hold  at  all  costs,  the  northern 
fringe  of  the  wood  of  Vaux,  and  that  fringe 
of  the  wood  of  Ognons  which  looks  towards 

1  It  was  an  order  commanding  the  movements  of 
two-thirds  of  Steinmetz'  army  of  three  corps,  without 
consulting  him. 


818         PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

Gravelotte,  so  that  the  corps  would  be  drawn 
up  facing  north  and  east. 

Steinmetz  next  gave  General  Headquarters 
an  account  of  the  orders  he  had  delivered, 
and  also  communicated  his  observations  on 
the  attitude  of  the  French.  He  seems  in  the 
same  dispatch  to  have  asked  for  the  8th 
Corps  to  be  given  back  to  him,  or,  at  any 
rate,  to  have  asked  to  have  it  moved  more 
towards  the  east. 

This  communication  reached  Pont-a-Mous- 
son  in  the  night.  Moltke  was  asleep  and  he 
was  not  wakened. 

[Steinmetz  then  occupied  the  region  of  Ars 
with  the  jth  German  Corps,  instead  of  sending 
that  corps  towards  Gravelotte  as  the  orders  of 
Moltke  had  directed.} 

Steinmetz  turned  his  back  on  the  objective, 
and  refused  the  means  indicated  by  Moltke. 
He  allowed  himself  to  be  hypnotized  by  the 
task  of  occupying  Ars,  and  thus  aggravated 
the  already  doubtful  position  of  his  army. 

The  insufficient  foresight  shown,  on  the 
German  side,  must  be  counted,  from  the  I7th 
of  August  onward,  to  the  debit  of  this  easily- 
angered  character  :  only  thus  can  we  explain 
his  strange  conduct  during  the  battle  of  the 
morrow. 

***** 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        319 

[What  follows  concerns  the  action  of  the  iSth 
August.] 

The  German  General  Headquarters  arrived 
at  six  o'clock  in  the  morning  on  the  heights 
to  the  south  of  Flavigny. 

The  only  news  it  got  was  that  the  preceding 
night  had  been  calm  upon  the  front  of  both 
armies.  It  showed  a  certain  irritated  sur- 
prise at  not  having  later  information  than 
that  dated  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  on  the 
day  before.  It  is  true  that  it  had  asked  for 
nothing  and  ordered  nothing.  It  had  not 
even  indicated  in  what  direction  reconnais- 
sance might  be  of  service.  A  Higher  Com- 
mand really  anxious  to  act  with  a  knowledge, 
above  all  things,  of  the  general  situation, 
would  have  gone  at  a  gallop  from  Vionville 
to  the  Etain  Road,  taken  in  hand  the  system 
of  discovery,  sent  forward  a  mass  of  squadrons 
with  batteries  accompanying  them  in  the 
direction  where  novel  interest  had  arisen— 
that  of  St.  Privat — and  supported  that 
cavalry  and  those  guns  with  an  advance 
guard  of  infantry  and  artillery  capable  both 
of  maintaining  and  continuing  the  recon- 
naissance, or,  alternatively,  of  receiving  the 
squadrons  and  protecting  them  should  they 
have  to  retreat.  In  the  light  of  what  such  a 
Command  would  thus  have  discovered — what 


820        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

would  have  been  in  a  sense  under  their  very 
eyes — there  would  have  been  time  to  continue 
the  manoeuvre  of  the  army. 

***** 

Prince  Frederick  Charles  determined  to 
take  action.  He  was  aware  of  important 
French  forces  to  the  west  of  Metz.  Cavalry 
patrols  sent  forward  from  the  gth  German 
Corps  had  found  nothing  towards  the  north- 
east. Therefore  the  French  positions  could 
not  expand  beyond  La  Folie ;  he  determined 
to  attack  in  that  direction  with  such  forces 
as  might  be  necessary  to  carry  the  position. 

Thus,  while  General  Headquarters  turned 
its  gaze  towards  the  Briey  Road,  and  while 
the  ist  Army  remained  motionless  on  the 
Plateau  of  Gravelotte,  Prince  Frederick 
Charles,  at  Vionville,  alone  took  the  resolution 
of  acting  towards  the  east  with  part  of  his 
army.  Is  not  the  anarchy  in  this  way  of 
conducting  the  war  by  the  German  Higher 
Command  striking  ?  Does  it  not  suggest  the 
question,  "  Who  was  really  in  command?  " 

Yet  (a  singular  thing)  this  movement 
ordered  by  Prince  Frederick  Charles  became 
the  enveloping  attack,  the  decisive  action, 
of  a  battle  which  was  as  yet  neither  engaged 
nor  even  planned. 

It  was  evidently  a  very  sound  idea  to  engage 
in  the  direction  of  La  Folie,  for  that  would 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        321 

get  the  German  Command  out  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  "  unknown  "  in  which  it  still 
remained.  It  was  also  sound  to  demand  this 
effort  of  the  gth  German  Corps,  for  that  was 
the  corps  nearest  to  the  objective.  But  the 
movement  ought  to  have  been  ordered  as  a 
mere  reconnaissance,  because  as  yet  nothing 
was  known  :  and  it  ought  to  have  been  kept 
strictly  to  that  role  : 

I.  It  was  only  at  half-past  ten  in  the 
morning  of  this  day,  the  i8th  August, 
that  German  General  Headquarters 
began  to  see  things  as  they  were : 
the  French  army  to  the  west  of 
Metz  (where  it  had  been,  as  a  fact,  for 
several  days,  and  the  Germans  had 
been  moving  up  and  down  the  whole 
morning  of  the  i8th  in  front  of  it !). 
Moltke  did  not  even  yet  know 
whether  the  French  army  was  on  the 
march  or  stationary.  Might  it  not 
be  in  retreat  upon  Briey  ? 

II.  Anyhow,  without  any  further  certain 
information,  he  put  the  right  of  his 
troops  in  position  at  Montigny-la- 
Grange.  This  was  to  turn  out  an 
error  and  a  false  direction. 

III.  In  this  doubt  of  his  (which  later  was 
to  be  solved  by  his  subordinates)  he 


322        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

planned  a  manoeuvre  with  a  double 
alternative  objective;  it  was  aimed 
to  act  (a)  upon  the  enemy  in  retreat, 
or,  alternatively,  (6)  against  the 
enemy  in  position. 

IV.  But  this  manoeuvre  would  have  two 
totally  different  values,  according  to 
whether  the  one  or  other  of  these 
hypotheses  should  turn  out  to  be 
that  with  which  he  had  to  deal.  For 
if  there  were  no  retreat  going  on  the 
two  armies  would  come  to  the  shock 
on  the  enemy's  positions.  Whereas 
if  a  French  retreat  was  in  progress 
(on  which  point  Moltke  was  still 
without  news),  no  attack  could  be 
delivered  save  with  two  German 
corps,  the  Guard  and  the  I2th, 
which  alone  could  take  the  offensive 
through  the  district  of  St.  Marie. 
For  the  other  corps  had  each  already 
received  their  objectives  elsewhere. 
Therefore  we  have  here  a  notorious 
divergence  of  effort,  with  all  the 
weakness  that  might  result  from  it, 
at  the  decisive  point. 

And  what  would  happen  to 
Moltke's  manoeuvre  if  in  place  of 
the  two  hypotheses  which  he  allowed 
for,  a  third  should  turn  out  to  be  the 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        323 

reality  ?  We  see  here  once  more  the 
perils  and  the  incertitude  of  a  mili- 
tary combination  which  lacks  the 
solid  base  of  serious  reconnaissance, 
and  particularly  of  reconnaissance 
in  the  useful  direction — that  whence 
danger  threatens.  It  is  an  excellent 
example  of  how  powerless  one  is  to 
prepare  a  battering  blow  in  a  direc- 
tion on  which  one  is  not  thoroughly 
instructed. 

V.  But  let  us  admit  that  the  manoeuvre 

would  result  in  an  attack  on  the 
enemy's  positions.  There  are  still 
8000  yards  of  marching  for  the 
Guard  before  it  can  attack,  and 
nearly  12,000  for  the  i2th  German 
Corps.  In  other  words,  three  hours 
must  pass  before  contact  with  the 
enemy  will  take  place;  therefore 
one  is  supposing  the  enemy  to  be 
motionless,  for  one  is  leaving  him 
free  to  move  if  he  chooses.  Indeed, 
if  the  enemy  were  to  move  in  one 
direction  or  another  every  element 
in  the  manoeuvre  would  at  once  be 
called  into  question. 

VI.  Further,  who  shall  give  the  signal  for 

this  attack,  which  it  is  desired,  of 
course,  to  deliver  simultaneously? 


There  would  be  necessary,  in  order 
to  arrive  at  such  synchrony,  a 
Commander  who  could  watch  the 
masses  of  his  troops  arriving  and 
taking  their  distances  at  a  good 
useful  parallel  from  the  enemy's 
positions.  But  no  one  (so  far)  knew 
how  far  those  enemy  positions  ex- 
tended !  There  was  nothing  but 
guesswork  on  this  point.  Again, 
for  such  a  purpose  one  would  require 
a  Commander  who  should  march 
with  the  most  distant  troops  (the 
1 2th  and  the  Guard),  troops  which 
were  asked  to  solve,  even  as  they 
marched,  the  doubtful  question  of 
whether  the  French  were  retiring 
on  Briey.  That  Commander,  again, 
must  arrive  at  a  just  decision  accord- 
ing to  circumstances,  and  come  to 
such  a  decision  as  he  accompanied 
the  forces.  But  Moltke  remained 
at  Flavigny.  Given  that,  one  can 
foresee  -how,  in  spite  of  the  way  in 
which  the  French  played  into  the 
hands  of  the  Germans,  the  pro- 
gramme elaborated  by  the  German 
Headquarters  did  not  come  off. 
Above  all,  there  was  no  synchrony. 
The  victory  which  was  gained 


825 

reposed  entirely  upon  the  intelligent 
initiative  of  the  subordinate  Com- 
mands, not  upon  an  enlightened  and 
effective  Higher  Command.  That 
Higher  Command  remained  through- 
out incapable  of  fulfilling  its  task. 

Towards  noon  the  German  Higher  Com- 
mand (which  had  put  its  army  in  movement 
from  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  and  had  yet 
only  gained  some  8000  to  10,000  yards  of 
ground)  had  abandoned,  without  thorough 
examination,  its  theory  that  the  French  were 
in  retreat  towards  Briey,  and  had  admitted 
the  establishment  of  the  French  on  the  west 
of  Metz  from  Point-du- Jours  up  to  Montigny- 
la-Grange.  The  taking  up  of  the  new  direc- 
tion had  been  a  long  business,  though  it  was 
effected  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  who 
did  not  move  and  who  was  badly  protected; 
but  long  as  it  was  it  remained  incomplete. 
However,  as  German  Headquarters  thought 
they  were  quite  certain  of  the  position  of  the 
French  Right,  as  the  2nd  German  Army  was 
equally  certain,  the  decision  was  taken  to 
throw  what  was  supposed  to  be  a  defeated 
army  back  into  Metz. 

Even  as  Prince  Frederick  Charles  was 
giving  his  last  orders  the  cannon  was  heard 
just  after  midday  towards  Verndville.  But 


826        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

before  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  given 
any  new  orders,  the  troops  on  the  left  of  the 
2nd  Army  had  further  probed  the  situation 
and  on  their  own  initiative  had  taken  their 
dispositions,  corresponding  to  the  new  state 
of  affairs.  Thus  the  Guard  let  it  be  known  as 
early  as  11.30  that  St.  Marie-aux-Chenes  was 
occupied  by  French  infantry  and  that  there 
were  many  French  troops  at  St.  Privat. 
The  Guard  also  let  it  be  known  that  on 
account  of  these  circumstances  and  of  the 
instructions  received  it  would  march  not  on 
VerneVille  but  on  Habonville. 

The  I2th  Corps  sent  information  at  11.45 
that  the  enemy  was  in  position  at  Moineville 
and  St.  Marie-aux-Chenes ;  consequently,  that 
this  army  corps  was  about  to  march  against 
these  two  places,  covering  itself  by  a  flank 
guard  towards  Valleroy. 

The  manoeuvre  continued,  therefore,  to 
prolong  itself  both  in  time  and  in  space. 
The  combined  action  of  the  two  corps,  the 
Guard  and  the  I2th,  was  still  awaited. 
Because  they  had  not  reconnoitred  the  posi- 
tions which  they  desired  to  attack,  the 
Germans  passed  from  one  surprise  to  another. 

It  was  imperative  for  the  Germans  that 
they  should  win  this  action  of  the  i8th  be- 
cause, if  they  did  not,  all  their  plans  would 
be  upset.  Therefore  it  was  determined  to 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        327 

attack  St.  Privat  immediately,  and  with  the 
Guard  alone,  because  it  was  impossible  to 
count  upon  the  arrival  of  the  I2th  Corps, 
either  in  time  to  be  of  use  or  in  the  required 
direction.  Such  was  the  end  of  Prince 
Frederick  Charles'  original  plan  :  the  plan 
of  attacking  with  the  gth  Corps.  He  had  to 
give  it  up.  Moreover,  as  the  plan  which  he 
next  adopted  (attack  by  the  Guard)  led  to  a 
check,  there  was  neither  a  victory  of  the  and 
Army  to  be  put  to  the  credit  of  its  General, 
nor  a  victory  of  the  armies  as  a  whole  to  be 
put  to  the  credit  of  Moltke.  To  the  one  as 
to  the  other  insufficiency  of  reconnaissance 
had  forbidden  a  sufficient  power  of  direction 
to  develop  the  projected  combination. 
***** 

At  from  600  to  800  paces  behind  the 
advanced  ridge  which  covers  St.  Privat  the 
Guard  halted  in  a  condition  of  complete 
exhaustion.  Of  11,600  men  which  had  en- 
gaged in  the  action,  hardly  4,600  were  left  fit 
to  maintain  the  struggle.  The  proportion 
of  officer  losses  was  even  heavier  than  this; 
in  certain  battalions  not  an  officer  was  left. 
The  Prussian  Guard  was  at  the  mercy  of  any 
counter-offensive  the  French  might  choose  to 
make.  But  none  was  made. 

***** 

The  capture  of  St.  Privat  at  eight  o'clock 


328        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

in  the  evening  decided  the  defeat  of  the  French 
right  wing.  But  it  was  only  the  arrival  of 
the  1 2th  Corps  after  it  had  marched  all  day 
under  the  direct  and  personal  instructions  of 
its  own  Commander,  the  Prince  Royal  of 
Saxony,  which  permitted  this  result  to  be 
obtained. 

It  was  the  initiative  of  the  Corps  Com- 
mander of  the  1 2th  which  assured  the  decision 
of  St.  Privat  in  time.  At  every  other  point 
the  German  efforts  had  remained  impotent ; 
and  it  is  he  whom  we  ought  to  recognize  as 
the  true  victor  of  that  day,  or,  at  least,  as 
the  true  author  of  the  2nd  German  army's 
success. 

*  *  *  *  * 

Steinmetz  and  Zastrow  thought,  still  earlier 
in  the  day,  that  the  enemy  was  in  retreat  and 
even  in  rout !  At  three  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon the  Commander  of  the  ist  Army 
(Steinmetz)  had  sent  this  order  to  the  ist 
Division  of  Cavalry  grouped  to  the  west  of 
Malmaison  :  •  "  The  ist  Division  will  imme- 
diately go  forward  and  cross  the  depression 
of  Gravelotte."  At  the  same  time  he  ordered 
the  7th  Corps  to  go  forward  with  its  infantry. 
***** 

The  advanced  infantry,  sent  by  the  8th 
Corps  (the  3 ist  Brigade)  and  by  the  7th 
Corps  (the  27th  Brigade)  to  reinforce  the 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        329 

cavalry,  found  shelter  in  the  woods  of  the 
ravine  of  the  Mance  at  the  moment  when  this 
ist  Cavalry  Division  met  with  its  disaster. 
Nevertheless,  its  entry  into  the  line  was 
thereby  delayed. 

The  check  was  complete;  first,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  moral,  through  the  profound 
impression  which  the  disaster  produced ;  next, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  material,  for  two 
batteries  had  been  destroyed  by  the  French 
fire  and  a  third  had  been  lost  in  the  ravine. 
Three  others  were  wandering  about  without 
the  power  to  engage.  The  artillery  of  the 
7th  Corps  was  reduced  to  thirty-six  pieces. 
The  situation  would  have  become  very  critical 
for  the  8th  Corps  if  the  enemy  had  only  taken 
advantage  of  that  moment. 

To  sum  up  :  On  the  right  German  wing, 
to  which  General  Headquarters  had  par- 
ticularly attached  itself,  the  battle  was  lost, 
and  lost  under  conditions  which  forbade  its 
renewal  on  the  iQth.  The  last  available 
corps,  the  2nd,  had  come  up  in  the  night, 
lost  its  direction,  and  bunched  confusedly 
at  a  range  of  no  more  than  200  to  300  yards 
from  the  enemy. 

The  last  information  from  the  2nd  Army 
was  as  early  as  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
and  at  that  moment  nothing  decisive  had 
occurred. 


830        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

One  understands  well  enough,  therefore, 
why  Moltke  came  back  to  Rezonville  towards 
eleven  o'clock  that  night,  "  sombre  and  taci- 
turn." The  physical  fatigue  he  suffered — 
he  had  been  going  from  four  o'clock  in  the 
morning  to  five  in  the  afternoon  of  the  I7th, 
and,  on  this  day  of  the  i8th,  from  three  o'clock 
in  the  morning  to  that  night — was  the  least 
cause  of  his  mood.  Beyond  that  there  was 
the  very  bad  impression  which  he  had 
gathered  of  the  fight  in  the  ravine  of  the 
Mance.  He  had  left  the  field  of  battle  with 
regret.  He  had  certainly  gathered  no  laurels 
and  he  had  no  reserves  with  which  to 
begin  the  struggle  again  upon  the  following 
day. 

Doubtless  at  this  moment  he  thought  with 
bitterness  of  the  4th  Corps  which  he  had 
sent  off  against  Toul  and  Commercy,  and  of 
the  3rd  Army  halted  near  Nancy.  Either  the 
one  or  the  other,  had  he  but  had  the  foresight 
to  retain  them,  would  now  have  proved  a 
precious  auxiliary  to  the  solution  of  his 
problem. 

Nevertheless,  he  awaited  the  dispatches 
of  Prince  Frederick  Charles,  and,  though  he 
was  in  perplexity,  kept  the  calm  which  he 
always  showed  in  great  circumstances.  He 
was  even  able  to  take  his  regular  sleep,  which 
was  a  proof  of  the  balance  of  his  nerves  as 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        331 

well  as  of  his  strength  of  character.  After 
midnight  there  came  news  of  the  victory  of 
Frederick  Charles.  He  received  that  news 
with  apparent  indifference  and  as  though  he 
had  never  doubted  its  arrival. 

***** 

Moltke  was  but  a  Chief  of  Staff.  The 
General  Headquarters  of  the  German  Army 
in  1870  could  not,  on  account  of  its  com- 
position— that  is,  on  account  of  the  age  and 
the  character  of  its  principal  personalities — 
hope  to  drive  the  war  at  the  pace  it  should 
have  had. 

In  the  absence  of  an  effective  superior 
Command,  there  were  two  battles  upon  this 
1 8th  of  August :  that  of  St.  Privat  which  was 
a  victory  and  one  in  which  Moltke  was  not 
present,  but  in  which  his  ideas  were  followed ; 
another  at  Gravelottes  which  was  a  check. 
There  Moltke  was  present  and  yet  was  unable 
to  make  his  views  predominate. 


(i)  The  Manoeuvre  of  Sedan 

[The  army  of  Bazaine  had  been  reduced  to 
a  stationary  condition  under  Metz  after  St. 
Privat.  Moltke  then  invested  it  with  the  ist 
and  2nd  German  Armies,  while  he  formed  a 
4th  Army  composed  of  the  tfh  Army  Corps,  the 
I2th  Army  Corps  and  the  Guard.  This  army 


332        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

/ 

went  off  to  operate  in  concert  with  the  three 
German  armies  which  had  been  victorious  at 
FrcKschwiller ,  against  the  army  of  MacMahon  ; 
which  last  had  been  concentrated  at  the  camp 
of  Chalons  and  had  been  reported  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Rheims.] 

We  here  see  one  of  the  characters  attaching 
to  Moltke's  strategy  :  the  battle  dependent 
upon  superior  numbers  conditioned  by  space 
— a  mathematical  dimension.  This  concep- 
tion, which  had  produced  the  concentration 
on  the  Rhine  and  the  Battle  of  Marnheim, 
Moltke  repeated  on  the  25th  of  August  when 
it  was  his  task  to  stop  the  French  Army  on 
its  march  from  the  camp  of  Chalons  towards 
Metz. 

Given  that  this  army,  composed  of  four 
army  corps,  had  been  noted  on  the  23rd 
August  at  Rheims,  it  could,  by  the  25th,  be 
on  the  Aisne  River,  and  by  the  27th  on  the 
Meuse.  It  could  therefore  be  quite  certainly 
held  at  Damvillers  :  because  the  German 
forces  could  reach  that  point  in  three  days 
(that  is,  on  the  28th).  From  that  date  the 
following  German  forces  could  arrive  there : 
two  corps  from  the  Army  of  the  Metz,  three 
from  the  army  of  the  Meuse,  two  corps  from 
the  3rd  Army.  That  is,  seven  corps  all  told 
against  the  French  four. 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        333 

On  the  28th  of  August,  therefore,  the 
French  would  find  themselves  at  this  point 
(Damvillers),  within  a  march  of  the  Meuse, 
engaged  in  battle  under  conditions  of  very 
notable  numerical  inferiority.  It  may  be 
seen  from  the  map  that  Damvillers,  standing 
as  it  does  from  Vouziers  to  Metz,  is  the  centre 
of  a  circle  which,  within  a  radius  of  less  than 
the  distance  from  Damvillers  to  Vouziers, 
included  all  seven  German  army  corps. 

If  one  looks  at  the  matter  solely  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  result  which  Moltke  was 
aiming  at,  this  strategy  had  a  mathematical 
certitude  about  it  which  was  full  of  grandeur 
and  simplicity.  His  result  once  obtained,  his 
concentration  once  realized  on  the  2Oth  of 
August  at  Damvillers  (as  during  the  first  days 
of  August  at  Marnheim),  Moltke  evidently 
would  have  his  battle  under  the  most  favour- 
able conditions.  But  can  he  be  sure  before- 
hand of  that  result  ?  Can  he  be  sure  of 
effecting  his  concentration?  He  is  in  the 
presence  of  an  adversary  who  is  in  action 
and  who  is  separated  from  him  by  no 
great  obstacle.  What  guarantee  has  he  of 
achieving  his  groupment  of  troops  without 
interference  ? 

It  is  here  that  the  inferiority  of  Moltke's 
strategy  to  that  of  Napoleon's  (in  1806,  for 
instance)  appears.  Napoleon's  strategy  of 


334        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

1806  implied  a  concentration  which  at  its 
origin  was  frankly  defensive,  only  to  become 
as  frankly  offensive  at  its  close.  The  opera- 
tion was  covered,  at  every  moment  of  its 
development,  in  its  every  phase,  by  a  special 
organ  which  gave  it  strategic  security  :  first, 
by  covering  troops ;  then,  by  general  advance 
guard.  Should  the  enemy  appear  and 
menace,  Napoleon  did  not  only  seek  security 
in  the  element  of  space  but  also  through 
this  force  (the  advance  guard)  capable  of 
manoeuvre  and,  if  necessary,  of  resistance. 

Moltke  in  1870  did  not  apply  these  theories. 
He  did  not  believe  in  strategic  security  or  in 
the  necessity  of  a  covering  force. 

Had  he  done  so,  the  result  he  was  aiming  at 
(concentration  of  forces)  could  have  been 
achieved  more  surely  and  at  less  distance  in 
spite  of  the  enemy.  Moreover,  during  all 
the  time  that  this  concentration  was  being 
effected  it  would  have  been,  thanks  to  the 
covering  force,  not  only  safe  from  the  blows 
of  the  adversary,  but  also  capable  of  starting 
a  new  manoeuvre  or  transforming  that  already 
begun,  if  such  a  necessity  should  impose  itself 
during  the  process  of  concentration. 

It  is  remarkable,  in  spite  of  its  absence  in 
1870,  that  strategic  security  had  been  both 
known  and  practised  by  the  German  staffs, 
notably  in  1814  and  1815. 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        335 

THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR 
The  Russian  Army  was  constituted  and 
maintained  its  being  at  the  extremity  of  a 
single  line  of  railway  over  7000  miles  in 
length.  The  Japanese  Army  was  grouped 
and  had  to  act  on  the  far  side  of  a  sea  700 
miles  broad  (the  distance  from  Port  Arthur 
to  Nagasaki).  The  theatre  of  operations, 
Corea  and  Manchuria,  has  bad  roads  and  few 
railways.  The  war  in  this  region,  therefore, 
went  at  a  slower  pace  than  it  would  have  done 
in  the  more  intensely  living  countries  of 
Europe.  In  spite  of  a  Higher  Command  of  the 
very  first  order,  it  could  not  achieve  those 
sudden  strategic  deployments,  those  rapid 
marches  and  those  lightning  attacks  whence 
the  first  shocks  of  European  struggles  spring 
upon  us  like  thunderclaps. 

Again,  the  war  did  not  put  the  national 
existence  of  either  party  at  stake,  but  only 
their  future.  The  political  object  of  the  war 
was  therefore  restricted ;  and  therefore,  also, 
the  lessons  it  has  for  us  are  neither  complete 
nor  of  immediate  interest.  The  moral  it 
affords  is  not  one  which  we  have  to  copy. 
But  having  once  granted  all  this,  we  still  see 
that  the  war  obeyed  the  same  dominating 
principles,  especially  on  the  Japanese  side, 
as  appear  in  other  campaigns. 


336        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

After  methodical  preparation  the  Japanese 
Command  realized  to  its  full  limits  the  idea 
of  strategic  security.  The  I2th  Japanese 
Division  first  disembarks  at  Tchemulpo,  far 
from  the  enemy,  and  then  advances  to  cover 
the  disembarkation  of  the  ist  Army  at 
Tchinampo,  160  miles  nearer  the  adversary. 

The  army  thus  constituted  crosses  the 
Yalu  River  in  order  to  cover  the  disembarka- 
tions of  the  2nd,  3rd  and  4th  Armies  in  the 
Peninsula  of  Laiutang,  so  as  to  cut  the  com- 
munications of  Port  Arthur.  The  whole 
thing  was  a  practical  example  of  the  theory 
of  the  Napoleonic  advance  guard. 

When  the  Japanese  passed  to  action  an 
offensive  spirit  inspired  all  their  decisions, 
and  personal  initiative  animated  the  whole. 
Strategically  as  well  as  tactically  they  at- 
tacked; but  their  attack  was  not  merely 
simple  or  frontal.  It  was  constantly  accom- 
panied by  manoeuvre.  It  aimed  strategically 
at  the  communications  of  its  adversary, 
tactically  at  the  envelopment  of  a  wing  with 
the  object  of  destroying  that  wing  and, 
again,  of  reaching  the  line  of  communication. 
At  Mukden  Nogi's  army  was  not  so  much 
concerned  with  crushing  the  Russian  Right 
by  a  flank  attack  as  with  getting  behind  it  in 
order  thus  to  compel  the  retreat  of  all  the 
enemy  forces.  Hence  we  may  say  that  the 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        337 

manoeuvre-battle  of  the  Napoleonic  epoch  and 
of  1870  was  transformed  into  an  operation- 
battle  lasting  several  days.  One  may  say  that 
the  decision,  even  on  the  battlefield  itself, 
had  become  a  strategic  affair  and  that  the 
union  between  strategy  and  tactics  was  far 
closer  than  it  has  been  in  earlier  days. 

Since  the  assailant  extends  his  lines  beyond 
limits  hitherto  known,  and  the  double  pressure 
of  frontal  attack  and  flank  attack  are  very 
greatly  enlarged,  a  new  call  is  made  both  upon 
the  power  of  weapons  and  upon  field  fortifica- 
tion (the  Japanese  linesman  was  never  with- 
out his  entrenching  tools) ;  further,  to  render 
command  possible  under  such  circumstances, 
it  depends  upon  the  wire. 

We  have  seen  in  all  this  that  the  mind 
retains  the  same  universal  conception  of  the 
essential  act  of  war,  but  that  by  a  wider  and 
more  careful  use  of  material  means  it  renders 
that  act  practicable  in  an  ever-increasing 
dimension  of  space.  The  advance  of  modern 
industry  modifies  the  forms  of  war  and  con- 
tinues the  evolution  of  the  art  of  war,  but  it 
does  not  produce  a  revolution  therein  :  it 
does  not  affect  in  any  point  the  fundamental 
principles  of  the  conduct  of  war. 


338        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

\ 
ON   MEN 

ALVENSLEBEN 

German  general :  Commander  of  $rd  German 
Corps  in  1870.  See,  in  the  Precepts,  the 
heading,  "Moral  Ascendancy." 

BEAULIEU 

Austrian  General,  commanding  the  Army  of 
Italy  against  Bonaparte  in  1796. 

Beaulieu  had  just  taken  over  the  command 
of  the  Austrian  Army  (he  no  longer  com- 
manded the  Sardinians) ;  he  was  seventy- 
two  years  old  and  had  a  situation  and  a 
reputation  to  save.  "  He  was  the  product  of 
sixty  years  of  official  pedantry,  the  thing  most 
likely  to  depress  the  mind  and  the  heart. 
He  was  the  old  servant  of  an  old  monarchy, 
the  instrument  of  a  heavy  and  starched  aulic 
council  "  (Clausewitz) .  What  would  such  a 
man  look  for?  Before  all  he  would  try  to 
avoid  risking  either  his  own  reputation  or  the 
army  and  the  interests  of  the  monarchy,  even 
if  at  such  a  game  neither  of  them  should  gain 
anything. 

His  schemes,  as  well  as  his  temperament, 
were  inferior  to  those  of  Bonaparte.  He  still 
contemplated  taking  the  offensive,  but  only 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        339 

in  order  to  drive  the  French  from  the  Riviera, 
to  take  the  department  of  Alpes-Maritimes ; 
join  hands  with  the  English;  thenceforward 
continue  a  war  of  posts  in  the  mountains,  and 
threaten,  if  need  be,  the  French  in  Provence. 
How  greatly  did  such  a  conception  of 
warfare  differ  from  the  new  idea  launched 
by  Carnot,  "  follow  up  the  enemy  until  com- 
plete destruction  ensues  "  !  Beaulieu's  type 
of  war  was  conducted  for  partial  gains  only. 
Preparation,  execution,  would  likewise  in- 
volve but  a  reduced  and  partial  use  of  the 
means  at  hand. 

BLUCHER 

Prussian  Field-Marshal  engaged  in  the 
campaign  1806,  1807  and  1813,  where  he  com- 
manded the  inner  army  of  Silesia  ;  the  cam- 
paign of  1814  in  France  and  0/1815  in  which 
he  decided  the  Battle  of  Waterloo.  [In  June 
1815  his  dispositions  were  judicious,  his  whole 
army  could  be  concentrated  in  two  days  on 
whatever  side  Napoleon  might  present  himself 
and  in  the  direction  where  he  might  be  attacked. 
He  threw  out  two  "feelers,"  the  ist  and  the  -yd 
Corps.  Nevertheless,  his  own  concentration 
which  he  had  fixed  for  his  army  was  somewhat 
too  much  exposed  to  an  enemy  offensive.  In 
the  face  of  an  adversary  such  as  Napoleon  he 
had  neither  time  nor  space  to  manoeuvre.] 


340        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

Let  us  remember,  besides,  what  Scharn- 
horst  so  rightly  said  when  Bliicher  was 
appointed  Commander  of  the  army  of  Silesia 
in  1813  :  "7s  it  not  the  manner  in  which  the 
chiefs  fulfil  that  task  (commanding,  imparting  a 
resolve  to  other  men's  hearts),  which  makes  them 
true  warriors,  much  more  than  all  other  abilities 
or  faculties  theory  may  require  from  them  ?  " 

Facts  were  soon  to  vindicate  the  sound- 
ness of  this  appreciation  of  Bliicher,  whom 
courtiers  were  still  calling  an  imbecile  and 
a  sick  old  man,  an  embodiment  of  impotence ; 
although — owing  to  his  influence  over  the 
country — he  was  to  his  fellow-citizens  the 
very  embodiment  of  patriotism  and  had 
taken  in  hand  all  national  claims ;  although— 
owing  to  his  popularity  within  the  army — he 
had  conquered  the  soldier's  love  by  con- 
stantly attending  to  the  soldier's  interests  and 
was  able  to  request,  undertake,  attain  any- 
thing. Reposing  on  so  considerable  an  in- 
fluence, this  man  who  dared  to  face  the 
French  Caesar — a  man  of  a  little  mind,  but  of 
a  will,  of  a  passion  which  would  never  tire 
and  would  never  lay  down  arms — was  to 
draw  whole  nations  into  the  war  and  lead 
his  armies  to  victory,  just  as  he  was  to  carry 
to  Paris  the  sovereigns  of  Europe,  and  this 
in  spite  of  themselves — at  least,  as  regarded 
one  of  them,  the  Emperor  of  Austria,  who 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        341 

did  not  desire  to  dethrone  his  son-in-law  and 
to  make  his  daughter  a  widow. 

BONAPARTE 

Just  as  the  political  revolution,  which  had 
recently  taken  place,  might  have  come  to  an 
end  after  an  ephemeral  existence — with  the 
Directory,  for  instance — had  not  Bonaparte 
proved,  by  taming  it,  that  it  was  possible  to 
base  on  these  new  principles  the  organization 
of  a  lasting  society,  so,  without  superior 
minds  such  as  Hoche,  Carnot,  Bonaparte, 
and  certain  other  Generals  of  the  Revolution, 
the  conception  of  the  mass-levy,  of  war  with 
unlimited  resources,  would  have  risked  re- 
maining a  mere  fancy,  an  Utopia  confuted  by 
the  armies  and  theories  of  the  eighteenth 
century. 

To  master  that  epoch  of  the  Revolution,  it 
would  not  have  sufficed  to  apply  ancient 
processes  to  the  new  situations  and  resources 
created  by  it,  as  did  commonplace  men. 

Therein  lies  the  greatness  of  a  time  which 
supplied  the  man  who  was  to  launch  the  new 
principles — Carnot — and  the  men  who  were 
to  apply  those  principles :  Hoche,  Bona- 
parte, etc. 

So  long  as  the  early  Generals  of  the  Revolu- 
tion were  left  to  themselves,  they  continued, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  were  waging  a 


842        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

national  war,  to  apply  the  methods  of  the 
eighteenth  century  to  seek  positions,  lines, 
cordons. 

Moreover,  as  a  result  of  the  new  processes 
(for  instance,  the  army  housed  and  fed  by  the 
country  it  occupied)  and  of  the  considerable 
numbers  used,  the  line,  the  cordon  were  still 
extended;  weakness  increased. 

For  a  long  time  the  remedy  was  not  per- 
ceived by  average  minds. 

Let  us  remember  that  Moreau  himself 
entered  Germany  in  1800,  four  years  after 
1796,  with  an  army  which  by  destination, 
by  organization,  contained  one  centre,  two 
wings,  one  reserve — an  eminently  rigid  con- 
ception of  things;  while  every  one  of  these 
organs,  like  every  early  army  of  the  Republic, 
had  its  own  distinct,  and  purely  geographical, 
object.  This  brings  us  back  to  the  metaphor 
of  the  specialization  of  credit;  to  fixed  and 
invariable  apportionment. 

And  as  one  infirmity  involves  another, 
what  do  we  see  when  Moreau  enters  Germany  ? 

Such  a  block,  composed  of  elements  not 
interchangeable,  drawn  up  on  an  invariable 
model,  sometimes  advancing,  then  going  back, 
stopping  in  order  to  establish  itself  on  a 
position,  never  seeking  battle — such  are  the 
manoeuvres  of  1800  around  Ulm,  the  retreat 
from  the  Black  Forest,  etc. 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        343 

CARNOT 

It  was  Carnot  who  first  initiated  this 
manner  of  understanding,  organizing,  and 
conducting  war.  This  we  have  from  Du- 
mouriez,  the  victor  of  the  Argonne,  who 
cannot  be  suspected  in  the  matter  since,  after 
betraying  his  country,  he  never  failed  to 
sneer  at  his  contemporaries — more  especially 
at  those  in  office.  Yet  he  wrote  in  his 
Recollections  : 

"  Carnot  it  was  who  created  the  new  state 
of  things  in  military  affairs ;  a  state  of  things 
which  Dumouriez  had  barely  the  time  to 
adumbrate  and  which  was  perfected  by 
Bonaparte." 

The  reason  why  the  application  was  not 
at  first  very  clear  was  because  Carnot  did  not 
himself  act  in  the  field.  Nevertheless  it  was 
he  who  wrote  these  words  : 

"  All  the  armies  of  the  Republic  will  have  to 
act  offensively,  but  not  everywhere  with  the  same 
amount  of  means  (the  apportionment  of  means 
depends  on  the  goal  to  be  reached).  We 
must  have  a  most  offensive  and  decisive  cam- 
paign ;  we  must  constantly  pursue  the  enemy 
until  he  shall  be  completely  destroyed  (a  new 
result  to  aim  at !)." 

All  his  correspondence  shows  that  he  was 
the  first,  in  that  period  of  commotion  and 


344        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

revolutionary  chaos,  to  try  and  put  things 
in  order  once  more.  He  sought  to  remedy 
the  scattering  and  crumbling  which  were 
ruining  France's  considerable  forces  (fourteen 
armies  in  1794),  by  means  of  convergence  of 
effort  and  singleness  of  goal. 

The  numerous  divisions  set  up  tended  to 
scatter,  to  isolate  themselves,  in  order  to 
live,  march,  and  enjoy  their  independence; 
he  showed  them  the  importance  of  aiming  all 
at  one  same  point. 

To  the  block  of  the  ancient  armies,  which 
could  no  longer  reappear,  for  it  was  utterly 
incapable  of  manoeuvring  on  the  new  scale, 
he  tried  to  substitute  concordance  and 
synchrony  in  many  efforts  starting  from 
various  points. 

To  reunite,  to  induce  troops  apparently 
scattered  to  co-operate,  such  was  the  first 
result  he  aimed  at  and  reached. 

And  likewise,  in  one  particular  battle,  at 
Wattignies,  Carnot  being  present,  the  idea 
of  an  attack  by  superior  forces  on  a  point  of  the 
line  first  made  its  appearance. 

All  this  is  economy  of  forces. 

Carnot  did  more  than  that,  and  indicated 
how  the  result  must  be  sought.  Thus  he 
wrote : 

"We  prescribe  to  the  Generals  commanding- 
in-chief  the  armies  operating  in  Germany  to 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        345 

see  that  the  numerous  and  brilliant  combats 
they  have  sustained  shall  be  followed  by  more 
serious  actions  the  results  of  which  should 
be  final.  It  is  only  by  winning  great  battles 
that  they  will  succeed  in  completely  dis- 
solving the  Austrian  army,  and  however 
skilful  that  army  may  be  in  retiring  from  one 
position  to  another,  we  hope  that  by  coming 
into  contact  with  it,  they  will  enforce  a  general 
engagement  the  consequence  of  which  will  be 
to  compel  the  enemy  to  fall  far  back.  ..." 

We  have  travelled  a  long  way  from  Marshal 
de  Saxe ;  from  that  good  general  who  thought 
he  could  wage  war  his  whole  life  without 
giving  battle.  We  are  very  near  Napoleon, 
who  said  :  "  There  is  nothing  I  desire  so 
much  as  a  great  battle  " ;  who,  according  to 
Clausewitz,  always  looked  out  for  a  chance  of 
fighting. 

CLAUSEWITZ 

See  in  the  Precepts  the  heading,  "  Evolution 
of  War." 

CONVENTION 

[The  Parliament  of  the  French  Revolution.] 

When  the  Convention  decreed  the  mass- 
levy,  they  at  first  produced  in  the  military 
field  nothing  but  chaos  in  all  its  forms,  as 
well  as  that  impotence  which  I  have  just 
mentioned  in  conducting  operations  of  war. 


846        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

Creating  a  new  order  of  things  does  not 
involve  the  ability  to  give  to  that  order  from 
the  outset  the  power  of  working,  nor  even 
life. 

DUMOURIEZ 

Tactical  results  are  the  only  things  that 
matter  in  war.  Nothing  but  decision  by 
arms  makes  an  award  possible,  for  such  a 
decision  alone  makes  a  victor  and  a  van- 
quished ;  alone  does  it  modify  the  respective 
situation  of  the  opposing  parties,  of  which 
one  becomes  the  master  of  his  own  acts,  while 
the  other  has  to  submit  to  the  will  of  the 
adversary.  Where  there  is  no  battle,  there 
is  no  award,  nothing  is  accomplished.  Valmy 
proves  it.  Dumouriez  finds  himself  in  Sainte- 
Menehould.  Is  he  outflanked?  He  is,  for 
he  finds  himself  cut  off  from  direct  com- 
munications with  Paris ;  he  resorts  to  indirect 
communications.  But  there  has  been  no 
decision  by  arms,  no  tactical  result.  He 
decides  that  nothing  is  yet  concluded  :  he 
does  not  withdraw.  When  he  is  attacked,  he 
defends  himself.  As  he  is  not  beaten,  it  is 
the  enemy  who  are  beaten,  for  they  have 
failed  at  the  bar  of  battle. 

DE  FAILLY 
General  commanding  the  $th  French  Corps 


PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS        847 

in  1870.  See  also  the  Precepts,  under  the 
heading  "  Discipline." 

By  a  dispatch  sent  out  from  Metz,  on  the 
morning  of  August  5th,  the  5th  Corps  had 
been  placed  under  Marshal  de  MacMahon. 
The  Major-General,  who  transmitted  this 
decision,  believed  the  three  divisions  of  the 
5th  Corps  had  met  at  Bitche  in  the  evening. 
Marshal  de  MacMahon,  for  his  part,  tele- 
graphed at  8  p.m.  to  General  de  Failly  : 

11  Come  to  Reichshoffen  as  soon  as  possible 
with  your  whole  army  corps."  He  ended  by 
saying :  "I  expect  you  to  join  me  in  the 
course  of  to-morrow." 

Here  was  again  a  very  clear  order  to  be 
carried  out :  to  come  as  soon  as  possible. 

General  de  Failly  answered  at  3  a.m.  on 
the  6th  :  "  That  he  could  only  send  the 
Lespart  Division  on  that  day." 

In  any  case  the  Lespart  Division  alone 
received  the  order  to  start  early  on  the  6th, 
by  the  road  to  Niederbronn ;  but  the  division, 
owing  to  rumours  brought  by  frightened 
peasants,  put  off  its  departure;  it  did  not 
start  till  7.30  a.m. 

No  intelligence  service  had  been  regularly 
organized.  Military  decisions  were  dictated 
by  rumours,  founded  or  unfounded,  generally 
magnified  by  fear ;  how  could  such  decisions 
correspond  to  the  reality  of  things  ? 


348        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

General  de  Bernis,  with  the  i2th  Chasseurs, 
preceded  the  division.  He  had  neither  an 
advance  guard  nor  a  flank  guard.  Numerous 
roads  and  paths  debouch  on  the  left  of  the 
road  followed ;  General  de  Lespart,  therefore, 
feared  lest  he  should  be  attacked  in  flank. 
He  advanced  only  step  by  step.  The  column 
stopped  at  every  cross-road.  The  country 
was  searched  in  front  and  on  the  side  by 
cavalry,  often  even  by  infantry  detachments. 
The  whole  division  rolled  itself  up;  the 
column  only  resumed  its  advance  after  the 
reconnaissances  had  come  back  and  stated 
that  it  could  go  ahead  without  danger. 

A  great  number  of  halts  resulted  from  this, 
to  the  particular  bewilderment  of  the  rank 
and  file.  Officers  and  men,  excited  by  the 
noise  of  gunfire  which  had  been  heard  since 
the  morning,  grew  impatient  of  these  delays 
and  found  that  the  measures  taken  were — to 
say  the  least  of  it — ill-timed.  When  they 
came  nearer  to  Niederbronn,  returning 
wounded  were  met,  then  fugitives;  these 
latter  became  more  and  more  numerous  : 
they  naturally  said  that  things  were  going 
badly ;  they  soon  announced  that  the  battle 
had  been  lost. 

When  they  arrived  on  the  heights  over- 
looking Niederbronn,  a  retreating  flood  was 
seen  crossing  the  town ;  it  was  five  o'clock. 


PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS        349 

The  Guyot  de  Lespart  Division  had  been 
from  7.30  a.m.  until  5  p.m. — more  than  nine 
hours — on  the  march  to  cover  the  fourteen 
miles  distance  from  Bitche  to  Niederbronn. 

The  troops  it  was  bringing  up  were 
physically  and  morally  exhausted.  Above 
all,  these  troops  were  useless.  It  was  too 
late  ! 

The  whole  of  the  $th  Corps  had  failed  to 
keep  its  appointment. 

It  was  its  fault  that  the  battle  was  lost. 

Men  who  had  not  been  made  to  march 
twenty  miles  in  order  to  be  led  to  victory, 
were  now  able  and  compelled  to  walk  in  a 
state  of  demoralization  for  nearly  sixty  miles 
(Abbatucci  Brigade,  from  Niederbronn  to 
Saverne)  within  thirty-six  hours. 

Without  having  fired  a  single  shot,  the 
5th  Army  Corps,  composed  of  gallant  troops, 
of  undeniable  value,  had  withdrawn  from  the 
struggle  in  a  state  of  annihilation  and  of 
depression;  the  men  had  been  deprived  oi 
their  moral  strength ;  they  no  longer  trusted 
their  own  chiefs;  they  stood  ready  to  be 
routed.  In  the  army's  judgment,  and  for  a 
long  time  to  come,  that  corps  was  to  be  held 
responsible  for  the  defeat  at  Frceschwiller ; 
rightly  enough  if  the  command  and  the  rank 
and  file  are  made  jointly  responsible ;  wrongly, 
however,  if  one  perceives  the  truth,  which  is, 


350        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

that  battles  are  lost  or  won  by  Generals,  not 
by  the  rank  and  file. 

PRINCE  FREDERICK  CHARLES 

Commander  of  the  German  2nd  Army  in 
1870-71.  See  also  in  the  Precepts  the  head- 
ings, "  Activity  of  Generals  "  and  "  Moral 
Ascendancy." 

Frederick  Charles  was  a  man  of  action  in 
the  highest  degree;  the  mere  thought  of  a 
great  result  being  possible  turned  his  head 
to  the  point  of  depriving  him  of  the  ability 
to  perceive  what  should  be  his  starting-point, 
or  to  measure  all  the  import  and  risks  in-  • 
volved.  Von  Moltke's  'hypothesis  became  a 
certainty  to  him.1  He  rushed  on  impetu- 
ously. Up  to  the  end  and  unconsciously  he 
will  remain  blindfold.  He  claimed  a  kill 
before  finding  his  fox. 

This  is  precisely  what  happens  in  general 
when  a  man  starts  from  a  supposed  certainty 
which  is  founded  on  nothing.  Just  as 
Frederick  Charles  had  not  felt  the  need  of 
getting  hold  of  a  well-founded  truth,  so  he  did 
not  find  it  necessary  to  verify  his  belief,  and 
the  latter  still  held  good  to  his  mind.  He 
did  not  seek  for  information  on  the  i6th,  as 

1  In  the  middle  of  August  1870,  as  Bazaine  fell  back 
on  Metz,  Moltke  erroneously  believed  him  to  be  retreating 
northwards. 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        351 

we  have  seen;  but  more  than  this,  on  the 
same  i6th,  at  noon,  he  dictated  an  order 
which  settled  the  way  in  which  the  whole  of 
the  2nd  Army  should  arrive  on  the  I7th  at  the 
Meuse  (he  was  still  banking  on  the  alleged 
victory  of  the  I4th),  an  order  which  the 
official  Records  of  the  Great  General  Staff  has 
carefully  preserved  for  us  (although  it  was 
not  carried  out  in  the  least)  ;  as  though  it  did 
not  contain  the  most  bitter  and  violent 
criticism  of  the  decision  taken  by  that  prince 
during  these  days;  as  though  it  were  not  a 
kind  of  ironical  monument  set  up  to  him,  the 
interest  of  which,  from  an  historical  point  of 
view,  can  only  consist  in  exonerating  von 
Moltke  from  the  responsibilities  incurred 
during  the  acute  crisis  of  August  i6th  —  and 


GAMBETTA 

The  glory  of  Gambetta  in  history  will 
consist  in  having  understood  that  the  centre 
of  power  in  a  country  is  not  its  capital,  but 
the  nation  itself,  with  its  resources  of  every 
kind.  The  capital  has  two  million  inhabi- 
tants, soon  suffering  siege;  but  the  nation 
has  thirty-five  millions  still  free  to  manoeuvre 
and  to  attack.  On  this  basis  Gambetta 
organized  the  national  war  and  a  struggle 
to  the  bitter  end. 


352        PRECEPTS  AND  JUDGMENTS 

Unfortunately,  even  the  best  brains  have 
difficulty  in  escaping  from  the  ideas  of  their 
time,  and  that  is  why  Gambetta  did  not  apply 
his  theory  completely. 

He  had  organized  national  armies,  but  did 
not  discover  the  art  of  waging  a  national  war, 
nor  did  he  shake  himself  free  from  the  super- 
stition that  the  fate  of  a  nation  depends  upon 
that  of  its  capital.  Therefore  did  he  give 
to  those  armies  which  he  created  as  though 
by  magic,  the  relief  of  Paris  as  their  very 
first  task.  He  wore  them  out  in  an  attack 
upon  numerous,  well-instructed  and  victorious 
troops,  in  an  offensive  which  was  beyond  their 
strength,  and  he  bade  them  attempt  an 
immediate  and  complete  decision  of  which 
they  were  incapable.  He  directed  them,  for 
this  purpose,  through  ground  (the  district  of 
the  Beance)  most  unfavourable  to  young  and 
raw  troops. 

Utterly  different  would  have  been  the 
programme  of  a  national  struggle  thoroughly 
thought  out.  It  would,  in  the  first  place, 
have  aimed  at  defending  foot  by  foot  the 
territory  which  furnished  resources  for  both 
armies,  and  only  later  would  have  attempted 
the  deliverance  of  the  country.  The  execu- 
tion of  such  a  plan  would  have  involved  at 
the  outset  a  mere  defensive.  That  is  the  only 
form  of  war  possible  to  raw  troops  at  first, 


because  it  makes  use  of  space,  time  and 
ground,  and  allows  one  to  refuse  one's  adver- 
sary a  decision,  though  that  is  what  the 
adversary  immediately  needs  if  he  is  to 
break  down  the  resistance  and  to  conquer 
the  country.  In  the  last  stage  this  plan 
would  have  involved  an  offensive,  but  an 
offensive  then  delivered  with  armies  trained 
to  war  and  confident  against  an  enemy  neces- 
sarily dispersed,  worn  out  by  sterile  effort, 
and  starved  by  the  length  of  its  communica- 
tion. Such  was  the  tactic  demanded.  The 
great  patriot  and  powerful  organizer  could 
not  accomplish  this  task  because  he  had  not 
special  knowledge.  Military  institutions  and 
ideas,  like  all  others,  only  yield  fruit  when 
they  are  strongly  founded  on  reality,  and  such 
strong  foundation  in  this  case  meant  com- 
plete possession  of  the  nature  of  war  and  of 
an  armed  force.  It  was  because  he  knew 
both  so  well  that  Carnot  was  able  to  draw 
victory  from  the  principle  of  the  mass-levy. 

GARIBALDI  (IN  1870) 
Many  tactical  lessons  might  be  drawn  from 

these  fights  around  Dijon. 

The  result,  as  is  well  known,  was  the  great 

success  of  the  Southern  German  Army. 
As  for  Garibaldi,  the  repeated  attacks  of 

January  2ist  and  23rd  induced  him  to  believe 

AA 


354        PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS 

that  he  had  before  him  important  German 
forces.  He  remained  on  a  cautious  defen- 
sive :  he  praised  his  own  successes  in  the 
most  eulogistic  terms. 

The  result  was  the  disastrous  defeat  of  the 
Eastern  French  Army. 

Error  is  human,  we  may  be  told ;  it  is  not 
a  crime. 

The  crime  does  not  lie  in  that,  but  in  the 
fact  that  Garibaldi,  after  being  ordered  to 
join  the  Eastern  Army,  had  not  done  so. 
He  never  thought  of  carrying  out  his  orders. 
His  conduct  was  dictated  by  his  own  personal 
views,  by  his  craving  for  personal  success. 

GENERALS  OF  THE  RESTORATION 

The  new  mechanics  were  no  more  grasped 
by  Moreau  and  the  early  Generals  of  the 
Revolution,  than  later  on  by  the  French 
Generals  of  the  Restoration  who  reorganized 
the  lineal  order,  or  than  by  the  authors  of 
our  Field  Service  Book  of  1883,  which,  until 
1895,  a  few  years  ago,  continued  to  affirm 
that  :  "  Armies  are  composed  of  a  centre, 
wings,  and  reserve;  marching  armies  use 
the  greatest  possible  number  of  roads,  etc." 

GUYOT  DE  LESPART 
General  commanding  a  division  of  General  de 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        355 

Failly's  $th  French  Corps  in  1870.     See  "  De 
Failly." 

KETTLER 

German  General  commanding  a  brigade  in 
1871.  See  in  the  Precepts  under  the  heading, 
"  Advance  Guard/' 

KIRCHBACH 

German  General  commanding  a-  division  in 
1870.  See  in  the  Precepts,  under  the  heading, 
"  Cavalry." 

MOLTKE 

Moltke,  some  have  thought  it  possible  to 
characterize  by  stating  that  he  had  "  the 
merit  of  doing  well  all  he  did."  It  is  an 
appreciation  which  would  make  him  a  sort 
of  superior  scholar;  a  sound  appreciation 
all  the  same,  as  it  throws  a  keen  light  on  a 
man  who  served  his  country  so  well  and 
attained  by  hard  work  such  high  results 
that  he  reached  genius  merely  by  being 
methodical. 

*  *  *  *  * 

Moltke  :  a  Chief  of  Staff  constantly  appeal- 
ing to  his  own  intelligence,  leaning  on  reason, 
an  intellectual  rather  than  a  performer,  meets 
the  unknown  by  building  up  an  hypothesis  ; 
a  logical  hypothesis  it  is  true,  but  one 


356        PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS 

• 

exclusively  derived  from  his  own  imagination, 
and  one  which,  by  the  way,  he  does  not 
consider  to  be  undisputable ;  he  thus  ends 
by  framing  a  solution  which  he  does  not 
impose.  After  discussing  the  various  com- 
binations the  enemy  may  adopt,  he  selects 
the  most  rational  one,  wherefrom  his  own 
scheme  of  manoeuvre  will  be  derived.  His 
supposition  seems  in  every  respect  to  be  true ; 
however,  it  is  not  true.  For  want  of  belief 
in  the  accuracy  of  his  own  decision,  he  does 
not  dare  to  impose  it;  he  advises,  he  does 
not  command,  remaining  a  Chief  of  Staff 
instead  of  being  a  commander  of  armies. 
For  that  reason,  the  great  results  of  the  war 
of  1870  were  only  partly  due  to  him.  He 
behaved  in  the  same  way  at  Sedan,  where  he 
again  ceased  commanding  on  August  3oth, 
and  where  the  enveloping  movement  resulted 
from  an  understanding  between  two  armies, 
not  from  a  decision  taken  at  headquarters. 
He  behaved  in  the  same  way  during  the 
operations  on  the  Loire. 

MOREAU 

See  in  Precepts  under  heading,  "  Strategic 
Reserve/' 

NAPOLEON 
See  in  Precepts  under  heading,  "  Object  of 


PRECEPTS   AND  JUDGMENTS        357 

War,"  "  Battle,"  "  Manoeuvre/'  "  Work  and 
Genius." 

SAKE  (MARSHAL) 

See  in  Precepts  under  heading,  "Transforma- 
tion of  War." 

SWARTZENBERG 

Austrian  General  commanding  army  of 
Bohemia  in  1813-14.  See  the  Precepts  under 
the  heading,  "  Transformation  of  War." 

STEINMETZ 

General  in  command  of  the  ist  German  Army 
in  1870. 

He  was  seventy-four  years  old  in  1870. 
He  was  a  veteran  of  the  War  of  German 
Independence  against  Napoleon  and  active 
and  vigorous  in  spite  of  his  great  age.  He  had 
already  acquired  fame  in  1866  in  difficult 
circumstances,  through  his  iridomitable  energy 
and  his  spirit  of  enterprise.  From  that 
period  the  German  Army  had  given  him  the 
name  of  "  The  Lion  of  Nachod."  He  was 
tireless,  as  hard  for  himself  as  he  was  for 
others,  but  irritable  and  suspicious.  His 
manner  of  command  was  rough,  and  he  was 
also  of  an  extreme  touchiness  which  sprang 
from  pride  and  rendered  his  relations  difficult 
with  superiors  and  inferiors  alike. 


358        PRECEPTS  AND   JUDGMENTS 

VON   DER   GOLTZ 

General  commanding  a  German  brigade  in 
1870.  See  in  the  Judgments,  under  "  The  War 
of  1870  :  Battle  of  Borny." 

WELLINGTON 
(See  "  Bliicher  :  his  dispositions  in  1815.  ") 

In  contrast  with  this  view  of  the  Prussian 
staffs,  another  would  seem  to  have  prevailed 
within  the  English  Army.  Being  distributed 
from  Mons  to  the  sea  (80  miles),  from  Tournay 
to  Antwerp  (60  miles),  with  headquarters  at 
Brussels  (45  miles  from  the  most  advanced 
body),  it  cannot  assemble  on  any  central 
point  within  less  than  four  or  five  days.  How 
can  it  hope  to  find  those  four  or  five  days, 
with  its  most  advanced  cantonments  (Tour- 
nay)  within  one  day's  march  of  the  great 
French  fortified  town  of  Lille  ?  It  is,  indeed, 
obvious  that  any  important  French  attack 
starting  from  the  neighbourhood  of  that 
town  could  not  be  sufficiently  held  up  during 
the  four  or  five  days  required  for  the  con- 
templated concentration. 

Wellington  had  never  personally  confronted 
Napoleon.  As  he  did  not  know  the  violence 
and  quickness  of  the  Emperor's  attacks,  he 
very  likely  believed  his  dispositions  to  be 
sufficiently  good  to  give  him  the  time  to  meet 


PRECEPTS   AND   JUDGMENTS        359 

the  adversary's  undertakings,  and  more  par- 
ticularly to  be  able  to  join  the  Prussians. 

ZlETHEN 

Prussian  General  commanding  an  army 
corps  in  1815  (the  ist  Corps). 

Ziethen's  corps  had  suffered  heavy  losses, 
but  attained  a  considerable  result :  that  of 
delaying  the  battle 1  until  the  i6th ;  of 
making  concentration  possible. 

As  Clausewitz  puts  it  :  "  One  sees  thereby 
what  caution  and  what  delay  circumstances, 
however  little  complicated  they  may  be,  un- 
avoidably impose  even  on  the  most  resolute  of 
generals,  on  Napoleon." 

Among  the  complications  which  Ziethen 
skilfully  utilized,  must  undeniably  be  placed 
that  double  retreat  by  the  roads  to  Gilly  and 
Gosselies,  which  prevented  Ney  from  going 
to  Quatre-Bras,  which  made  Napoleon's  inter- 
vention necessary  on  that  side,  and  thereby 
also  delayed  the  action  on  the  road  to  Namur. 

It   must   be   also   pointed   out   that   this 
divergent   retreat   did  not   prevent   the   ist 
Prussian  Army  Corps  from  having  its  four 
divisions  assembled  on  the  following  day. 
1  Ligny  :  June  16,  1815. 


PRINTED    m    GKIAT    BRITAIN     DT 

RICHARD  CLAY    &  SONS,  LIMITED, 

DKUNSW1<~K  ST.,  STAMFORD  ST.,  S.K.  I, 

AND  DUNGAY,  SUFFOLK. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY,  LOS  ANGELES 

COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


COL  OB. 

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NOV  2  6  1967 


Book  Slip-15m-8,'58  (589084)  4280 


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College 
Library 


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